

NO COMPROMISE
The Conflict Between Two Worlds



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NO COMPROMISE

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

BY

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*“The struggle between two worlds
[Democracy and Fascism] can permit
no compromise.”* MUSSOLINI

NEW YORK • 1939

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Set up and printed. Published June, 1939.

FIRST PRINTING

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN BOOK-STRATFORD PRESS, INC., NEW YORK

TO MY PARENTS

**CARY MELVIN RADER
HARRIET MILLER RADER**

FOREWORD

IF ANY reader of this book wonders why a teacher of philosophy should desert the traditional themes to write a work on Fascism, the answer is contained in a statement made by one of the distinguished philosophical journals of Europe, the *Philosophische Hefte* published in former Czechoslovakia: "Today the issue is not between this or that school of philosophy, but the possibility of the survival of any philosophy at all. The foundations of culture are tottering." Everything depends upon repairing the material and the spiritual basis of life. Under these circumstances, philosophy dare not abstract itself from the political and economic struggles of the present day. No struggle is more crucial than that between Democracy and Fascism.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

MY COLLEAGUES, Dr. William Savery, Dr. Everett J. Nelson, Dr. Herbert J. Phillips, Dr. Brents Stirling, Dr. Giovanni Costigan, Mr. Angelo M. Pellegrini, and Mr. Glenn Wiprud, all of the University of Washington, have made important criticisms and suggestions. Dr. Savery, as my former teacher, has contributed greatly to whatever fund of social ideals I now possess. Mr. Pellegrini has kindly translated a number of passages from the Italian. Mr. Lewis Mumford, whose books and articles I have found highly stimulating, has read the entire manuscript and given me his expert advice. My wife, Virginia Rader, has been a frequent source of encouragement and criticism. The manuscript has been carefully typed by Mr. Verne Benedict. Mrs. Helga Phillips has assisted in proof-reading and the preparation of the index. Above all, I am indebted for invaluable assistance to a friend who prefers to remain unnamed. I am deeply grateful for all of the help that I have received. The above mentioned individuals, however, are in no sense responsible for the ideas expressed or the defects in style and thought.

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NO COMPROMISE

The Conflict Between Two Worlds

FASCISM AND THE WORLD CRISIS

If this civilization is to be saved, if it is not to be submerged by centuries of barbarism but to secure the treasures of its inheritance on new and more stable foundations, there is indeed need for those now living fully to realize how far the decay has already progressed.

—JOHAN HUIZINGA¹

1. *The Scope of the Present Book*

AT THE beginning of this century, Henry Adams forecast that another generation would require "a new social mind."² Adams' prediction has been fulfilled; a new mind is desperately required. The reason is obvious: the civilized world is facing one of the supreme crises of its history. No one except the hopelessly ignorant would think of denying it for an instant. Men may debate whether this is the most crucial turning-point of history, but they can hardly deny that the present situation is extremely critical. We obviously live in one of those ages of profound transvaluation—an age like the Renaissance or the Reformation, or like the revolutionary periods in France and America. Yet the current transformation is even broader and deeper. It is world-wide in its scope, unique in its objectives, and unprecedented in its dangers. We do need a new social mind.

But is there any indication that this new mind is emerging? At the present time there are two great insurgent movements that are at death grips, and divide a large part of the world between them. One of these is Socialism, the other is Fascism. Does either movement represent the "new phase subject to new laws," the "jump" in human life, which Adams thought would be necessary?

We shall not undertake to answer this question in reference to Socialism, although we shall touch upon the subject. Our

¹ *Notes are to be found at the end of the volume.*

aim is to determine whether Fascism represents this new mentality, or whether it is, on the contrary, an extreme form of cultural decay.

I understand by Fascism not merely the movement in Italy, but the kindred movements in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere. Mussolini has rightly declared, "Fascism has now acquired throughout the world that universality which belongs to all doctrines which by achieving self-expression represent a moment in the history of human thought."³ Despite the use of other terms, such as "National Socialism" in Germany, there is enough similarity to justify the common name.

For a number of reasons, I have concentrated upon Italian and German Fascism. In these countries the movement has achieved its fullest and clearest expression. It is hard to obtain adequate data for the study of Fascism in other countries. Japanese Fascism is particularly difficult to study if one is unfamiliar with Oriental languages. Yet I have borne in mind that Fascism is world-wide. The great Fascist powers are supported by sympathetic forces in almost every country, and hence we should be lacking in realism if we did not recognize that there is a Fascist International.

Before we are ready to pass judgment upon Fascism, we must understand the philosophical roots of Fascist thought. Some of the most notable thinkers in the world have unwittingly contributed to this new *Weltanschauung*. This fact should forewarn us against any hasty dismissal of Fascist "philosophy." Thinkers of such stature as Machiavelli, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Sorel, Pareto, and Spengler cannot easily be refuted. No one of these men was a Fascist, yet much that they thought does correspond to the Fascist outlook; each contributed, in certain aspects of his thought, to the patchwork of doctrines which constitutes "the philosophy of Fascism." Until we have examined the arguments of these thinkers, we are unprepared to reach a conclusion.

As we proceed, we shall consider, one by one, the major

problems which are presented by Fascist theory. Should we rely more or less, upon reason as a basis of social action? Can there be a science of values? Is it possible, and if so is it desirable, to achieve impartiality in the sphere of morals? Should the direction of society be placed in the hands of an élite? To what extent are men and nations justified in resorting to violence? Should individuals be subordinated to the State, or should the State be merely an instrument for the welfare of individuals? Are "ideals" or "material" processes more fundamental as historical causes? Can Western civilization survive, or is it doomed? What sort of program, if any, offers hope for the salvaging of civilization? These far-reaching questions must enter into the present critique. We shall indicate how these questions have been answered by the thinkers who have contributed most to Fascism. So far as our space allows, we shall criticize the Fascist answers and offer alternative solutions.

2. *The Social and Economic Basis of Fascist Theory*

We cannot grasp the import of Fascist thought without understanding its relationship to the world crisis. Fascism is largely the product of war and economic collapse. In this respect, I disagree with the theory of G. A. Borgese, the brilliant author of *Goliath: The March of Fascism*. Borgese contends that the Italian movement is "an outburst of emotionalism and pseudo-intellectualism" springing from the personal inspiration of Mussolini and the intellectual deterioration of modern Italy. He specifically asserts that "social and economic factors . . . explain 'Fascism' as little as the mushrooms crowding at the foot of the tree or the mistletoe clambering on the branches explains the tree itself."⁴ Without denying that ideas and personalities are potent forces, I regard Borgese's interpretation as much too idealistic and personalist. Man both acts and reacts: he makes his world and is made

by it. He is not the mere puppet of economic and social forces, nor does he live in a vacuum, immune from these forces. Borgese's interpretation, like the opposite extreme of a quietistic economic determinism, neglects the constant interplay between spirit and matter, man and nature, thought and things. The Fascists, like everybody else, cannot escape the pervasive influence of their environment. This is an age of crisis: every great social movement is fundamentally conditioned by this fact.

War, the most violent form of crisis, has left its deep imprint upon Fascism. From its very inception until the present day, the Fascist economy has been militaristic in character. The World War, according to Mussolini, overthrew Democracy and inaugurated the age of dictatorship:

The war was "revolutionary" in the sense that—with streams of blood—it did away with the century of Democracy, the century of number, the century of majorities and of quantities.⁵

After Mussolini seized power, he saw to it that Italian economy was dominated by military preparations. In a speech in May, 1927, he announced:

The precise, fundamental, and paramount duty of Fascist Italy is that of putting in a state of preparedness all her armed forces on land, on sea, and in the air. We must be in a position, at a certain moment, to mobilize five million men, and we must be in a position to arm them. Our Navy must be reinforced and our Air Force—in which I have more and more faith—must be so numerous and so powerful that the roar of its engines should drown any other noise in the Peninsula and the span of its wings should hide the sun from our country.⁶

Three years later, in May, 1930, he was able to stage a gigantic military review. In anticipation of this occasion, he declared:

Tomorrow, Black Shirts, you will see an armed review of impressive character. It is I who desired it, because, although words are beautiful things, rifles, machine guns, ships, aeroplanes, and

cannons are still more beautiful things: because, my Black Shirts, right, unless accompanied by force, is a vain word, and your own great Niccolo Machiavelli has warned us that prophets who have disarmed will perish.⁷

Four more years pass, and the armaments of Europe mount dizzily upwards. But Mussolini is not yet satisfied. He thus addresses the General Staff:

We are becoming—and shall become so increasingly because this is our desire—a military nation. A militaristic nation, I will add, since we are not afraid of words. To complete the picture, warlike—that is to say, endowed ever to a higher degree with the virtues of obedience, sacrifice, and dedication to country. This means that the whole life of the nation, political, economic, and spiritual, must be systematically directed towards our military requirements. . . . I recall to you that military forces represent the essential element in the hierarchy of the nation. Nothing has yet been discovered which can take the place of that which is the clearest, most tangible, most decisive expression of the total strength of an entire people—that is to say, the size, the prestige, the power of its arms on land, on the sea, and in the air.⁸

Two more years elapse. Italy is completing a war of conquest. Soon she will be plunged into a military campaign against Spanish democracy. By this time, the armaments of Italy have been built up to huge dimensions, and Mussolini anticipates a general conflagration. War is now Italy's prime concern, as Mussolini states in a speech before the assembled representatives of industry:

I come now to a most important point in my speech, to what I shall call a plan for the regulation of Italian economy in the near future of Fascism. This plan is based on a premise: the inevitability of war and of our nation being drawn into it. When? How? No one can tell, but the wheel of destiny spins fast. . . . During the period we have entered these industries [the "heavy industries"] will have neither time nor opportunity to supply the private consumer. They will be obliged to work exclusively, or almost so, for the armed forces of the State.⁹

The cycle has almost come full circle: from world war to world war. But now the situation is very different from that of 1913, for the nations of the world are spending approximately three times as much on military preparations as they did in the year before the Great War.¹⁰ Moreover, science has greatly perfected the instruments of destruction.

We shall not undertake to trace the similar development that has occurred in the economy of Nazi Germany. It will suffice to quote the opinion of the *New York Times* correspondent in a dispatch to his paper on March 22, 1936: "Fundamentally the German economic situation revolves around the issue of how to finance rearmament."¹¹ The latest dispatch from Germany is in the same tenor.

The intense crisis of September, 1938, revealed the cruel extremes to which the Fascists are prepared to go in threatening millions of people with destruction. As a result of the Munich agreement, Hitler has very greatly increased his strength and prestige: by threat of war, his desires have been imposed upon the world. He now has more man-power, vastly more resources, and a decisive influence in Central Europe. Unfortunately, his occasional promises to refrain from further aggression are not reassuring; he has broken solemn promises in the past, he has lost no time in breaking the specific promises he made at Munich, and his book advocates lying as a means of allaying suspicion and outmaneuvering the enemy. The British Prime Minister's "realistic" policy of making immense concessions to aggressor-nations at the expense of their victims has not served to turn a man like Hitler from the path of violence. The devastating arms race continues, and the warlike spirit of Fascism shows no sign of abatement.

The essential characteristics of Fascism are directly related to its militaristic temper. "We are an army," Mussolini has said, "and it is just because we have this special organization that we must make discipline the supreme pivot

of our life and action."¹² In very truth, the Fascist countries have the organization and morale of nations in a state of war. The extreme centralization of authority, the regulation of capital and especially labor, the suppression of dissident political elements, the regimentation of public opinion by means of propaganda, the subordination of other phases of culture to military and political requirements, the abandonment of the ideal and practice of scientific objectivity, the intense upsurge of nationalism, and the glorification of obedience and "heroism" as opposed to free criticism, not only are the characteristics of a nation in the desperate throes of war, but are also the characteristics of Fascism! To a great extent, Mussolini and Hitler have obviously refurbished the ideals of wartime.

Fascism is just as significantly related to class conflict, although the nature of this relationship has been obscured by propaganda. The Fascists have often professed not to be greatly interested in the economic order, and even when economic interests have been admitted, Fascist propaganda has been extremely misleading in describing its "objectives." As a renegade Socialist, Mussolini knew how to capitalize upon the strong appeal the working-class movement had for the mass of Italians. He spoke of his party as based upon Syndicalist ideals, and made use of many Socialist slogans. Hitler and his associates likewise adopted the name of National Socialist German Workers' Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*), and announced many of the objectives which the name implies.

We cannot begin to understand Fascism, however, if we take its promises at face value. The late Huey Long, an American would-be dictator, pointed out, "Fascism in America will arrive on an anti-Fascist platform."¹³ As we all know, it arrived in Europe under false colors; in the name of "socialism," it clubbed, imprisoned, and killed the Socialists. Financed by rich industrialists, it attacked chiefly trade

unions and workers' organizations. Its development, accordingly, cannot be understood apart from the crisis of capitalism. The postwar chaos and world-depression meant a rising tide of popular resentment and radicalism. Fascism has been promoted as a countermovement to crush the insurgency of the masses. It had been growing within the womb of the old order for more than a century, but the world crisis nourished its growth, and brought it quickly to birth and maturity.

Although it parades a spurious radicalism, it is still capitalistic. The Italian Charter of Labor, the most basic law of the new regime, declares that "private initiative" is "the most effective and useful instrument of the national interest," and announces that the direction of industry "belongs to the employer, who is responsible for it." The chief innovation is that the right of labor to bargain collectively is quashed, and State intervention is considered permissible when, and only when, "private initiative is lacking or insufficient, or when the political interests of the State are at stake."¹⁴ Hitler similarly pledges his government to "the utmost furtherance of private initiative and . . . the recognition of the rights of property."¹⁵ Fascism does, of course, involve a considerable degree of State capitalism, but it is not socialistic in its basic intent. In the interests of clearness and rigor of thought, we should not confuse it with Communism, Socialism, or any other left-wing movement.

One must grant, of course, that the term "socialism" has been assigned many different meanings, and it can be employed in a sense which is consonant with "National Socialism." Werner Sombart, in his *Deutscher Sozialismus*, quotes numerous definitions of the term, many of which are entirely compatible with capitalism. The definitions quoted from Nazi sources are extremely vague, and imply no opposition to private industry. One German writer, for example, applies "socialism" to Henry Ford's theory of "benevolent" capitalism. Bernhard Köhler, a leading Nazi, has stated: "So-

cialism is no economic form, but a moral duty." Dr. Ley, director of the Nazi "Labor Front," has defined socialism as "nothing other than comradeship." Hitler has declared that "he who so comprehends our great anthem, '*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,*' that nothing in the world stands higher for him than this Germany, people and land, land and people, is a Socialist."¹⁶ Thus socialism may be identified with everything from Henry Ford's antiunionism to Hitler's nationalism. But these meanings are very different from the socialism to which Marx looked forward: "The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." In this revolutionary sense of the word, socialism is at the opposite pole from what is called "National Socialism."

In theory, the Fascist State terminates the struggle between economic classes. Mussolini advocates the fullest collaboration between classes. He has declared that class struggle means "the destruction of wealth, and, therefore, universal poverty," whereas the cooperation between capital and labor means "a state of well-being for all the citizens."¹⁷ Similarly, Hitler has said:

The National Socialist State leadership is so sovereign, so above all economic ties, that in its eyes the designation "employee" and "employer" are immaterial concepts. Before the greater interests of the nation there are neither employer nor employee, but only labor delegates of the entire people.¹⁸

The principle involved in these statements is that the interests of the classes are identical. As the French monarchist, Charles Maurras, has put it, "The soundest guarantees of all the rights of the lowly are inseparably bound up with the advantage and prosperity of the strong."¹⁹ Hence, Fascism has no intention of abolishing classes. Mussolini has declared, "Fascism seizes individuals by their necks and tells them: 'You must be what you are. If you are a bourgeois you must remain such. You must be proud of your class.'"²⁰

This attitude has certain advantages for the bourgeoisie, but drawbacks for the proletariat.

Moreover, class struggle, as we shall maintain in a later chapter, can only be eliminated by the abolition of classes, or by a large measure of repression. Since the former alternative is excluded by the Fascists, they must depend upon repressive methods. This means that many sorts of liberty must be eliminated, and the Fascists boldly acknowledge the necessity. Mussolini has declared that the "Goddess Liberty" is nothing but a "decayed corpse" which Fascism does not hesitate to trample.²¹ One might cite from Hitler numerous sentiments of a kindred import, although perhaps not so pungently expressed. Everyone knows that this theory has been applied. All rival political parties have been abolished, strikes and lockouts have been prohibited, a great many opponents have been thrown into prisons or concentration camps, and the freedom of expression has been severely curtailed.

The above interpretation of Fascist economy is apparently in conflict with the opinions of certain well-informed observers. The *New York Times* correspondent, Mr. Otto D. Tolischus, for example, has declared:

. . . In actual practice all Germans have quickly discovered that National Socialism is no respecter, much less representative, of persons, classes or class interests, that on the contrary it is a semi-military organism determined on totalitarian mobilization of the entire nation in order to enable Germany to make a new bid for a "place in the sun," and that in the service of that mobilization it has clamped an iron rule on all classes and interests, most especially labor and capital . . . Business and private property thereby become not an instrument of private "egoism" but "functions of the people." They remain private wherever and so long as they fulfill their "functions." Wherever and whenever they fall down, the State steps in and either forces them to fulfill the functions or takes them over entirely.

Yet Mr. Tolischus also writes that "the list of German millionaires, reduced by the economic crisis, is lengthening again"; whereas wage rates have continued "unchanged" despite the armaments boom and increased living costs. Labor in the aggregate, it is true, is earning more now than a few years ago because of wider employment and a greater demand for skilled workers. Tolischus thinks there are prospects, however, of a downturn in business and employment, since Germany, like every capitalistic country, is subject to economic cycles. He cites no facts which cannot be accounted for on the basis of a regulated capitalism with a limited extension of public ownership.

German capitalism, we grant, can no longer function under the "automatic" operation of supply and demand, and hence State supervision is required to keep the system intact. The main intent of the new regulations has been to save the regime from economic and political collapse, and simultaneously to build up the military power of the nation. Mr. Tolischus admits that the principles of managed economy "were applied here because Nationalist Socialist Germany's prime consideration was a national mobilization for rearmament."²² A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* also emphasizes the military nature of Fascist "planning":

The working classes have been crushed, and planning has introduced compulsory labour in the service of future destruction, but not general well being and social justice. Even in its most perfect organization National Socialism has so far shown itself a tragic parody of Socialism proper.²³

Similar remarks apply to Fascist Italy.

We conclude that Fascism, despite its superficial resemblance to genuine Socialism, may be defined in its institutional aspects as follows: it is an economic and political alliance of the antidemocratic forces in a time of profound social crisis. This combination embraces all those opposed

to economic and social democracy: the militarists, the capitalists, the landed aristocrats, and the political élite. In this alliance, the capitalists have to compromise to some extent; since the Fascist hierarchy develops economic and political interests of its own, and these interests may diverge from those of the older propertied groups. Big business men, however, are compensated by the forcible suppression of those elements that are striving to achieve a *real* social and economic democracy. Since Fascism represents the embattled forces of authoritarianism, it tends to spring up when the established order is jeopardized by a great popular movement to establish a more nearly equalitarian society.

3. *The Economic Function of the Fascist Weltanschauung*

This explanation permits a more realistic grasp of Fascist theory and practice. The principal characteristics of Fascism are definitely related to its social and economic objectives. The basic elements in the Fascist *Weltanschauung* may be catalogued as follows: (1) the theory of the élite, (2) the doctrine of the totalitarian State, (3) the development of militarism, (4) the intensification of nationalism and racial chauvinism, (5) the emphasis upon "idealism" as opposed to "materialism," and (6) the retreat from reason. All of these elements in the Fascist creed have an economic and political function.

First, the theory of the élite is obviously a convenient doctrine for the defenders of economic inequality. As interpreted by the Fascists, this theory means that the stratification of social classes is immutable and divinely ordained. For example, Walther Darré, the Nazi Minister of Agriculture and one of the leading spokesmen of the Third Reich, subscribes to the following sentiment:

The order of society rests upon an inequality which cannot be abolished, but which is inseparable from man like birth and

death. Inequality is as unchangeable as mathematical truths, and as eternal as the laws which govern the movements of our planetary system.²⁴

Similarly Mussolini has declared, "Fascism . . . affirms the immutable, beneficial, and fruitful inequality of mankind."²⁵ There are some born to command and others to obey: such is the tenor of numerous statements in Fascist books.

The élite in the business field are said to be the employers. The Italian Charter of Labor specifies that direction of industry shall "belong to the employer," and this result is insured by prohibiting strikes and destroying *bona fide* labor unions. Similarly, a Nazi document states:

As in every community so also in business there can be only one Leader; only he can make decisions and he alone is responsible for economic and social affairs. . . . The interests of the Followers must be placed behind the interests of the business community, and be brought into conformity with the economic requirements of the business.²⁶

To safeguard the rule of the old economic, and the new political, élite, the democratic rights of the workers are destroyed. Since parliament had become dangerous as an instrument for attacking the existing order, it is either abolished or made a puppet of the Fascist party. Militant radicals, or even ordinary liberals, are driven into hiding, conducted to prison, or killed. Thus the struggle for a democratic economic and social order is choked.

Second, the totalitarian State perpetuates social and economic inequalities by controlling virtually every aspect of life. One of the main characteristics of liberal democracy, in contrast to Fascism, is its recognition of an immense sphere of life over which the State has far less control than under a totalitarian system. Art, science, religion, and philosophy are considered mainly nonpolitical in character. Men are left relatively free, after paying taxes and possibly performing

military service, to work, play, think, and feel as choice determines or opportunity permits. Under Fascism this principle of toleration is supplanted by the principle of totality. The press, the radio, the cinema, the theater, the school, the church, every institution in fact, becomes more or less subservient to the single party which controls the State. As Ley, the Leader of the Nazi Labor Front, has stated: "The party claims the totality of the soul of the German people."²⁷ Mussolini similarly sums up his conception of the totalitarian State in the often quoted formula: "All within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State."

What this comprehensive political control means in effectiveness of regimentation, and hence in prolongation of the social and economic *status quo*, must be obvious to the most superficial observer. Mussolini has announced that the Fascist regime will last at least a century. Hitler, more confident, predicts that Nazi rule will continue for a millennium! Although these predictions may be a bit too sanguine, they do indicate the intention of freezing the authoritarian system into a rigid, unbreakable mold. Nothing could be more agreeable to those who enjoy economic and political power.

Third, the development of militarism is another means of making economic interests prevail. The military force has always exercised the coercive power of the State. By greatly augmenting this arm of the government, Fascism is prepared not only to put down disobedience at home, but to force conquest abroad. During the past seventy years, capitalistic nations have engaged in a vast imperialistic race for colonies and raw materials. In this race, Italy, Germany, and Japan have been worsted. The industrial interests in these countries are now yearning for a larger share of the world's resources. Hence we have Japan's "penetration" into China, Italy's "civilizing mission" in Ethiopia, and the recent "struggle" of both Germany and Italy "against Communism" in Spain.

The spirit of militarism, moreover, fits the political requirements of Fascism. The "principle of leadership"—"that authority should be exercised from above downwards and responsibility from below upwards"²⁸—is the distinguishing principle not only of the military establishment, but also of the authoritarian order in politics and industry. Hence the value of the moral temper of the soldier. The soldierly cast of mind, involving the submission of thought and feeling to the military virtues, is splendidly calculated to prolong a system of force and privilege. The militaristic spirit, it is true, sometimes gets out of hand, and works against the economic advantage of certain industrial magnates; but more often there is a working partnership between capitalism and militarism.

Fourth, intense nationalism and racial chauvinism, which almost invariably accompany an exaggerated militarism, also fit the social and economic purposes of Fascism. Such nationalism serves the imperialistic ambitions of the Fascists, since it predisposes men to risk aggression, and prepares them to disobey the edicts of international law. Even a totalitarian State, we must remember, is not all-inclusive: arrayed outside, and often against it, are other States. The question arises: Does each State have an absolute value beyond which we cannot go, or is there a wider international community which exercises just claims over the individual States? The Fascist answer to this question is emphatically to reject the idea of a world order. Mussolini declares, "Internationalism is an absurd fable," and refers to the "insuppressible datum of race and nation."²⁹ In the same spirit Hitler has written:

All foreign policy must be estimated from the following viewpoint: Is it of use, or will it bring injury, to our nation now or in the future? No other thought must be allowed to intrude. Party programs, religious aspirations, humanitarian principles,

in fact all other considerations without exception, find no place.³⁰

This apparently means that there can be no moral restrictions upon the State in its dealing with other States. It can do anything and everything so long as this conduces to the nation's advancement. Here is one of the basic assumptions of Fascist philosophy: *ethics simply do not apply as between States*. The Fascist powers, asserting that they belong to the "have not" countries, are thus prepared to adopt a policy of force and fraud in the effort to become "have" countries.

Moreover, the consuming fire of nationalist and racial passion diverts men's attention from their economic ills. Hatred is fanned against the international and "Jewish" character of Socialism and Communism, the workers are thereby divided so that they cannot act in concert against their opponents, and the socialist promises of the Nazi platform are partly liquidated when the resentment aroused against the wealthy is deflected against the Jews. The people are now told that "National Socialism" is not directed against patriotic German capital but only against international Jewish high finance.

Fifth, Fascist "idealism" is a means of diverting attention from economic ills and thereby winning support from the masses. In time of war people appeal to God to bless their cause, and talk a great deal about "ideals," "morale," and the "spirit" of the nation. In much the same manner, the Fascists exult in their "idealism" and proclaim a religious revival. Mussolini denounces "the democratic spirit" as materialistic, and announces that "spiritual values are returning."³¹ The Nazi leaders similarly denounce liberalism and Socialism on the ground that they represent "Jewish materialism," and speak of the necessity of reviving the Germanic religion.

Now it is not hard to see that such "idealism" has its political and economic uses. Emphasis upon the "spirit" serves

to make the poor less dissatisfied with their lot. As Ley, the director of the Nazi labor organization, explained in March, 1935, a raise in wages was "out of the question," and hence it was necessary to "suppress the materialism," and "instead divert the gaze of the workers to the spiritual values of the nation."³² Fascism cannot afford to incite the material interests of the people, because this would intensify the dissatisfaction of the masses with their economic plight. To emphasize the importance of economic values would give aid to Fascism's bitterest enemies, the Socialists and Communists, who desire to abolish poverty through a restructuralization, and eventual abolition, of economic classes. Even Democracy is denounced as materialistic, since it tends to emphasize economic welfare. To soften the popular clamor for bread, the Fascists have summoned mighty forces both religious and chauvinistic. They have blended patriotism and faith, thereby doubling the effect.

Sixth, economic and political expediency necessitates the rejection of science and reason in so far as these impinge upon politics. Hitler and Mussolini have learned the lesson taught by Machiavelli and Pareto, that the masses can be most effectively manipulated by an appeal to their passions. Mussolini declares, "We play on all the strings, from violence to religion, from art to politics."³³ In the same spirit he remarks, "It is faith that moves mountains, not reason. Reason is a tool, but it can never be the motive force of the crowd. Today less than ever."³⁴ Even more frank is Hitler:

The great mass of people consists neither of professors nor of diplomats. The scantiness of abstract knowledge possessed by the mass confines its perceptive faculties to the realm of feeling. Within these limits, its attitude is either positive or negative. It can perceive only a forceful stimulus in one of these two directions, and can never appreciate a middle ground lying between them. This emotionalism of the mass, however, is responsible for its extraordinary stability. Faith is more difficult to shake than knowledge, love undergoes fewer changes than respect, hate

is more powerful than aversion, and the impetus to the most powerful revolutions upon this earth has lain at all times less in scientific cognition dominating the masses than in the fanaticism inspiring them and sometimes in the hysteria driving them forward. He who wishes to win the broad mass must know the key which opens the door to its heart. It is not called *objectivity*, i.e. *weakness*, but *will* and *strength*.³⁵

In emphasizing these methods of winning popular support, Hitler is indicating one of the major characteristics of Fascism. Although the Fascists suppress democratic institutions and employ force, they also recruit a large following by the methods of propaganda. In thus addressing the crowd, they reject the calm and judicious methods of reasoning, and instead appeal (as Propaganda Minister Goebbels has said) "to the primitive instincts of the masses."³⁶

An anecdote will illustrate the political significance of Fascist antirationalism. A friend of mine was traveling through Germany not long before the Nazis seized power. He discovered to his surprise that he shared a train compartment with several leaders of the National Socialist movement. Being familiar with the German language and a close student of German culture, he supposed himself prepared for argument with his fellow passengers. Yet in the ensuing dispute he found himself utterly discomfited. His Nazi opponents vehemently rejected the very foundation of argument. "We cannot argue with you," they would exclaim scornfully. "You are a rationalist!" My friend was helpless in his effort to reason with men who thus rejected the claims of logic. Perhaps the point is that antirationalism is a necessary creed for the defenders of irrational institutions. Men who defend unjust privilege fear nothing in the world so much as vigorous thought.

Fascism employs thought, of course, but not as an unfettered instrument to reach the truth; frequently it is no more than a cloak and rationalization for certain very practical objectives. In support of this interpretation, a number of writ-

ers have pointed out that Fascism existed in fact before it contrived to piece together a "philosophy." In August, 1921, Mussolini wrote to one of his supporters: "Now Fascism, on pain of death or, rather, suicide, must give itself a body of doctrine. . . . This order is a bit big; but I demand that in two months' time, the philosophy of Italian Fascism be created."⁸⁷ The new ideology was thus artificially fabricated to "justify" the activities of Mussolini and his supporters. Although Fascist theory is now more elaborate, its basic character has not greatly altered.

In characterizing much of Fascist theory as mere afterthought, I do not mean to deny its efficacy or significance. Rationalization is useful; otherwise it would not be so common. Mussolini was right in thinking that the lack of a "philosophy" would be suicidal. Such "window-dressing" must be convincing, since rationalization that is *palpably* false will not work: this is the main reason that propaganda has become a subtle art. When men cease to believe in Fascist theory, the days of the dictators are numbered. Even false ideology, moreover, reflects the character of its promulgators; just as men can be judged by the kind of lies they tell, so the Fascists can be judged by the kind of myths they propagate.

These myths serve to promote and preserve authoritarian control—as exercised by the military, the industrial, the agrarian, and the political "élite"—in a time of economic distress and revolutionary ferment. We shall misunderstand its character unless we bear this fact in mind. This interpretation does not mean that Fascism, either in theory or in practice, springs from the conspiracy of a small group of business men and landowners who are intent upon safeguarding their profits. Such an "explanation," for a number of reasons, is altogether too simple: it involves a particularly crude form of economic determinism. Society as a whole is undergoing a fundamental transformation, and the economic factor, although basic, intermingles with other factors in a vast concert of forces.

II

THE FLIGHT FROM REASON

The historical world stretches before us darker, more uncertain, and more threatening than our forefathers thought, as regards the nature of its further course. For the full strength of the instinctive and dark powers of history has revealed itself to our thinking and our experience. But human intelligence must not cease to maintain itself against them.—FRIEDRICH MEINECKE¹

1. Reason in Discard

THE revolt against reason is the most striking indication of the profound nature of the contemporary crisis. The minds of millions of people have been so violently shaken that their whole manner of thinking has been disturbed. Not a single compartment of human thought seems to be unaffected. Under these circumstances, men are bewildered and take flight from reason.

Fascism is the embodiment of this tendency. James Drennan, spokesman for the British Union of Fascists, has declared:

Fascism is real insurrection—an insurrection of *feeling*—a mutiny of *men* against the conditions of the modern world. It is completely characteristic of this aspect of Fascism in its early stages, both in Italy and in Germany, that the movement should have grown to full strength without either logical theory behind it or cut-and-dried program in front of it. The men who built Fascism in Italy and Germany—who are the “common men,” the “men in the street,” leave theories to the intellectuals and programs to the democrats who have betrayed them with programs for a century. The Fascist . . . acts, in fact, instinctively, and not theoretically.²

Likewise Mussolini, in speaking of the rise of Fascism, boasts:

There was much discussion, but—what was more important and more sacred—men died. They knew how to die. Doctrine beautifully defined and carefully elucidated, with headlines and

paragraphs, might be lacking; but there was to take its place something more decisive—Faith.³

Similar declarations occur frequently in Nazi books and speeches.

Such disavowal of the intellect indicates, not an utter lack of philosophy (at least in the broad meaning of the word), but rather the acceptance of a romantic philosophy based upon intuition and pragmatic considerations. Fascism is essentially activist and irrational. Anti-intellectualists such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Georges Sorel furnish the philosophical grist for the Fascist mill. What issues thence is altered, of course, but it still shows signs of its origins.

Human beings, Nietzsche believes, cannot live without fictions; hence it is necessary "to recognize untruth as a condition of life." Indeed, "the falsest opinions are the most indispensable to us." Illusions conduce to the noble life; but Nietzsche will not tolerate "any namby-pamby ideas of nobility! A certain modicum of brutality cannot be dispensed with."⁴ Such remarks provide ammunition in the offensive against reason. Not without justification do Mussolini and Rosenberg claim this German heretic as a founder of the Fascist creed.⁵

Sorel's defense of "myths" is no less famous than Nietzsche's advocacy of "vital lies." As a leader of French syndicalism, he was far more interested in "battle-images" than in logical abstractions. Nothing but sublime visions, he declared, can incite men to heroic struggle and make deep impressions upon revolutionists. Class warriors must "perceive instantaneously" and act boldly. Science can help us little, and parliamentary deliberation not at all. Hence, reliance must be put upon "intuition alone" as contrasted with "considered analysis."⁶

Sorel is unquestionably one of the precursors of Fascism. Mussolini and many other Italian Fascists have become familiar with his theory of myths. Although the Nazis, in contrast,

have not been directly influenced by Sorel to any notable extent, Rosenberg expresses a similar point of view:

We cannot appeal to our much lauded human logic, nor to insight into economic laws; for the disposition of forces everywhere in the world has become clear; it is not logic that governs the fundamental movements of nations, but the decisions of the will, the passions. Just as nature and its happenings have nothing to do with reason or logical requirements, so also during great historical movements, the same forces of nature, operating in the human soul, overleap the confining wall of logic.⁷

Although Rosenberg does not seem to have been directly influenced by Sorel, he entertains a similar attitude towards reason. He has made irrationalism a fundamental principle, and has demanded the creation of racial myths as the means to national regeneration. Perhaps he is partly indebted for his myth-theory to Hans Vaihinger, the famous author of *The Philosophy of As If*, who contends that fictions are the basis of life.

But the Fascist abandonment of reason cannot be traced back to any single source nor to any small group of theorists. Anti-intellectualism has been part of the "mental climate" of the age. Among the creeds which have contributed to the revolt against reason may be mentioned Henri Bergson's theory of the superiority of instinct and intuition, Oswald Spengler's preference for the more romantic and activist phases of culture, Giovanni Papini's exaggerated interpretation of the pragmatism of William James, Vilfredo Pareto's emphasis upon sentiment and illusion as the basis of social action, and such voluntaristic creeds as Gabriele d'Annunzio's theatrical romanticism, Charles Maurras' passionate nationalism, Maurice Barrès' "philosophy of energeticism," Giovanni Gentile's "philosophy of the pure act," and Houston Chamberlain's theory of militarism and racial imperialism. We could trace back the current to such men as Wagner, Treitschke, Fichte, and to German romanticists like Adam Müller and Ludwig

von Haller. Similar early forerunners may be found among the Italians. But we must leave to future historians the detailed examination of these sources. It is safe to say that the activist and pragmatic flavor of Fascist philosophy is the result of many factors.

There can be no doubt that the Fascists, influenced in this manifold way, disavow the intellectual life. "We think with our blood," has become the well-known slogan. Mussolini's official biographer, Margherita Sarfatti, describes the mental processes of her hero as follows:

"My blood tells me," "I must listen to my blood," are phrases sometimes used by this statesman-gliadiator, so rational normally in coping with the urgent questions which confront him. "It is no good!" he will add: "I am like the animals. I *feel* when things are going to happen—some instinct warns me and I am obliged to follow it."⁸

Hitler often appears to be motivated by a dreamlike faith and self-assurance. Shortly after the military reoccupation of the Rhineland, which brought Europe to the verge of war, he declared in a speech broadcast to Germany and the world: "I go my own way with the assurance of a somnambulist—the way which providence has sent me."⁹

Even Gentile, the chief professional philosopher in the ranks of Fascism, has declared:

. . . I am convinced that the true doctrine is that which is expressed in action rather than in words or books, in the personality of men and in the attitudes which they assume in the face of problems; and this is a much more serious solution to problems than that of abstract dissertations, sermons and theories.¹⁰

Mussolini has announced that "pragmatism" is one of "the foundation-stones" of Fascism, and has boasted that "we have no preconceived notions, no fixed ideas, and, above all, no stupid pride."¹¹

Such pragmatism is much more exaggerated than that of

William James, who declared: "Our passional nature not only lawfully may but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot be decided on intellectual grounds."¹² This statement implies that intellect must first be given its chance, and that passion is allowed to dispose only of those problems which thought cannot resolve. But Mussolini apparently favors action even when reason tells him it is unwise. He has declared:

The upshot of the battle is but a secondary matter. The struggle is its own reward, even if one should be defeated. . . . It has become ever more plain to me that action is of primary importance. This even when it is a blunder. Negativism, quietism, motionless, is a curse. . . . I am a wanderer.¹³

Such exaggerated voluntarism is upheld as the new way of life for the Fascist élite.

Mussolini's creed approaches more closely to the philosophy of Bergson than to that of James. Bergson has declared that the intellect is a mere "annex to the faculty of action," and has said: "We cannot too often repeat it, intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions."¹⁴ Yet in this case, also, there is a difference: Bergson does not approve of Fascism. The "intuition" which he exalts is "instinct become disinterested," and is much more akin to pure esthetic contemplation than to political pragmatism. It is Sorel who reinterprets Bergsonian intuition so that it becomes a faculty of political action, and thereby supplies Mussolini with a philosophical tool.

Fascist "intuitionism" finds its fullest expression in an intense patriotism. In often quoted words that remind us of Sorel, Mussolini has proclaimed:

We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, it is a passion. It is not necessary that it shall be a reality. It is a reality by the fact that it is a goad, a faith, that it is courage. Our myth is the Nation, our myth is the greatness of the Nation! And to

this myth, to this grandeur, that we wish to translate into a complete reality, we subordinate all the rest.¹⁵

In the Nazi version, the "race" calls forth the same sort of response as is evoked in Italy by the "nation."

The anti-intellectualistic and religious character of the new creed is apparent from the words of Alfred Rosenberg, the official interpreter of Nazi ideology:

Today a new faith is awakening: the myth of the blood, the belief that it is by the blood that the divine mission of man is to be defended; the belief, based on the clearest knowledge, that Nordic blood represents that mystery which has overcome and replaced the ancient sacraments.¹⁶

It is to this source that Rosenberg traces the mental life of the German people:

We believe that the three possibilities of understanding the universe through perception, will and reason, originate from a single faith, from a single myth, the myth of the blood, the myth of the people.¹⁷

The blood-metaphor in Nazi literature is expressive of the new *Weltanschauung*. Blood is the symbol of battle, and also of the continuity of life; it has been employed in mystical lore and religious sacraments. It connotes the primeval, mysterious aspects of existence. No doubt the word is valued for these dark associations. But in Christianity, "spirit" takes precedence over "blood"; whereas in the Nazi religion, "blood" is the fundamental value, and all thought is said to be determined by biological factors. We are specifically told that "science is a consequence of the blood."¹⁸

Yet we are also informed that blood and spirit are one. Rosenberg refers almost as frequently to the "racial soul" as to the blood. Even when he employs this alternative terminology, he retains his bias against reason:

The life of a race and of a people is not a philosophical creation which develops logically, nor a process which unfolds ac-

ording to a natural law; it is rather the formation of a mystical synthesis, a manifestation of the soul, which cannot be explained by the logic of reason nor by causal analysis.¹⁹

Reason has a very limited value, and the attempt to make life rational leads only to decadence:

The intellect is a purely formal and therefore empty tool; its task consists merely in discovering the law of causality. If it becomes enthroned as lawgiving sovereign, the end of the culture is at hand.²⁰

Such declarations are typical of Fascist neo-romanticism. When translated into practice, they constitute a very effective attack upon the life of reason.

2. *The Regimentation of Thought*

On the celebrated occasion of the "burning of the books" (May 10, 1933) the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, proclaimed a new era of German liberation, and quoted the words of a Renaissance scholar: "O Century! O Science! What a joy to be alive!" But the man who first used these words was rejoicing at the escape from ignorance and superstition, whereas Goebbels was jubilant at a return to bondage.

The Nazis not only have burned books but have driven into exile the greater proportion of notable German authors. American scholars have estimated that of the one hundred writers who were most highly regarded before the advent of Hitler only twelve are now living within Germany. Even if one includes, to be completely objective, the most famous Nazi authors, Hitler, Rosenberg, and Goebbels, the number is only fifteen. Of the eleven writers who enjoyed the greatest international reputation before Hitler's advent, only two are still living within German boundaries. These estimates are based upon purely objective criteria—the size of the editions,

the number of translations, and the number of reviews exceeding fifty lines.²¹

There has been a similar exodus of German scholars and artists. Among the distinguished exiles are Bronislaw Huberman, violinist, Otto Klemperer, symphony conductor, Georg Grosz, painter, Max Reinhardt, theatrical producer, Thomas Mann, novelist, Ernst Toller, playwright, Elisabeth Bergner, actress, Heinrich Brüning, former Chancellor, Kurt Rosenfeld, Prussian Minister of Justice, Dr. James Franck, Nobel Prize winner in Physics, Albert Einstein, author of the Relativity theory, Walter Behrendt, authority on architecture and city planning, Walter Gropius, architect and industrial designer, Hans Reichenbach, philosopher and mathematician, Max Wertheimer, psychologist, and many others. The list includes men of great attainment in every field of endeavor.

The higher schools have consequently suffered tremendously. There has been an immense decline in student registration, and a great many faculty resignations, demotions, and discharges.²² These alterations have been in conformity with Nazi theory. The concept of scientific objectivity is entirely foreign to Hitler's mode of thinking. He thus defines his point of view in *Mein Kampf*:

It is the task of the racial State to see that world history is so written that the problem of race is elevated to a dominant position. . . . Even science must be regarded by the racial State as a means of promoting national pride. Not merely world history, but the entire history of culture, must be taught from this point of view. The inventor shall appear great, not merely because he is an inventor, but even more as a member of our nation. The admiration for every great deed must be bathed in pride because he who so fortunately achieved it was a member of our own people. We must select the greatest from the list of great names in German history and place them before our youth so impressively that they may serve as the foundation of an unshakable patriotism.²³

Similar declarations are made by Alfred Rosenberg (to whom the Government in 1937 awarded a national prize of approximately \$40,000 for his services to German culture and enlightenment). He insists that art, history, and science must be based upon purely Germanic foundations:

Upon many occasions during the past decade, people have spoken of the international character of art and science. We are now prepared to say that this view of art is antiquated; since no aspect of the national life is more forceful and tender than its art; and as for science, I believe that so-called international science never existed, and does not exist today. . . . If people tell us that objective science and history suffer because of such assertions, we can only reply that an objective concept of history does not exist, and that individuals who speak in its name attack each other. We believe that the time has arrived to announce a German version of history.²⁴

In his *Myth of the Twentieth Century*, Rosenberg presents us with such a "German version," and a very bizarre one it is. He explains that the "significance of world history" is due to Northern genius and the spread of culture "by a blonde, blue-eyed race."²⁵ "For a long time it has been a truism," he asserts, "that all the States of the Occident and their creative values were produced by the Germans."²⁶ From the Germanic migrations sprang the great men of past cultures. Rosenberg refers, for example, to "the blue-eyed forceful Sulla, the purely Nordic head of Augustus," and finds Nordic qualities even in Jesus, who he insists was not a Jew.²⁷

Even in the Universities racial chauvinism prevails. At the University of Heidelberg, to cite a famous example which bears repeating, the authorities have removed from the portal of one of the buildings the statue of Athena, the goddess of wisdom, and the accompanying inscription "To the Eternal Spirit," and have substituted the German symbol of the eagle and the inscription "To the German Spirit." The University itself has utterly changed its character. Heidelberg was the

first University in Europe to establish academic freedom, and once offered a teaching position to the great and heterodox Jew, Spinoza. But the celebration in 1936 of the 550th anniversary of the founding of the University indicated that Heidelberg is no longer a free institution.

On this anniversary occasion, the German Minister for Education, Herr Rust, asserted that science must now emancipate itself from "the false idea of objectivity," and that "the new science is entirely different from the idea of knowledge that found its value in an unchecked effort to reach the truth." Dr. Ernest Krieck, Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg, declared on the same occasion: "We do not know of or recognize truth for truth's sake or science for science's sake."²⁸ The purposes to which the Nazis subordinate truth are indicated by Dr. Kahrstedt, Professor of History at the University of Göttingen, in an address on German Empire Day:

We renounce international science. We renounce the international republic of learning. We renounce research for its own sake. We teach and learn medicine, not to increase the number of known microbes, but to keep the German people strong and healthy. We teach and learn history, not to say how things actually happened, but to instruct the German people from the past. We teach and learn the sciences, not to discover abstract laws, but to sharpen the implements of the German people in competition with other peoples. If the German universities make and keep this vow, then it will naturally come about again that they are the first to be consulted in all cultural and spiritual questions.²⁹

Many of the great Universities of the world, being aware of these opinions of Nazi educators, and realizing that hundreds of German professors have been dismissed for opposition to this program, refused invitations to participate in the Heidelberg anniversary celebration and the similar celebration a year later at the University of Göttingen.

The program of "Germanic" instruction has involved

strange innovations in the field of science and education. Anthropology has been transformed into a glorification of German "blood," courses in international law have been abolished, military science has become a principal item in the curriculum, physics and mathematics have become "German sciences." Einstein's theories, for example, are rejected on the ground that they have been formulated by a Jew. At a recent international congress of astronomers at Basel, the Nazi scientists attacked, on racial grounds, the work of Einstein and of other Jewish astrophysicists.

The new attitude towards science is illustrated by the following statement by Dr. Wacker, a high Nazi official in the Ministry of Education:

It is very superficial to speak of science "as such," as a common property of mankind, equally accessible to all peoples and classes and offering them all an equal field of work. The problems of science do not present themselves in the same way to all men. The Negro or the Jew will view the same world in a different way from the German investigator.³⁰

A speech by Dr. Tomaschek, Professor at the University of Dresden, reveals how this relativistic conception of truth is applied. The German press gave the following report of his remarks upon the occasion of dedicating a new Institute of Physics at Heidelberg:

In an enthralling way he contrasted the Nordic conception of infinity with the strange shrinking of the Semites from such infinity (the Bedouin tent). In the same spirit he explained Einstein's theory of relativity, with which he settled in great style. To the abstract mathematical junk of the Jewish physicists he opposed the living conception of high and holy laws of Nature, such as the Nordic investigator wins for himself in reverence before the logic and greatness of Nature. At the conclusion of his stirring address, Professor Tomaschek emphasized that overloading and complicating the methods of research with many mathematical formulae would certainly not lead to Nature.³¹

Even eminent scientists deny that science is international, and contend that there is a specifically "German" truth. A distinguished German physicist, Philipp Lenard of Heidelberg, has issued a treatise on physics with the title "German Physics." He begins his preface as follows:

"German Physics?" one asks. I might rather have said Aryan Physics or the Physics of the Nordic species of man, the Physics of those who have fathomed the depths of Reality, seekers after Truth, the Physics of the very founders of Science. But I shall be answered, "Science is and remains international." It is false. Science, like every other human product, is racial and conditioned by the blood.³²

The first issue of a new mathematical journal, *Deutsche Mathematik*, announced its program as follows:

We serve the German way in mathematics and wish to cultivate it. We are not alone in this world; other peoples have the same claim to express their way in mathematics. Various points of contact exist between the mathematical work of the different peoples. Our review has an open mind for the suggestions and information which may derive therefrom for us, also. But we see everything from the standpoint of the mathematical accomplishments of our people. For it, our labor is meant, conscious of the fact that creative mathematics also develops the stronger and achieves the greater importance for the world the deeper it is rooted in the national spirit.³³

If even mathematics, the most neutral and abstract of all the sciences, is made to conform to the "German spirit," we can be sure that history and the social sciences are thoroughly regimented. The elementary schools have been subjected to supervision as rigid as that in the Universities. Free and impartial education no longer exists in Germany.

The more informal instruction afforded by the press has also passed entirely under the control of the Nazis. Newspaper editors have been forced to conform, or their papers have been seized. Even President Roosevelt's speeches are re-

garded as dangerous and are banned in Germany.³⁴ The control of the press has been supplemented by "coordination" of the cinema, stage, radio, and pulpit.

A great many people find this state of affairs very oppressive. During the 1936 season, one of the Berlin theaters presented Schiller's *Don Carlos*, in which occurs Marquis Posa's famous advice to King Philip, "Give us freedom of opinion!" Every night during the performance this speech was greeted with loud applause. The newspapers attacked the "political immaturity" of the audiences, but the demonstration continued and was louder than ever when the Minister of Propaganda attended.³⁵ The play, we suspect, would have been suppressed if it had not been a popular German classic.

The character of Nazi propaganda has been in accord with Hitler's notions. In *Mein Kampf*, he frankly outlined the policy which Goebbels was later to carry into execution:

The more modest its scientific ballast, and the more exclusively it directs itself to the feeling of the masses, the more successful propaganda will be. This is the best proof of the correctness or incorrectness of propaganda, not the satisfaction it may afford to certain scientists or esthetes. . . . The power of reception of the masses is only very limited, their understanding is small, but their capacity to forget is great.³⁶

He points out that the propagandist must not try to be objective:

The task of propaganda is not the measurement of conflicting rights, but exclusive emphasis upon the right which it represents. It does not need to search objectively for truth that is favorable to the opposition, and then give this truth to the masses with doctrinaire sincerity, but it unintermittently must serve its own truth.³⁷

The manner in which Hitler himself avoids "doctrinaire sincerity" is illustrated by his conduct during the Czechoslovakian crisis. In his speech at the Sport Palace on Sep-

tember 26, he grossly deceived his audience. "Never by a phrase," points out the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, "did Hitler let his hearers know that the real dispute no longer was between him and Beneš but between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other. Never did he let them guess that it was not a parade into Czechoslovakia which hung in the balance, but a European war." Instead of reciting the true facts, he lashed his audience into a hysterical demonstration against the Czech people and their President. "The surge of voices, as in a menagerie where all the animals have gone mad, but by some trick can still be made to bay and howl in unison, will not soon be forgotten by anyone who listened through to the end."³⁸ It appears that Hitler was not only ready to plunge his people into a vast war, but even to lead them blind and frenzied to the slaughter. When we remember that the German press is completely subservient to the Führer, we can expect every "news" organ to be kept.

The record in Fascist Italy is similar to that in Nazi Germany. The extent to which the Italian press is censored is clearly indicated in the instructions sent to Italian newspapers by the government. Carlo Rosselli, the editor of an Italian anti-Fascist newspaper in Paris, published a series of secret instructions to the Italian press covering the period from January 5 to May 10, 1937. These instructions were reproduced by the *Manchester Guardian* and other reliable newspapers. The following are a few excerpts:

January 16: Give no news of the bombardments of inhabited centers by the Spanish "Nationalists," and above all deny that it is done by Italian or German aviators.

February 9: Do not describe the military situation of the Spanish "Reds" as disastrous. Be less optimistic.

February 20: Begin and continue a strong campaign against Czechoslovakia. Absolute silence on the date fixed for ending the dispatch of volunteers to Spain.

February 26: Insist on the eventuality of Eden's leaving the

Foreign Office. Have sent from London news of Eden's dismissal.

May 6: It is absolutely forbidden to publish any articles or make any reference whatever to the British Government; limit yourselves purely to Stefani [Fascist news agency]. Emphasize the news about the big crowd at Rome for tomorrow's review.³⁹

Rosselli had published a similar series of secret instructions a few months previously. For these offenses, he and his brother, it appears, were murdered by Fascist agents.⁴⁰ A similar list of "directives" issued to the German press in August, 1935, has been published by the *Manchester Guardian*. These indicate the same sort of distortion and suppression as appear in the Italian instructions.

The temper of Italian journalism is reflected in the pronouncements of Virginio Gayda, authoritative Fascist editor, whose *Giornale d'Italia* is a semiofficial organ. Shortly after France's abject surrender to the German-Italian demands at the Munich conference, Gayda utilized the pages of his journal for a typical attack upon French democracy. He spoke of France's "avid egoism, overbearing pretentiousness, general jealousy, intrigue, continuous hostility and unremitting march towards the depths of subversive criminality."⁴¹ Such language was selected by the chief editor of Italy, immediately after "peace" had been secured by the capitulation of Chamberlain and Daladier.

The Italian control of education has not been so severe as the corresponding system in Germany, yet it has been effective. At the beginning of his term in office, Mussolini did not molest scholars. After the murder of Matteotti in 1924, Italian professors divided into two opposing camps, the Fascists being led by Giovanni Gentile, and the anti-Fascists by Benedetto Croce. This condition was not allowed to continue. In January, 1925, the Fascist "revolution" was completed by the destruction of opposition parties, the muzzling of the press, and the suppression of autonomous trade unions. At this

time, the secondary schools were placed under State censorship, and textbooks thenceforward had to embody Fascist doctrines.

The Universities were still relatively free, although the pressure gradually increased during the next few years. Many professors wrote to Il Duce pledging their support, and a large number found it prudent to join the Fascist Association of University Professors. In 1931 came the decisive stroke. All professors were compelled to take an oath of allegiance to the Fascist regime. Only twelve refused, and they were deprived of their positions. The Universities are now firmly ruled by the State. Benedetto Croce, Italy's greatest philosopher, has been forced into retirement at Naples, and the government has even searched his library to find incriminating documents. But Croce remains the undeviating foe of Fascism. He has courageously declared that liberty means "human dignity and civilization," and that the "suppression of liberty" under dictatorship means "the debasing of men until they are either a flock to be led to pasture, or captured, trained animals in a cage."⁴²

A number of Italian intellectuals, like their German contemporaries, have sought refuge abroad. The long list of exiles and expatriates includes such distinguished men as Toscanini, the musician, Silone, the novelist, Borgese, the publicist, Ascoli, the political scientist, Venturi, authority upon art history. De Marco, expert on problems of finance, and De Sanctis, Salvemini, and Ferrero, the historians. The most prominent victims of Fascism have been scholars and intellectuals: Giacomo Matteotti, the criminologist, Giovanni Amendola, the philosopher, Lauro de Bosis, the poet and chemist, Carlo Rosselli, the economist, and Nello Rosselli, the historian. All of the learned professions have been "coordinated"; doctors, lawyers, journalists, technicians, and artists are all regimented by the State.⁴³

The concepts that govern Italian education are illustrated

by the opening remarks of Professor Sergio Panunzio in inaugurating a new course in political theory at the University of Rome in 1928. He contended:

We must "Fascicize" the instruction of law and politics in order to dissipate the agnostic and neutral spirit which, in the form of objectivity and rigid scientificism, is or may be limited to a study of law and politics either contrary to, or outside of, Fascism. . . . *Instruction in theory of the law is like instruction in religion.* There can be no neutrals. . . . Only instruction in the theorem of Pythagoras can be a-political! ⁴⁴

The new conception of history is defined by an Italian professor: "History is effective as myth and not as truth. . . . It is not the truth of the historical fact which is of significance, but the effect which follows." ⁴⁵ Thus men take flight from reason in Italy as well as in Germany.

3. *Examination of the Fascist Assumptions*

Since the fundamental values of truth and scientific method are in question, we should examine the tenets of Fascism with extreme care. What are the main assumptions which underlie Fascist anti-intellectualism? Are these assumptions valid? We can reduce these basic premises to three:

First, the Fascists maintain that truth is relative to nationalistic or racial interests. The Nazis, as we have seen, are the most ardent advocates of this point of view; but in Italy, in Japan, and even in the democratic countries, there is a pronounced tendency to conceive of truth as that which serves the national interests.

Julien Benda, the famous French critic, points out that truth is a barrier to national chauvinism. Since the truth is essentially universal, it is opposed to the separatist tendencies of nationalism. Hence the nationalists tell us that there is no "universal truth"—there is only that which is "true in France,"

or "true in Germany," etc. "What is true on one side of the Pyrenees may perfectly well be error on the other side!"⁴⁶

There is very little that can be said in answer to such a thesis except that it is *nonsense*. The mere fact that a man is (let us say) a German, even if he is of the most approved "Nordic" type, does not equip him to grasp truth in a way denied to men of other nations. The principles of logic are universal; men of any race or nationality can think straight, or commit fallacies. All men have eyes, noses, ears and other sense organs—they all can observe, with approximately equal equipment, the contours of reality. They all have minds with which to interpret what they observe. Great discoveries and inventions have been contributed by all the principal races, and not least by the Jews. Two plus two equals four in every land under the sun. Science is based on just such universally true propositions, and the same basic mathematical and logical principles underlie the work of scientists all over the world. Science is an international patrimony, enriched by many generations in all civilized lands.

If the Nazis insist that what is true for a German may be false for a Jew, we can only answer that the principle of contradiction has not been revoked by Nazi decree. A proposition, if understood in an identical sense, cannot be both true and false. When a German says Hitler is infallible, and a Jew says that he is not, and they are talking about the same identical "Hitler" in identical terms, either one person or the other is mistaken.

Second, the Fascists deny the value of an open discussion and review of many basic problems. There is a curious contradiction in their philosophy in this respect. Mussolini has declared:

Struggle is the origin of all things, for life is full of contrasts: there is love and hatred, white and black, day and night, good and evil; and until these contrasts achieve balance, struggle fatefully remains at the root of human nature. However, it is good

for it to be so. Today we can indulge in wars, economic battles, conflicts of ideas, but if a day came to pass when struggle ceased to exist, that day would be tinged with melancholy; it would be a day of ruin, the day of ending.⁴⁷

Rosenberg applies this doctrine of conflict to the political sphere:

It is to be understood that there will and must always exist political personalities and groups within a body politic. A "people of brothers" is a utopia and not a fine one at that. Complete brotherhood means equalization of all differentials of value, of all tensions and of all the dynamics of life. Here, too, conflict remains the life-producing spark.⁴⁸

This doctrine has been inherited from such romantic predecessors as Adam Müller. In his *Elemente der Staatskunst*, published in 1809, this political theorist of the German romantic period wrote:

There is a common saying which is not always understood: "Where we find no plaintiff, we find no judge." Translated into the language of higher jurisprudence, this means: "Without hostile factions there is no judge, without opposing rights there is no law, without war there can be no peace." Through combat, through clashing rights, through contending parties—the concepts of "peace," "law" and "judge," which *per se* are dead, become a living reality.⁴⁹

This doctrine of conflict was an integral part of romantic theory, and has been revived by a number of modern writers. It fits the Fascist ideal of an "heroic" and "energetic" life. Unquestionably it contains an important truth, although certain forms of strife are of course undesirable.

But the Fascist practice of suppressing all political and ideological opposition does not harmonize with this conception of the value of conflict. It would seem that the Fascists are only devoted to the more violent forms of opposition. They divert strife from the field of debate to the field of carnage.

It is in their squadrist tactics, and in their wars in Ethiopia, Spain, China, that they have demonstrated their love of "contrasts." We shall later examine their philosophy of force, and discover reasons to question its validity.

For the present, it will suffice to point out the flimsy basis upon which they suppress ideological opposition. Mussolini has said:

Opposition is stupid; superfluous in a unanimous administration like the Fascist regime. . . . We are not old nags that have to be spurred. We control ourselves severely. . . . In Italy there is no room for anti-Fascisti; there is room only for FASCISTI.⁵⁰

The Duce thinks there is enough opposition in inanimate things, and in the "objective difficulties of life."⁵¹

Obviously the Fascists, despite their praise of contrasts, do not respect the dialectical nature of thought. An idea lives only in conflict with its opposite. Without debate and discussion, even a true doctrine rapidly degenerates into a lifeless dogma. Without relational struggle and live opposition, without the clash and cooperation between minds, even the best of thinkers cease to think. But the Fascists too often cannot distinguish between opposition and treason.

Instead of testing beliefs by means of discussion they assume the infallibility of their dictators. The 1938 Nazi Yearbook states: "The *Führer* is always right."⁵² Italian recruits to the Fascist party must pledge themselves "to obey without question the commands of the Duce," and a widely publicized Fascist decalogue announces: "Mussolini is always right."⁵³ One wonders whether Hitler and Mussolini retain their infallibility even when they disagree (as for example when Mussolini favored, and Hitler opposed, the rule of Dollfuss in Austria).

No doubt, as the Fascists contend, there are limits to toleration: we should not allow indiscriminate slander, or the spread of palpable falsehoods which cause great injury. We

would not repeatedly allow a man to offer little children potassium cyanide, a deadly poison, and to tell them that it is candy. Yet intolerance cannot be justified by merely assuming infallibility in respect to highly controversial issues. Unless it can be shown that repression will probably operate in the interests of human welfare, there is no justification in suppressing free debate and discussion. It is possible to demonstrate that potassium cyanide is poisonous, but it is not possible to demonstrate that anti-Fascist principles are deadly. Indeed, the Fascists have never advanced a reasoned defense of repression. They have never answered the powerful arguments in favor of toleration to be found in classic writers such as Milton, Locke, and Mill.

Third, the Fascists often prefer "myths" or misleading propaganda to the conclusions reached by scientific method. We are so used to the technique of propaganda, which has been adapted from modern advertising, that we seldom realize how irrational it is; but a visitor from an alien culture cannot fail to notice that our minds have been stultified. When Rabindranath Tagore visited the United States, he was impressed by the way in which Democracy had adapted this same technique to politics. In June, 1927, he wrote:

. . . While aristocracy strenuously cultivates self-respect, often at the cost of material profit, and guards a high standard of culture against deterioration, undiluted democracy has a tendency to glide down to the lazy level of the average, for all its striving is to add to its rights, not to build up a high tower of excellence. It makes a deliberate study of the dark patches in the human intellect, wherewith to help itself to create an atmosphere of delusion through hints, gestures, yells and startling grimaces, for the purpose of stupefying the popular mind. Once when I was in Chicago I saw everywhere on the town walls one single name blazoned in big letters in an endless round of repetition, like the whirling monotony of a dervish dance that dazes one's mind into vacuity. Evidently the name belonged to some candidate for political election. But what an insult to the people,

who are supposed to represent the supreme power in their government, openly to apply to them the spell of hypnotism in place of reason, as the medicine man does in the heart of Africa!⁵⁴

When the fomenting of extravagant desire and the spreading of misinformation are added to the mechanical effect of repetition, the practice of advertising, whether commercial or political, may be said to constitute the most effective psychological technique in stimulating public irrationalism ever practiced on a vast scale. Perhaps the most fateful discovery of the early twentieth century was that this technique has almost limitless possibilities in politics. During the war, the method of propaganda was perfected and applied with terrific effect; but not until the rise of Fascism did political leaders espouse a creed of life that corresponds to the emotionalistic methods of the propagandist. There is a great difference between employing the methods of propaganda for a limited purpose as in Western democracies and, on the other hand, pulling the whole of life down to this plane of subjectivity. Yet now we are told by Hitler that "objectivity" is "weakness," and "fanaticism" is "will and strength."

Such an abandonment of reason surely does not represent an adequate ideal of human life. In so far as man's volitional and passionate nature is developed at the cost of his intellectual nature, the personality is distorted, and loses its harmony and integrity. As Plato and Aristotle maintained, the neglect of any essential part of human nature is wrong, and it is especially shameful and dangerous to constrict the reason, which is man's most distinctive gift.

Furthermore, the constant employment of myth and propaganda must result in the wide dissemination of error. If such error is useful, it is useful to realize some objective. To justify the means it is necessary to justify the end: the Fascists must show that deception is being practiced for a worthy purpose. Otherwise, we shall suspect that they are merely making use of a bad means for a bad end.

Even if the end be approved, moreover, the means might still be condemned as ineffective. An erroneous defense of an excellent practice exposes that very practice to the danger of destruction that almost inevitably attends the false belief. The good and real reasons for a course of action are obscured and weakened by an unreal defense of that course; a weak defense is substituted for a strong. If there are sound reasons for Fascism, it is unfortunate that the Fascists neglect them in favor of erroneous reasons, which are liable to attack and refutation.

To foster error is in so far to encourage erroneous ways of thinking in general; it is to sap the power of the people to recognize valid reasoning. Just as sensational journalism debases public taste, so lying journalism undermines public rationality. Once certain errors are established in the public mind, subordinate or supplementary errors must be invented to lend support to the pre-existent stock of error. Unless the regime is finally exposed to people in general as a fabricator of lies, there can be no end to this process of cunning deception: one lie will inevitably beget another. Even if all these lies are believed by the public, the effect upon men's critical faculties, and upon the moral nature of those who spread the lies, cannot be other than deplorable.

Whatever aid a false belief may furnish toward the realization of present objectives, it is very unlikely to be of benefit in the long run. An error once inculcated cannot be immediately dispelled when it has served its purpose. It persists to clog the future course of men toiling to reach the truth. One of the chief obstacles to human improvement throughout history has been superstition and falsehood. As Goethe has said, "The truth helps us; nothing comes of error: it simply entangles us."⁵⁵ Unfortunately, this remark applies only to good men. Men of evil will can often achieve their objectives by means of lies.

The present chapter indicates that there has been a sharp

break with the greatest traditions of our culture. During the most progressive eras of modern history, the ideal of scientific humanism has been a supreme renovating force. The intellectual leaders of society have accepted the conclusion of Socrates, "A life uncriticized is not worth living." His admonition to be critical, and Jesus' commandment to be kind, have set the pattern for almost all the idealism, if not most of the practice, of the ensuing centuries of enlightenment. In place of these ideals, the Fascists would now substitute a different set of values. Nothing could be more opposed to the Socratic ideal of critical reflection than the words of Rosenberg: "To all doubts and questions the new man of the first German empire has only one answer: Nevertheless, I will!"⁵⁶

This one-sided emphasis upon volition and instinct threatens to undermine democratic institutions throughout the world. Democracy is an attempt to substitute persuasion in place of force: conflicts are resolved by the methods of debate and experimental effort, rather than by the domineering control of men of fanatical will. In this sense, democracy is the product of the scientific spirit, and is a heritage from Greece as well as Judea. Hence Fascist irrationalism involves an assault upon the very basis of democracy. The foundations of our social order are tottering.

III

VALUATIONS: SENTIMENTAL OR SCIENTIFIC?

To live by science requires intelligence and faith, but not to live by it is folly.—GEORGE SANTAYANA¹

1. *Pareto and the Fascists*

IN THE present chapter, we shall analyze one of the main aspects of Fascist anti-intellectualism: the refusal to employ science in the determination of basic human ideals. Our method will be to examine the tenets of that scholarly forerunner of Fascism, Vilfredo Pareto, whose contention that values are not amenable to science was welcomed by Mussolini and his sympathizers, and whose ideas embody a number of the basic elements in the Fascist creed.

As a youthful exile in Switzerland in the summer of 1904, Mussolini subscribed to two courses given by Pareto at the University of Lausanne. There is no record of how faithfully he attended classes during the nine weeks of the summer-school term; but if we can believe his so-called *Autobiography* (actually written by Richard Washburn Child, the American Ambassador to Rome), he followed the lectures with great eagerness.² His friend and biographer, Margherita Sarfatti, likewise declares that these lectures on Economics and Sociology left "an indelible impression upon his mind." She believes that there is much in common between Mussolini's aversion to systematic thought and Pareto's emphasis upon the "tentative" and "imponderable" factors in social science.³

In the same year that these lectures were given, the young exile (then only twenty-one years of age) wrote enthusiastically about the "distinguished author of *Les Systèmes Socialistes*." His remarks indicate that he was especially im-

pressed by Pareto's denial of the intellectual, political, religious, and moral unity of society, and that he interpreted the Paretan relativism as a proof of the necessity of class struggle. Again in 1908, Mussolini wrote: "Do you recall the theory of the élites of Vilfredo Pareto? It is probably the most extraordinary conception of modern times."⁴ In these early comments, the future dictator interpreted Pareto as offering support for a socialistic doctrine of class-conflict and of the rise through such struggle of an élite recruited from the proletarian class. Eventually he revised this interpretation and utilized the arguments of the same author in defense of Fascism.

Pareto's doctrines eventually found many advocates. His theories were presented in the *Voce*, a journal which served to crystallize pre-Fascist thought.⁵ Some of his ideas were also aired in Mussolini's newspaper, the *Popolo d'Italia*. He thus became known to the Fascist groups, which were then being organized.

Whatever may be the degree of Pareto's influence upon the theory of Fascism, Mussolini was only performing a symbolic act of justice when he appointed his former teacher (who was shortly to die), a member of the Italian Senate and an economic delegate of Italy to the League of Nations. It was altogether fitting that the world's premier Fascist should honor the man who wrote, long before the March on Rome, an impressive apology for the cultivation of "myths" and the forcible rule of the "élite."

Pareto reciprocated these favors by becoming a contributor to Mussolini's personal periodical, *Gerarchia*. He employed its pages both to praise and blame the Fascist government. Despite his published utterances, it is difficult to say how far he might have agreed with the later activities of Fascism, since he died on August 19, 1923, less than a year after Mussolini's seizure of power. We know that he advocated a retention of some of the practices and institutions of

liberalism, such as freedom of speech and of trade, and hence he probably would have been disappointed by much that has happened in recent years. Nevertheless, the main tenor of his thought can be adapted to the Fascist program.

Since we are abstracting those elements in Pareto's theory which either have influenced or typify Fascism, our disapproval of these does not mean that we regard his work as without merit. Indeed, Fascism itself has certain merits which we would not think of denying. In this case, however, the bad effects seem to us greatly to overbalance the good, and it is therefore more realistic to point out these evils than to dwell at length upon the occasional benefits.

2. *The Significance of the Problem Reformulated by Pareto*

The contention advanced by Pareto is by no means novel. Many thinkers in addition to the Fascists have agreed with him in rejecting a scientific approach to ethics. The Greek Sophists championed uncritical self-interest or the whim of the moment; Machiavelli and Nietzsche extolled the strong man's power as opposed to the moralist's scruples; Plotinus, the Scholastics, and the Hindus espoused a religious ethics based upon supernaturalism; Pascal, Shaftesbury, and Rousseau trusted to the "heart" rather than the "head"; Shelley and the German romanticists based morals on imagination rather than on reason; Fichte transformed patriotism into a religion largely exempt from rational considerations; Westermarck, observing the diversity of moral ideas, concluded that values rest upon emotion. Thus the idea of a science * of human welfare, conceived by Socrates more than two thousand years ago, has met with stubborn opposition down to the present.

* By "science," in this connection, I mean a body of knowledge derived from experience, and so coordinated that it will be useful for prediction and control.

The problem of scientific valuation is treated afresh in Pareto's *Trattato di Sociologia generale*. This elaborate work undertakes to prove among other things that ethics and all theories of ultimate value rest solely upon "sentiment." The argument turns upon a distinction between the "logical" and "nonlogical" aspects of life. The "logical" division embraces both "logico-experimental theory" and "logical activity." Logico-experimental theory is that formulated by the pure scientist in the act of knowing, logical activity is that of the capable politician or any other individual who finds effective means to promote a given end. The "nonlogical" division embraces, among other things, any attempt to discover the goals of life. Thus we may be logical in finding *ways* to satisfy wants, but the wants themselves are beyond the pale of reason. We may have a science of values, such as economics, only if we rigidly exclude the consideration of ultimate purposes. For this reason, economics contains no criticism of ends, and it can be scientific only because it does not.⁶ Different individuals have different conceptions of welfare, and science cannot compare or reduce these heterogeneous goods.

The result is the separation of scientific thought from ethical conduct. Valid theory is based upon empirical logic, but theory is no guide to moral practice. The choice of means depends upon wants, and wants are divorced from reason. Morality, along with religion, falls wholly outside the scope of science:

In morals and religion sentiments reign supreme, and therefore in those fields it is difficult to get theories that, let alone scientific, are even to any extent exact; what we get is an amorphous mass of metaphysical preconceptions and expressions of sentiments. . . . Pseudo-sciences [such as theology and ethics] . . . take us altogether outside the logico-experimental field.⁷

The nonrational character of action does not seem to Pareto a lamentable condition; he even contends that it is desirable:

For purposes of knowing, logico-experimental science is the only thing of any value; for purposes of doing, it is of much greater importance to follow the lead of sentiments. . . . Practice is the better the more practical it is and theory the better the more theoretical it is. Altogether wretched, in general, are "theoretical practices" and "practical theories."⁸

Nothing could be more absolute than the separation which Pareto tries to establish between theory based on science and practice based on sentiment. "The experimental and non-experimental worlds," he contends, "have nothing in common and nothing touching the one can be inferred from the other."⁹

While the theories of ethics and religion from the logico-experimental standpoint are said to be devoid of all exactness and of any strict accord with facts, yet Pareto does not deny the great importance that these theories have had in history and in determining the social equilibrium.¹⁰ Indeed, roughly two-thirds of his argument is concerned with proving the tremendous influence of such nonscientific factors in human behavior. He believes that science plays an almost negligible role in social processes, and he is quite willing that it should occupy a restricted sphere. Indeed, he asserts:

Men have an absolute need to escape from the domain of reality, to make excursions into the domain of the indemonstrable. It is because of this that a religion is indispensable to them. To wish to substitute science in place of religion is an absurdity. In this sense one has cause to speak of "the bankruptcy of science." But it is necessary to add that the science which has become insolvent is the science which has wished to depart from its true domain, and which has pretended to satisfy the non-logical and non-experimental needs of men, whereas it has no business outside of the sphere of logic and experience.¹¹

Ethics, we must remember, is classed with religion, as entirely nonscientific.

Pareto applies his doctrines to society with cynical frank-

ness. Since sentiments are exempt from criticism, the ruling minority should waste no time with moralistic scruples. They should rid themselves of those sentiments that hinder their own advancement, and learn to manipulate the prejudices of others:

. . . The art of government lies in finding ways to take advantage of . . . sentiments, not in wasting one's energies in futile efforts to destroy them. . . . The person who is able to free himself from the blind dominion of his own sentiments is capable of utilizing the sentiments of other people for his own ends. . . . The statesman of the greatest service to himself and his party is the man who himself has no prejudices but knows how to profit by the prejudices of others.¹²

If the rulers are unable to work their will by means of deception, they should not hesitate to employ violence: for the meek, Pareto thinks, shall *not* inherit the earth:

. . . The use of force is indispensable to society; and when the higher classes are averse to the use of force, which ordinarily happens because the majority in those classes come to rely wholly on their skill at chicanery, and the minority shrink from energetic acts now through stupidity, now through cowardice, it becomes necessary, if society is to subsist and prosper, that that governing class be replaced by another which is willing and able to use force. Roman society was saved from ruin by the legions of Caesar and Octavius.¹³

The ruling minority, however, is apt to be threatened by insurrection from the masses. Even a military dictatorship may fail if the people become aroused to what they consider their own interests. Hence the élite should do everything possible to teach docility to the multitude. The pious sentiments of orthodox religion and morality should be widely propagated:

. . . It is advantageous to society that individuals not of the ruling class should spontaneously accept, observe, respect, revere, love, the precepts current in their society, prominent among

them the precepts called—roughly, inadequately, to be sure—precepts of “morality” and precepts of “religion.”¹⁴

The subject class may also be encouraged in its interest in the natural sciences, but reflection in the field of ethics is apt to be extremely dangerous:

Experimental researches, even if imbibed or practised by the masses at large, have proved beneficial; whereas ethical researches have, under the same circumstances, proved harmful in that they are for ever shaking the foundations of the social order.¹⁵

Although Pareto denies that ideals are amenable to scientific criticism, he looks with great apprehension upon the attempt so to consider them. (Incidentally, he cannot consistently employ such terms as “advantageous,” “beneficial,” and “harmful” in any strictly objective sense, since he denies the possibility of an objective determination of values.)

The philosophy of Pareto is that of a modern Machiavelli. Just as *The Prince* instructed the tyrants of the Renaissance in the methods of fraud and violence, so this *Treatise* instructs our modern overlords in the “gentle” art of government. The advantage of Pareto’s book is that it not only suggests ruthless tactics, but offers a clever defense against the pangs of conscience. It enlists the prestige of science in support of the will-to-power. As an apostle of the “logico-experimental method,” Pareto bedecks his pages with algebraic signs and graphs, most of which are employed to excellent purpose. He “proves” his view that values are purely sentimental by marshaling a large amount of “inductive evidence.” He thus appears to be a resolute defender of science, intent upon keeping “theory” uncontaminated by “practice” and “sentiment.”

Since he adopts the role of a scientific purist, the casual reader is apt to misunderstand the import of his argument. His treatise in effect is an attack upon the life of reason, and

this is true despite his apparent attachment to strict scientific method. As a matter of fact, he so unduly restricts the field of science that a great portion of existence is turned over to violence and passion. He regards most of life as governed by sentiment, and human nature as unalterable in this respect. Reason masks rather than curbs or eradicates our semi-instinctive and ubiquitous biases. Morals and social ideals are only "derivations," that is, mere rationalizations or sophisms. This restriction of science to a narrow sphere is opposed to the main trend of Western culture, which has involved the expansion of science into an increasing number of fields, including scientific criticism of moral, religious, and metaphysical dogmas.

It would be wrong to say that Pareto's standpoint, here and elsewhere, wholly coincides with Fascism. The Fascists either leave no room for pure theory, or subordinate it to morale and action. Typical of the Fascist attitude are the words of an early Nazi theorist, Moeller van den Bruck: "The future belongs not to the problem-monger, but to the man of character."¹⁶ Needless to say, Pareto has more respect for the thinker; but he conceives the role of intellect so narrowly that his influence is cast upon the side of Fascism.

His contention that practice should in general be divorced from theory, and that values must be founded upon sentiment, is certainly not far from the position of Walther Darré, the Nazi Minister of Agriculture. The latter emphasizes the "imponderable" factors in life:

The essential basis upon which depends everything in the political sphere does not consist in the formulations of thought, in programs and theses, but in the imponderables: disposition, inner attitude, passionate willing, the sacrifice of all things in favor of the perpetuation of one's kind—all the elements which we call "character." Out of character deeds are born, and we therefore find that whenever action is uppermost, the qualities of character are in the foreground.¹⁷

Sarfatti remarks that Pareto discoursed to Mussolini "during his University years on 'the value of the sum total of imponderable things.'" ¹⁸ These "imponderables" are the very factors that defy logic. Emphasis upon them was bound to appeal to men of Fascist inclinations.

3. *Truth and Error in Pareto's Argument*

There is this much truth in the anti-intellectualist thesis of Pareto—that intelligence is not all-sufficient. Even Spinoza, the arch-rationalist, surmised that reason left to itself is impotent.¹⁹ The business of ethics, as a guide to moral practice, is not to supplant emotion by intelligence. As Francis Bacon aptly said, ethics should so compose the passions that they fight on the side of reason rather than invade it. The unity towards which we must strive is a harmony of intellect and emotion. Yet we must be sure that each is genuine: that science is not corrupted by bias, nor feeling weakened and made anaemic by thought.

Pareto is also right in thinking that there are special difficulties in the way of a science of welfare. The more complex values of human life depend upon a great number of physical, biological, psychological, and social factors. We are here dealing, as the scientist would say, with a larger number of "variables," and all our calculations are correspondingly more difficult. Experiment, moreover, is hard to contrive, or even impossible: we cannot so easily subject men and societies to experimentation as we can white rats or pieces of carbon. We can watch the development of Fascism or Socialism, but we cannot, as average individuals, direct that development.

Bias, moreover, is especially difficult to avoid in the consideration of values. Hume long ago remarked, after observing human behavior, that "moral distinctions are not the offspring of reason," ²⁰ and Pareto has collected a host of

illustrations of nonlogical conduct in the field of values. Distortions which spring from prejudice are especially difficult to avoid during a period of social conflict. The days of combat are ill suited to the scientific spirit of tentativity; and even in normal times it is difficult to transcend the prejudices of the society about us. "Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence," observed Pascal; "a meridian decides the truth. Fundamental laws change after a few years of possession; right has its epochs; the entry of Saturn into the Lion marks to us the origin of such and such a crime. A strange justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side."²¹ Opinions in the field of the "physical sciences," as Pareto realized, are not so liable to these warping perspectives.

We must also concede that ultimate values are, in a sense, determined by "sentiment" rather than by reason. Such values rest upon preference, *i.e.*, upon emotion and volition. No one, for example, can *prove* that pleasure is, or is not, intrinsically good. It has to be "tasted," and its goodness directly experienced. If two people disagree as to what is good for its own sake, and if they continue to disagree after ignorance, misunderstanding, prejudice, and irrelevant considerations are eliminated, there is nothing more that can be done to reconcile their divergent attitudes.

Pareto and most ethical relativists, however, tend to confuse two questions which are really quite distinct. The first question is: "What is the end-of-action which I prefer, desire, or strive for?" And the second question is: "What would I prefer, desire, or strive for *if I knew much more about myself and the world about me?*" Too often it is supposed that only the first question needs to be answered and that no further problem can arise. But it is quite common for a person to change his opinion of the fundamental goal or goals of life as a result of learning more about himself and his world. Values, in other words, are based upon preference—a nonrational

factor—but preferences themselves change in response to knowledge and insight. Pareto is flying in the face of experience when he assumes that purposes and inclinations are merely given, and are impervious to intellectual criticism. In the transition from the dark ages to modern times, ethical ideas and tendencies change concurrently with deeper insight into the nature of man and his place in the cosmos.

Our present ideals can be immeasurably clarified and deepened by the further application of knowledge. Without a scientific investigation of the physical conditions of welfare, of the nature of purposive activity, of the character of human needs and frustrations, and of the maladjustments and experiments that abound in the social sphere, no man can pretend to speak with authority concerning the proper objective of society. After such investigation, a person will probably find that his entire conception of human good has been transformed, and that his basic preferences have been profoundly influenced by the deepening of his insight. It is in this sense, and this sense only, that we can speak of a science of values: but no such science, even as a possibility, is admitted by the Fascists.

One of the basic errors of Pareto is to distinguish very sharply between ends and means, and to conclude that science does not apply to ends even though it does apply to means. Now, we must object to this doctrine of the discontinuity of means and ends for two reasons.

In the first place, *a science of means, without a critique of ends, does not make life rational.* (Perhaps life cannot be rational, but we should hesitate to leap to this conclusion.) If there is no way of determining whether our purposes are reasonable, there can be no way of judging whether the means are rightly employed. Every technique may be adapted to a variety of ends. The knowledge of chemistry that is applied in medicine can be diverted to the manufacture of poison gas. Explosives can be used to make fireworks, mine coal, or

maintain a military dictatorship. The methods of advertising can be employed to sell either a useful or a fraudulent product. Propaganda is useful in promoting such divergent ideals as Fascism and Social Democracy. The knowledge of economics may be used to defraud the public or to organize a system of economic security for the common people. Clearly, we shall be none the better for all our technical knowledge unless we have something more—knowledge of the good. Without this, our efficiency profits us nothing, or is an actual liability. If men are hell-bent, the expeditious are worse off than the handicapped. A devilish lot of modern ingenuity, in fact, has gone into the effort to poison and destroy human life. Reversing the remark in *Hamlet*, we can say to the Fascists, "Though this be method, yet there is madness in 't."

In the second place, *there can be no sufficient application of means without a criticism of ends*. Many conflicts break out in the field of practice, and these cannot be adjusted without moral reflection. Some examples will help to verify this fact: We might suppose that the desirability of health can be taken for granted, and that consequently the science of medicine leads only to a consideration of means. But medicine has forced us to revise our whole conception of the importance of health, and to call in question those values which obstruct it. Men have been compelled to reconsider the merits of religions which interfere with medical practices, moral codes which oppose vivisection or the candid treatment of sexual disorders, educational systems that neglect or overtax the physical organism, philosophies that set up a dualism between mind and body, and economic systems that create malnutrition and wretched housing. Ultimately men are forced to consider the ideal of socialized medicine, and this, in turn, involves the vexed question of individualism versus collectivism.

Again, it might be contended that beauty is obviously desirable, and that we need only ascertain the means to its real-

ization. But shall we devote more energy to the pursuit of beauty than to the attainment of truth? Shall we eliminate the vast quantities of ugly merchandise that flow from our factories, even if this means abandoning the profit system? Shall we insist that every man has a right to a beautiful home, even if this involves the destruction of present real estate values? Should workers be supplied with labor in which the impulse of craftsmanship finds a congenial expression? Is it possible to achieve a union of art and machine-industry? And, if so, what sacrifices should we make to achieve this goal?

These examples are sufficient to indicate that the vigorous prosecution of a major objective involves a continuous reconstruction of ideals. Men are forced to inquire into the assumptions behind their actions, and to frame definitions of specific and universal values until they form a system. Pareto's sharp separation of ends and means, and the resultant doctrine that science may determine techniques but not ideals, overlook the inevitable conflicts that arise when we try to *apply* ideals, conflicts that cannot be resolved without a consideration of *ultimate* values.

4. *The Argument Based on the Freedom of the Will*

There are still certain objections which we have not met. Pareto and his disciples have advanced a number of arguments to prove that a science of values is impossible. The first argument that we shall consider is based on the freedom of the will. It is maintained that men are endowed with a faculty of arbitrary choice which renders human life and its values too unpredictable for scientific treatment.

The emphasis upon free will is typical of Fascism. Mr. Lawrence Dennis, an American exponent of Fascism, has declared, "The Fascist scheme of things is an expression of human will which creates its own truths and values from day to

day to suit its changing purposes.”²² Similarly, Mussolini has said, “By the exercise of his free will, man can and must create his own world.”²³ If man’s “world” is created by free will, and altered from day to day to suit ever-changing purposes, there would appear to be no basis for scientific prediction. Pareto does not make use of this argument, since the doctrine of free will is too “metaphysical” for his taste, but it has been used by the Fascists to support his thesis that a science of values is impossible.

The argument, if valid, would eliminate not only the value-sciences, but also psychology and sociology. The latter must also depend upon a certain constancy in human nature. If freedom is conceived as pure indeterminism, in the sense of absolute chance, no science of human life is possible in so far as freedom obtains. Hence if psychology and sociology can be scientific, this objection must be invalid.

Very few people would maintain that psychology and sociology are utterly unscientific. The advances in the field of psychiatry, for example, indicate that men have gained some scientific understanding of the psychological basis of conduct. Sociology is an even younger science; yet its achievements are sufficient to permit such impressive works as the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* and the report of the President’s Research Committee on Social Trends.²⁴ We must conclude, therefore, that free will, if it does exist, must be such as to permit a science of human life.

The human personality, most of us would say, is to some extent free. Such freedom consists neither in the blind operation of lifeless, unthinking forces, as in a landslide, nor in sheer indeterminism, which is equally blind. Nothing is so fatal as an accident, and nothing is more accidental than an undetermined event. As Santayana has said:

The notion that absolute freedom might save many a critical situation, and that in general the intervention of groundless movements would tend towards a happy issue rests upon a com-

plete confusion. It is the gambler's fallacy. Empty possibility seems to him full of promise; but in fact sheer chance, throwing dice, would seldom throw sixes. The only force that really tends towards happy results is the innate force of the soul herself. . . .²⁵

Real freedom, as contrasted with the bogus freedom of "indeterminism," involves the causal efficacy of intelligence, imagination, and character. This conception of the free personality, as a part of nature, and yet a power in its own right, is entirely compatible with scientific prediction and control; it simply insists that human nature, as purposive, is a force to be reckoned with. Psychology and sociology, in any event, have made important advances, and this fact is sufficient indication that "free will" does not preclude a scientific treatment of human problems.

5. *The Argument Based upon the "Superiority" of Nonrational Faculties*

Another argument, unlike the preceding one, does not necessarily deny the possibility of a science of values, but does question its worth. The scientific approach to human welfare merits little respect, it is maintained, because values are best apprehended in nonscientific ways. The pro-Fascist English writer, Major J. S. Barnes, has advanced this point of view:

It is impossible to turn life into a system. Life is an art and should be conceived as a work of art, which is the expression of an intuition. . . . This intuitive outlook, typical of the Italian peasant, represents indeed the central active principle of the Fascist *Weltanschauung*, in contrast to the rationalistic and analytical temper of the centuries that have just flown by.²⁶

Barnes is certainly right in maintaining that the Fascists stress other factors than intelligence. This is true even of Pareto, since he would base valuation, and much of action, upon sentiment.

There is a partial validity in this point of view: no one can deny the tremendous importance of emotion and imagination in achieving the good life. But intelligence is also required, for two reasons. First, it is notorious that emotions or esthetic impressions may be in conflict. There is often disagreement among men, or even within a single mind at different times. Scientific thought is required to adjust such conflicts. Second, emotion and imagination, when too exclusive, merely lead to prejudice. Sex and religion, for example, are intensely emotionalized, and it is well known that thought in these respects is apt to be fanatical. Men speak of "blind love," and sexual antagonisms are notoriously blind. The imagination also has its special forms of bias: it admires the grand gesture, the tragic spectacle, the aristocratic display. If Napoleon had not captivated the imagination of France, and been duped by his own imagination, he could never have turned Europe into a bloody shambles. The appeal of Fascism, at the present time, is greatly heightened by its glitter and false heroics.

Undoubtedly values involve much more than mere abstract thought; but this fact does not mean that they are exempt from criticism. It is one thing to cherish, and quite another thing to discover reasons why the object should be cherished, or why, perchance, the cherishing is misdirected. Thus I may love, but to reflect upon that love, and to determine its validity, is not in itself an act of loving. The solution of life's problems requires such critical evaluation, and not just spontaneous liking or disliking. The proper alternative to an overemphasis upon reason is not the opposite extreme of caprice.

6. *The Argument Based on the History of Science*

Scientists, it is often said, have gradually discarded explanations in terms of values. They have abandoned the sacred

numbers of Pythagorean mathematics, the occult forces of medieval chemistry, the lucky and unlucky stars of the ancient astronomers. Kepler's "argument," that the sun must be the center of the universe because it is very beautiful and dignified, can now only provoke a smile. Newton's belief, that space and time are the sensorium of God, can no longer appeal to scientists, as such. Science, it is maintained, has advanced only when it has rid itself of all religious and ethical notions, and has looked upon reality as absolutely neutral. As soon as the social sciences reach maturity they also will renounce all notions of good and evil.

Pareto on the whole accepts this point of view. Within certain limits, he takes as his model the "natural sciences," and eschews both religion and metaphysics, in which "sentiments" are said to color the results:

We are trying to follow in sociology the path trodden before us by astronomers, physicists, chemists, geologists, botanists, zoologists, physiologists, in short, by all natural scientists of modern times; and to avoid, so far as within us lies, the road that led the Church Fathers to denying the existence of antipodes, and Hegel to prattling about mechanics, chemistry and other similar sciences—and which is generally followed by metaphysicists, theologians, and men of letters in studies that they pretend deal with facts of nature but which in reality are a mere hotch-potch of sentiments.²⁷

This argument, at first glance, appears remote from anything advanced by the Fascists. It is based upon a plea for scientific objectivity, whereas the Fascists are inclined to cast objectivity to the winds. Yet Hitler and Mussolini are not opposed to the natural sciences so far as they can make use of them. They are delighted with a chemical science which manufactures poison gas (used in conquering Ethiopia), or which creates synthetic products to take the place of foreign imports. The Fascists do not want to destroy the natural sciences, but they do want these sciences to be put to the

"right" uses. Pareto's theory suits them perfectly in this respect. It exempts ethics and religion from the control of scientific method, but otherwise retains science. The *ends* which science is made to serve can then be determined by "character," by the "imponderables," in other words, by the Fascist *Weltanschauung*. If this point of view prevails, the scientist, as such, is not able to remonstrate, since no scientist, in his professional capacity, is permitted to criticize ends.

Unquestionably the argument possesses some validity: ethics and physics are distinct. Pareto rightly points to the errors which arise from allowing one's sense of the "ought" to influence one's sense of what "is." But those who advance the argument usually take a great deal for granted. First, they assume that all sciences are in this respect alike. Since values fall outside the scope of certain sciences, it is presumed by some writers that they fall beyond the range of science altogether. This assumption is surely uncritical. We admit that it is nonsense to speak of naughty atoms; but is it nonsense to speak of bad men? What is true of rocks or carrots or tigers, may not be true of human beings. Even in the case of tigers, a different level of reality is reached; certain restricted references to value are no longer silly. Some biologists maintain, on the basis of experimental data, that the higher animals are goal-seeking creatures, and that the purely mechanistic account of their behavior is inadequate. At any rate, when we reach man, the problem of scientific description is a distinctive one. Think of man's esthetic, erotic, religious, and philosophical activities, think of his struggles in war and revolution, think of his endeavors to subdue nature to his ends. It would be a hardy mechanist who would maintain that all these activities take place without any purposes or ideals operating as causes. Valuations actually occur, and no theory of man's life that refuses to recognize them can pretend to be true or scientific.

Pareto, of course, admits that human beings have likes and

dislikes, and indeed he lays great stress upon these factors of preference. In this sense, he does not reduce "social science" to the level of "physical science," and hence is not subject to the criticism contained in the preceding paragraph. On the other hand, he does not endeavor scientifically to gauge the validity of human valuations, and indeed he denies the possibility of doing so. In insisting on the purely descriptive character of all science, he is "reducing" the account of human valuations to the nonnormative level. This is to neglect what is most distinctive about them; namely, their claim to validity.

The so-called normative aspect of values cannot simply be brushed aside; we cannot be content to surrender our ideals to the whimsy of mere emotionalism. As Edward L. Thorndike, speaking as President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, has pertinently remarked:

It is certainly undesirable for men of science to restrict their thinking to what is and will be, leaving to propagandists and reformers and talkers the decisions about what ought to be. Is any group of thinkers qualified to study the wants of mankind, the consequences of acts and events, and the improvement of human valuations without reliance on the facts and methods of anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics, government and other sciences of man? Can science avoid the responsibility of trying what impartial curiosity and honest work can accomplish in this field of controversy and prejudice?²⁸

Surely there is more promise in this recommendation of a distinguished psychologist than in the immemorial reliance upon emotional bias. Granted that certain sciences must exclude the thoughtful evaluation of human objectives, it does not follow that all sciences should do so.

The proponents of this argument also assume that the methods that science has fruitfully employed in the past must necessarily continue without extension or modification. But this is to overlook the progressive character of science,

whose techniques and objectives are by no means static. It is true that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was a tendency to restrict science to the quantitative aspects of reality. The world was at times conceived as a huge, uniform machine, the laws of which could be expressed mathematically. Galileo banned values from the realm of science, and Hobbes tried to reduce all life to the mechanical level. But today we are not satisfied with these restrictions. We are now insisting that science include the qualitative: the esthetic structure, the social relations, the weal and woe of human life—all these are present in experience and demand a rational interpretation. In particular, many of us who are greatly distressed by the extent of human misery recognize the prime importance of the social sciences, and believe that scientists in these fields must manifest a deep concern for human welfare. We are no longer content with an abstract economics that fails to take account of suffering, and that merely contributes, by reason of its very abstractness, to the dehumanization of industry. Similarly, we must challenge a political science that has no clear conception of the proper goal of statesmanship.

7. *The Argument Based on the Prevalence of Ethical Intuitions*

We are often told that science uses experiment and induction as much as possible and intuition as little as possible. For example, Pareto contrasts genuine scientific concepts with the "concepts that the human mind finds in itself, as some say, without the aid of objective experience."²⁹ We all recognize that people who have a frequent recourse to the "self-evident" are not of a scientific temper. Consider the statement of Herr Goebbels: "Christ cannot possibly have been a Jew. I don't have to prove that scientifically. It is a fact."³⁰ This "fact," though perhaps "self-evident" to the

Nazi Minister of Propaganda, is surely open to question. If value judgments are, in a similar manner, "immediate" and "intuitive," there is every reason to question their scientific status. Yet such judgments are commonly said to rest upon "conscience" or "taste." Hence Pareto and others have concluded that they lie beyond the scope of science.

If all people relied as much as the Fascists do upon "intuition" or "instinct," the argument that we are now considering would be a crushing one. The typically Nazi approach to problems of social ethics is disclosed in the following passage from Alfred Rosenberg:

Richard Wagner once uttered a marvellously wise aphorism for all educators. He said that man in his creative endeavor cannot always be sure of what he wants, but he can almost invariably recognize what he does not want. If he only casts aside all those things which in his heart he finds antagonistic, his instinct will lead him to those things which correspond to his character. . . . The National Socialist movement undoubtedly takes upon itself a great responsibility, but it does so because it is sustained by a *great faith in the truthfulness of its instincts*.³¹

To the extent that such a view prevails, there certainly can be no science of values.

Yet we may question whether the mere presence of an intuitive element, if kept within bounds, is sufficient to render a field of thought nonscientific. It is impossible to demonstrate absolutely everything, since a few principles must be used even in the first demonstration. There are a few basic principles and postulates in every science that must be taken for granted. So long as these are reduced to the minimum, and subjected to a rigorous criticism which eliminates questionable or redundant elements, the scientific attitude has not been abandoned.

But the contention that we are now considering is that value-theory relies almost exclusively upon intuition as the guide to knowledge. Those who think this surely underesti-

mate the sophistication of modern thinkers. Almost everybody knows that "conscience" is not an infallible guide to right and wrong. There is no greater commonplace of history or daily experience than the fact that human beings conscientiously differ as to what constitutes right conduct. The conscience of St. Francis is not that of Savonarola; the scruples of Dostoevski do not coincide with those of Lenin. To resolve such conflicts, men must resort to evidence and reflection—in other words, to science, in the wide meaning of the term. It is only at the nonscientific level of thinking that intuitions abound.

As a foundation for a science of values, no more than three ethical intuitions would seem to be required. First, there can be no such science unless men recognize that there *are* values. Hence we may say that the intuition that some experiences are better (or worse) than others is indispensable. There would seem to be no risk of error involved in this intuition. Values of some sort actually occur, and we have only to live to be aware of some of them.

Second, there must be an intuition as to what *is* the good (or evil). This intuition should be highly critical. The investigator must undertake to rid himself of misunderstandings, prejudices, irrelevant considerations, and inadequacies in his own experience of values. He must not confuse what is good as a means with what is good as an end. He must not attribute existence to unreal abstractions, such as a bare pleasure, apart from some further content. So far as possible, he should isolate the factor which he regards as good, to see if it is really good when considered by itself, or whether the good depends upon some associated factor. Finally, he should check his conclusion against the judgment of other careful thinkers, so as to reduce the likelihood of error. Such an intuition is highly sophisticated, and may properly be considered as an integral part of a "science" of values. (If after such critical intuition the investigator still finds himself in dis-

agreement with other ethical thinkers, he should not conclude that he has reached an impasse. He may persuade others of his point of view, and even if methods of persuasion fail, he may be able to cooperate with them in the pursuit of concrete goals. A "united front," for practical purposes, may be maintained among people who differ in points of theory.)

A third intuition is that good should be promoted, and evil should be reduced. It is wrong to choose the worse when one can choose the better. It is wrong to choose one's own lesser good in place of someone else's greater good. No type of bias, such as egoism, racialism, or nationalism, can justify the rejection of the greater good, as this would be estimated by an impartial and accurate judge. This intuition is the basis of moral objectivity; it is indispensable if the scientific attitude of impartiality is to be maintained. I do not see that any further "intuitions" are required.

8. *The Argument Based upon the Supposed Inefficacy of Reason*

Next, the Fascist may contend that a science of values, however much a *desideratum*, is a practical impossibility. Human beings, it may be said, merely employ thought in this field to excuse what instinct or sentiment dictates.

This argument bulks very large in Pareto's treatise. Ideals and ethical systems, he maintains, are products of pseudo-reasoning used to mask the real facts. In employing thought in this manner, most people even deceive themselves:

Civilized peoples naïvely imagine that they follow in practice the principles of a certain theoretical ethics. In point of fact, they act very differently indeed and then resort to subtle interpretations and ingenious casuistries to reconcile theory and practice that are ever and anon discordant.³²

This naïveté, which characterizes the masses, does not extend to the more wily of the élite. The latter become conscious of the use of sophisms and rationalizations and cunningly employ them to dupe the masses.

Thus Pareto, who had for the most part lost faith in the liberal ideals of his generation, adopted a cynical, nihilistic interpretation of ethical thought. Mussolini closely resembles him in this respect. His theories exhibit a curious duality: he speaks loftily of the idealistic outlook of Fascism, yet he finds that the stark facts are summed up in the ancient phrase, "man a wolf to man." Sometimes he frankly says that the accepted ideals merely serve to mask the ugly realities:

I see the world as it actually is; that is a world of unbridled egoism. Were the world a pastoral Arcadia, it would be a very pleasant and beautiful thing to spend the time among the nymphs and shepherds. But I do not see this Arcadia. And even when I look at the great flags of great principles fluttering in the wind, I do not fail to perceive that behind these flags, more or less hallowed, are hidden egoistic interests seeking their place in the sun.³³

Such unreserved cynicism repeatedly appears in Fascist writings. If this were indeed an adequate account of human life, our boasted ideals could never be more than sentimental vaporings or clever disguises. To make matters worse, Pareto contends that "human nature" is practically unalterable. His constant emphasis is upon the *invariant* factors that underlie the variable disguises. According to this typically Fascist point of view, whatever basic failings human beings now have they will continue to exhibit in the future.

The plausibility of Pareto's indictment of human thought depends upon presenting a great many examples of sophistry and rationalization, and the refutation similarly depends upon amassing counter evidence. What is required is a his-

tory of human wisdom, which presents the mass of evidence counter to Pareto. Obviously such a demonstration is impossible within abbreviated space.³⁴

Let us assume, however, for the sake of argument, that Pareto is right. It would not follow that what has been prevalent in the past must be equally prevalent in the future. Whatever may be the depths of folly, there are surely degrees: one man is more utterly biased than another. Although no one is able to achieve the life of reason consistently, a man can approach closer to this state than many of his fellows. Socrates was less a slave of passion than Alcibiades, and Confucius was more impartial than Genghis Khan. Just as one individual may differ from another in degree of rationality, so one period of time may be more nearly rational than another. We are not forever condemned to the thought processes of the voodoo man.

The fact that rationalizations can be detected is indication that they can often be guarded against. This is the conclusion of Karl Mannheim, the author of *Ideology and Utopia*, who has given much thought to the present problem. He finds that one of the main characteristics of our age is the tendency to unmask rationalizations, and he believes that this fact affords ample ground for hope:

Even in our personal life we become masters of ourselves only when the unconscious motivations which formerly existed behind our backs suddenly come into our field of vision and thereby become accessible to conscious control. Man attains objectivity . . . not by giving up his will to action and holding his evaluations in abeyance but in confronting and examining himself.³⁵

Mannheim is as much aware as Pareto of the influence of nonlogical factors upon life and thought, but he thinks that this very awareness, if it becomes general, will be the prelude to far more objective social science.

His suggestion, in the above passage, that we should not give up the will to action, also provides a contrast with

Pareto's separation of theory from practice based on value sentiments. This suggestion has a bearing upon the question we are now discussing. May not the seeming inefficacy of reason be the result of failure in actual life to link thought with action? Unless we take steps to put our judgments into operation, we should not be surprised to find them ineffectual.

Two other famous thinkers, Freud and Marx, may be mentioned in connection with Pareto's argument. Sigmund Freud has stressed the human proneness to rationalize, but he has worked out psychological techniques whereby rationalizations can be detected and guarded against. In so far as psychoanalysis is sound, it offers an antidote for the very disease which Pareto regards as hopeless. Karl Marx has emphasized the falsity of many ideologies, but he believes that profound social change may be a means of restoring honesty and vigor to human thought. He contends that false ideologies spring mainly from the decay of social classes. When a ruling class has outlived its usefulness to society as a whole, it must mask the facts from the people and from its own conscience in order to survive.

The false ideology of Fascism may be accounted for on this basis. Its capitalistic foundation and materialistic interests have been elaborately masked by an "idealistic" creed. Professor Gaudens Megaro has shown, for example, that Mussolini has been a "double advocate" to an amazing degree. Before his sudden conversion to Fascism, he was making such declarations as the following: "Down with the State in all its forms and incarnations." "We are positively against every form of dictatorship." "Imagine an Italy in which thirty-six million citizens should all think in the same mould . . . and you would have . . . the kingdom of boredom and imbecility." "The national flag is a rag to be planted on a dunghill." "God does not exist. In science, religion is an absurdity; in practice, it is immorality; and in men, it is a disease." "Mili-

tarism! Here is the monstrous polyp with a thousand viscous tentacles that sucks unceasingly the blood and best energies of peoples!" Now that his purpose is different, Mussolini talks in an entirely different vein. After considering Mussolini's somersaults, Megaro concludes that "nationalism, patriotism, Italy, the interests of the Italian people are mere words to him, mere symbols of sentiments which he can and does use and exploit to his own advantage with superlative effectiveness."³⁶ Unquestionably many Fascist pronouncements must similarly be classified as masks and shibboleths which conceal the essential interests of the dictatorship.

The remedy for such a situation, according to Marx, is not to lapse into irrationalism or despair, but to mobilize the forces for social change. In a just society men will have no need to shy away from realistic thought, and the officials will not need disguises. Freud thus affords a psychological technique for combating false ideologies, and Marx advocates a revolutionary social technique.

Whether or not we accept the specific point of view of Mannheim, Freud, Marx, or some other of similar persuasion, we can hardly deny the significance of the contrast between a theory such as that of Pareto, who regards the failings of human thought as practically irreducible, and the theories of equally erudite thinkers, who believe that the mind is subject to discipline and correction. The evidence is almost overwhelming in favor of the second type of theory. We know far too much about the civilizing influence of culture, and the modifiability of human nature as a result of education and social reconstruction, to believe that human nature is cast in an utterly rigid mold.

9. *The Argument Based on the Relativity of Values*

The relativist asserts that values vary so much from person to person, or from group to group, that science is inappli-

cable to the determination of ideals. What is one man's meat is another man's poison; but reason involves some degree of universality, and hence there is no use in disputing about tastes.

Pareto fully endorses this point of view. He asserts that "the concepts various individuals have of what is good for them and good for others are essentially heterogeneous, and there is no way of reducing them to unity."³⁷ All that the various definitions of the "highest good," or even the plain "good," have in common, is that each definition is "agreeable" to its proponents.³⁸ "Social reformers" who attempt to escape from this subjective bias are merely deluding themselves.³⁹

This conception of ethical relativity has also been accepted by the Fascists. In an article entitled "Relativity and Fascism," which appeared in the *Popolo d'Italia* November 22, 1921, Mussolini himself champions the relativistic position. Endeavoring to go the relativists one better, he defines Fascism as "super-relativity." The Fascists, he asserts, display their extremely relativistic outlook by refusing to give a definite form to their program, and by recognizing "in life and action an absolute supremacy over intelligence." The theory of "super-relativity" is linked to Nietzsche, whose "will to power" is said to represent relativistic ethics as applied to individual and nation.⁴⁰

The American Fascist, Lawrence Dennis, similarly connects relativity with the forcible exercise of power. Like Pareto, he contends that values are wholly subjective. Two people or two nations may be equally justified "in choosing and pursuing a diametrically opposite set of objectives."⁴¹ In case of a conflict of wills, the ultimate arbiter is force:

The assumption that right, independent of might, can ever be anything but a figment of the imagination, or that might does not make right, or that a given norm of right can prevail except by might, is invariably refuted by the conflict which always follows

an attempt to assert a right without might or against a superior might. Indeed, the falsity of such assumptions may be said to be proved by every standing army, every police force, every governmental act of coercion, and every war or successful revolution. . . . What is the sense of "X" building up a system of concepts of right or ethics to prove that "a" equals "b," if "Y" has interests or volitions which make it impossible for him to accept the premises and moral equations of that system? So far as those ethical propositions or moral values and the persons "X" and "Y" are concerned, there is but one determining factor—force.⁴²

The argument of the ancient Sophists is here revived, as it has been many times in the past.

There are three parts to the argument: first, that extreme ethical relativism is a fact; second, that this fact precludes a scientific approach to values; and third, that force, rather than persuasion, must consequently be the arbiter of ethical disputes. All three parts may be challenged.

In the first place, a little reflection will disclose that there are definite limits to relativity. According to the relativists, "goodness" is based simply upon the subjective bias of each individual. The good is what each individual likes. Very well. We will then have the following type of situation:

- Mr. A. likes power.
- Mr. B. likes knowledge.
- Mr. C. likes art.
- Mr. D. likes friendship.
- Mr. E. likes physical exercise.
- Mr. X. likes travel.

The list could be extended indefinitely, although soon we should find that there are people who like the same things. Let us, for the present, disregard this circumstance. Is there anything in common between these various individuals? Obviously there is. They all "like" something. Is there anything in common between all the objects listed? Yes, of course—they are all objects of "liking." Now let us give to "liking" and its opposite, "disliking," the name of "interest." We can

then say that, in all such experiences of value, there is an interest in an object, or an object of interest. Hence, there is a kind of universality after all.

Alternative language may be employed by the relativists, but the result will be substantially the same. I know of one relativist who says that goodness simply means "end-of-action," and the ends selected may vary. Let us assume that this is true. All of ethics will then involve ends-of-action. "Action" in turn will be found to depend upon volition, feeling, and oftentimes judgment. Hence again there is a kind of universality.

Let us now take our universal factor—call it "interest" or purposive "action"—and subject it to analysis. Psychology and the social sciences should be able to throw a great deal of light upon the meaning of this concept. The composition, genesis, varieties, and mutations of interest (or purposive "action") can be studied with great care. The result will be to deepen our sense of what value means, and a considerable measure of agreement can surely be reached.

Superficially, there is an irreconcilable divergence between the main theories of value, yet the difference tends to disappear in the sphere of practice. Hedonism, voluntarism, self-realizationism, the "interest theory," and relativism—to mention the theories most commonly accepted—seem to differ widely as to what constitutes "goodness"; and yet all these theories would agree, for example, that normally a man should eat when he is hungry. The hedonist would say that the man should eat to attain pleasure and to avoid displeasure; the voluntarist would assert that the man should eat to satisfy his desire and to avoid frustration; the "self-realizationist" would declare that the man should eat in order to actualize his potentialities and to avoid thwarting his nature; the advocate of the interest theory would contend that the man should eat to fulfill his interest (*i.e.*, his affective-volitional preference) and to avoid negative in-

terest or dislike; the relativist would maintain that the man should eat to realize this specific end-of-action. But all the theories would agree that the man should eat!

What do the theories have in common which accounts for this agreement in practice? The answer, I think, is that the good depends in every instance upon the existence and satisfaction of a want. If the man did not *want* to taste the food, if in other words he had no relish for the taste, he would not get pleasure from eating; nor would he have a desire to satisfy; nor would he have a tendency to realize; nor would he have an interest to fulfill; nor would he have a specific end-of-action to attain. All these theories of value depend either directly or indirectly upon the existence of human wants. If we were all as impassive as sticks or stones, if there were never a flicker of inclination, there would be no good or evil so far as we are concerned. Hence all the theories can agree upon the desirability of satisfying the basic wants of man.⁴³

Not only do values depend upon wants, but human beings in great measure agree in what they do want. The values of love and warmth and sunshine and rest and food are universal, or nearly so. The subtler values which depend upon training and personal endowment are manifestly less universal; but our confidence in them need not be shaken upon this account. The familiar fact that taste *can* be intelligently cultivated shows that there are principles of growth and development. "Disagreements" in this sphere, moreover, do not usually involve a conflict about the same thing; analysis reveals that the disputants are really talking about quite different things. Thus two people may "disagree" about the value of a certain musical performance; but one of them grasps the musical relations, whereas the other finds the form too difficult to follow. Each one hears something different, and it is not surprising that they differ in their appraisals. Disagreements about social ideals are likewise at

times much more apparent than real. As Harold Laski has pointed out, such differences are often "a function of the different social conditions that we confront." Thus no one should demand that a backward industrial country cling to the same ideals as an advanced country, and "no one would expect Aristotle today to defend the institution of slavery." ⁴⁴

Since human beings are sufficiently alike to permit a science of psychology, they must be enough alike, we contend, to permit a certain community of values. Every value in a man's life is based upon some property of human nature. The question of its validity is whether it is well based or not. When the inclinations and needs of human beings are not rightly understood, the values are apt to be superficial or confusedly apprehended. The business of the ethical thinker is not to deny facts in behalf of ideals, nor to neglect ideals out of respect for "brute" facts. It is to discover man's basic needs and potentialities, and realistically to plan a course of action for the steady realization of those goods which otherwise would be partial and fleeting. The problem is one of estimating human nature and its opportunities truly: it is similar to the problem of psychology, except that the facts are approached from a different angle. If human beings contrasted with one another as sharply as men contrast with rats, we should have to abandon both psychology and ethics. Finding our differences irreconcilable, we could only resort to flight or mutual extermination. But it would appear that human nature is no mere figment of the imagination: men, being somewhat alike, can meet on common ground and erect principles to govern their behavior. The very existence of social institutions indicates that they can, on occasion, do this.

Unless we assume that there is a very radical disparity between human beings, there is nothing in relativism that precludes science. Granted that wants vary to some extent from person to person, or from group to group, there would

still be the scientific problem of eliminating conflicts. As Samuel Alexander has said, ethics is the answer to the problem of reconciling the manifold likes and dislikes of many people.⁴⁵ A science of human welfare would not call in question these divergent preferences unless they seriously obstruct each other. Instead, its effort would be to indicate the conditions for the fullest and most varied realization of values. No one should expect an artist and an engineer to choose the same values, but thoughtful men should try to discover how such diverse values could be combined in a harmonious society. Here is a problem whose urgency would only be increased by the fact of ethical relativism; and the task of achieving such a harmonization of values could certainly not be resolved in a purely thoughtless way. Science would not be abolished; its function would merely be reinterpreted.

The plain fact, we may safely conclude, is that human beings are a good deal alike. They have similar biological natures, they are born into a common world, and they must learn to live as citizens and neighbors. Fortunately they do differ, since no one cares for standardized robots. These differences should be accepted as welcome variations upon the basic theme of life. Unless men's minds have been so poisoned that they refuse to reason they should be able to find ways of enjoying, or at least adjusting, their differences.

To maintain, as do many of the Fascists, that might makes right, is to overlook the degree to which human wants are identical or can be intelligently harmonized. Even in the jungle, there is a great deal of cooperation between animals, and some toleration of divergencies. I see no reason why human beings should descend lower than the jungle. We have every reason at the present time to insist upon persuasion, tolerance, and mutual aid. If the opposite creed prevails, London and New York will eventually suffer the same wartime fate as Addis Ababa, Madrid, and Shanghai;

and all that we most cherish may ultimately be shattered. The Fascists are willing to admit a community of interest on a national or a racial basis (forcibly excluding certain elements); but their insistence upon the relativity of values as between races or nations may prove fatal to civilization. Professor Tawney has remarked that clever men emphasize the differences which separate them from their fellows and wise men emphasize what they have in common. This remark applies upon an international scale.

10. *The Argument Based on the "Ought"*

This objection to a science of values rests on the distinction between facts and ideals. It would seem that no man could deny the contrast between what *is* and what *ought to be*. Man's soaring visions of a better world are obviously different from the concrete muddle of actuality. History is full of crimes and calamities; what happens is one thing, and what ought to happen is often another. Hence, it may be said, we cannot use a scientific technique, which is adapted to the study of facts, in an effort to determine ideals. Facts are discovered by investigation; values are formulated by imagination and sentiment.

This is an argument of which Pareto is fond. He repeatedly asserts that the moral imperative is too subjective a thing to be based on science. The term "ought," he says, "does not correspond to any concrete reality," and takes us "out of the experimental field."⁴⁶ Closely related to the concept of "ought" is that of "duty," which Pareto also finds beyond the scope of science:

What in the world is this thing "duty" that has suddenly popped up? Everybody has his answer—the illiterate, the educated man, the philosopher, all alike; and we go from the childish answer of the plain man to the abstruse, but from the logico-experimental standpoint no better, theory of the metaphysicist.⁴⁷

According to Pareto, facts are one thing, ethical imperatives are quite another. Only facts can be dealt with by science.

The Fascist attitude towards duties and ideals is not so consistent as Pareto's, but the upshot is much the same. The Fascists boast of being guided solely by facts rather than by weak-kneed ideals. In this mood, they will speak of "what the laws of nature demand" (Göring), or reject the "fable" of "human brotherhood" (Mussolini). Similarly, James Drennan, the English Fascist, quotes with approval the following statement of Spengler:

. . . In the historical world there are no ideals, but only facts—no truths, but only facts. There is no reason, no honesty, no equity, no final aim, but only facts, and anyone who does not realize this should write books on politics—let him not try to *make* politics.⁴⁸

In another mood, Fascist "idealism" comes to the fore, and politics are said to rest upon a moral, and even a mystical, foundation. Thus we find Camillo Pellizi, one of the early contributors to Fascist doctrine, writing as follows:

We start out with the idea that politics is an original creation of the spirit and that the spirit realizes itself in politics as an absolute responsibility to itself and to its own action and in politics creates its own moral personality. . . . Not every deed of man is consequently good, but every deed of man that is inspired by this total, mystical responsibility.⁴⁹

From the standpoint of Pellizi, ideals are based upon an inner, mystical prompting, whereas from the point of view of Spengler, ideals are simply dismissed in favor of "facts." According to both, there can be no scientific determination of values.

The problem we are considering is a serious one. If science is a knowledge of *existence*, and an "ideal" or "norm" is what ought to be but *is not*, the conception of a "normative science" is contradictory. Modern thinkers have been deeply

disturbed by this apparent contradiction. The remedy, we shall contend, is to remove the sharp antithesis between facts and ideals.

What is the basis in actuality of obligations and ideals? There must be some basis, since an ideal is false if it is irrelevant to life. "Only a morality frankly relative to man's nature," as Santayana has remarked, "is worthy of man, being at once vital and rational, martial and generous; whereas absolutism smells of fustiness as well as of faggots."⁵⁰ The principle of all sound idealism is implied in the saying of Christ: "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath." A valid ideal is a plan of action for the satisfaction of genuine needs, and as such refers to what exists.

A need arises when there is an impulse that is frustrated, or at least, unconsummated. We *need* food when we are hungry, companionship when we are lonely, information when we are curious. We may define a need as an *authoritative want*: strong and durable enough to be worthy of our attention, and compatible with a working harmony among our various desires. Most men, for example, have a real need to love; because the sexual impulse is a fundamental part of man's nature, and love blends well with other positive values. On the other hand, there is little or no need to walk a tight rope; because the mastery of this difficult art corresponds to nothing deep in human nature, and would consume much time that could be devoted to the satisfaction of other wants.

Here we are on scientific ground; there are techniques for finding out what people want. An interesting method was adopted by the engineers and technicians who conducted the National Survey of Potential Product Capacity. This survey, made under the auspices of the United States Government, calculated the extent to which our productive resources could satisfy the wants and needs of our population if the American economic system should function to the full extent of its capacity. One of the tasks of the survey was to dis-

cover what the American people do require in the way of goods and services to achieve desirable living standards. This problem, declares Harold Loeb, one of the directors of the survey, "did not prove as difficult as might be expected."⁵¹

The survey experts recognized that the way people spend their money is one of the surest indications of what they want. Since money is itself a measure of market value, it provides an objective indication of the character and intensity of wants so far as these can be satisfied through ordinary purchases. This method, however, is largely inapplicable to the poor, since they want many things which they cannot possibly afford. Also the method does not work very well in reference to the rich, since they have so much money that they can indulge in fantastic and idle expenditures. Consequently, the National Survey investigated the spending of an intermediate group; namely, families with an average yearly income of \$6,000. The experts decided that the clothes purchased by members of this income group in the area of Berkeley, California (a typical city in terms of living costs), would be a fair indication of what human beings want in the way of clothing when they are not hampered by poverty nor spoiled by luxury. Now this method can be applied to many types of goods and services, and a schedule of typical wants can thus be prepared.

The survey also made use of other methods. In the case of food, it was quite reasonably assumed that most people would like to enjoy a "liberal diet" as defined by the specialists of the United States Department of Agriculture. This diet includes "just what a family requires in the way of foodstuffs in our climate in order to maintain the maximum efficiency and growth, and to provide meals gratifying to the taste."⁵² Next the survey depended upon the advice of recognized medical authorities as to what is required for proper medical care. In education, the budget was determined by the au-

thorities at Teachers College, Columbia University, etc. Scientific standards were thus worked out as to what would satisfy the fundamental wants and needs of human beings. The National Survey discovered that the chief requirements in goods and services could be defined with scientific precision.

Various psychological techniques can also be of great assistance in determining what human beings want. A good example is afforded by the investigations of Dr. G. V. Hamilton, Director of Psychobiological Research for the Bureau of Social Hygiene, New York City. He has made a detailed study of patients afflicted with nervous disorders. Such people suffer from the frustration of major cravings; hence, by studying these cases intensively, a skilled psychiatrist can determine which cravings are so basic that a denial of them produces neurosis. After an examination of two hundred nervous cases, Hamilton reached the following conclusion.

Productive occupation, access to familiar sources of gregarious satisfaction, harmonious domestic conditions, freedom to pursue and opportunities for pursuing various sexual-romantic values, conditions which make for the incidence of a considerable variety of stimulation,—these factors must enter into the life of the average individual if his reactive equipment is to function smoothly.⁵³

The “creative type” of person must in addition secure constructive expression for his artistic, scientific, or inventive bent. Hamilton not only gives a general account of human cravings, but points to many specific inclinations, especially those of a sexual nature.

Another attempt to work out a schedule of human wants occurs in the writing of the Chicago sociologist, William I. Thomas. In his extensive study, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*,⁵⁴ he investigates the disorganization of personalities under the trying conditions of migration from the “old country” to the “new.” After many case studies of

the struggles of these Polish immigrants, Thomas concludes that the great variety of human wishes may be reduced to the following general classification:

1. The desire for new experience.
2. The desire for security.
3. The desire for response (love, intimacy, friendship).
4. The desire for recognition (status, reputation).

This classification is very similar to the conclusions reached by Hamilton.

These and similar studies prove that wants can be subjected to scientific investigation. *There is no necessity of relying upon the vague "intuitions" of the Fascists. Plans for the betterment of human life can be worked out upon the basis of very definite knowledge of the major human cravings.*

One great difficulty, however, is that wants often conflict, both within a single personality and between persons. Hence, certain wants must be sacrificed to others. How shall we assign weights in determining which should be sacrificed?

Fascism's answer is to accept certain types of bias. The biases of race, nation, class, sex, etc., determine which wants the Fascists choose to sacrifice. The wants of a Jew, for example, are to be sacrificed to those of an "Aryan"; the wants of a woman are to receive less consideration than those of a man; the wants of an employee are to be less respected than those of an employer. (Chapter IV will be devoted to proving that these biases predominate under Fascism.) The principles which should govern a more objective approach to the problem may be outlined somewhat as follows:

First, the more durable satisfactions are generally to be preferred to the less durable. Other things being equal, a lasting good is obviously better than a transient good.

Second, the more basic and intense satisfactions are generally to be preferred to the more superficial. Clearly, if some-

thing has to be sacrificed, we should give up satisfaction of our minor cravings rather than of our major cravings. Renunciation of the former does not involve great loss, whereas denial of the latter produces mental disease and misery. We have already indicated that science can discover which cravings are fundamental.

Third, the more certain satisfactions are usually to be preferred to the less certain. We must, like insurance companies, consider the factor of risk. This justifies a certain preference in favor of beings near us in time and space and similar to us in nature, since distance and unfamiliarity obscure the effects of our actions. *The Fascists, however, put far too much stress upon this factor.* In their opportunism, they tend to sacrifice ultimate welfare for the sake of an immediate advantage; and their racial and nationalistic prejudices cruelly restrict their sympathies. Under modern conditions of communication and rapid mobility, moreover, we can often determine the effects of choices upon alien or distant people with a high degree of accuracy.

Fourth, the more harmonious satisfactions are ordinarily to be preferred to the less harmonious. As Bertrand Russell has wittily remarked, love is usually better than murder, because love suits both parties and murder suits only one. In the event of conflict, there is suffering or deprivation. We may accordingly classify sources of satisfaction roughly as follows:

| <i>Generally Concordant</i> | <i>Generally Discordant</i> |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Love | Tyrannical power over people |
| Wisdom | Bigotry |
| Health | Acquisitiveness |
| Sense of workmanship | Military prowess |
| Devotion to beauty | Racial or nationalistic pride |
| Economic security, etc. | Various immoderate satisfactions, etc. |

Now the chief fault of Fascist values is that they tend to fall into the discordant class. They intensify conflicts which are the main sources of misery. The science of welfare, in con-

trast, would study the fundamental causes of conflict and seek to remove them.

These principles must be considered conjointly and balanced against each other. The ultimate objective of securing the greatest possible surplus of satisfaction over dissatisfaction must be kept in mind and should determine which wants are to be regarded as *genuine needs*.

We are now prepared to summarize the process of formulating and testing ideals. There is a need, to be determined in the manner we have just indicated, which gives rise to a certain "ideal" as to how the need can be met. This ideal is a *plan of action*, constructed as a result of appraising present and past experience, but involving an element of uncertainty because of its prospective character. In order to reduce this factor of uncertainty, we must ask ourselves, "What acts can we perform that will bring to light the data that we need in order to verify our objectives?" The problem, as John Dewey has stated it, is

to break up our judgment of choice, or act to be performed, into a number of acts as specific as possible, so that flexible reappraisal can be performed with a minimum of waste. No "ideal" is ever realized off-hand or wholesale. We only embody it through acts in such ways that its meaning becomes clearer, so that we get the possibility of a further intelligent act.⁵⁵

Sometimes, as in the social field, the experiment cannot be made by the investigator; but he can at least critically evaluate social movements as they emerge, stage by stage, in various parts of the world.

Many different individuals can join in the testing and application of our ideals: the philosopher, the esthetician, the physician, the hygienist, the psychologist, the welfare worker, the community planner, the architect, the engineer, and the statesman. The humane arts and sciences can pool their wisdom in mapping out a program for human welfare. We have the experts and the resources; we lack only a de-

termination to draw up the plans and put them into vigorous operation. Success, we believe, will depend upon the preservation of the democratic virtues: free thought, voluntary action, experimental effort, unfettered sympathy, and responsibility to the people—virtues opposed to the authoritarian rule of the Fascist dictatorships.

What *ought* to be, we have seen, is what satisfies needs. These needs can be determined scientifically, and a plan to satisfy them elaborated with due regard to the facts. This plan or ideal is then subject to critical verification and revision. We may thus interpret the meaning of “ought” and “ideal” so that these concepts are entirely consistent with science.

As yet we have scarcely touched upon the meaning of “ought” in the specifically moral sense of duty. This question will be fully discussed in the next chapter. I shall then indicate that there is nothing antiscientific in the concept of obligation. If we divest our minds of superstitious interpretations of duty, the concept of “moral obligation” can be construed as a demand for impartiality as opposed to prejudice. I do not mean that moral objectivity, as embodied in the sense of duty, is identical with scientific objectivity, but I do contend that the one kind of objectivity is entirely compatible with, and even closely akin to, the other. It is not the recognition of obligation, but the acceptance of various types of bias, which leads the Fascists to abandon the methods of both scientific and moral objectivity.

11. *Conclusion*

In the present chapter we have defended the attitude of inquiry as opposed to Fascist anti-intellectualism. We fully agree with the point of view expressed long ago by Socrates, who is represented by Plato as declaring:

Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;—that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.⁵⁶

It is this basic attitude that has been of inestimable importance in the development of Western culture. The humanistic tradition, which is integral to our society, is mainly a combination of this Greek ideal of inquiry and the Christian ideal of kindness. By "humanism" we mean the tradition of utilizing the full resources of intelligence for the welfare and happiness of mankind. Now Fascism is antihumanistic: it rejects many of the scientific, humanitarian, and universalistic elements of our civilization. It exalts strength of will and emotionalistic bias and attacks free inquiry and international brotherhood.

Choosing Pareto's argument as the most articulate expression of certain elements in the Fascist ideology, we have opposed those aspects of his theory which embody an anti-humanistic approach to values. We have criticized his theory of the discontinuity of means and ends, and his tendency to limit unduly the province of science. We have contended that the implications of his argument are much more opposed to a life of reason than appears at first glance. In effect, he prepares the way for a regime of force and fraud. We have argued, in opposition, that the practicable and only proper basis of social action is scientific research into fundamental human needs and the available means of satisfying them; and we have answered, one by one, the principal arguments against the scientific approach to problems of value. In doing so we have provided a basic criticism of the Fascist "revolt against reason."

So long as we realize that the construction of ideals should

involve reason and evidence, it matters little whether we call it science. We are more concerned with the substance than with the name. What is important is that we vigorously oppose irrationalism, which is rampant in the world. Civilization is now confronted by the advancing outposts of disaster. If we wish to save our society from ruin, we must utilize all our intelligence to hurl back the forces of savagery.

IV

MORAL BIAS AND OBJECTIVITY

What are kingdoms without justice but large robber bands?

—ST. AUGUSTINE¹

1. *The Meaning of Moral Objectivity*

THE criticism of the Fascist theory of values, which we undertook in Chapter III, must now be supplemented by an analysis of the Fascist attitude toward moral obligation. We must first indicate the standpoint which we mean to employ in the evaluation of Fascist morality.

No one can read any large amount of Fascist literature without noticing that the ideal of moral objectivity receives but scant respect in the official publications. For example, Hitler declares in *Mein Kampf*:

Whenever our propaganda permits in a single instance the shimmer of an appearance of right on the other side, it has laid a basis for doubt in the right of our cause . . . especially among a people that so suffers from objectivity-mania as the German!²

In another passage, he refers to "objectivity" as "weakness," and contrasts it with the "strength" to be found in "fanaticism" and even in "hysteria."³

The outright abandonment of "objectivity" illustrated in these statements, represents what we shall mean in this chapter by the abandonment of the moral "ought." For the person who feels the valid claims and applications of the "ought," there is a recognized need to take an impartial point of view. "Men of good will" try on occasion to rid their minds of bias, that they may choose a course of action which will bring about the most welfare, instead of a course which has only irrational passion to recommend it.

Largely as a reaction against ascetic misinterpretations of

the "ought," various thinkers have tried to explain away the fact of moral obligation. No one, I believe, has succeeded. The chief attempts may be summarized as follows:

A person may argue that the "ought" merely means that the agent has a feeling of approval towards the act in question. Acts we feel inclined to do, it may be said, are the very acts we say we ought to perform. But this contention is incompatible with the fact that the moral emotion is at times *causally determined* by the moral judgment. We sometimes recognize what our duty is before we have much, if any, feeling on the score, and this very recognition arouses the emotion. Moreover, there is surely a sense in which a person ought to do an act, whether he is so inclined or not. If a child is in danger of drowning, and an experienced swimmer can easily save the child's life, he cannot escape his duty by simply declaring, "I am not so inclined." Indeed, the feeling of "oughtness" usually arises in *resistance* to inclination.

A special application of this type of argument is the attempt to substitute the concept of "sympathy" in place of "obligation." But it is evident, for the reasons just given, that obligation is not simply reducible to sympathy (which is a type of feeling or inclination). Sympathy, in fact, may be wrongly directed; it is often excessive, inadequate, or misplaced. Hence it needs to be criticized. On the other hand, if sympathy is rightly directed, it is what we *ought* to feel. There is no reason for saying that sympathy is good at all unless it ought to exist. Clearly the "ought" is an indispensable concept, and is necessary to confer moral validity upon sympathy.

A person may contend that the "ought" simply expresses the approval of himself plus the approval of his group. Frequently we are told that the "ought" is merely an echo of custom. But surely we can feel a moral obligation even when others quite disagree with us. We cannot be content supinely to accept whatever standards happen to be current. More-

over, there is such a thing as moral genius—a capacity to see more profoundly into the content of the moral life than others have succeeded in doing. Moral character unquestionably develops as a result of social influence, but an individual can nevertheless exhibit independence and originality of judgment. Hence to say that the sense of duty is entirely the result of “social conditioning” is to offer an inadequate explanation.

In any event, we cannot dismiss the belief in obligation by merely indicating the conditions of its origin. It is too often assumed that values are discredited if it can be shown that they arise in a certain way. But the question is not how they arise but whether they are valid. In its *developed* form, the sense of obligation involves much more than a mere passive reaction to custom or social training, and the question of its *validity* is not to be decided by a mere *factual* reference to its *origins*. The fallacy of saying that “obligation is only the reflection of custom or social conditioning” lies in that word “only”; it is a case of oversimplification.

A person may contend that, when we say that a man ought to do a certain act, all we mean is that he is bound under penalties to do it—the penalties being public disfavor and possibly legal punishment. But we admit that there are acts which it is right to perform, but which will call forth public disapproval; and that there are also acts which the public may approve, but which we ought to avoid. Again, we recognize that a man may be unjustly punished, and that it may be a person’s duty to oppose a very unjust legal order. Thus we distinguish between what a person ought to do, and what the law happens to prescribe. Neither democratic nor Fascist lawmakers are morally infallible.

A person may contend that obligation merely means that God will reward the person who obeys his commandments, and punish the person who disobeys. But as Henry Sidgwick points out, many people make moral judgments and feel

moral emotions without believing in this particular form of theism. Outright atheists have a sense of obligation. Even those who believe in divine rewards and punishments, generally suppose that God is concerned with a just return for acts *independently* right or wrong. Finally, it is right for God to act justly; and this certainly does not mean that he will be punished by himself if he does not.⁴

The conclusion is that we must seek some other explanation than any of the foregoing. We would not deny that the sense of obligation arises from a synthesis of a number of factors and is subject to analysis; but the "ought" has a meaning of its own which resists complete identification with any other concept. This irreducible concept, nevertheless, is too important to leave in a nebulous state: we cannot be satisfied without further attempt to understand its meaning. Under what circumstances does the judgment of obligation arise? When is this judgment valid?

The essential clues are provided, I believe, by two Scotchmen of the eighteenth century, David Hume and Adam Smith. These famous men were by no means mere intellectualists. Both insisted upon the prime importance of sympathy as a basis for the moral life. This "fellow feeling," this imaginative identification with the weal and woe of others, was held to be the foundation of all unselfish actions, and the means of breathing life into ethical deliberations. But both men realized that sympathy is often capricious. Barriers of race, class, and creed, dulling effects of ignorance and distance, benumb and distort our natural feelings. We are inclined to be too partial toward our intimates and our own kind, and too cold toward people very different from ourselves. Favoritism and callousness play the devil with our sense of justice. Hence we must control our prejudices, and strive to be more objective.

In his *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume recognizes that all men are prone to be biased in their outlook:

. . . Every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis impossible we could ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent these continual *contradictions*, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some *steady* and *general* points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation.⁵

In another passage he declares:

The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem and respect. 'Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil.⁶

Moral judgments are those which we formulate when we escape from bias.

This contention is also advanced in Adam Smith's early work, the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. He definitely recognizes that our sympathies are apt to be distorted by prejudices and particular circumstances. Hence it is necessary to appeal to a higher standard than the whims and biases of the individual or of the circumscribed group. This ultimate authority is the "supposed well-informed and impartial spectator." Such a completely wise and unprejudiced being is only hypothetical. He is "the man within the breast," the ideal man which judges "the outward man." As the personification of the more stable, rational, and universal elements in human sympathy, he represents the goal which we strive to achieve. In so far as we attain such objectivity, our moral judgments possess validity. But in so far as we yield to bias, and as a result choose the worse instead of the better, our judgments are invalid.

Professor F. C. Sharp has formulated this doctrine as follows:

That conduct is right which a judge would desire who was able to put himself completely in the position of each and every person making up the situation, and thus to realize to the full precisely what the proposed course of action would mean to all. . . . Only that conduct can properly be called right which is desired when it is looked at from an impersonal point of view.⁷

This does not mean that emotion should be eradicated, but merely that it should be regulated. It should be steady, generous, and unprejudiced.

From this vantage-point, we are able to discern the nature of moral obligation. The "ought," as we would interpret it, expresses the need for moral objectivity. This concept is applied when two or more alternatives are presented as a basis for choice. The feeling and judgment of oughtness arises particularly in resistance to "temptation." We are "tempted" whenever we are prone to choose a lesser good in place of a greater good. The *right* way to act is to realize the greater good (simply because it is good and is greater), even at the cost of sacrificing the lesser good which tempts us.

By good we mean human welfare or happiness, and by evil we mean human misery. For practical purposes, happiness can be taken as consisting of the satisfaction of wants, with the accompanying pleasure; and misery can be taken as consisting of the frustration of wants, with the accompanying displeasure. Further refinements in analysis are debatable, and are hardly necessary in the present context. An act, from this point of view, can be accounted right if it conduces to the maximum surplus of happiness over misery, everybody considered and in the long run. The *increase* of misery and the *decrease* of happiness is conversely the sign of wrong action.

Bias is to be condemned because it makes us choose the wrong act. As the eighteenth century moralist, Lord Shaftesbury, declared: "Whatever causes a misconception or misapprehension of the worth or value of any object, so as to

diminish a due, or raise any undue, irregular, or unsocial affection, must necessarily be the occasion of wrong." ⁸ Bias is just such an occasion.

But why not yield to bias even if it does lead to less welfare? Why not choose the lesser good of ourselves or of those people who are members of our group, instead of the greater good of others? The only answer is that good ought to be maximized, and evil ought to be minimized. There is no more simple and ultimate principle of ethics than this. This principle appears unreasonable only when we *are* overmastered by bias. As we expand our sympathies and attain a livelier realization of the values of people at a greater remove from ourselves, as we approach a complete knowledge and a perfect realization of the weal and woe of everybody concerned, we can find less and less excuse to confine our "moral code" within narrow bounds. It will then seem irrational to deal with living men as if they were dead ciphers, and to harden our hearts against people of a different race, or sex, or nation, or class, or creed. If it be reasonable to act upon the basis of the clearest realization of the effects of action, then bias must be regarded as unreasonable; since it prevents men from reaching out, in imagination and sympathy, to comprehend the joys and sufferings of others.

In terming such bias "unreasonable," we do not mean to confuse it with what may be termed "scientific bias." This latter form of bias, which is definitely refutable, manifests itself in a willful neglect of the facts. For example, an astrophysicist who retains the theories of Newton even when the evidence clearly vindicates the theories of Einstein, may be said to exhibit scientific bias. A second type of bias—the theme of the present chapter—is preference for a narrow spread of good (egoism, racialism, nationalism, etc.). Unlike scientific bias, it cannot be formally disproved, although "moral insight," based upon sympathy and intuitive understanding, can be brought to bear against it. The two types of

bias are frequently interdependent. A man who has a moral bias against Negroes, for example, is very apt to be scientifically biased against the evidence adduced in their favor; and *vice versa*. In the present chapter, we are mainly concerned with moral, rather than scientific, bias; but the two are so frequently intermingled that we shall pay some attention to both types.

Just as there are people who refuse to renounce their scientific biases, so there will always be a certain number of people who, in spite of every consideration, will cling to their moral biases. This disagreement does not invalidate a universalistic standard of values. It is likewise impossible to obtain unanimity of opinion in physics, biology, mathematics, logic, or any other branch of human thought. Even the most ultimate principles in these sciences are subject to a great deal of dispute. The inexpert, in particular, have little or no insight into the reasons for many of the basic principles. This does not mean that the ideal of scientific truth and objectivity has to be abandoned. What finally decides is the opinion of the most expert and authoritative of the scientists.

A similar situation exists in the sphere of values. There will always be unmoral and nonmoral individuals; there will be men of prejudice, men of ill will, and men with moral blind spots. On the other hand, there are a certain number of persons who are generally recognized as ethical authorities. They are gifted with a special moral sensitiveness and breadth of vision, and they gradually win a reputation for their superior insight. Men like Buddha, Socrates, Jesus, Epictetus, Confucius, Lao-tzu, St. Thomas, and Spinoza are recognized as having unusually pure motives, unbiased outlook, and keen ethical insight; and they eventually win the names of saints and sages. Now no one can study the opinions of these men without discovering a very considerable measure of agreement in their ethical outlook. Such men agree upon

the widest community of good: they not only recognize that there are moral obligations, but turn away from the restrictive morality of tribalism and caste, and the multiple forms of intolerance and exclusion. They emphasize the common life of which all men are members. This universalist ethics cannot be established by formal proof, yet it has the prestige of the supreme moral sages to recommend it. This is the type of ethics which alone can lay claim to impartiality.

Just as the ideal of objective truth is a regulative principle in the field of science, so the ideal of moral objectivity is a regulative principle in the field of ethics. If a nation disregards the claims of moral objectivity, then it becomes, as St. Augustine said, nothing but a large robber band. From this standpoint we can criticize Fascist morality, since it is definitely biased.

2. *Nationalistic Bias*

The Fascists' abandonment of moral objectivity is displayed in their hypernationalism. The Nazi Party Year Book for 1938, for example, defines "right" as "whatever profits the [National Socialist] movement and therewith Germany."⁹ In the same spirit, Rosenberg has said that "national honor" is "the highest value on this earth."¹⁰ Hitler describes the "end" of foreign policy as "exclusively encouragement of our own nationality," and declares that no "humanitarian principles" must be allowed to intrude.¹¹ Professor Otto Koellreutter, one of the chief Nazi theorists, has declared:

In every case, the fundamental principle in the present-day world of States is that the national interests of individual States always precede international interests, that the nation [*Volk*] comes before humanity.¹²

Such declarations apparently mean that moral obligations stop short at the nation's boundaries.

If we turn to Fascist Italy we find much the same outlook. "Internationalism," declares Mussolini, is fit only for a "snobbish imbecility," and at bottom is an "absurd fable." "The great masses," he thinks, "do not escape nor can they, and it is the best of fortune that they can not escape, the insuppressible datum of race and nation."¹³ The glory of the nation becomes the new exclusive "myth" to which, it is said, all other considerations are subordinate. Mussolini depicts "the return of the Caesars" as the appropriate ideal for Fascist Italy:

My ideas are clear, my orders are precise. As in the well-ordered and powerful days of the First Empire, Rome must again become the marvel of the world.¹⁴

The Japanese are similarly taught by their patriotic militarists that "Japan is the only divine land." One of their intellectual leaders has declared:

The center of this world is Japan. From this center we must expand the Great Spirit throughout the world. . . . The expansion of Japan throughout the world and the elevation of the entire world into the Land of the Gods is the urgent business of the present, and again, it is our eternal and unchanging object.¹⁵

It is not difficult to see that the superpatriots are also the warmakers.

The moral implications of extreme nationalism are formulated by Carl Schmitt, a leading Nazi political theorist. His book, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, begins with the declaration:

The essential political distinction is that between *friend* and *foe*. It gives to human actions and motives their political significance. All political actions and motives can be traced back ultimately to this distinction.¹⁶

The sphere of politics, he goes on to say, is concerned with the contrast between friend and foe, just as ethics is con-

cerned with good and evil, esthetics with beauty and ugliness, and economics with utility and disutility. The "friend-foe" contrast represents an "absolute category," upon which depends the whole existence of the political order.

The consequences of this doctrine are quite explicitly stated:

A world in which the possibility of war were completely put aside, and had vanished, a world finally pacified, would be a world without the distinction of friend and foe, and therefore it would be a world without politics. . . . Consequently there will be, as long as any State still exists, several States; and a World State, comprising the totality of human beings, is an impossibility. The political domain is a pluriverse, not a universe.¹⁷

In explaining what he means by a "foe," Schmitt insists that an arbitrator must not be allowed to meddle in crucial disputes:

The foe . . . is, existentially, *somebody else*, an alien, with whom in the extreme case, conflicts jeopardising existence are possible. Conflicts of this kind can neither be decided according to a previously arranged general norm, nor with the help of a "non-participating," and therefore, *impartial* third person. A third person can not answer the question whether the "most extreme" case is given, nor the question of what becomes necessary as the most extreme means, in order to defend and preserve one's integrity. The third person may present himself as *critical, scientific, neutral*, and may give his alien judgment hidden beneath similar veils. . . . But in the extreme case of conflict, only the participants can decide among themselves; especially, is each of them alone able to decide in the concrete case whether the alien antagonist threatens his own existence, and therefore whether the foe must be fought or guarded against in order to preserve life.¹⁸

Translated into political terms, this means that the nationalistic State is the one and only judge of *when* and *how* and *whom* to fight. Since any expansionist program may be

declared a condition of survival, the way is prepared for the amoral exercise of force. The doctrine of unlimited national sovereignty has never been stated more clearly.

The Fascists are not slow to embrace this view. Hitler has indicated that right is only determined by the brute strength of a nation:

The fact that it was possible for a people illegally to usurp soil does not involve a higher duty to acknowledge this fact forever. The fact only proves the strength of the usurpers and the weakness of the usurped. And in that strength alone lies right.¹⁹

Mussolini likewise asserts, "Right, unless accompanied by force, is a vain word."²⁰ Like Schmitt he refuses to limit national sovereignty by collective agreement or international arbitration: "Collective security," he declares, "has never existed, does not exist, will never exist. A virile people brings about its own collective security on its frontiers and refuses to entrust its destiny into the uncertain hands of third parties."²¹

Schmitt's theory might be dismissed as merely an intellectual curiosity if it did not express the actual policy of the Fascist States. They have refused to support an order of international right, and have insisted upon unlimited nationalistic autonomy in a world seething with conflict. Such a conservative British statesman as Lord Cecil, winner of the 1937 Nobel peace prize, has pointed out:

From every side we hear of representations being made by diplomatic envoys from those two countries [Italy and Germany] to State after State begging them to leave the League. . . . It is to be observed that this campaign is not carried out against any particular provision of the Covenant, but against the whole conception of the international organization of peace. . . . The whole tenor of German and Italian policy is hostile to any international authority.²²

In spite of Fascist attitudes, the moral order is world-wide. Right and justice are not bounded by a nation's frontiers, and the head of a great State owes duties to all mankind, especially the duty to avoid a new World War. The Fascist tendency to renounce international obligations has ominous implications.

3. *Racial Bias*

Intense nationalism is closely related to racial bias. When nations engage in war, they usually begin by denouncing the racial characteristics of their enemies. During the World War, racial hatred tremendously aggravated nationalistic fervor. Even in present-day America, we hear a great deal about "undesirable aliens," and we are sometimes told that the "Anglo-Saxons" represent the only true national ideals. In Nazi Germany, the interests of the nation have been identified with the interests of the dominant race, and Jews have been denied the rights of nationality. Nevertheless, nation and race can be distinguished, and racial bias can be studied in its own right.

Many terrible deeds have been inspired by race hatred. Animosity against the black and yellow races has been utilized by the apologists for ruthless imperialism. Anti-Semitism, especially in Germany and Central Europe, has become extremely prevalent. In America, colored people have been denied most of the rights and prerogatives of citizenship, and the greater proportion of our lynchings have been directed against Negroes. Our newspapers are full of incidents of racial conflict. It would be absurd, therefore, to suppose that race hatred is confined to the Fascist countries.

In fact, until recently there has been less racial bias in Fascist Italy than in most of the non-Fascist nations. Mussolini has even scoffed at the racial chauvinists:

Of course there are no pure races left; not even the Jews have kept their blood unmingled. Successful crossings have often pro-

moted the energy and the beauty of a nation. Race! It is a feeling, not a reality; ninety-five percent, at least, is a feeling. Nothing will ever make me believe that biologically pure races can be shown to exist today. . . . National pride has no need of the delirium of race.²³

Unfortunately, this attitude of tolerance has not prevailed. Prejudice against black-skins was utilized by the Fascists to drum up support for the Ethiopian War. Since Hitler's accession to power, moreover, anti-Semitism among Italians has been increasing. There are so few Jews in Italy—some 40,000, it is said—that it has been impossible to use them as the national scapegoats; but Italian politicians have sometimes found anti-Jewish bias a useful weapon. For example, Signor Roberto Farinacci, member of the Fascist Grand Council, and one of the chief spokesmen of the Government, has charged that the English have been corrupted by the Jews:

The system of deliberate lying is the moral heritage of the English people, but in the present-day journalism of Great Britain the acute perfidy of the Jewish mentality is added to the national hypocrisy, reinforced by the Anglican education.²⁴

On July 14, 1938, a group of Fascist professors, under the protection of the Ministry of Popular Culture, issued a manifesto on racialism and anti-Semitism similar to the pronouncements of the Nazis. Even Mussolini, with characteristic lack of principle, is now enforcing the very policy he once decried as "the delirium of race."²⁵

Anti-Semitism is likewise encouraged in Fascist Spain. The *ABC*, official organ of Franco, published in Seville, said on December 20, 1937:

Against whom are we fighting? Against a secret committee of Israelites which governs Jews all over the world. . . . The brute who decapitates wooden saints in Castile, Extremadura or Andalusia is merely obeying the religious impulses of a Samuel or a Levi who appears so worldly in London, Paris, or New York and seeks distraction from his business in Rotarian luncheons.²⁶

When President Roosevelt expressed his horror at the anti-Jewish pogroms in Germany, he was described by the *Voz de España*, the Insurgent newspaper of San Sebastian, as one "who recently posed in some sort of toga of masonic mummery and who groaned in chorus with Quakeresses, Mormons, and atheistic Jews over the smashing of crockery in Berlin."²⁷ Such sentiments have been expressed frequently in Franco's Spain.

Everybody knows that Hitler's program is based upon racial pride; but it is worth while examining the moral implications of this prevalent form of bias. The Nazis announce that moral standards should be wholly determined by racial considerations. Writing in the *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, the central theoretical organ of the Nazi movement, Alfred Rosenberg declares:

Moral values depend only upon our intention of safeguarding the eternal existence of our people. This means . . . we desire the assurance of the greatest possible number of prolific, hereditarily sound families, families of racial value to the German people.²⁸

In his *Myth of the Twentieth Century*, Rosenberg likewise concludes that "the race-soul is the measure of all our thoughts, . . . the final criterion of our values."²⁹ Carl Schmitt, whose "friend-enemy" theory we have already examined, maintains that all morality is relative to racial differences:

We know not only intuitively but through strictest scientific insight, that all justice is the justice of a certain folk. A sound theory of knowledge demonstrates that only the person whose character and attitude are determined by his kind, and who helps to shape the common mores, and who actually belongs to the community, is able to see facts in the right way, and to form valid impressions of human beings and things. In the deepest core of his feelings, and in the smallest fibre of his brain tissue, man stands within the confines of his folk and race. . . . An alien may be as critical as he wants to be, he may be intelligent

in his endeavor, he may read books and write them, but he thinks and understands things differently because he belongs to a *different kind*, and he remains within the existential conditions of his own kind in every decisive thought. This is the objective reality of "objectivity."³⁰

No one will deny that there is truth in this statement; our thinking is conditioned by our environment and racial affiliations. Every scientist admits the existence of racial factors, but every scientist and every objective moralist seeks to avoid the distortions of racial bias. As opposed to the Nazi position, we would contend that "objectivity" still has a meaning. A man is not merely a German, a Frenchman, or a Jew, but a citizen of the world and a member of the entire human race.

Unfortunately, no such universalistic outlook has prevailed: "the delirium of race" has been carried to pathological extremes. Hitler's autobiography bristles with the most extreme expressions of race hatred, and his followers have echoed his sentiments. In a speech at the Nürnberg Party Congress, September, 1937, Herr Goebbels, the powerful Minister of Propaganda, "described" the Jew:

This is the world enemy, the destroyer of civilization, the parasite among nations, the son of chaos, the incarnation of evil, the germ of decomposition, the plastic demon of the decay of humanity.³¹

At the same Congress, Rosenberg "exposed" the "Jewish plot" against civilization. Purporting to read from a book written by an American Jew, he uncovered the remarkable plans of "Jewry":

Life would ooze from the peoples of Europe in streams of suppurated blood, through mouth, eyes and pores. Only sucklings and illiterates would be spared—everything else will make of Moscow and Petrograd a horrible graveyard. He [the avenging Jew] will make a crying wilderness of Poland and the Ukraine, and all the women will be raped before they are murdered as a reminder of what was done against a defenceless people in their

midst. The docks of Danzig will gush with putrefied blood. Of Belgium and Germany he will make such a slaughterhouse that it will be necessary to build new and higher dikes around Holland. He will sweep through France like fire through a cornfield.³²

Anyone who could cite such frightful drivel as an indication of the Jewish "menace" is surely unbalanced, if not mad. Yet at this Congress, Rosenberg received from the government a prize of one hundred thousand marks for his contribution to German culture and enlightenment! Excited by such propaganda, many other Nazi officials have been guilty of the most intemperate utterances. For example, Deputy "Gauleiter" Holz, in a public address in October, 1936, sweetly declared: "If all Jews throughout the world were to be slain in a single night it would be the holiest festive day in the entire history of the world."³³

The consequences of German Anti-Semitism are sometimes comic but more often tragic. In the former category is a series of decrees issued in certain German villages. These edicts are meant to protect the village cattle from the Jewish taint. A typical decree, as published in a Bavarian newspaper,³⁴ reads as follows:

PUBLIC NOTICE
TOWN OF KOENIGSDORF

For regulating maintenance of the community bull and for preventing danger of epidemic, it is decreed:

1. Cows and oxen directly or indirectly purchased from Jews are excluded from intercourse with the community bull.
2. Cows and oxen that have been stabled with cattle purchased from Jews must be placed under observation for one year.
3. This decree goes into effect, beginning October 1, 1935.

Koenigsdorf, September 28, 1935

THE MAYOR OF TOWN OF KOENIGSDORF.
(Signed) ERNST SCHREYER, *Head Mayor*

Such regulations are laughable, but we cannot laugh when we consider the effect of anti-Jewish prejudices upon human beings. A vast number of Jews have been economically ruined and subjected to extreme insult and injury. By law, moreover, a person is accounted a non-Aryan, and is roughly classed as a Jew, if but one of his grandparents was Jewish.

What has happened in Germany is indicated in the report by James G. McDonald, appointed by the League of Nations as High Commissioner for German refugees. In a letter of December 27, 1935, to the Secretary General of the League, Mr. McDonald declared:

Relentlessly the Jews and "non-Aryans" are excluded from all public offices, from the exercise of the liberal professions, and from any part in the cultural and intellectual life of Germany. Ostracized from social relations with "Aryans," they are subjected to every kind of humiliation. Neither sex nor age exempts them from discrimination. Even the Jewish and "non-Aryan" children do not escape cruel forms of segregation and persecution. In party publications, directly sponsored by the government, "Aryan" children are stirred to hate the Jews and the Christian "non-Aryans," to spy upon them and to attack them, and to incite their own parents to extirpate the Jews altogether. It is being made increasingly difficult for Jews and "non-Aryans" in Germany to sustain life. Condemned to segregation within the four corners of the legal and social Ghetto, which has now closed upon them, they are increasingly prevented from earning their living. Indeed, more than half of the Jews remaining in Germany have already been deprived of their livelihood. . . . In no field of economic activity is there any security whatsoever.³⁵

Since Mr. McDonald's letter was written, conditions have grown steadily worse. In an article published in the conservative London *Times*, June 18, 1938, the conditions in Austria since the *Anschluss* are described:

In Vienna and Austria no vestige of decency or humanity has checked the will to destroy, and there has been an unbroken orgy of Jew-baiting such as Europe has not known since the darkest

days of the Middle Ages. . . . Not a day still passes without its toll of arrests and suicides.

Even these terrible acts of persecution were exceeded by the savage bestiality of the anti-Semitic riots and demonstrations in November, 1938. This wave of terrorism was in "retaliation" for the murder of Ernst vom Rath, a secretary of the German embassy in Paris, by a seventeen-year-old Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, who had brooded over the persecution of his family in Germany. Using as an excuse the act of this single embittered youth, the Nazis subjected over a half-million human beings to merciless abuse. They burned synagogues, looted shops, invaded homes, and beat, imprisoned, or killed thousands of victims. After these riots had subsided, the Jews were forced to repair the damages caused by their enemies, and to hand over their rehabilitated business establishments to the "Aryans." A fine of approximately four hundred million dollars—roughly half of the remaining wealth of the Jews—was extorted from them; and new laws were passed banning them from almost every economic and cultural activity. President Roosevelt voiced the sentiment of decent people everywhere when he declared: "I myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth century civilization." ³⁶

Most of the Central European countries have powerful anti-Semitic movements, oftentimes Nazi in control, and even Denmark, Belgium, and Holland have not been altogether spared. The contagion has spread to England, where Oswald Mosley and his Fascist colleagues have been stirring up anti-Jewish prejudice. Similarly in America, racial intolerance is being cultivated by Fascist and like-minded groups.

Racial prejudice has been rationalized in Germany by an elaborate myth of "Aryan" or "Nordic" superiority. Many individuals have contributed to the formation of this myth. Gobineau, Chamberlain, and Rosenberg have probably been most influential.

Count Arthur de Gobineau, a French nobleman, furnished the first comprehensive interpretation of history as based upon race. His famous *Treatise on the Inequality of Human Races*, published in 1855, soon gained a following among the "aristocrats" of Europe. He was also the author of numerous other works—novels, plays, travel books, critical and political articles—which reflect his racial theories. A brilliant and versatile man, he became famous as a diplomat, an artist, and a thinker. In 1876 he met Wagner in Italy, and the two became fast friends. The composer, impressed by Gobineau's racial theories, did much to popularize them in Germany. (This is one reason why the Nazis regard Wagner as a precursor of National Socialism.) The myth was thus transmitted to Wagner's son-in-law, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who reformulated it to suit the requirements of German imperialism.

Gobineau starts with a division of mankind into white, yellow, and black. The white race was originally pure Aryan, though it has suffered from race pollution. This race is vastly superior to the other two:

Such is the lesson of history. It shows us that all civilizations derive from the white race, that none can exist without its help, and that a society is great and brilliant only so far as it preserves the blood of the noble group that created it.³⁷

But at this point, Gobineau makes the surprising admission that all artistic genius is the result of intermarriage between blacks and whites. "The poison of mixture," in fact, has produced not only art, but such other manifestations of decadence as commerce and democracy!

Intermixture is leading to a progressive degeneration of the white race, and hence to a decay of culture. The Jews, we are told, are basically Negroid, and they have contaminated the entire population in the Mediterranean area. All of the Latin peoples—the French, Italian, Spanish, and Por-

tuguese—have been corrupted by Semitic blood. There are a few Aryans left in France, and Gobineau counts himself one; but in general race pollution is said to be continuing apace. Just as the blacks have poisoned Europe, so the yellow race poisons the whites whenever they intermarry. Since this contamination is bound to occur, civilization is doomed.

The Nazis have been unable to accept certain elements in the Count's teaching. They are hardly prepared to admit that all "Nordic" art is due to the presence of a Negroid taint! Being superpatriotic, they cannot agree with Gobineau that patriotism is a servile invention of the Jews. They have also rejected his theory of the inevitable decay of civilization, which they hope to arrest by eugenic measures. Since Germany's alliance with Japan, they are not so inclined as he to stress the "yellow peril." There is even a school of Nazi thought which contends that the Japanese are Nordic! Otherwise they agree with the essentials of Gobineau's theory.

The Count's ideas, as we have remarked, were welcomed by Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Although Chamberlain was born in England, he elected Germany as his Fatherland and became an intense patriot. He enjoyed the special esteem of Kaiser Wilhelm II, whose reign he compared to a "rising morning." His most famous book, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, was personally endorsed by Wilhelm. According to General von Bülow, the Kaiser used to read long passages to ladies of the court until they fell asleep. Chamberlain survived the World War, which he had helped to prepare, and in the postwar period witnessed the rise of Hitlerism. He greeted the new movement with real enthusiasm. One of his last compositions was a letter to the Führer, praising his program and leadership.³⁸ The Nazis in turn have taken Chamberlain to their hearts, and have extravagantly praised him.

His concept of race is nebulous; he discounts the physical

marks of race, and emphasizes the feeling of "cohesiveness" as an instinctive sign of race. He uses the term "German race" to include not only the Teutons but other European peoples such as the primitive Slavs and Celts; but he thinks that the so-called Celts and Slavs of today have degenerated as a result of racial intermixture. Only the Teutons remain as the relatively pure bearers of German blood.

He announces that all the great cultural periods of modern history are due to men of German race:

This German for 1500 years has been the vital, the only creative force of our civilization and culture. Europe, which today embraces the world, has been his achievement; an achievement which he completed despite the racial chaos and even against it. Wherever he went, there grew up—as long as he remained pure from bastardization—mighty peoples, and plentiful were the flowers of genius; but where he mixed with non-Germanic majorities, he perished and with him disappeared the vital force of life.³⁹

The fantastic lengths to which Chamberlain carried his theory may be illustrated by his remarks about the great men of Italy:

That Dante, for example, was a German of pure lineage, can scarcely be doubted any longer. . . . All the famous Italian nobility are of German descent, and the evidence will undoubtedly show that the artistic and intellectual ability of this people was of German origin.⁴⁰

Individual artists and thinkers may be exceptions, he thinks, but at least the "total phenomenon" and "creative force" of Italian culture is really Germanic.

The Germans, we are told, are a lordly race, to whom it is natural to be free. Chamberlain quotes with approval Aristotle's famous remark in defense of slavery: "Some people are free by nature, others are born slaves." The genuine slaves, he contends, are those of "inferior" race, such as the Negroes,

the Semites, and the Chinese. Altogether different are the "Aryans":

Physically as well as mentally the Aryans surpass all other human beings; therefore, rightfully they are (as the Stagirite says) the overlords of the world.⁴¹

Hence the Germans, as the purest representatives of the Aryans, deserve to rule the entire earth.

Despite the defeat of Germany in the World War, Chamberlain continued to nourish the dream of Germany's imperial mission. In one of his postwar utterances, he adopts the theory of Fichte, that the German language is vastly superior to any other tongue. It is Germany's duty to impose this language upon the world rather than to allow English to gain world-wide currency:

Hence it is dire necessity that the German language,—and not English—shall become the language of the world. If the English language should be victorious, the culture of mankind is doomed to perish. The moral decay of England has revealed itself in a terrible measure since the World War: mendacity, brutality, ruthlessness, boasting, combined with lack of dignity, lack of uprightness, rectitude, and manliness: that is a sorrowful picture. . . . Therefore, the German, and with him things German, must win; and if the German has won—today or in a hundred years, the "must" remains the same—there is no task so important as this: the German language is to be relentlessly imposed upon the world. Everywhere, even among the hundreds of thousands of people comprising foreign races there are some of outstanding ability and mentality; without a knowledge of the German language, they remain excluded from the highest culture.⁴²

What "the highest culture" means for Chamberlain is made abundantly clear: he is utterly opposed to liberal and democratic ideals. A great future awaits Germany if she will only toss aside all democratic ideals:

Germany—and I am firmly convinced of it—within two centuries may get to the point where it will govern the whole earth

(in part by political means, and in part, indirectly, through language, methods, culture) if—yes, if!—it is possible soon to enter upon "the new course," that is to say, if the nation breaks completely with Anglo-American methods of government and with the State-destroying ideals of the French Revolution.⁴³

The ideas of Chamberlain have been championed by Alfred Rosenberg, whose *Myth of the Twentieth Century* is the official handbook of the Nazi racial creed. Rosenberg, like some other proponents of pan-Germanism, was born outside Germany. As a number of writers have remarked, it is indeed curious how much has been contributed to Nazi racialism by men either of a different race or of a different nationality: by Gobineau, a Frenchman; by Chamberlain, an Anglo-Scotchman; by Hitler, an Austrian; and by Rosenberg, a Balt, who, until the World War, was a Russian subject. One would expect that from such varied sources would spring a cosmopolitan creed, instead of a doctrine of racial and nationalistic intolerance.

Rosenberg's greatest contribution to the racial Myth is his insistence that the "Nordics" must have a peculiar religion and morality of their own. Reserving his strictly religious ideas until a later chapter, we shall merely sketch his "racial" interpretation of "German morality." Like Gobineau and Chamberlain, he regards democratic and humanitarian principles as the creations of degenerate mongrels. In this respect, he sharply opposes the Christian emphasis upon love and pity. Although he regards Christ as really a Nordic in disguise, he believes the early Christians have completely distorted the heroic principles of the founder. The youth of Germany, he contends, cannot be content with such a slave morality:

The young generation has no other wish than to contemplate the great personality of the founder of Christianity in his real greatness without the falsifying additions of Jewish fanatics like Matthew, or materialistic Rabbis like Paul, or African jurists

like Tertullian, or spineless mongrels like Augustine. . . . Youth aspires to comprehend the world and Christianity from the standpoint of its own nature and of Germanic values.⁴⁴

The courage of the German, we are told, stands in utter contrast to "the cowardice of the Apostles." "To us," declares Rosenberg, "even such a frightful figure as Hagen seems to be far greater than, for example, Peter, 'the rock.' Hagen throws away his honor in service to his king, and ultimately dies for his failure, still a proud and unbroken man." On the other hand, "the talkative Peter renounced his Lord on the first occasion," and his only show of heroism is "overshadowed by his subsequent lies. In vain, the tradition of the Church tries to make a hero of Peter."⁴⁵

The genuine Nordic man, being a true nobleman and warrior, is immune to the pusillanimous ideals of Jewish Christianity:

If war were conducted brutally, it was the first premise of the Nordic man to acknowledge his deeds. This feeling of responsibility, demanded from every single individual, was the most effective defense against the pervasive ethical morass of hypocritical evaluation, which throughout Western history has overwhelmed us with inimical temptations in the various forms of humanitarianism. At times it called itself democracy, at times social pity, at times love and humility. But the personal honor of the Nordic man demanded courage and self-control.⁴⁶

Now "all heroism groups itself around a highest value, and this value has always been the idea of spiritual honor." To realize what honor means, the youth of Germany should study the Germanic heroes of the past, such as Odin, Siegfried, Theodoric, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck. The romantic Titanism of the Wagnerian legends lives again in the pages of Rosenberg.

Toward men of lesser breed, our author has an attitude ranging from condescension to the sheerest contempt. The Italians still have some good blood flowing in their veins,

since the Gothic king, Theodoric the Great, settled with thousands of Gothic families in Italy, and this blood has been transmitted to Mussolini's countrymen. But in France "the Nordic race power, if not broken completely, was at least weakened tremendously. The classical France shows only intelligence without nobleness." There has been "a destruction of character," which accounts for the rise of French democracy.⁴⁷ As for the Jews, their baseness is inexpressible.

The achievements which liberals regard as the most progressive in modern history are denounced by Rosenberg as the products of racial decadence. Democracy, humanitarianism, internationalism, pacifism, and feminine emancipation are the alarming symptoms of race pollution. "Man's inner life became deformed when in the weak hours of his fate an alien motive was held before his eyes: the salvation of the world, humanitarianism, and the culture of mankind."⁴⁸

The Russian experiment is similarly the result of racial decay:

The domination of Bolshevism was only possible with a people sick in race and body and soul, a people which was not able to decide in favor of honor, but only in favor of bloodless "love."⁴⁹

As opposed to Christian, liberal, and socialist ideals, Rosenberg advances "a hard and harsh demand":

Until today, the idea of a so-called humanity was bound up with pity for all of the sick, the weak, the decaying, and the decayed. We National Socialists, however, combine the idea of humanity with the spiritually healthy, the strong, and the courageous. We know that the doctrine of humanitarianism tried to counteract the selective processes of nature, and that consequently nature takes vengeance, and will destroy all democratic and other experiments once and for all.⁵⁰

Thus racial bias is used to reinforce a crude naturalistic ethics.

The foregoing brief summary of the ideas of Gobineau,

Chamberlain, and Rosenberg will perhaps suffice to indicate the moral temper of the Nazi racial theories. No doubt it is possible to find a somewhat more temperate expression of the German racial creed, as in Werner Sombart's *Deutscher Sozialismus*.⁵¹ But the Nazi leaders are not inclined to be temperate.

Their theory of racial superiority has been criticized by many competent writers.⁵² The consensus of expert opinion agrees with the eminent British biologist, Julian Huxley, who has declared:

It is a shocking story the way the scientific method is being prostituted to perpetuate the Aryan myth. Of course, every one knows there is no such thing as an Aryan race, but even if such a race existed more than three-quarters of the German people would be non-Aryans, including Hitler himself.⁵³

The term "Aryan" was originally introduced by philologists to designate a group of related languages. A number of writers thereupon inferred that there must have been a single parent language, and assumed that this language must have been spoken by a single race, which they designated the "Aryan race." *But there are no written records of this hypothetical language, and there is no record of the kind of people who spoke it.* No one really knows the color of their hair or skin, the shape of their heads, the place of their origin, or in fact anything about them. The assumption that they must have been racially homogeneous is very shaky: it has been arbitrarily supposed that a single race must have used the "Aryan" language; but we are all familiar with the fact that a single language is often spoken by peoples of mixed race or by various races.

Even if this hypothetical Aryan race once existed, it exists no longer. The Germans are referred to as a single "race," yet even the leading Nazi anthropologist, Hans Günther, admits that the German people represent a mixture of many

racial elements, including (in Günther's terminology) Nordic, Dinaric, Eastern, Falic, Western, and Sudetic. The eminent anthropologist, Franz Boas, has pointed out:

It is a fiction to speak of a German race. We should rather ask what types of physical build are represented among the Germans. Here we encounter a complete lack of unity. Blondes with long heads in the North, darker people with short heads in the South; broad faces here, narrow ones there; noses turned up and aquiline, the general build tall and short, broad and slight. There is no "German race"; there are only local types which are very different one from another, each of which comprises individuals of different characteristics, so that representatives of all these types may be found in any part of Germany and of the neighboring countries. The East German is closer to his Polish neighbor than to the Frisian; the Tyrolese shows more similarity to the East Alpine Slav than to the North Germans, the Rhinlander more to the neighboring Frenchman than to the German in more distant parts.⁵⁴

But even if it were possible to prove that there was an original Aryan race, and that the present-day Germans constitute a homogeneous race which has preserved the Aryan blood, there would be no ground for concluding that the Germans are superior by reason of these facts. Available evidence provides no basis for the supposition that certain races are innately and unalterably superior. T. R. Garth, a reputable scientist, has assembled the evidence as to mental differences between races, and has reached the conclusion that no essential innate differences can be established.⁵⁵ Karl Pearson, the famous British biologist, has painstakingly investigated the relation between mental traits and the physical characteristics emphasized in racial theories: the form of the head, the color of the hair, and the form of the nose. He is unable to discover any correlation between mental qualities and these physical traits.⁵⁶ Boas has even disproven the supposed immutability of the physical marks of race. He has shown that the unmixed descendants of immigrants underwent a marked

physical change in the United States. For example, the descendants of short-headed oriental Jews, in the absence of any crossbreeding, became longer-headed, and the long-headed Sicilians became shorter-headed.⁵⁷ Many excellent scholars contend that the differences between the cultural levels of various races may be explained on historical and environmental grounds without regard to supposed innate differences in capacity.⁵⁸

The close student of history, in fact, will find it impossible to admit that cultural achievements are mainly the result of innate biological factors, such as race. In terms of civilization and life-habits, there has been an immense change since the dawn of history, but there is no evidence of great change in the biological equipment of man in this same period. We *act* very differently from cave men, but we are not built so very differently from them. When conditions are favorable, there is a tremendous outburst of human creativity in a short period of time: as in Ancient Athens in the time of Pericles, or Florence in the time of Leonardo da Vinci, or London in the time of Queen Elizabeth. But there is no indication that human beings are changed in their basic hereditary natures at such periods of great cultural achievement. Hence it would seem that changes in civilization are largely independent of racial or biological alterations.

Similar conclusions are reached by the anthropologists. They point out that there is an immense diversity of culture within a single race. Among the Negroes, or American Indians, or Semites, or so-called Nordics, may be found a tremendous variety of behavior and creative activity. Under favorable conditions, a race may achieve a very high cultural level, but under unfavorable conditions, the very same race may attain to only a low level. Man's nature, without undergoing biological transformation, has been molded to a great number of contrasting modes of expression. These facts have driven most anthropologists to conclude that the decisive fac-

tor in determining the quality of a civilization is not racial stock, but historical and environmental circumstances. To speak of the innate superiority or inferiority of races is regarded as unscientific.

Even if the Fascists could prove that certain races are innately inferior, they would not thereby be justified in persecuting these racial groups. Morons are obviously inferior mentally to ordinary adults, but this fact does not justify cruelty towards them. We are not even justified in being unnecessarily cruel towards animals. The terrible maltreatment of Jews, Negroes, and other racial minorities, however inferior they might be, would likewise be morally unjustifiable. There is every reason to be suspicious of doctrines which lead men to employ whips, clubs, lynch ropes, Klan robes, and similar devices.

The plain truth is that people embrace the "science" of racial discrimination because of various ulterior motives. The racial myth flatters the pride of the "superior race"; it is used to excuse the exploitation of colonial peoples and racial minorities; it provides the defenders of the economic *status quo* with the necessary scapegoats, who are blamed for the starvation and misery which the economic system produces; it permits a series of cheap victories, won by defeating such helpless "enemies" as the Jews, and thus adds to the self-esteem of the racial majority; it encourages an excessive belligerency towards other races beyond the borders of the nation.

In Hitler's autobiography, there is a fatally easy transition from the passages in which he celebrates German racial superiority, to such ominous outbursts as the following:

If the German people (*Volk*) in their historical development had achieved that herdlike unity, as other peoples have, then the German Reich would today be the lord of the earth. World history might then have taken a different course, and perhaps in that event the goal might have been reached, which today so

many blind pacifists hope to attain by mourning and weeping: *a peace supported not by the palm-waving of tearful, pacifist wailing-women, but established by the victorious sword of a lordly people, conquering the world in the service of a higher culture.*⁵⁹

Anyone who doubts that racialism is inherently dangerous should ponder this declaration.

4. *Antifeminine Bias*

In addition to racial animus, there is a second form of bias based upon congenital differences. This is the ancient and inveterate prejudice of men against women. The result has been one of the basic forms of human tyranny: the minds and bodies of half the human race have been kept in bondage.

During the last fifty years, this tyranny has been effectively challenged. After heroic and protracted struggles, women have won the elementary rights of free human beings. The old conception, that woman's role is to obey the man and mind the baby, has become unacceptable to liberal minds. It is recognized that a woman cannot be a good wife and mother without being a free and cultivated person. Women are crowding into the universities, and are demonstrating that *both* halves of the human race are capable of great achievement. Such women as Myra Hess, Sigrid Undset, Virginia Woolf, Edna Millay, Marie Laurencin, Madame Curie, and Jane Addams have become famous throughout the world. A tremendous change has occurred since Ibsen shocked the world with his *Doll's House*—a change which has involved difficult problems of adjustment, but also greater dignity and happiness for millions.

In Germany, the gains before the advent of Hitler were especially impressive. The Weimar constitution prescribed identical civil rights for men and women. As a result, more

women participated in public life as officials of the government than in either America or Great Britain. There was an immense increase in the number of women attending the universities and participating in the professions. "Barriers which it would apparently take centuries to destroy suddenly disappeared."⁶⁰

These gains have now been sacrificed to the ancient prejudices. The Fascists have deliberately revived the cult of the "three K's"—*Kinder, Kirche, Küche*, Children, Church, Kitchen—and have tried to force women back into this limited sphere. Hitler has declared that "the conception of woman's equality is a product of decadent Jewish intellectualism," and has contrasted his own program with the liberal policy towards women's rights:

Liberalism has a large number of points for women's equality. The Nazi program has but one: this is the child. While man makes his supreme sacrifice on the field of battle, woman fights her supreme battle for her nation when she gives life to a child.⁶¹

Hitler's attitude is also revealed in his remarks about feminine education: physical training, he declares, should receive the most stress, spiritual development should be secondary, and intellectual improvement is worthy of the least emphasis. The unalterable aim of such education, he announces, is to prepare women for motherhood.⁶² The narrowness of Hitler's outlook is again betrayed in his boast to an audience of women at the Nürnberg Party Congress (September, 1936):

You ask me what I have done for the women of Germany. Well, my answer is this—that in my new army I have provided you with the finest fathers of children in the whole world; that is what I have done for the women of Germany.⁶³

In obedience to the Führer, the government has imposed severe restrictions upon the entrance of women into the professions and public life. By law of December 28, 1933, the

number of women permitted university degrees was restricted to ten per cent of the total.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the process of sending women "back to the home" has been a failure; the number of women workers in industry has risen from 4,700,000 in 1933 to 6,300,000 in August, 1938.⁶⁵ More jobs have been available as a result of the country's inflationist economy, and women have been forced by poverty into the menial of these employments. The effect of Nazi prohibitions has been, not to restore women to the home, but to restrict their opportunities in desirable fields of activity.

The theory underlying these restrictions has been expressly formulated by Alfred Rosenberg. He insists upon the sharp and fruitful contrast between man and woman. Life, he declares, is based upon the fundamental polarity of masculine and feminine. This "sexual polarity" creates "organic tensions" which are "the foundation for any creative action." Hence "it follows that the attempts to equalize the sexually conditioned tensions must necessarily result in a diminution of the creative forces." Woman's nature is directed toward "the plant-like and the subjective"; she is "lyrical" but not "architectonic." Man, on the other hand, "approaches the world and life as an inventor, as a synthesizing architect." But unfortunately, "the woman, because of 'the movement of emancipation,' became not architectonic, but purely intellectual (an Amazon) or purely erotic (as sexually emancipated)." And man, deserting his own architectonic and creative function, "began to pray to the false gods of humanitarianism, pacifism, and emancipation from slavery."

The remedy for this sad condition is to understand woman's nature and to restore the duality of the sexes. It is necessary to realize that "the women of all races and of all times lack the power of creative synthesis and intuition." Hence Aristotle was quite right when he declared that "a woman always remains a woman because of a certain incapacity." Indeed, "all the deeper thinkers have held this view, as a self-

evident consequence of life itself, that man in all fields of exploration, invention and construction is superior to the woman."

Women should not be allowed to dabble in political affairs. Social and political institutions are entirely "the result of manly will and manly creativeness," and "the enduring influence of women upon the State can only mean the beginning of an obvious decline." Hence "the woman shall have all opportunities to develop her capacity, but this much must be clear: judge, soldier, statesman, the man must be and must remain." In denying women a right to participate in politics, Rosenberg is more impartial than might appear at first glance, since he also withholds this right from most men!

The right to the secret ballot shall be taken away from women? Yes!—and it shall also be taken away from the men. A people's State shall have no decisions made by anonymous masses of men and women, but only through responsible personality.⁶⁶

Mussolini's ideas about women are very similar. He asserts that "women exert no influence on strong men," and thinks they are doomed by their inferiority to play a secondary role:

Woman must play a passive part. She is analytical, not synthetic. During all the centuries of civilization has there ever been a woman architect? Ask her to build you a mere hut, not even a temple; she cannot do it. She has no sense for architecture, which is the synthesis of all the arts; that is a symbol of her destiny. My notion of woman's role in the State is utterly opposed to feminism. Of course I do not want women to be slaves, but if here in Italy I proposed to give our women votes, they would laugh me to scorn. As far as political life is concerned, they do not count here.⁶⁷

Apparently it has not occurred to Mussolini that woman's "deficiencies" may be the result of environmental rather than of congenital factors.

The Fascists, however, do glorify one female function, namely, childbearing. Despite frequent complaints that their

territories are small and overpopulated, they have utilized a great deal of propaganda and expended large sums in economic bounties to stimulate the birth rate. This campaign is not without its ulterior motives. Mussolini has recently explained to an audience of Italian ecclesiastics that the "more babies" campaign is essential to Italy's military strength. The sixty bishops and two thousand priests who congregated upon this occasion were received by the Duce's bodyguard with a salute of uplifted daggers. Mussolini told his guests:

Only big families yield the big battalions, without which victories are not won. It is the duty of Italy, a Catholic nation, to be a bulwark of Christian civilization by her intrinsic strength and by her high birth-rate.⁶⁸

The priests, when asked to assist (a delicate task!), are said to have broken into applause. In a similar patriotic vein, Hitler remarked to the assembled women at a Nürnberg Party Congress (September, 1936): "You must produce more young children who will be as good soldiers for Germany as their fathers."⁶⁹

Fascism is essentially a masculine creed; its emphasis is upon "manly heroism" and martial virtues. But the greatest insult is to impose these ideals upon women, and to ask them to breed soldiers for future carnage in man-made wars. How far breeding takes precedence over other considerations among certain Fascist groups is indicated by an article in *Schwarze Corps*, the periodical of Hitler's Black Guard. The writer insists that marriage must be judged from a "national and ethical" point of view, and dismisses the usual "consideration for the personal happiness of the married couple." A sterile marriage, it is contended, should be dissolved even if the husband and wife are perfectly happy. Such a union is of no service to the Nazi State, and should be replaced by a fecund marriage.

The same article sharply differentiates between masculine and feminine adultery:

Viewed according to our conception of the meaning of marriage, the illicit relations of a man are something quite different from those of a woman. The outlook on this matter has been obscured for us by the fact that the impulse which brings the two sexes together has been called the sexual impulse in the case of both of them, so that the same term is employed for two things fundamentally different, thus viewing the masculine and feminine impulse as identical. It is high time we purged our German life of this conception—a conception for which the Church is mainly responsible. Adultery on the part of a man, is,—both from the physiological point of view and from that of the object of marriage—something different from adultery on the part of a woman.⁷⁰

These remarks do not reflect the opinion of all people who call themselves Nazis; but they do indicate the common Fascist tendency to embrace a double standard.

We do not mean to suggest that the Fascists have contributed nothing constructive to family life. Doubtless there is much to be said for their practice of compensating and honoring motherhood. The proper rearing of children requires a great deal of toil and intelligence; and no task is more important to society. Hence mothers deserve a substantial reward; the democratic countries would do well to provide even more assistance to parents than the Fascists have given. Neither the nation nor the world is well served, however, by a policy which impresses women into the service of military ambitions, and denies them equality of opportunity and the basic means to self-realization. Even in democracies, many forms of sexual discrimination continue, but the trend has been towards greater freedom and justice for women. Under Fascism this trend is reversed.

5. *Class Bias and Human Selfishness*

It is the boast of the Fascists that they have eliminated class bias. They declare that they have substituted, in place of class

divisions and conflicts, the greater unity of the nation. Rosenberg, for example, points out that May Day, which has been the traditional occasion for radical demonstrations, has now become the day of reconciliation and good will:

The first of May is the day of the brotherhood of the people, a day to transcend all barriers, when one man shakes hands with another, in the realization that over and above certain appearances in the daily life, and some differences of feeling and thought, there exists a single larger unit, which all of us must serve: Germany.⁷¹

Mussolini has, on numerous occasions, expressed similar views. He boasts of a new "economic" and "political discipline . . . which is over and above conflicting interests, binding all together in a common faith." ⁷² Oswald Mosley has promised to eliminate class antagonisms in Great Britain:

Functional differences will exist according to difference of function, but differences of social classes will be eliminated. They arise from the fact that in present society the few can live in idleness as a master class upon the production of the many. Under Fascism all will serve in varying manner and degree the nation to which all are responsible.⁷³

Similarly Lawrence Dennis has predicted the end of class conflicts in the United States as a result of "the coming American Fascism." ⁷⁴

If we compare these fine words with the reality, we soon become aware of a remarkable discrepancy. *Fascism pretends to eliminate class hatreds but has actually intensified them.* By means of repression, the more obvious signs of class struggle have indeed been eliminated. Many heads have been split and much castor oil has been forced down anti-Fascist throats before this "peace" could be achieved. But such measures do not produce a spirit of love and human brotherhood. When enough opponents are dead or are thrown into prison, shooting and clubbing temporarily subside but hatred does not.

Surely few men in the history of the world have been so intensely hated as Mussolini and Hitler.

The elimination of class bias is indeed a consummation to be desired. The way to achieve it, however, is not by ruthless repression, but by the creation of economic and social justice. Class bias will end only when a classless society is achieved. So long as some men enjoy luxury while others starve, so long as there is enforced scarcity for the sake of profits, there will be smoldering hatreds and sometimes open violence. The plain fact is that the existing society impels men to hate and even to kill each other. Until this fact is courageously faced, and adequate steps are taken to remove the causes, there will be a continuation of the evils which Fascism pretends to cure.

The emptiness of the Fascist boasts is disclosed by Professor Carl T. Schmidt of the Department of Economics, Columbia University. In a recent book, full of statistics and factual evidence gained from firsthand study in Italy, Professor Schmidt concludes:

It is constantly suggested that the history of modern Italy before the "March on Rome" is ignoble, humiliating, empty, while everything that has happened since 1922 is brilliant, glorious, unrivaled elsewhere. Yet, beneath all the dramatic speeches, beneath the stirring strains of "Giovinezza," persists this horrifying note of discord: *Under Fascism the working masses live, and must live, in material and spiritual poverty.*⁷⁵

Professor Salvemini, in his recent book, *Italian Fascism*, reaches the same conclusion.⁷⁶ He maintains that the corporations are controlled by the biggest monopoly capitalists, and that to their interests are sacrificed the interests not only of the laborers but also of the smaller business men. His argument is supported by statistics and other concrete evidence to indicate that both industrial and agricultural workers have suffered very severely under Fascism. Professor Salvemini, of course, is an enemy of the system he describes; but as a dis-

tinguished historian and social scientist, he has presented a well-documented argument that merits respect.

The economic situation appears to be somewhat better in Germany; but the democratic rights of labor have been destroyed. Despite the State regulation of capitalism, men of great wealth, in contrast to their employees, have not declined in power. In his authoritative book on Nazi Germany, Professor Stephen H. Roberts of the history department, University of Sydney, concludes:

... Hitler has done nothing to break the power of the big industrial combines. Indeed, one of the striking features of his four years of power has been the rise of super-trusts in the heavy industries, especially of the Thyssen and Flick interests. The large industrialists have suffered from the rise of Hitlerism just as little as have the Junkers.⁷⁷

In Spain, the alliance of the Fascists with the great landlords and industrialists should dispel any possible illusion as to which side, in the event of class conflict, Fascism chooses to support. Even in the democratic countries, the representatives of great wealth, such as the English "Cliveden set" and the American Liberty League, have been sympathetic towards international Fascism, and have materially aided it. The wealthy have exhibited a bias towards Fascism, just as Fascism has exhibited a bias towards the wealthy.

We have heard a good deal about the "socialistic" trends under Fascist rule, but these collectivistic tendencies have not been motivated by the ideal of an equalitarian society. We can now see that a collectivistic order carries no value in itself, and that it can be utilized for tyrannical and militaristic purposes. Society does need to be organized, but not every type of organization is desirable. Although partly collectivistic, Fascism has done little or nothing equitably to redistribute wealth and power. It is misleading to apply the term "socialism" to a system which represents the very opposite of what most Socialists have desired.

The class bias manifested by the Fascists is related to the extremely common bias of human selfishness. At first glance, selfishness appears to be an inveterate human trait, quite unrelated to class divisions. Every man is in the egocentric predicament: he lives within his own skin, regards the world from his own point of view, experiences his own values directly and immediately. Hence he tends to choose his own good at the expense of the greater good of others. Egoistic bias is difficult to escape; yet sacrifice is not unknown in human life, and sympathy is the foundation of our existence. Far from selfishness being an unalterable feature of human nature, the intensity of egoism and self-interest is a function of specific social conditions.

Societies in which there is far less selfishness actually exist; anthropologists have described various communal tribes which produce relatively altruistic human beings. The Arapesh tribe of New Guinea, for example, lives in a harsh natural environment that might be expected to promote a competitive spirit, but the tribal institutions have cultivated quite the opposite temperament. Dr. Margaret Mead points out that "the system is run upon tenets of happy cooperation":

The great adventure is to produce food—for others to eat. Men plant that others may feast on their yams, fatten pigs for others, hunt that others may eat meat—for the greatest crime of all is to eat one's own kill. If by chance one's yam crop is very large, one is permitted by the community to give a special ceremony in which all of the surplus yams are distributed to the community as seed—from which one may never eat again—in return for voluntary gifts of other things. . . . The whole conception of human nature is strongly in contrast with that of those cultures which conceive men as working most willingly for self-centered ends. . . . A lack of self-interest and a lack of aggressive competitiveness have been institutionalized throughout the whole [Arapesh] culture.⁷⁸

Judging from such anthropological evidence, the selfishness manifested under our present social order is by no means inevitable.

Since the calculation of exclusive personal gain is characteristic of our society, there is no possibility of substantially reducing human selfishness unless the basic social and economic causes are removed. The cultivation of unselfish personalities would appear to depend largely upon the establishment of a more cooperative economy, corresponding, upon a far higher level of technique and resources, to such cooperative societies as that of the Arapesh. At the present time, there is a mighty international movement to reform and ultimately to supplant the existing system of "devil take the hindmost." Already our economic system is ripe for change, but the transition is blocked by those who uphold unjust privilege. Surely the greatest single barrier to reform is Fascism and organized reaction in general. So long as these forces are in power, the predatory and acquisitive features of our system will continue to make headway at the expense of mutual aid. The class bias and the antihumanitarian ethics of Fascism strengthen the grip of human selfishness.

6. *Retributive Bias*

In an age of class conflict and international warfare, we can expect to witness a revival of hatred and cruelty. The desire for retribution has again flared up like a fast spreading fire. Sometimes this impulse assumes a more pathological form, and men delight in malicious cruelty. This is surely the most vicious type of bias; it lowers man to the status of a beast of prey. It has distorted the system of justice since the dawn of history and is working great mischief today.

Retributive bias has unquestionably flourished under Fascism. Hitler's own book fairly bristles with repetition of the idea that his enemies should be made to suffer. This point of

view has come to dominate the entire Nazi regime. Dr. Frank, the Minister of Justice, has boasted, "We shall hound the criminal until he learns to tremble."⁷⁹ His conception of "justice" is illustrated by his treatment of a reputable Jewish lawyer, a man by the name of Strauss, who had earlier won a lawsuit directed against him. For this "crime," Frank had the lawyer arrested. As Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld, the former Prussian Minister of Justice, has related:

Strauss was then beaten, deprived of his shoes and led, to the mockery of the crowds, through the streets of Munich, bearing this sign around his neck: "I will never complain about the Nazis again." He was then murdered in the concentration camp at Dachau. Frank's responsibility for this murder is so clear that fifty Bavarian jurists sent him the notice of Dr. Strauss's death with the inscription: "Your murder, Mr. Frank!"⁸⁰

Under the enlightened leadership of Frank and his colleagues, there has been a complete reversal of policy since the days of the Weimar Republic. The humane officials of the former regime have been dismissed. An official in the Moabit Prison, named Moritz, offered some resistance to the new methods. Accused of friendliness and excessive leniency towards the prisoners, he boldly defended himself in court, and criticized the Nazi penal system and the methods of the Secret Police and the Schutzstaffel (the Nazi Guards). The trial ended at eleven o'clock on October 21, 1937. At three o'clock on the same day he was found dead in his cell.⁸¹

Frank's chief assistant, Dr. Roland Friesler, has set forth the Nazi conception of justice in his introduction to an official report on penal law reform:

According to the German conception, the dead man accuses the perjurer who approaches him through the bleeding opening of his wounds, for the murdered one shrieks for vengeance. And the inner justification for vengeance lies in the cry for expiation, for the expiation which the guilt of Oedipus, the guilt of the Nibelungen, which every guilt demands.⁸²

In another official statement, Dr. Friesler has again affirmed that "guilt demands expiation":

It may not be possible to prove this by reasoning. It is not necessary to establish it by philosophy. The demand for expiation lives in us, and that is enough. Penal law is fighting law, the object of which is not to do battle with the enemy but to destroy him.⁸³

Another Nazi authority has stated:

Our penal law must once more become *penal law*. The idea of retribution must again become decisive, and the word "terrorization" must again become, I might say, "respectable."⁸⁴

These conceptions of legal vengeance have led to a thorough renovation of penal procedure. "Prison sentences," the new regulations state, "shall take place under such conditions that the prisoner shall feel his imprisonment is a definite source of discomfort. The purpose of imprisonment is to punish the prisoner for his crime."⁸⁵ A great deal of cruelty has resulted from these regulations. Even if we discount such a left-wing report of Nazi torture methods as Karl Billinger's *Fatherland*, there are sufficient indications of retributive tactics from conservative sources.⁸⁶

What makes the system especially cruel is the arbitrary method in which "justice" may be executed. The conception of *reasoned* principles of law has been largely abandoned. For example, we find Dr. Helmut Nicolai, the principal exponent of the Nazi legal theory, propounding the doctrine that law is a spontaneous emanation of the race-soul, and the pure Aryan knows instinctively what the law should require:

The man of pure race decides correctly—artlessly, surely, and instinctively. The mixed person must choose between various possibilities. He lacks firm feeling and singleness of conscience. He does not feel what is good and what is evil; he must first decide.⁸⁷

Dr. Nicolai proceeds to contrast the formalism of the Roman law with the belligerent and flexible code of the "Teutons." When law is conceived in this spirit, it is liable to whimsical and arbitrary applications.

Another strange example of Fascist legal theory is supplied by the prominent Nazi lawyer and official, Hermann Schroer, in a speech before the National Socialist Law Society in Cologne on May 10, 1938. "The approval of capital punishment," he announced, "is a National Socialist dogma." The application of this penalty and other legal punishments, however, is said to be governed by the Nazi nationalistic and racial conceptions. For example, the crime of attacking the State merits death. Otherwise the penalty is to depend upon racial considerations:

For, with the Old Germans, those who were racially sound were not punished with death, in spite of their guilt, while the racially degenerate were destroyed. . . . The tragedy of Aryan law begins with the introduction of Mosaic conceptions into the Germanic penal code. . . . Once again National-Socialist penal law, however, has regained the right path. In the future a homicide shall only be treated as murder, and punished by the death penalty, when accompanied by particularly reprehensible features. The distinction between premeditated and non-premeditated homicide has been dropped. In its place there has been revived the ancient Germanic racial-biological principle.⁸⁸

A criminal, in other words, is apt to escape with a light penalty if he is an approved Nazi, but the "racially degenerate" are to be treated with utmost severity. In addition, the distinction between premeditated and unpremeditated acts is no longer admissible; yet this distinction is indispensable for the just and humane consideration of extenuating circumstances. Impartial justice is not to be expected from men who adhere to this point of view.

Judicial procedure, moreover, may be entirely set aside. The right of habeas corpus, which is fundamental to human

liberty, has been abolished; and court decisions can be freely disregarded. The case of Pastor Niemöller, leader of the Church opposition to the Nazi regime, is a notorious instance of these extrajudicial methods. After a secret trial ending March 2, 1938, he was released by the court, having already served the prison term to which he was sentenced. Yet he was immediately taken into custody once again by the Gestapo (secret police) and confined to Sachsenhausen concentration camp. He has been kept in an individual cell, and has not been allowed to speak either to the prisoners or to the guards. Until the end of November, 1938, he was refused all reading material except the Bible, a hymn book, and the daily issue of the Nazi newspaper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*. The only writing permitted was a letter twice a month to his family. Since November, 1938, he has been treated with even greater rigor. He is now in strictest solitary confinement, forbidden to write or receive letters, and denied contact with his wife and relatives who used to visit him at rare intervals. No less than forty-nine delegations, representing various classes in the community, have called upon the Church Ministry and the Ministry of Justice to ask for his release; and appeals have been sent to Hitler, personally. The Gestapo has demanded at the price of release that he sign a statement accepting expulsion from his own parish and congregation. Although his health has been shattered by his illegal detention, the indomitable clergyman has refused to comply.

Another famous case is that of Herr Carl von Ossietzky, the German pacifist and editor who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1936. He was arrested by the Nazis immediately after the Reichstag fire, being first imprisoned in Berlin and afterwards removed to the Sonnenburg concentration camp and subsequently to another camp. So greatly did he suffer from ill treatment that the authorities finally had to transfer him to a police hospital. He finally died in May, 1938, from the tuberculosis which he contracted. At no time

during his years of detention by the Nazis were any charges brought against him, and no one has suggested that he was guilty of any "crime" except that of supporting the League of Nations and advocating universal disarmament and collective security.

Legal procedure is thus disregarded when it suits the Nazi purpose. The Howard League for Penal Reform, in a report to the League of Nations, has pointed out that the action of the German police is free from judicial control, and individuals may be kept in prison or tortured without recourse to legal process.⁸⁹ Many cases of injustice and brutality have been reported in such reputable newspapers as the *Manchester Guardian*.

General Göring, the original Nazi organizer of the Prussian police, has revealed the nature of his instructions:

I gave strict orders and demanded that the police should devote all their energies to the ruthless extermination of subversive elements. . . . Whoever did his duty in the service of the State, whoever obeyed my orders, and took severe measures against the State's enemies, whoever ruthlessly made use of his revolver when attacked, could be certain of protection. Whoever on the other hand was a coward and avoided a fight and looked the other way, whoever hesitated to make use of his weapons, would have to count on being thrown out by me at the earliest possible moment. I declared then, before thousands of my fellow-countrymen, that every bullet fired from the barrel of a police pistol was my bullet. If you call that murder, then I am the murderer.⁹⁰

Göring admits that "there were some cases of brutality," but insists that the Jewish and Marxist menace has been checked. Police brutality is excused if it is directed against a minority race, or against men who have a political viewpoint different from General Göring.

With the revival of dueling, extralegal methods of attaining "justice" have extended into private life. Announcing that sword practice is to be made compulsory in the univer-

sities, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, Hitler's own newspaper, declared on April 5, 1937:

Soon, when we hear again the words of command for the duel in the universities and seats of higher learning, and the arms clash again, we shall know that this bodily exercise that belongs equally to the whole nation, is no longer a class distinction as formerly. And everywhere, when a man challenges the offender of his honor, there will no longer be any such thing as academic privilege, but only the manly settling of an offence against honor for every Folk-Comrade trained to arms.⁹¹

On March 17, 1937, the Nazi Students' Association announced that beginning with the summer term it would be compulsory for all student members to give "unconditional satisfaction" by means of a duel in questions affecting their honor.⁹² It has once more become a mark of honor to bear a saber wound and to be able to boast that the enemy has received a deeper cut. In the army, the code is grimmer than in the universities. Few duels take place, but they are likely to prove fatal.

The system of justice in Italy is milder than in Germany, but the basic trend has been the same. Dr. Giovanni Novelli, the Director-General of Penal and Corrective Institutions, has declared that the penal law must "intimidate" and "castigate" the criminal. The indeterminate sentence, Dr. Novelli thinks, is incompatible with the purpose of retribution and hence must be rejected.⁹³ As Dr. Giulia Battaglini, editor of an Italian journal of penology, has pointed out, "the new code decidedly inclines to the principle of fault and punishment."⁹⁴ This obviously means that "bad men" are made to suffer. Judicial safeguards, moreover, are frequently set aside. Men may be "interned" by the police without even a preliminary hearing, interrogation, or indictment, and may be kept in confinement indefinitely without legal process. In 1931, according to an official document, there were 78,004 people so confined; and on December 31, 1934, there were

36,626 male and 2,945 female prisoners in such custody. Under Italian Fascism, there has indeed been a flareup of cruel and arbitrary methods of punishment, and of extralegal punitive action.⁹⁵

The administration of "justice" under Franco's rule in Spain has been distinguished by its terroristic extremes. The great Catholic writer and philosopher, Miguel Unamuno, observed these cruel practices with grave misgivings. Although he at first favored the Insurgent cause, he soon changed his attitude and issued a fervid denunciation:

I am terrified by the violence, the sadism, the inconceivable cruelty of this civil war as it appears from the Nationalist side. All the horrors which have been reported to me as having been committed by the "Reds"—and in which I by no means believe—are pale trifles compared to the cruelty, the systematic and organized sadism which every day here accompanies the execution of the most honest and innocent people, irrespective of their party label, simply because they are liberal and Republican. And note well that these brutalities are not here a question of individual terrorist action, but result from collective orders given by the General Staff, which calls itself national. All these crimes are committed in cold blood, in response to the slogan implied by the double-edged cry of this insane general who calls himself Millan Astray: "Death to intelligence and long live death!"⁹⁶

Not long after writing these passionate words, the aged writer died.

Additional testimony of the same tenor is supplied by Antonio Ruiz Vilaplana, formerly Dean and President of the College of Commissioners of Justice in Burgos (the capital of Nationalist Spain), who has written a horrifying account of his experiences as an official.⁹⁷ Called upon by the authorities to certify the deaths of people executed in his district, he found numerous bodies in the woods and ditches in the vicinity of Burgos. These people, he tells us, were killed by no mere unauthorized extremists: governmental officials handed over their victims to the squads of executioners. Many of the

bodies were horribly beaten and disfigured, and executions occurred without trials upon slight grounds of complaint. It is possible that these reports are exaggerated, but unfortunately there is much evidence from other sources of the vindictive nature of Franco's "justice" both before and since the cessation of the Civil War. Doubtless the Loyalists were also guilty of excesses, but the authorities of the former Republican government, at any rate, repeatedly voiced disapproval of popular violence.⁹⁸

It has been customary to boast that we have left the "dark ages" far behind; but when we consider the way Jews are bloodily beaten and pogromized, when we hear about the current use of knout and castor oil and lynch rope, when we reflect upon the blood purges and the mass executions and the open bombing of cities, we have every reason to inquire into the quality of our civilization. The Howard League for Penal Reform points out:

No one who examines the evidence can doubt that, actually, the use of torture is more widespread today than it was a half century ago. The evil is not extinct but is growing.⁹⁹

Human malevolence dies hard, and right now it shows every sign of rejuvenation.

Both in war and in "peace," the Fascists bear the major responsibility for the revival of sadism and beastliness. We must not forget, however, that even in the United States, we have our chain gangs and lynchings and tortures. These are not only reprehensible in themselves, but may be the seeds of Fascism.

7. *Esthetic Bias*

Another type of prejudice which is typical of Fascism can be termed "esthetic bias." A biased act is one in which all the values involved are *not* seen steadily and completely; the mind is controlled by the relatively less important aspects of

the situation, and hence chooses a lesser good or a positive evil in place of a greater good. Such an act occurs when a person is misled by superficial esthetic glitter. Using bias in a broad sense, we can say that acts of this sort are biased in favor of the esthetic aspects of existence.

The spectacular and ceremonial side of life has countless esthetic appeals. We all have a taste for the vivid and the dramatic. In seeing a play, for example, we enjoy a vivacious and dashing villain, although he brings great harm to the other characters. In this instance, we are able to enjoy the villain with a good conscience, since we know that it is only a play. But the stage view of life tends to influence us even in real life. Many a bad public servant has succeeded in politics because he has been a picturesque character. One reason why Huey Long could gain his immense power is that he gripped the popular imagination. For similar reasons, the English people retain their king; they love the parade of royalty even though His Majesty has little power. There is no reason to regret such esthetic responses unless more important interests are sacrificed.

An excellent illustration of esthetic bias is provided by Fascism. "The working masses," Hitler has disdainfully observed, "want only bread and circuses, they have no understanding of any kind of ideal."¹⁰⁰ The Führer may not always furnish the bread, but he certainly supplies the circuses. Likewise Mussolini can truthfully boast that his regime has restored "color" to public life.¹⁰¹

Fascism is spectacular. The "heroic" attitudes, the dramatic "threats," the gigantic military reviews, the fervid nationalistic myths, the campaigns for imperialistic expansion, serve to captivate the imagination. The dictators themselves are excessively romanticized: no movie stars have ever had such assiduous press agents. No hero of the past has ever been greeted by so many clicking heels, so many arms raised in salute, so many throats hoarse with shouting. Countless air-

planes fill the heavens; dramatic commands echo to the skies.

Hitler is a conscious master of the art of mass suggestion. As his autobiography clearly indicates, he knows the value of myths, symbols, atmosphere, and emotionalistic rhetoric. He loves the grand gesture, the swift and dramatic act. What could be more thrilling than the reoccupation of the Rhineland, or the seizure of Austria, or the gigantic mobilization and desperate crisis of September, 1938? As the intrepid Führer staked everything upon these bold and defiant ventures, the world trembled upon the verge of the greatest war in history. In prosaic democracies like France and England, the statesmen back down undramatically before these grand exploits, and Hitler gets ready for another fling. Thus life is one grand round of thrills: the Reichstag fire, the blood purge, the Jewish pogroms, the terror, the spectacular party congresses, the fanfare of militarism. It seems that only another World War can slake the thirst for melodrama.

Mussolini is likewise a marvelous showman. A friend of the present writer, Professor Angelo Pellegrini, has remarked:

We Italians are dramatic by temperament anyway. And how superbly Mussolini has succeeded in inflating our ego and dramatizing our personality! Italy, the land of noisy opera and pompous tenors, where everyone, consciously or unconsciously, is an actor and where every detail of life is elaborately dramatized! Italy, the land of self-conscious pomp and show, the seat of papal splendor! That is the Italy of the average Italian before whom Mussolini struts with impeccable skill. When he announces (as he did to the Chamber of Deputies on May 26, 1927) with a characteristic grimace, a forward thrust of the chest, and a clamping of the jaws that his successor is not yet born—what a superb appeal to the dramatic Italian! When he sends his black-shirted legions to conquer Ethiopia, in defiance of a world (Great Britain in particular) too engrossed in holding on to what it has in its bag to go to the rescue of the Conquering Lion of Judah, what superb showmanship in international politics! And a squadron of planes across the Atlantic to steal the show at the Chicago World Fair! That is the work of an impresario. Defiant,

dramatic, shrewd, unscrupulous, Mussolini makes the world sit up and take notice! ¹⁰²

Most people, especially in a poverty-stricken land such as Italy, lead monotonous lives deficient in glamour and achievement. They naturally turn to phantasy as a means of escape; they yearn for thrills to vary the dull round of existence; they enjoy rulers who inflate their ego and keep their country in the world's headlines. This is especially true of people that have been deeply humiliated, as the Germans were by the loss of the War and the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Although Italy was technically one of the victors, the Peace Settlement also disappointed the Italians. Their government's demands for a share of the spoils of war were brushed aside. Orlando, quitting the Conference in tears, was a symbol of the humiliation of Italy. Rightly or wrongly, every Italian was made to feel that his country had been scurvily treated. Both the German and the Italian people were henceforth eager to find some way of rehabilitating their national self-respect, and Fascism provided the opportunity. By contributing their cheap melodrama, Mussolini and Hitler unquestionably have brought color and a sense of justification to jaded lives.

Yet we must not overlook the dangers in this form of entertainment. Mr. Julien Benda has remarked that "artistic sensibility is far more gratified by a system which tends to the realization of force and grandeur than by a system which tends to the establishment of justice, for the characteristic of artistic sensibility is the love of concrete realities and the repugnance for abstract conceptions and conceptions of pure reason, the model of which is the idea of justice." ¹⁰³ Esthetic bias can therefore be very dangerous: at least if Lord Acton was right in saying that "absolute power corrupts . . . absolutely." The difficulty is partly that the dictators are apt to be the dupes of their own imaginations. Surrounded by flatterers, and dreaming of conquests, they are likely to fall victims

to their own delusions of grandeur. As I write these words, a World War is still in the offing, but the choice seems to lie with two would-be Caesars.

There is no reason to suppose that animosities will dissipate, and that the Fascists will some day relinquish their prejudices. Fascism *must* build itself upon various forms of bias. It cannot afford to be scientific, impartial, just; it would thereby prepare its own funeral. It can flourish only if human beings are divided against each other—in gangs, classes, nations, races, creeds. If Gentile does not hate Jew, if white does not exploit black, if man does not oppress woman, if class is not arrayed against class and creed against creed, if men's sympathies are not benumbed and confused by selfishness, retributive bias, and esthetic glitter, Fascism is unthinkable; and dictatorship becomes a relic of the past.

Human beings must pay a heavy price for their biases! Hatred perpetuates the cruelty of man towards man. Prejudice divides men who should be able to work together in peace and amity for the common good. The price of bias is misery and violence.

FORCE OR CONSENT?

The creation of the world—said Plato—is the victory of persuasion over force. The worth of men consists in their liability to persuasion. They can persuade and can be persuaded by the disclosure of alternatives, the better and the worse. Civilization is the maintenance of social order, by its own inherent persuasiveness as embodying the nobler alternative.—ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD¹

1. *The Urgency of the Problem*

IN THE last three chapters we have been concerned with Fascist anti-intellectualism and bias. We have seen that the ideals of scientific objectivity and moral impartiality are sacrificed to a passionate chauvinism. The program of scientific humanism is discarded: it is no longer accounted desirable to pursue the maximum good with the full force of human intelligence.

An important consequence of this revolt against reason is the disintegration of the methods and institutions of persuasion. So long as men entertain the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, they will probably compose their major differences by debate and conciliation; but as soon as they abandon this ideal, the arbitrament of force takes precedence over courts, parliaments, and international leagues. When men cease to reason they begin to fight. We might observe this fact with indifference if the very structure of civilization were not at stake. Simple prudence demands that the bitter facts be faced.

The need of reducing the use of force has never been greater than at the present time. Throughout the world, dictatorships have brutally seized power. The nations are engaged in a mad armaments race which dwarfs the one which culminated in the World War. During the last few years, the Italian-Ethiopian War, the Japanese-Chinese Wars, and the Spanish War have exacted a frightful toll of death and de-

struction. Hardly a week passes without a new "international crisis." Despite the alleged postponement of war in the Munich Settlement, the threat of a gigantic catastrophe worse than anything in the past confronts the statesmen in every country.

Even as matters now stand, the present century is incomparably the most bloody that the world has seen. In the most comprehensive survey of war ever made, the conclusions are sufficiently grim to appall any civilized mind. This survey of the magnitude of war from the years 1100 to 1925 has enabled its author, Pitirim A. Sorokin, to reach the following generalization:

If now we take the relative indicators of the casualties, probably the most important criterion of war, they tell definitely and unequivocally that the *curse or privilege to be the most devastating or most bloody war century belongs to the twentieth; in one quarter century it imposed upon the population a "blood tribute" far greater than that imposed by any of the whole centuries compared.*²

These figures are *relative* to the total population in each century. If we take the absolute figures, "the losses of 1901-1925 are little less than all the losses for all the previous centuries taken together."³ Sorokin traces much of this destructiveness to the hellish efficiency of such modern weapons as tanks, machine guns, big Berthas, airplanes, and poison gas. As a result of "progress" in lethal instruments, "the losses in the World War amounted to 30 and 40 per cent of the army, instead of 1, 2, and 5 per cent as in the wars of the past."⁴

Not only are more people being killed, but they are being killed in an increasingly frightful manner. In the spring of 1937, Webb Miller, European news manager of the United Press and a veteran war correspondent, declared: "In the last twenty-one years I have seen something of six wars, but none, not even the World War, was so ghastly and horrible as the one now in progress in Spain."⁵ The method of "totalitarian warfare"—ruthless slaughter of not only combatants but civil-

ians—is fast becoming the rule. It is impossible to predict how far this tendency will go.

The likelihood of a vast new war is rendered greater by the prevalent disregard of the promises exchanged between nations. A large number of the more important international treaties signed since the World War have been violated. The victors in the War broke their promise to carry out universal disarmament, and this breach of faith provided Hitler with an excuse for treaty breaking. The Versailles Treaty was again violated by Germany's introduction of universal conscription in March, 1935, and the military reoccupation of the Rhineland in March, 1936. The League Covenant has been broken by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the war between Bolivia and Paraguay, and the Italian assault upon Ethiopia. The latter attack also violated a treaty of amity and conciliation concluded between Italy and Ethiopia on August 2, 1928, and reaffirmed on September 29, 1934. The treaty of St. Germain, limiting the military forces of Austria, and the treaty of Trianon, reducing the army of Hungary, have both been flouted with the connivance of Italy. The Locarno Treaties collapsed with the remilitarization of the Rhineland. The Spanish Non-Intervention Agreement has been subjected to the most flagrant and cynical violations. The Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war has been trampled under foot by the German and Italian armies invading Spain, and the Japanese armies invading China. The Nine Power Treaty guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of China has likewise been violated by the Japanese aggression. A treaty signed by the Nazis in July, 1936, guaranteeing the political independence and territorial integrity of Austria, was obliterated when that country was forcibly annexed by Germany in March, 1938. During the great crisis of September, 1938, Hitler evinced not the slightest respect for the existing Treaty of Arbitration with Czechoslovakia nor for the Kellogg-Briand Pact to which Germany

was a signatory; and even France broke her agreement to protect Czechoslovakia, and England disregarded her obligations under the League Covenant. By seizing Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, Hitler demolished the agreement that he had extorted at Munich. The result of these numerous treaty violations has been profoundly to shake the confidence of all governments in the validity of treaties and thus to intensify the international anarchy. New agreements are increasingly hard to reach because old ones have been broken. The most peace-loving nations are compelled to rely increasingly upon the threat of force rather than upon negotiation.

Other forms of violence in addition to war have been increasing. There has been a startling number of political murders. The fashion was set by the murder of Matteotti, the anti-Fascist leader, who was brutally beaten and killed soon after Mussolini attained power.⁶ The Rumanian Premier, Duca, was murdered by the Iron Guard in 1933. In Austria, Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered. Barthou and the pro-French king of Jugoslavia were murdered by the Fascist organization, "Ustachi," in 1934. There were political murders in connection with the Stavisky scandal in France. During Hitler's blood purge of June, 1934, several hundred political enemies were murdered.⁷ The murder in 1934 of Kirov, high Russian official, and other acts of homicide and wrecking appear to have been parts of a conspiracy of Russian oppositionists and Fascist secret agents to slaughter a very large number of people.⁸ In June, 1937, Carlo Rosselli, famous anti-Fascist journalist, and his brother Nello Rosselli were murdered under circumstances which point unmistakably to Fascist attack.⁹ Many lesser individuals have been eliminated in a tide of violence.

There have also been numerous acts of violence in connection with strikes and riots. An example is the massacre, unreservedly denounced by the Senate Civil Liberties Committee and other investigating bodies, of ten workers in

Chicago on Memorial Day, 1937. This same committee has revealed that more than a million dollars' worth of tear and nausea gas has been bought in two and one-half years by private industry in the United States. Viewed as a whole, the findings of the committee tell an appalling story of violence and Fascist trends. The lynchings in the South with the occasional connivance of officials, the beatings and murders perpetrated in connection with sharecropper strikes, the reign of terror in Herrin and other American industrial towns, are examples of violence similar to that which has accompanied the rise and reign of Fascism in Europe. We have every reason to be apprehensive of the development of "squadrist" tactics in the United States. "It can happen here."

2. *The Philosophy of Violence*

Among the main forerunners of the Fascist theory of violence are Machiavelli, Sorel, Nietzsche, and Pareto.

There are many indications that Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) has influenced Mussolini. Il Duce has told how he first absorbed *The Prince*:

My father used to read the book aloud in the evenings, when we were warming ourselves beside the smithy fire and were drinking the *vin ordinaire* produced from our own vineyard. It made a deep impression on me. When, at the age of forty, I read Machiavelli once again, the effect was reinforced.¹⁰

The Fascist publishing house, apparently recognizing the Machiavellian character of the present regime, has issued a *de luxe* edition of the Florentine's works, appropriately dedicated to the Duce; and Mussolini himself has written an appreciative preface to a French edition of *The Prince*. Finally, when the University of Bologna in 1924 offered to confer upon him an honorary Doctor's Degree, he suggested that the honor be postponed until he submitted a "thesis"

on Machiavelli to the University authorities. The thesis was never completed, but a brief Introduction was published in Mussolini's newspaper, *Gerarchia*. The degree, of course, was then enthusiastically conferred by the university.

In his Introduction, Mussolini indicates that Machiavelli's argument is as fresh today as when it was conceived:

It may be asked what there is still living in *The Prince* after these four centuries; whether the counsels given by Machiavelli could conceivably be of any use to the rulers of modern States. . . . I affirm that the doctrine of Machiavelli is more living today than it was four centuries ago, because, if the external aspects of our life are greatly changed, no profound modifications are perceptible in the merits of individuals or of races.¹¹

Mussolini quotes from Machiavelli's *Discourses* to show that its author held a very pessimistic view of the "merits" of human beings:

As is demonstrated by all those who reason regarding civil life, and as all histories are full of examples to illustrate, it is necessary for him who has the directing of a Republic and who has the ordering of its laws to presuppose all men to be bad and to exploit the evil qualities in their minds whenever suitable occasion offers. . . . Men never effect good actions save from necessity; but where freedom abounds, and where licence can come about, everything is filled immediately with confusion and disorder.¹²

This doctrine of the basic corruption of man, declares Il Duce, is "not incidental but fundamental in Machiavelli's mind. . . . It represents a justified and sorrowful conviction. . . . Much time has passed since then, but if I were allowed to judge my fellows and my compatriots, I could not attenuate in the least Machiavelli's verdict. I might even wish to go further than he." ¹³

Thus holding his fellow men in contempt, the Fascist Dictator in the same essay reveals his low opinion of government by popular consent. "To speak of a sovereign people," he declares, "is to utter a tragic jest." Among the passages

which he quotes from Machiavelli is the following recommendation to use force rather than the democratic methods of persuasion:

Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowards, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince, who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined. . . . Men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by dread of punishment which never fails.¹⁴

There can be no doubt that modern dictators, like their Renaissance forerunners, have acted upon the basis of these principles.

Another passage which Mussolini quotes with evident delight is even more unequivocal in its advocacy of a violent dictatorship. After declaring that those rulers who "use force" succeed much better than those who "use prayers," Machiavelli concludes:

Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force. If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have enforced their constitutions for long.¹⁵

Mussolini declares that Machiavelli, in addressing his advice to "the Prince," has in mind the authority of the State, which he wishes to exalt above all other forces. In this respect, the "thesis" continues, his principles are the same as those advanced by Il Duce himself in the essay, "Force and

Consent" (in which liberty is compared to a "decayed corpse"):

In Machiavelli's thought, the antithesis between Prince and people, State and individual, is of central importance. That which has been labelled utilitarianism, pragmatism, cynicism, Machiavellianism, issues logically from this initial position. The word "Prince" is synonymous with the word "State." In Machiavelli's doctrine the Prince is the State. While individuals, driven by their own selfish interests, tend to social anarchy, the State represents an organization and a limitation. The individual tends continuously to evade. He tends to disregard laws, escape taxes, and avoid war. Few indeed are the heroes and saints who sacrifice self upon the altar of the State. All others are in a condition of potential revolt against the State.¹⁶

Mussolini hails Machiavelli as one who combated these anarchic and disintegrative tendencies, and who did not hesitate to advocate force as a means of achieving social cohesion. Indeed, Machiavelli did exalt the political community as well-nigh a moral absolute. Religion and morality are regarded as mere instruments of State. Any means, even extreme treachery and violence, are praised if they contribute to political unity in a time of crisis.

Machiavelli's advice to the Prince, that he should combine the hypocrisy of the fox with the courage of the lion, almost sums up the moral outlook of Mussolini. The number of treaties and promises which he and his government have broken certainly suggest the hypocrisy of the fox. He has issued, in honor of the lion, a coin with the motto, "*Meglio un giorno un leone che cento anni una pecora*" (Better a lion for a day than a sheep for a century).

A more recent thinker than Machiavelli who also emulates the lion's ferocity is the Prussian historian, Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896). His influence upon Italian Fascism has been negligible, but he has been read and frequently quoted by Nazi theorists. His outstanding characteristic is the intensity of his nationalism and militaristic ardor. He

taught that the State was founded upon force (a judgment which is partly true); that its laws must be maintained at all costs; that the poor should continue to be subjugated to the rich; and that military victory is the test of national greatness. "War," he said, "must be taken as part of the divinely appointed order."¹⁷ As a friend of Bismarck, a prominent member of the Reichstag, and the Royal Historian of Prussia, he was a man of influence in his own lifetime; and he is remembered today by such Nazi spokesmen as Walther Darré and Alfred Rosenberg.

A far more gifted thinker, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), has unquestionably influenced Fascism. This profound man fascinated the youthful Mussolini. The latter published, as early as 1908, an essay, "The Philosophy of Force," which is chiefly devoted to Nietzsche's conception of the "Will to Power." In this essay, Mussolini states that Nietzsche is the "most extraordinary mind of the last quarter of the last century," and that his conception of the "superman" is a "great creation."¹⁸ Admiration for Nietzsche is also expressed in Il Duce's more recent utterances. Likewise Alfred Rosenberg, spiritual mentor of the Nazis, declares that German Fascism "sees in Nietzsche a critique akin to itself," and he lists the poet-philosopher as one of "those personalities" to whom National Socialism "is vitally and directly bound."¹⁹

Certain elements in Nietzsche's outlook are quite opposed to Fascism. Far from championing a racial or nationalistic chauvinism, he insists upon the virtue of being a "good European," and even advocates the amalgamation of nations. He despises the name of patriot, and denounces Wagner for his narrow race prejudice. He calls the State a "cold monster" and wishes to curb it. Although he praises war and conflict as a moral tonic, he is inclined to dislike the German militarism of his time. He would have nothing but contempt for the "idealism" to be found in Fascist literature. But there are other doctrines which find their counterparts in

Fascism: his celebration of "the will to power" as the vital principle in nature and life, his desire to substitute an élite of masterful men in place of democracy, and his glorification of violence as a means of subjugating the common "herd."

He regards the entire structure of organized society as having been reared upon the foundation of savage acts of aggression. The primitive war lords established a division of society into masters and slaves. Each of these classes has created its own moral code. The slaves have formulated a Christian morality of love, humility, and resignation. The masters have created a warlike ethics of pride, strength, and tragic glory. This tension and equilibrium of forces constitute the true health of society and the dynamism behind all social advance. The modern world has suffered from an ascendancy of the slave morality; democracy and Christianity have held the masters in thrall. The élite must break this bondage; they must emulate their primitive forbears, and not shrink from acts of violence. "War and courage," they should realize, "have done more great things than charity."²⁰ A great resurgence of the master class awaits its realization of this principle.

Nothing could be more uncompromising than Nietzsche's contempt for the common "herd." "The great majority of men," he declares, "have no right to live, and are only a misfortune to their higher fellows."²¹ Since "mediocre people are joining hands in order to make themselves masters . . . it is necessary for *higher* men to declare war upon the masses!"²² Our decaying civilization can be renovated only by a division of mankind into masters and slaves: "so that at last, beside its new and sublime product, slavery (for this must be the end of European democracy), that higher species of ruling and Caesarian spirits might also be produced, which would stand upon it, hold to it, and would elevate themselves through it."²³ Nietzsche does not shrink from

the conclusion that a great sacrifice is required to renovate society:

The magnitude of a "progress" is gauged by the greatness of the sacrifice it requires: humanity as a mass sacrificed to the prosperity of the one *stronger* species of Man—that *would be* a progress.²⁴

This kind of ideal can slay its tens of thousands.

Certain of the ideas of Nietzsche are ingeniously developed and applied in the theories of Georges Sorel, who is the philosopher of violence *par excellence*. Among the passages which he quotes with approval from Nietzsche are the following:

The knightly aristocratic "values" are based on a careful cult of the physical, on a flowering, rich, and even effervescent healthiness, that goes considerably beyond what is necessary for maintaining life, on war, adventure, the chase, the dance, the tourney—on everything, in fact, which is contained in strong, free and joyous action. . . .

This audacity of aristocratic races, mad, absurd, and spasmodic . . . their nonchalance and contempt for safety, life, and comfort, their awful joy and intense delight in all destruction, in all the ecstasies of victory and cruelty. . . .

The magnificent blonde brute, avidly rampant for spoil and victory. . . .²⁵

In quoting these passages, Sorel leaves no doubt in the mind of the reader that he would like to revive these "Homeric values."²⁶

Beyond question, he has been influential in the development of Italian Fascism. Professor Megaro has shown that as early as 1908, Mussolini responded enthusiastically to the leading doctrines advanced in *Reflections on Violence*: particularly to Sorel's "passionate hatred of reformist, parliamentary socialism and his passionate love of violent political struggle." Yet in 1910-1912 Mussolini ceased to praise, and instead attacked Sorel. The Frenchman by this time had

abandoned his syndicalist ideals, and had flirted with the reactionary and antiproletarian forces of the *Action Française*; whereupon Mussolini, as an advocate of "red" violence, scathingly assailed Sorel's "somersaults." As a matter of fact, Il Duce himself went through the same kind of gyrations when he became a Fascist, and many radicals and syndicalists followed suit. Megaro points out:

Judging by the almost wholesale passage of Italian ex-syndicalists and ex-Sorelians to Fascism, Sorel's syndicalism was nothing but a movement of reaction. In 1911, Mussolini clearly saw how certain deformations of syndicalism would cause it to end up in a "theistic, patrioteering, nationalistic, anti-socialist caricature." This is an acute description of what was to be known as Fascism.²⁷

Whether there was a decisive Sorelian influence upon Mussolini may be questioned. He stated in an interview in 1926, it is true, that he owed more to Sorel than to any other thinker; but as Megaro shows, he would have been temperamentally inclined to embrace similar opinions even if he had not read Sorel's books. In any event, we can find in these volumes an expression of certain doctrines which Fascism shares.

Sorel's advocacy of violence is closely connected with three other articles of his creed: his pessimism, his antidemocracy, and his anti-intellectualism. As the title of one of his books, *Les Illusions du Progrès*, implies, he sharply attacks the belief in progress. In all his works, he depicts ordinary human nature as mean and insipid; but his pessimism is belligerent rather than resigned. From this militant pessimism springs the belief that the improvement of human life is a necessary but not an easy task. It requires a real uprooting of man's nature, and hence heroic virtues. Nothing short of catastrophic events can jar men out of their habitual mediocrity. The regeneration of man depends, not upon a mild class conflict, but upon a violent class war.

Since Sorel thinks little of his fellow beings, he does not trust to the ordinary operations of democracy. A minority must assume active leadership, and dispense with the rigmarole of parliament. In fact, Sorel is more interested in the development of exceptional traits in a new élite than he is in the details of a new economic and political order which will bring comfort to the masses. Peace and democracy lull men into stupefaction; the violent clash of enemies is necessary to sting men into heroic activity. "It is to violence that Socialism owes those high ethical values by means of which it brings *salvation* to the modern world."²⁸

Reason, he thinks, is not the source of heroism:

When working-class circles are *reasonable* . . . there is no more opportunity for heroism than when agricultural syndicates discuss the subject of the price of guano with manure merchants. . . . Lofty moral convictions . . . never depend on reasoning or on any education of the individual will, but on a state of war in which men voluntarily participate and which finds expression in well-defined myths.²⁹

By myths he means dynamic illusions. The intimate union of force and fraud which is thus advocated is a harbinger of the practices of Fascism.

Among Sorel's friends and admirers was another precursor of Fascism, Vilfredo Pareto, whom we have considered at length in Chapter III. He likewise attacks the belief in progress, and advocates the use of myths and violence in the interests of the élite. The "subject-class," he complains in one passage, "have recourse . . . to sentiments of asceticism," and condemn "resistance on the part of the governing class in the name of sociality, pity, and repugnance to sufferings in others." Pacifists add to these sentiments a description of the "horrors of war." "It was the surpassing merit of Georges Sorel," he continues, "that in his *Réflexions sur la violence* he threw all such fatuities overboard to ascend to the altitudes of science."³⁰ How far Pareto himself is willing to

"ascend" in the same direction is revealed in a passage in which he describes the conflict between humanitarians and men of force. If the latter "kill large numbers of humanitarians," he remarks very sweetly, "they are performing a useful public service, something like ridding the country of a baneful animal pest." ³¹ The praise of violence is an integral part of Pareto's theory.

We have now shown that there are a number of famous thinkers in Western thought who exalt the extreme use of force. To this list might be added others, such as Chamberlain, Spengler, Blanqui, Maurras, and Barrès, all of whom have had a share in preparing the world for Fascism. The writers who have exercised the greatest influence upon the Fascists almost invariably either have been bellicose in temper, or have maintained doctrines, such as racial chauvinism, which beget conflict. When we consider the ferocity of such theories, and their great influence upon the human race, we are almost tempted to agree with Anatole France, "Man may be defined as an animal with a musket."

The arguments assume various forms: Violence is a moral tonic and purgative. Violence is a means of creating or preserving a noble élite. Violence is needed to develop heroes, to achieve honor, to attain glory. Or more prosaically, violence is a constant necessity because of the depravity of men. (Nothing is said about the depravity of the men who use violence.)

All of these arguments are myths which conceal the material interests of the aggressors: the appeal of the iron mines of Spain, the cotton fields of Ethiopia, the rich wheat lands and oil fields of the Ukraine, the vast and unexploited resources of China, the cheap labor and raw materials of the "colonies." The lure of Empire, the feverish search for markets, the pressure of expanding population, the desperate extremities of capitalism in decline . . .

3. *How the Fascists Praise Violence*

The immediate precursors of Italian Fascism were the "Futurists." Led by F. T. Marinetti, this group not only produced works of art bristling with "dynamism," but formulated a political program based upon militaristic chauvinism and the rejection of democracy. At the first opportunity Marinetti became a Fascist, and in the initial stages of the movement was as prominent as Mussolini. Although Futurism and its leader have now receded into the background, the extravagances which they widely publicized have helped to determine the moral temper of Fascism. The nature of these outpourings may be judged from the following examples:

Who can deny that a strong man breathes much more freely, eats much better and sleeps much more soundly after having slapped and knocked down an enemy? Who can deny that the word man and the word fighter are synonymous? Hence we conclude that when we speak of war it is the better part of our blood, the futurist part that speaks in us.

. . . Violence has today become the best condition of real health for a people. Order, pacificism, moderation, the diplomatic and reformist spirit, are they not perhaps arterio-sclerosis, old age and death? . . . For to the present esthetics of filthy lucre we oppose—and let it come, let it come—an esthetics of violence and blood! ³²

These "mystics of action," as the Futurists called themselves, represent a more insane point of view than any official pronouncements of the Fascist officials. When Marinetti declares, "We admit but one hygiene for the world—War," he has reached the *reductio ad absurdum* of belligerency, and Mussolini is too shrewd to follow suit.

Yet absurdity is a matter of degrees; and the members of some future and happier generation may look back upon the

annals of our time, and smile incredulously and a little sadly when they read the tragic folly expressed in some of Mussolini's utterances. All men may some day realize the terrible absurdity of his declaration: "War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it."³³ Equally absurd is his further assertion: "War is to man as maternity is to woman. . . . I do not believe in perpetual peace; . . . it depresses and negatives the fundamental virtues of man which only in bloody effort reveal themselves in the full light of the sun."³⁴

Such warmongering, unfortunately, is not mere twaddle, but a dire threat to civilization. The Ethiopians and the Spaniards already understand the disaster which impends. In the meantime, the armaments race is becoming ever more devastating. "The corner-stone of our doctrine and our spirit," Mussolini told 100,000 Sicilians in an address on August 11, 1937, "is an ever more intense preparation of the Italian people for military life."³⁵

It may be objected that Mussolini sometimes speaks in very pacific terms. This is unquestionably true. "I am more than ever convinced," he has declared, "that to disturb the peace of Europe means to bring about the collapse of Europe."³⁶ But there is a disquieting duplicity in the Fascist policies. The remark just quoted was uttered on the evening of the fall of Addis Ababa, and not long before the beginning of the military adventure in Spain. We cannot lightly put out of our minds the image of Italian airplanes dropping their deadly freight upon Barcelona and Madrid. Nor can we be greatly reassured by the form in which Mussolini offers peace, as in a speech at Bologna: "I hold out a great olive branch to the world. This olive branch springs from an immense forest of eight million bayonets, well-sharpened and thrust from intrepid young hearts."³⁷ On at least seven occasions since 1929 Mussolini has solemnly an-

nounced that Italy has no further territorial ambitions, yet these assurances have not hampered his expansionist program in the slightest degree. We would like to believe in Fascism's devotion to peace, but obstacles are put in our way.

We do not mean to assert that Hitler and Mussolini are always hypocritical when they speak of the desirability of peace. No doubt they would like the rest of the world to offer no resistance, so that they could achieve their entire program without war. But men who do not directly desire war may nevertheless desire certain other things so much that they are willing to resort to war if they cannot achieve their ends by alternative means. This is the situation which has plunged Italy into war against Ethiopia, Japan into war against China, and Germany and Italy into an undeclared war against Loyalist Spain. The Fascists' bellicose philosophy reconciles them the more readily to the "necessity" of war.

Mussolini's tastes are revealed not only by his foreign, but also by his domestic, policies. In referring to an attack on the opposition newspaper, *l'Avanti*, which was destroyed, amid bloodshed, by the Fascist squadristi just before the March on Rome, Mussolini addressed these words to his followers:

Here was the real Milanese Fascism. Not the petty violence of individuals, sporadic and often ineffectual, but the grand, beautiful, inexorable violence of the decisive hours.³⁸

It is true that he has also said, "Fascist violence must be equitable, rational, and surgical," and has even announced that it is an "unwelcome necessity."³⁹ But what he regards as a "necessity" is indicated by his further statement:

I declare that my desire is to govern, if possible, with consent of the majority; but, in order to obtain, to foster, and to strengthen that consent, I will use all the force at my disposal.

For it may happen that force may bring about consent, and if that fails, there is always force. With regard to all the requirements of government, even the most severe, we shall offer this dilemma: accept in the spirit of patriotism, or submit. This is my conception of the State and of the art of governing the nation.⁴⁰

This "art" has included such practices as the administration of terrible overdoses of castor oil, and the cruel imprisonment and even the murder of dissenters.

This predilection towards violence is not a recent acquisition. Mussolini has abandoned almost all the principles of his pre-Fascist radicalism, but in one respect he has been thoroughly consistent: from early manhood until the present, he has displayed an extreme love of bloodshed and explosives. In numerous quotations cited in Megaro's thoroughly documented biography, Mussolini harps upon the beauty and necessity of violence. This biographer concludes that whatever Mussolini's "alleged social objective, Socialism or Fascism, he has always been certain that 'it is blood which gives movement to the resounding wheel of history.'" ⁴¹

The attitude of Hitler toward violence is not very different. On September 25, 1930, while testifying at a supreme court trial of certain army officers charged with treasonable activities in the Nazi interest, Hitler promised that the heads of his enemies would eventually roll in the dust.⁴² The subsequent record of events has demonstrated that this was no idle threat. Göring, who directed the early phases of the terror, has euphemistically stated: "It will always remain Hitler's greatest merit that he did not bridge over the gulf between Proletariat and Bourgeoisie, but filled it in by hurling both Marxism and Bourgeois parties into the abyss."⁴³ The abyss, as everyone knows, was filled in with a good many dead bodies.

Even in childhood, Hitler's temperament was bellicose. "While still a boy, I was no pacifist," he wrote in his auto-

biography, "and all educational efforts towards that end came to naught."⁴⁴ In another passage, he reveals his boyish taste in reading:

While going through the library of my father, I found several books of a military nature. Among them was a popular account of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Two volumes of an illustrated magazine of these years now became my favorite reading matter. After a short time the heroic fight had become my greatest inner experience. From that time onward, I became more and more enthusiastic about everything which dealt in some way or other with war or military life.⁴⁵

In another part of his autobiography he relates:

The Boer War struck me like a bolt of lightning. Day by day I anxiously waited for the newspapers and swallowed telegrams and reports, and was happy to be, at least from afar, a witness to this heroic struggle.⁴⁶

The opportunity came at last in 1914 when he was old enough to fight. He greeted the declaration of war with almost hysterical joy:

The hours of that time seemed to absolve me from the angry feelings of my youth. Even today I am not ashamed to say that I sank to my knees, overcome by turbulent enthusiasm, and thanked heaven with all my heart that it had given me the fortune to live during this period.⁴⁷

Lest anyone suppose that this martial ardor had subsided since the War, Hitler explains that the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles has provided a great opportunity "to infuriate the national passion to the highest pitch."⁴⁸ Once this Teutonic fury is aroused, action will not be far distant: "When propaganda has filled a whole people with an idea, organization can, with a handful of men, draw the consequences."⁴⁹

What these consequences are Hitler indicates with amazing frankness. He announces that all those who are of German blood are to be united in one German Reich. A great many

Germans are to be found in Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Russia, Schleswig (Denmark), Eupen-Malmédy (Belgium), South Tirol (Italy), Yugoslavia, Esthonia, and Hungary. There is thus a vast field for racial *Anschluss*, and Hitler, in annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia, has only begun to carry out his program.

War is threatened even when there are no Germans to be annexed. Hitler calls France the "irreconcilable, mortal enemy of the German people," and declares "that Germany in the destruction (*Vernichtung*) of France, sees only a means finally to give our people another area for possible expansion."⁵⁰ He also threatens eastern aggression: "We will stop the endless migrations of Germans towards the south and west of Europe, and direct our eyes towards soil in the east."⁵¹ He specifically mentions Russia and the border states of the Baltic as affording an attractive field for territorial expansion.

His ultimate ambition, it appears, is to make Germany "the supreme lord of the earth." Real peace, he announces, can only be achieved by "the German conquest of the world." The "pacifist-humanitarian idea may perhaps be very good after the world has been conquered and subjugated by the highest type of man," but the German people "must be resolved to make war in order that pacifism may be established."⁵²

The policies and methods which Hitler proposes to adopt are no more reassuring than his announced objectives. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the government must prepare the sword of war:

To forge this sword is the task of the internal political leadership of a people; to safeguard the forging and to find armed allies is the task of the foreign policy.⁵³

We are told that "an alliance which does not include in its aim the intention to make war is senseless and worthless."⁵⁴

When war begins, it must be waged with utmost rigor. "Humanitarianism . . . consists in the shortness of the process," and therefore "the severest (*die schärfste*) methods of combat are the most humanitarian."⁵⁵ Throughout his book, he proclaims "the eternal privilege of force and strength."

Unquestionably *Mein Kampf* must be used with extreme caution as a guide to Hitler's actual policy since his advent to office. Some men will talk like moral desperadoes when they are still powerless, but will lose much of their ferocity when power is within their grasp. Hitler is perfectly capable of moderating both his language and actions when it suits his purposes. Nothing could be more pacific in tone than the following clear statement from Hitler's speech before the Reichstag, May 17, 1933:

No new European war would be in a position to improve the unsatisfactory conditions of the present day. On the contrary, the application of violence of any kind in Europe could not create a more favourable political or economic position than that which exists today. . . . The outbreak of such infinite madness would necessarily cause the collapse of the present social and political order.⁵⁶

The nearest that Hitler has ever come to a retraction of his book, which obviously contradicts such a statement as the one just quoted, was in an interview with a French journalist on February 21, 1936. At this time, he was seeking to prevent the ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact, and hastened to assure the French people that their contemplated defensive alliance was unnecessary. Upon being asked by his interviewer about the threats against France which appear in *Mein Kampf*, the Führer replied:

When I wrote this book, I was in prison. It was the time when the French troops were occupying the Ruhr. It was at the moment of greatest tension between our two countries. . . . Yes, we were enemies, and I stood for my own country, as is fitting,

against yours; just as I stood for my country for four and a half years in the trenches. I should despise myself if I were not first of all a German in the moment of conflict. You want me to correct my book, like a man of letters bringing out a new and revised edition of my works. But I am not a man of letters. I am a politician. I undertake my corrections in my foreign policy, which aims at an understanding with France. If I succeed in bringing about the Franco-German rapprochement, that will be a correction which will be worthy to be made. I enter my correction in the great book of history! ⁵⁷

As soon as the Franco-Soviet Pact was ratified, however, the Führer announced that the treaty created "a new situation" much less acceptable to Germany. There have been recent reports that Hitler is writing a new book, but *Mein Kampf* will probably remain as an authoritative expression of Nazi principles.

The difficulty in accepting Hitler's pacific statements and partial retractions at their face value is that, in all probability, he is merely indulging in tactical lies. His professions of peaceful intent have not prevented him from rushing soldiers and military supplies to aid Franco, seizing Austria at the risk of war, and threatening to plunge the world into war during the Czechoslovakian crises. The German government has broken so many promises that its statements must be taken with a grain of salt. As early as March 7, 1936, Hitler declared in the Reichstag: ". . . I believe that today I can look upon the struggle for the restoration of German equality of rights as now concluded. . . . In Europe we have no territorial claims to put forward." ⁵⁸ Similar disclaimers of expansionist ambitions have been made on other occasions (January 30, 1934; May 21, 1935; March 11 and 12, 1938, etc.). Consequently, there is much to justify the opinion expressed by Sir Archibald Sinclair, the leader of the Liberal party in the House of Commons, who declared on October 3, 1938, in the course of debating the Munich settlement: "Two sources of enlightenment I have found about Hitler's intentions—his speeches

and *Mein Kampf*. I prefer *Mein Kampf* because it has never let me down." ⁵⁹ In this book, Hitler himself defends deception as an instrument of national policy, and states that the Nazis should be careful not to arouse too much suspicion: "By howling against five or ten States . . . we are sacrificing the possibility of acquiring strength by means of alliances for the final struggle." ⁶⁰

His frightful book, moreover, is still being distributed in vast quantities to the German people. About four million copies have already been sold, and newly married couples are being presented with free copies (with what effect upon the birth rate has not been revealed). If Hitler really wants peace, not merely temporary but *permanent* peace, he should emphatically renounce *Mein Kampf* and cease to promote its circulation. He should make his followers realize that their jingoistic tendencies are opposed, if such be the case, to the policies of the Nazi regime. He and his subordinates should not so love to appear in military garb, or stage so many gigantic military reviews. He should see to it that the state-controlled press and propaganda agencies end immediately their campaign to fill the souls of young people with martial ardor. He should check the expressions, which resound throughout Germany, of almost hysterical hatred against Russia. He should be willing to sign non-aggression pacts with any nation, including all the countries to the east. He should not violate a solemn international agreement, as in the case of the Spanish Non-Intervention Pact, which his own representative signed. He should never have permitted Germany's military assault upon the legal government of Spain, and should promptly renounce the threat of similar action against other nations implied in the dangerously worded "Anti-Communist" Accord.⁶¹ He should be not only ready but anxious that Germany disarm in concert with other great Powers. He should be only too ready to accept, rather than to brush aside as in fact he has done, President

Roosevelt's proposal (April, 1939) of a ten-to-twenty-five-year era of peace to be guaranteed by over thirty nations. Such actions and policies as these recommended would alone be consistent with his declaration that "the application of violence of any kind in Europe" is to be deplored. But Hitler pursues a different course, and it is not surprising that he is regarded with suspicion.

If we turn from Hitler to his lieutenants and followers, we find that they too appear to be animated by militaristic ideals. A Nazi organ boasts: "A truly new spirit prevails in Germany; even the ash-cans stand at attention!"⁶² Rosenberg declares: "We acknowledge the old saying that combat (*Kampf*) is the father of all things, not only as an empty formula, but as the content of our lives."⁶³ Darré announces: "The future of our people depends to a great extent upon the special regard for soldierly virtues."⁶⁴ A semi-official Nazi journal, the *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, proclaims the duty of youth: "The National Socialist people's youth affirms battle, and submits to the carrying of arms as the obvious foundations of all people's labor."⁶⁵ Hitler's old friend and honored compatriot, the late General Ludendorff, wrote a book in which he expounded the theory of the future "totalitarian war," the basic principle of which is that every resource of a belligerent nation must be commandeered, and not even enemy noncombatants are to be spared.⁶⁶ One of the foremost military theorists in Germany, Ewald Banse, who was appointed Professor of Military Science by the Nazi Government, has described the conditions for achieving national greatness:

Ideas and works and armies must march and fight and die before the vast and splendid structure of the Third Reich rises from the ground of the western world. Ideas and work and military service must go hand in hand in future, if culture is to survive, industry to flourish, and the State to maintain itself.⁶⁷

There can be no doubt that the mass of the German people love peace; but there can also be no doubt that the present

“leaders” of Germany are betraying these peaceful aspirations by word and deed.

The “leaders” plead by way of extenuation that Germany has been unjustly treated. No one can deny that this is true. Some of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were infamous, although not so infamous as the German-made treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, and the more recent Munich pact. The Allies, in any event, were partly responsible for the rise of Hitler, whose aim to eradicate the Treaty was immensely popular among his fellow countrymen. Rightly or wrongly, a vast number of Germans shared the viewpoint expressed by Oswald Spengler in a speech of February, 1924:

We have not only become miserable, we have also lost our honor. The right which is granted to every man and every small nation, to protect itself with the weapon in its hand, has been taken from us. We no longer belong to the group of independent nations. We have become the mere object of the will, the hatred, and the rapacity of others.⁶⁸

Certainly it is true that France, and to some extent England, pursued for years a policy of keeping Germany crushed and prostrate. *The whole world needs to take reckoning of what has happened; there is scarcely a nation which should not search its conscience.*

But after admitting these facts, we must still consider the question: Has not Hitler appealed to the injustices of Versailles to excuse a policy which has gone quite as far wrong or even much farther wrong in another direction? Can we fail to see that the German Government—itsself a victim of past discrimination—is violating the just claims of other peoples to human equality by its absurd racial theories, its extreme persecution of the Jews, and its program of militaristic expansion? Can we fail to recognize that the warlike acts and utterances of Germany’s rulers have brought the nation to the very brink of doom? Has not the entire world come to a sorry pass when the lives of millions of human beings

depend upon the whims of apparently irresponsible jingoes?

Even aside from the question of war, the Nazi attitude toward violence is far from reassuring. Perhaps this attitude may be judged from the remarks of high officials concerning the practice of lynching. No members of the Nazi ruling class appear to be more highly regarded than Darré and Rosenberg; hence their views may be regarded as representative. Darré's attitude toward lynching and other forms of violence is revealed in the following passage:

Some readers will perhaps consider it a sign of brutality that in earlier times the coward and the person unable to fight were killed. But if a people can assert itself only through an affirmation of violence, it must subordinate all its feelings to this necessity. As long as the spirit of our army was healthy, the principle that cowards should be brought before a court martial was enforced. Any person who is inclined to think that this measure constitutes a military invention should study the lynch laws of the United States. The hard necessities and the insecurities of life made it necessary to exterminate, without sentimentality, all the unfit.⁶⁹

Rosenberg also refers to practices in the United States:

A negro is not allowed to travel in the company of a white person; much less is he permitted to intermarry. If a negro rapes a white woman he will be lynched. This is not "nice" but it constitutes the only possible corrective of a practice inimical to nature, which sprang into being at a time when the world began to be poisoned by freemasons and humanitarians.⁷⁰

When the high officials of the State thus condone lawless violence, it is not surprising that anti-Semitism and other forms of collective hatred find a pathological or even murderous expression.

4. *How the Fascists Practice Violence*

Many accounts have appeared of the brutalities practiced in the Fascist countries. Some of the reports are prejudiced,

some are exaggerated; but where there is so much smoke, there is bound to be some fire. The most moderate observers have been repelled by the character of Fascist violence. For example, Professor Henri Lichtenberger, writing a book which has been praised by conservatives for its objectivity and restraint, is "tremendously shocked" by the "terrorism" and "calculated violence" of the Nazis.⁷¹ If the Italian record is somewhat better, it is at least unenviable.

The Fascists' policies toward foreign peoples have also been marked by brutality. The conquest of Ethiopia has been described by Mussolini and the Italian press as the triumph of civilization over savagery. Yet the general massacre of the population of Addis Ababa after the attempted assassination of Marshal Graziani has forced some well-informed persons to question the methods employed by the angels of civilization. The events following the attempted assassination are described in the *Manchester Guardian*:

Every Abyssinian man was shot on sight, and those [Fascists] who did not have rifles made use of clubs and other weapons. Thousands of native houses were then set on fire, and as the inhabitants tried to flee for safety they were shot or clubbed to death. In some cases no discrimination was made between men and women, and many women were killed. By the time this orgy was finished the greater part of the capital was in ruins; what had been left from the disorders of the previous year was destroyed.⁷²

This reprisal was directed mainly against persons who were entirely innocent; the few would-be assassins remained unidentified. Other methods employed in subduing Ethiopia—such as the widespread use of poison gas—have forced many persons to question the worth of Fascist "civilization."

The Spanish War has likewise aroused disturbing reflections in every sensitive mind. A single incident in this war will indicate the depth to which modern fighting may sink. The destruction of the little city of Guernica, an historic and

religious shrine of the Basque people, has a significance far greater than the immediate tragedy, although hundreds of noncombatants were slaughtered. The event is symbolic, it is a warning to all countries.

The Fascists cannot evade responsibility for this deed. General Franco, the Insurgent commander, has declared in unequivocal language that his objective has been to establish a Fascist State. The flyers who dropped the bombs were mainly, if not exclusively, Nazi aces flying in German planes.⁷³

At the time of its destruction, Guernica had a population of seven thousand inhabitants and three thousand refugees. These were not soldiers but noncombatants. No ordinary military objective was involved: the town was not near the fighting lines; a near-by factory producing war material remained unscathed. Apparently the sole purpose of the onslaught was to demoralize the Basque population.

Everything was managed systematically. The time chosen was the middle of an April afternoon on market day, when the town was full of peasants. Small parties of light airplanes at first flew overhead, dropping fifty-pound bombs and machine-gunning the inhabitants as they ran for cover. Then "a heavy drumming of engines was heard to the east," and the large bombers appeared. They dropped fifty- and one-hundred-pound bombs, and "great torpedoes weighing a thousand." The planes "chose their sectors in orderly fashion. After the explosive bombs came the incendiary bombs, tubes of two pounds, long as your forearm, glistening silver from their aluminum and elektron casings. . . . These fell many at a time, for they were dropped twenty-four together on a spinning rod." ⁷⁴ Soon the whole town was in flames.

An eyewitness, Father Alberto Onainda, Dean of the Cathedral of Valladolid, has supplied a vivid account of the effect of these events upon the inhabitants:

I was in Bilbao when the Basque Government decided to evacuate Guernica, where I had friends and relations. I arrived

at Guernica on April 26 at 4:40 P.M. I had hardly left the car when the bombardment began. The people were terrified. They fled, abandoning their livestock in the market-place. The bombardment lasted until 7:45 P.M. During that time five minutes did not elapse without the sky being black with German aeroplanes.

The method of attack was always the same. First there was machine-gun fire, then ordinary bombs, and finally incendiary. The planes descended very low, the machine-gun fire tearing up the woods and roads, in whose gutters, huddled together, lay old men, women and children. Before long it was impossible to see as far as 500 metres owing to the smoke occasioned by the bombardment.

Fire enveloped the whole city. Screams of lamentation were heard everywhere and the people, filled with terror, knelt, lifting their hands to heaven as if to implore divine protection.

The planes descended to 200 metres, letting loose a terrible machine-gun fire. I reached my car and just had time to take refuge in a small group of oaks. I have not heard of any inhabitants who survived among the ill and wounded in the hospitals.

The first hours of the night presented a terrible spectacle of men and women in the woods outside the city searching for their families and friends. Most of the corpses were riddled with bullets.

As a Catholic priest, I state that no worse outrage could be inflicted on religion than the *Te Deums* to be sung to the glory of Franco and Mola in the Santa Maria Church at Guernica, which was miraculously saved by the heroism of firemen from Bilbao.⁷⁵

The bombardment of the city was at first denied by General Franco, and newspapers throughout Germany published the lie that Guernica was destroyed by "Red incendiaries." When the Insurgents were at last forced halfway to admit the bombardment, they dismissed it as "a comparatively minor event."⁷⁶ The event was indeed not exceptional, since noncombatants have been ruthlessly slain upon many other occasions in the Spanish conflict. Hospitals, schools, museums, and public buildings have been mercilessly bombarded. Rows of workers' dwellings have crashed down upon

the heads of their inhabitants. Bombs have been showered into courtyards where children were at play. Women caught waiting in long queues for food rations have been pitilessly slaughtered.

In Barcelona, for example, during ten days of aerial bombardment in March, 1938, 815 people were killed, and 2,200 were wounded. The air raids, according to the Catalonian government, destroyed the Industrial School, the School of Engineering, the Professional Institute for Women, the 6,000-volume library of the Cultural Institutions, the world-renowned collection of rare editions made by Gustau Gili, a group of new schools with a capacity for 3,000 pupils, and thousands of homes. In addition to bombardments, there have been mass executions of defenseless citizens, as at Badajoz: "Eighteen hundred men—there were women, too—were mowed down there in some twelve hours." 77

But the bombing of Guernica, although not exceptional in its horror, does furnish a very clear example of the methods of "totalitarian warfare." An Episcopalian minister, the Canon of Manchester, Peter Green, has written a thoughtful letter concerning this event to the *Manchester Guardian*:

Sir,—A man may say what he likes about the Guernica horror, he may pile adjective on adjective and sentence on sentence, and when he has filled a column and a half he will have said nothing bad enough for this awful massacre of innocent noncombatants. But it could all have been expressed in four words: "This is modern war." The object of modern war is not to defeat or even to destroy armies in the field. The object of modern war is to destroy the machinery of everyday life and so to demoralize the civil population as to break the nation's will to war and put an end to war-resistance.

If a European war comes, as seems all too likely, the scenes in Guernica will be repeated in every big town in Europe. I may live to see all central Manchester in flames and the crowds that pass out of Central and London Road Stations every morning fleeing from machine-guns firing from low-flying aeroplanes. The criminals today are not the leaders of army, navy, and air force,

but the politicians in every country who conceal these facts from the man in the street.⁷⁸

The letter of Canon Green accurately depicts the horrible desolation which may eventually threaten, in this age of transoceanic flights, the cities not only of Europe but of America. Although atrocities are committed by both sides in every modern war, the methods which the Canon here describes are especially characteristic of the Fascists.⁷⁹

The bombing of Chinese cities by Japan, a near-Fascist power, has repeated the pattern supplied by the Fascists in Spain. Early in the war the British Government warned the Japanese: "It is one of the oldest and best-established rules of international law that direct or deliberate attacks on non-combatants are absolutely prohibited whether inside or outside the area in which hostilities are taking place."⁸⁰ But diplomatic warning by Britain and the United States has not prevented the violation of these "best-established rules." Shanghai, Hankow, Nanking, and other cities have been cruelly bombarded. After an attack on Hankow which killed one thousand noncombatants, the Associated Press reported:

Not a soldier was injured nor was any important military objective destroyed in the series of raids. At the time of the bombings there was not a soldier within miles of Hankow. The arsenals . . . were at least four miles from where the bombs rained.⁸¹

In both the Orient and the Occident, the methods of totalitarian warfare are being tested.

The extremes to which the Fascists might go in a vast new conflict are suggested in an article on germ warfare which appeared in the *Deutsche Wehr*, a professional organ of the German military class. This article thoroughly and cold-bloodedly analyzes the military effectiveness of germs of spotted typhus, yellow fever, typhoid, dysentery, smallpox, cholera, and bubonic plague. Distribution of the germs from

airplanes is said to be the best method, for the bacteria when thus spread not only attack human beings directly, but infect water, foodstuffs, and animals. "It is to be presumed," the article declares, "that attempts to spread germs will not be directed against troops in the field but against the civilian population in the remoter enemy territory. To use it against soldiers would entail great dangers to the attacking troops."⁸² The author believes that unhygienic and overcrowded districts would provide the best targets for launching epidemics.

This article, citing an Italian authority and appearing in a German journal, indicates that plans are being made for a new war which will outstrip in horror anything in the past. Military experts are of the opinion that such methods cannot be applied in the immediate future, and they discount the fantastic stories now current as to the present effectiveness of gas, aerial, and bacterial warfare. If barbaric trends, however, are not checked while there is yet time, the instruments of frightfulness may *eventually* become all that they have been imagined as being. As the President of the United States has declared:

Perhaps we foresee a time when men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book and picture and harmony, every treasure garnered through millenniums, the small, the delicate, the defenseless—all will be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed. . . . If those days come there will be no safety of arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in a vast chaos.⁸³

5. *Criticism of the Fascist Policy Toward Violence*

The Fascists, of course, do not simply encourage violence. No government, Fascist or otherwise, can permit lawless coercion to go absolutely unchecked. Such a policy would mean hopeless anarchy. The Fascists *must* have some ways of

limiting the reign of force. They claim, indeed, to have eliminated "class war" within the Fascist countries, and to have prevented violent revolution throughout Europe. "Adolf Hitler by his victory," declares Rosenberg, "saved Germany from Communism and the whole world from a bloody chaos."⁸⁴ Despite such assertions, the Fascist policy is a dismal failure. It is worth while to enumerate the reasons why Fascism offers no real solution of the problem of violence.

1. *The Fascists have romanticized violence, and have thus made it attractive.* "Democracy has destroyed the 'style' of the Italian people," Mussolini has declared, but Fascism restores "the character, the colour, the force, the picturesque, the unexpected, the mystic." This return of glamour is achieved by playing on all the strings, including violence.⁸⁵ Militarism, in particular, has been almost constantly on parade. Martial enthusiasm has been kindled in the young by drill, song, and fable; the military heroes of the past and present have been ostentatiously honored.

Unfortunately the grim realities of modern warfare are utterly different from the romantic illusions bred by these methods. "War," as Robert Bridges declares, "has fallen from a trumpeting, vain glory to a crying shame." What counts in actual engagements is not so much heroism as the soulless, mechanized efficiency of lethal instruments. The world's foremost authority on military methods, Captain Liddell Hart, has written:

The development of the War in Spain is symptomatic of the general trend of modern warfare. This serves to blow away sentimental vapourings about the heroic virtues of war, utilised by militaristic nations in generating a warlike spirit among their people. It can no longer be claimed that war is, in common sense, any test of a people's fitness. Or even of their national strength. The most virile and united people would not be able to withstand another, or even a mere party, inferior to it in all natural qualities if the latter had some decisively superior technical ap-

pliance. Fighting spirit itself is a factor of diminishing importance. There is even a prospect that a nation as such may be at the mercy of any gang of moral and physical degenerates which becomes possessed of such an appliance—a reflection which lends irony to the fact that nationalism is being so assiduously cultivated at the very time that science is undermining its foundations.⁸⁶

The military ideology of the Fascist is more suitable to an age of knights in armor than to a century of science and technology. To be thus out of date is terribly dangerous: the whole of civilization is imperiled.

2. *The Fascists have sought to avert the wrath of the poorer classes by diverting animosities into new and dangerous channels.* Machiavelli advised his Prince that the way to avoid revolt and dissension at home is to seek glory by foreign conquest. Whether Mussolini was consciously following this advice in his conquest of Ethiopia is difficult to say; but there can be little doubt that the Fascists utilize the principle of finding new objects of attack so as to divert men's minds from their immediate troubles.

The movement against the Jews, and against other racial and religious minorities, deflects ill will engendered by social distress into the persecution of these miserable scapegoats. The heaping of blame upon the "radicals" for the suffering of the common people strengthens the movement of the wealthy against the dispossessed, and thus intensifies the class divisions which are the ultimate source of conflict. The fulminations against Communism have served as a pretext for attacking democratic Spain, although when the attack began there were no Communists in the Spanish cabinet, and very few in the country. The kindling of nationalistic passions, and the fanning of prejudices against foreign peoples, may serve to diminish internal strife by exciting a warlike solidarity, but the ultimate effect is to destroy international peace and good will. These methods will tempo-

rarily avert class conflict, but the final result is to increase and intensify violence.

3. *The Fascists refuse to employ the methods of persuasion, and consequently must fall back upon the alternative of force.* International conflicts can only be peacefully adjudicated if nations submit to the methods of law and negotiation; yet the democratic countries have not been altogether true to their word, and the Fascist powers have been tearing up one treaty after another. They have broken past pledges, and reject the means to reach new, amicable agreements. As a result, the institutions of conciliation crumble: war follows war—in Ethiopia, Spain, China. . . .

Even in its domestic policy, Fascism rejects conciliatory methods: political opposition is suppressed and parliamentary government is abolished. This refusal to submit to discussion is connected with the entire revolt against reason. Violence is inevitable when men think like Italo Balbo, who writes in his diary:

How can one reconcile the theory of violence with liberal principles? And above all, how can one practice violence and preach respect for all opinions? The truth is one. Who believes that he possesses it must defend it with his life. And whoever does not believe that he possesses the truth in himself, absolute and unique, cannot be a Fascist, that is to say, be contemptuous of death. I am so sure of dwelling in the truth that I cannot understand how it is possible not to be a Fascist. When I speak in public I make no effort whatever. It is as though I were speaking to myself. . . . It appears to me absurd that others do not think like me.⁸⁷

When men reach this degree of dogmatism, they are not subject to persuasion, and it is unlikely that they can persuade others. *Yet persuasion is the only real alternative to force.* There is consequently a sinister implication in the remark of Alfred Rosenberg: "Only a Socrates could preach the insane doctrine that virtue can be taught, be taught to all

human beings." ⁸⁸ If virtue *cannot* be taught, if men's minds are insulated against persuasion, there is no chance to prevent the violent destruction of millions and millions of human beings.

4. *The Fascists have repressed social conflicts, and in so doing have merely aggravated the problem of averting strife.* There are two basic ways of dealing with violence. One is to remove the poverty, injustice, and clash of major interests which impel men to fight; this is the method of establishing genuine social harmony. It means nothing short of a profound reconstruction of society—the eventual abolition of exploitation; but it is the only real solution of the problem. The other way is ruthlessly to suppress those movements which threaten the regime of privilege; this is the method of repression, and is no solution at all. A powerful dictatorship may establish "order" by such a policy, but the effect is certainly not to achieve a real harmony. Repression simply drives the conflict underground, where the forces of opposition slowly gather force for a more violent and deadly struggle.

The Fascists employ the method of repression. They have immensely strengthened the coercive power of the State, and have violently suppressed civil liberty, political opposition, and autonomous labor unionism. But it is not always recognized that the famous "Corporate State" represents nothing but repression. The corporative system has been described in the most fetching terms. The leader of the British Union of Fascists, Sir Oswald Mosley, paints this attractive picture:

Class war will be eliminated by permanent machinery of government for reconciling the clash of class interests in an equitable distribution of the proceeds of industry. Wage questions will not be left to the dog fight of class war, but will be settled by impartial arbitration of State machinery; existing organizations such as trade unions and employers' federations will be

woven into the fabric of the Corporate State, and will there find with official standing not a lesser but a greater sphere of activity. Instead of being the general staff of opposing armies, they will be joint directors of national enterprise under the general guidance of corporative government.⁸⁹

A beautiful prospect, but what does it mean in practice? Shorn of all verbiage and disguises, the proposal here advanced is to abolish the right to strike, destroy all independent labor organizations, and substitute "company unions" under the protection of dictatorship.

This system is utterly opposed to the interests of labor. The figures issued from time to time by the League of Nations Economic Survey, and by other nonpropagandist agencies, show that real wages in Italy, the country in which the corporative system has received its first and fullest realization, are appallingly low and do not advance. The decisions handed down by the compulsory arbitration courts are unfavorable to labor. The relevant data for the first years of operation have been fully assembled by M. Rosenstock-Franck, in his book, *L'Economie Corporative* (published in 1934). "The conclusion to which his investigation has led him," writes Salvemini, "is that the workers always emerge with their bones more or less broken." Salvemini adds: "*There does not exist to this date [1936] a single case in which the Labour Court has increased workers' wages.*"⁹⁰ In his current book, *Italian Fascism* (1938), Salvemini brings the discussion down to date, and concretely describes the manner in which workers have met with heavy reverses.⁹¹ The settling of industrial disputes by courts "stacked" against the employees, and the enforcement of the decisions by absolute dictatorship, is the "solution" of the problem of industrial strife which the Fascists recommend to the democracies.

Dire poverty is perpetuated under the Fascist dictatorships, and the workers are beaten down by a political ma-

chine. These conditions belie the Fascists' boast that they are preventing revolution. The truth is that they are making revolution inevitable. Revolution breaks out when there has been an intolerable piling up of cultural lags, because of the tyrannical inflexibility of the established order. There has never been a true revolution where there has been no tyranny. There was tyranny in England before the revolt of Cromwell, there was tyranny in the United States before the American Revolution, there was tyranny in France before the French Revolution, and there was tyranny in Russia before the revolution of the Soviets. The most certain way to precipitate a violent revolution is to intensify Fascist repression. When the poor and downtrodden are denied all democratic rights and civil liberties, the specter of revolution begins to haunt the land of the tyrants. We have not yet seen any of the great Fascist powers crash amid the desperate revolt of the masses, but when the time comes, we shall witness a fierce and tremendous struggle. Tyranny can postpone the conflict, but the greater the repression, the more terrific will be the final explosion. The continued spread of Fascism and the fall of the remaining democracies would eventually force upon the world the most bitter and bloody war of liberation that this earth has ever experienced.

We who live in the democratic countries, and who wish to achieve justice with a minimum of violence, should do everything in our power to keep open the channels of peaceful reform. We should see to it that civil rights are jealously guarded against those who would either destroy or distort them in the interests of special privilege. We should protect and extend all the traditional liberties of a democratic people: freedom of thought, freedom in the expression of belief, freedom of assembly, universal suffrage, and universal free education. We should unswervingly maintain the right peacefully to strike and to picket, and the right of workers

to join labor unions of their own choosing. We should combat every effort to persecute Jews, Negroes, Catholics, and other religious and racial minorities. We should resist the hue and cry against radicals, and reject every demand that they be robbed of their civil rights. Political democracy cannot be genuinely realized without economic democracy, and the present distribution of wealth and power is grossly undemocratic and unjust. Hence we must unite for the rectification of these wrongs, and extend the ideal of democracy to include the right of all members of the community to full economic security. This program of freedom and justice, *if militantly prosecuted and safeguarded*, affords a far more realistic method of coping with violence than the repressive program of the Fascists.

5. *The Fascist powers use the theory of the "haves" and the "have-nots," based upon dangerous half-truths, to justify a policy of aggression.* This theory, for example, was advanced by the prominent Japanese newspaper, *Kokumin*, as a justification of Japan's assault upon China. "At the present," we are told, "the haves are Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Frankly, they possess too many resources." Hence there must be a "redistribution of resources," such as "Germany and Italy" have already advocated. "Now it is our problem. Japan's argument is that war is justified when the have nations dare to threaten the very existence of the empire."⁹² A spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Office has similarly declared: "If the haves refuse to concede to the rightful demands of the have-nots, peace will be difficult to maintain."⁹³ The argument was also used by Mussolini and the Italian press to justify the conquest of Ethiopia. It has been mentioned as a reason for the effort of Hitler and Mussolini to gain control of Spain. It is advanced by the Nazis in their insistent demand for colonies. It will probably be utilized to justify every imperialistic drive of the Fascist powers, despite the fact that Germany,

Italy, and Japan have already obtained a great deal of new territory.

The argument has a number of fatal defects. First, the advantages to be gained from the possession of colonies are not so great as might be supposed. Italy is finding Ethiopia, much of which is still unsubdued, an extremely costly acquisition, and has not profited greatly from her other African possessions. Japan's control of the immense area of Manchukuo has not reduced the terrible poverty of the Japanese peasant and proletariat, nor forestalled a new and very costly war of conquest. The government of the Reich declares that the welfare of Germany necessitates the return of her former colonies; but the remarkable prewar expansion of German industry did not depend upon these colonies:

As to markets: In the years preceding the war, Germany's imports amounted to \$2,750,000,000, of which the German colonies contributed less than \$14,000,000 or about one half of 1%. Of Germany's exports, the colonies consumed seven tenths of 1%. As to emigration: With the exception of parts of former German East Africa, the Reich's former African possessions are not suited for white settlement. Furthermore, at the outbreak of the World War, only 23,000 Germans were scattered throughout all of Germany's colonies.⁹⁴

Imperialistic interests under certain conditions may gain by conquest, but the common people seldom if ever gain. The advantages of empire have been grossly exaggerated.

The economic plight of the Fascist countries is primarily the result of tremendous expenditure for armaments, intense capitalistic exploitation, and feverish economic nationalism which strangles world trade. Genuine welfare and prosperity are not to be achieved by these methods, and are not dependent upon the vast territories for which the Fascists yearn. As Norman Angell points out:

It is a suggestive fact that some of the most prosperous States of the world—those, that is, which have evolved the highest standard of living and of civilization—are among the least self-sufficient; while those abounding in natural resources, like some of the Central and South American nations, have an extremely low standard of living and an unstable civilization. Compare the standard of living and civilization in the Swiss Republic, one of the least self-sufficient States of the world, with the standard of certain South American republics, which have immeasurably greater resources and come very much nearer to complete self-sufficiency. Compare the standard in the Scandinavian and Baltic nations—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland—with that of some of their larger and more powerful neighbors. These countries are deficient in some of the most vital of materials; their soil is in large part poor. Yet they do not feverishly build up their military power, nor make threatening demands for “outlets”—and do not seem to need them. They clamor for no “place in the sun,” but they are prosperous, highly civilized and stable.⁹⁵

The policies of these democratic countries, which cultivate international good will and organize cooperative enterprises, are surely more sensible than those of the Fascist powers, which complain of overpopulation and inadequate resources, yet do everything possible to stimulate the birth rate and almost nothing to eliminate poverty.

Second, the staggering burden of preparing for war, the terrific economic strain of financing it, and the frightful suffering involved in waging it are a heavy price to pay for whatever gains can be achieved by these methods. The wars in Ethiopia, Spain, and China have proved to be tremendous drains upon the aggressors, and as yet the opposing forces are by no means subdued. The policy of militaristic imperialism can hardly fail eventually to provoke a new world war, just as the War of 1914 was caused by imperialistic rivalry and the accompanying arms race.⁹⁶ Unquestionably the problem of equitably allocating territory and natural resources is a serious one, but it can only be solved by

the development of international understanding and the curbing of imperialistic greed. The way of peaceful cooperation has never been tried; surely it could not prove more of a fiasco than the opposite method.

Third, the argument is based upon an acceptance of the imperialistic scheme of things. It is assumed that certain races should exploit others. The trouble with this assumption is that it involves far too little consideration of the "have-nots" in the *subjugated* countries. When the Italian government brings civilization to the Ethiopians by dropping bombs and spreading poison gas, it is very questionable if even the *surviving* natives are the gainers. By implication, the argument excuses the imperialism of Great Britain, the United States, and other capitalistic powers, yet every informed person knows that such imperialism has involved frightful abuses. André Gide's *Travels in the Congo* contains a record (which may be duplicated from many sources) of the terrible brutality practiced by "democratic" imperialism. The Fascists, with their racial chauvinism and dictatorial rule, are not apt to improve upon the past. Nor is it likely that the subject peoples will remain passive under imperialistic dictatorships. Already the revolt of the "backward races," as in India and China, is gathering force, and there will be major and protracted struggles.

Fourth, the Fascists are unwilling to follow out their argument to its logical conclusion. Their contention is based upon the premise that the "haves" should divide with the "have-nots." But if this principle were taken seriously it would mean a profound social revolution which the Fascists would be the first to reject. Those who *really* lack are the poor in every country. Yet Mussolini, Hitler, and the Japanese militarists have no intention of forcing the rich people to divide their wealth among the poor. They have nothing but abuse to heap upon the *genuine* Socialists who believe in a basic redistribution of wealth and a democratization

of industry. Apparently the "have-nots" which the Fascists wish to aid are the "poor" millionaires in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and not the poor workers who fight the wars and *pay* for them.

Fifth, great natural resources will not substantially better a country so long as it is badly governed. Czarist Russia was nearly the richest country in the world in natural wealth, but almost the poorest in social welfare and living standards. China has unexampled natural resources, but no country has had more poverty. Spain is the richest country of Western Europe in undeveloped resources and once possessed many colonies, but this has not prevented the Spanish people from remaining poor and dreadfully oppressed over a period of centuries. Many people would question whether the rule of the Fascists is sufficiently enlightened to make any better use of new territory and natural resources. Until they change their tactics, what moral claim can they advance for a larger share of the earth? Can such a question be resolved by the arbitrament of force? Does not a nation, by waging an aggressive war, relinquish whatever moral right to expand she might otherwise possess?

Surely it is better to renounce the entire sickening business of imperialistic aggrandizement and wars of conquest. The problem of achieving lasting peace cannot be resolved by vindictiveness on the side either of the Fascists or of the anti-Fascists. It is high time to try a new method.

Any new settlement, however, should be within the framework of a general European or World pact, and should not be at the cost of sacrificing isolated democratic nations, as Spain and Czechoslovakia have been sacrificed, to the mercy of Fascist dictators and warmakers. Ultimately, war can be ended only by international economic and political action which will secure to all peoples a better way of life than dictatorship and imperialistic aggression can possibly obtain.

Not only the Fascists, but all the people of the earth,

should ponder the words of a brave German poet, Ernst Wiechert, whose moving appeal to the youth of Germany has been suppressed by the Nazi Government:

. . . It may well be that a nation ceases to distinguish between right and wrong and that it considers every battle to be right. Such a people, however, stands already on the level of heavy decline and its doom is already sealed. It may still win gladiatorial renown and set up in fits a sort of ethics which we may call "boxer's ethics," but for such a people the scales are already weighted and on every wall appears the hand which writes with letters of fire.⁹⁷

VI

THE THEORY OF THE ÉLITE

Socrates summed up his wisdom in the phrase, "Be intelligent; act critically." And Jesus, likewise pondering on human action, said to his followers, "Be kind."—ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN¹

1. *Aristocracy, Democracy, Timocracy*

THE spell of the myth and the force of arms brought the Fascists to power, and such special education as they receive is dogmatic and militaristic in character. Like the ruling class of ancient Sparta, the new "leaders" are men who exhibit the soldier's cast of mind. We can accordingly distinguish members of this élite not only from the democrats but also from true intellectual aristocrats. The Fascist theory of the élite will be more intelligible if we contrast it with these alternative ideals.

The basic theory of aristocracy was expressed more than two thousand years ago by Socrates. Living in a period of social crisis and transition, he contended that the business of man is not blindly to follow custom but critically to pursue the good. His political thesis was simple but convincing: those who *know* should govern. In advocating "aristocracy," he employed the term in its original meaning—"government by the best." He meant by it the rule of the wise.

Plato develops the Socratic ideal of government. True justice, he contends, must not be confused with equality. A just social order is one which works best; it requires the right allocation and performance of function. Men must be trained for particular occupations and supplied with tasks in accordance with their capacities. Although skill is needed in every sphere of life, the expert management of the State is most essential. This is the art of arts: it requires both moral and technical wisdom, a meticulous grasp of details,

and a magisterial vision of ends. Statesmen should therefore be men of rare gifts and intensive education. They should be selected by rigorous tests, and admitted to office only after they have won honors in an elaborate schooling. These men are the true aristocrats—the philosopher-kings—who can alone be safely entrusted with affairs of State. There can be no rest from social turmoil, no end to revolutions and political scandals, until men of this caliber are elevated to power.

Socrates and Plato have enunciated one of the perennial ideals of human life. Yet it is obvious that the aristocratic ideal—government by the best—is not so easily realized in practice. Who are the best, and what criteria shall we use to select them? Is there any way to find out the best so long as some people are very poor and some are very rich, so long as some people are free and others are enslaved? If an individual or a group or a race is *really* superior, it needs only equality of opportunity to prove its superiority. Wide, artificial differentials within the State prevent the self-realization of the underprivileged, and hence the exhibition and best use of talent. Even if a system of privilege does somehow procure the rule of wise men, it is questionable if this wisdom will be exercised for the general good. The “aristocrats” may think that they will give the common man what is good for him, but there is very little evidence in history to support this supposition. The rule *of* a minority has always been rule *for* a minority. As Laski has said, “exclusion from a share in power is also exclusion from a share in benefit.”²

Just as aristocracy emphasizes men’s differences, so democracy emphasizes men’s similarities. The democrat need not affirm the obviously false proposition that men are equal in all abilities. He does insist, however, upon a certain equality of rights; he contends that there are certain claims, liberties, and privileges the possession of which by the average man is essential to the realization of his welfare. If good be the criterion of action, every man has a right, with due re-

gard to the welfare of others, to achieve his own welfare; and this right involves a fair and equal opportunity for self-realization and happiness. The insistence upon such equality of rights, and the accompanying recognition of a common humanity, are characteristic of the democratic approach to politics.

Perhaps the moral essence of democracy may be summed up in two principles of Kant. First, every man is an end in himself; no man is a mere tool, to be exploited for the benefit of others. It is immoral for a leisure class to live off the sweat of the workers. Second, every man should be both subject and sovereign. As subject, he must exhibit moral responsibility; a social return is to be demanded of all; there are to be no parasites. As sovereign, he should have a measure of freedom, a right to develop and exercise his individuality, a right to participate in the decisions of the community.

Two other principles of Kant are fundamental to the democratic ideal. "All actions," he declares, "relating to the rights of other men are wrong, if the maxims from which they follow are inconsistent with publicity [i.e., public enlightenment and not mere propaganda]." He also states the converse: "All maxims which require publicity, in order that they may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both with right and politics."³ Kant thus makes "pitiless publicity" the test of fair dealing. Practices that cannot stand the light of day, that require secrecy, double-dealing, and falsehood, are in all probability unjust and immoral. On the other hand, practices that *do* demand the light, that depend upon open dealing and informed public opinion, are in all likelihood fair and right. Kant's recognition of the political and moral value of "publicity" is especially important for our own age. Myths, chicanery, and deceitful propaganda have become the staple of politics; under Fascism, every organ of opinion is kept. Even if public support is gained by

such methods, the effect is not to create a just society nor a real democracy.

Again, we can say that Christianity has formulated the moral basis of democracy. The ideal of sharing, of brotherhood, of kindness—the ideal of a universality of rights and duties—is an essential part of Christ's teaching. No one can read the Beatitudes, the advice to the rich young man, the command, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," the innumerable expressions of friendliness and compassion, the story of the attack upon scribes and money-changers and Pharisees, without becoming aware of a powerful creed which is opposed to exploitation and unjust privilege. We must not press this interpretation too far: the Christian doctrine is primarily a religious and moral ideal rather than a political and economic program. Yet the contrast between Socrates and Jesus is a significant one. On the one hand, there is the ideal of expert control and scientific criticism. On the other hand, there is the ideal of equality and sharing. Both of these ideals have been reexpressed many times, and will continue to exercise the most profound influence upon human life.

Now the Fascists do not accept either the democratic or the aristocratic ideal. We certainly cannot say that they uphold the ideal of expert control. Their "revolt against reason" makes it impossible for them to lay claim to intellectual aristocracy. Neither can we say that Fascism is democratic. It is true that Mussolini has said, "The greatest and most genuine democracies which the world knows today are the German and the Italian."⁴ Yet I fancy that no one is really taken in by such declarations. The Fascist theory of the élite represents a third alternative—the Spartan ideal.

In place of democracy, the Fascists substitute "the principle of leadership." In the formula of Hitler, this means that "the authority of each leader reaches downward, and responsibility reaches upward."⁵ What such a hierarchical system involves, in contrast to the parliamentary methods of

liberal government, is explained by Hitler's chief aide, General Hermann Göring:

The distinguishing mark of parliamentarianism, in contrast to the principle of leadership, is that authority is given from below upwards and responsibility from above downwards. That is to say, innumerable parties and their delegates impose their authority on the government and the government has to obey them. The government is therefore responsible to these parties and is the plaything of their interests. But the laws of Nature demand that authority should be exercised from above downwards and responsibility from below upwards. Each leader has authority and he issues his orders to officials and followers below him. But he is responsible only to his superiors, and the leader at the top is responsible to the people as a whole and to their future. In the past it has only been by virtue of this principle that anything has been achieved; only by this principle could nations arise and history be made.⁶

Göring's appeal to "the laws of Nature" to justify his position indicates that the principle of authority is for him no mere political expedient, but a universal truth. Such, indeed, is the form in which the doctrine is expressed in many a Fascist book. Inequality is the plan of nature, and man does well to conform to nature's pattern. In this form, the doctrine becomes the basis of organizing not only government and industry, but the moral life as well.

The "need of authority, of direction, and of order"—as Mussolini phrases it—is a reflection of the antirational bias of Fascist theory. In defining the characteristics of the Fascist "élite," the party spokesmen have stressed "heroism" and the will to mastery rather than reason. "The Fascist State is an embodied will to power," declares Mussolini, recalling the famous phrase of Nietzsche.⁷ Similarly Hitler, in explaining to his party followers what he means by "the élite," cites as exemplary the hierarchical structure of the army, an institution in which force rather than reason is incarnated.⁸

Plato had a name for this type of government: he called

it the "Timocratic State." The basic principle of this State is the rule of the "spirited" rather than the rule of the "wise." Such a regime is brought into existence, Plato said, when the military class seizes control of the government and develops a type of social order which suits its own nature.

2. *Portrait of the Timocratic Man*

Plato's description of the timocratic man is illuminating. Whereas the democrat tends to emphasize pleasure, and the aristocrat to emphasize wisdom, the timocrat subordinates both pleasure and thought to will. He has "been schooled not by gentle influences but by force":

Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for that; and he will also be . . . remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honour; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Finally "he has a piece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having lost his best guardian [Philosophy]." ⁹ When applied to Fascism, this description is not so wide of the mark.

The ideal Fascist, like the Spartan, is ever ready to sacrifice pleasure. Fascism wants to be "great" and "dynamic" rather than "happy." It "denies the validity of the equation, well-being equals happiness," says Mussolini, and discovers its "value" in "a will to exist and a will to power, a firm front in the face of the reality of 'violence.'" ¹⁰ An Italian Fascist has remarked: "The truth is that man was not born to live happily, but to work and to suffer." ¹¹ General Göring, who directs Germany's economic planning, likewise proposes no life of ease and comfort, but stern subordination to military demands:

I call on German workers to be untiringly busy in their factories. I know I demand much of them—overtime and still more overtime. But they help create the sword of the nation, and that in itself is the deepest inner satisfaction.¹²

The élite, of course, are those who wield the sword, rather than those who forge it; but they also are expected to display a Spartan indifference to mere pleasure. As Julien Benda has remarked, the Fascist position coincides with Nietzsche's proclamation in the *Twilight of the Gods*: "Shame on the ignoble happiness that is the dream of grocery clerks, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and all democrats!"¹³

Another characteristic of timocracy is the subjection of intellect to will. Again the parallel with Fascism is indubitable. The new élite are expected to *act*, even at the expense of prudence. Although "duty" becomes the ideal for the subordinates, a somewhat reckless "heroism" becomes the ideal for the élite. Mussolini, quoting Nietzsche, has declared: "A German philosopher says, 'One must learn to live dangerously.' I want this to become the motto of the young Fascist Party."¹⁴ Since democratic checks have been removed, heroism is free to disport itself. This is one reason why life is less secure since Fascism has gained the ascendancy.

Like the timocrat, the ideal Fascist is "a lover of gymnastic exercises." Mussolini has compelled even his high officials to perform extraordinary feats to demonstrate their physical fitness: to leap through a flaming hoop and to jump over a fence of bayonets. Hitler has announced: "I want the German boy to be weather-proof, quick as a greyhound, tough as leather, hard as Krupp steel."¹⁵ The Nazi Minister of Education, Bernhard Rust, upon the occasion of the cornerstone laying of the Faculty of Military Science, the first building of the new Berlin University, declared that "in the Germany of the future the athletic field . . . shall not be set up near the hall of the philosopher, but the philosophers shall gather about the athletic field."¹⁶ This is precisely to re-

verse the relationship advocated by Plato and to copy the Spartan system.

In identifying Fascism as a form of timocracy, I do not mean to suggest that there are no similarities between Plato's aristocratic "republic" and the present Fascist regimes. In the Platonic Utopia as in Fascist Italy and Germany, authoritarian rule is maintained by a body of trained fighters and by rigid censorship of art and education.¹⁷ There is even the suggestion, so fully carried out in the actual practice of Fascism, that social myths be invented to induce the people to accept their governing class. Yet there is a wide gulf between Plato's usual emphasis upon intelligence and the Fascist emphasis upon athleticism, "heroism," and obedience. The uncritical adulation accorded the Fascist chiefs is sharply opposed to the spirit of intellectual aristocracy. Consider, for example, the following statement from a textbook selected by the Ministry of Education for the Italian secondary schools:

As the Catholic must have a blind belief in the Catholic faith and obey the Catholic Church blindly, so the perfect Fascist must believe absolutely in the principles of Fascism and obey the hierarchical heads to whom he owes allegiance without reserve. Religious dogmas are not discussed because they are truths revealed by God. Fascist principles are not discussed because they come from the mind of a Genius: Benito Mussolini.¹⁸

In the same spirit, General Göring has declared:

Everyone who knows the close inner bond between Hitler and his men will understand that for us followers it is axiomatic that the Leader must possess any quality attributed to him in its highest perfection. Just as the Roman Catholic considers the Pope infallible in all matters concerning religion and morals, so do we National Socialists believe with the same inner conviction that for us the Leader is in all political and other matters concerning the national and social interests of the people simply infallible.

Hitler's infallibility, Göring contends, is due to "something mystical, inexpressible, almost incomprehensible which this unique man possesses, and he who cannot feel it instinctively will not be able to grasp it at all."¹⁹ Nothing in these quotations, or in the actual practice of Fascism, implies a true intellectual aristocracy.

We can judge the character of the Fascist élite by the methods being adopted to train leaders. In Germany, the higher schools are being transformed, and special "leader schools" are being established. In a statement of February 12, 1938, Education Minister Rust has defined the goal of this reorganization. "All education," he contends, "means the moulding of National Socialist human beings. It is quite definite that the conceptions of the National Socialist Party must penetrate all instruction and inspire it from within." Consequently the schools must recognize "the preeminence of life and action over all systems of education." The new school "proceeds from the body and captures the soul, and, both within and without the schoolroom, trains for community." The aim is to produce a "new type . . . on the basis of physical training" and political indoctrination:

The new conception of mankind, which is at the base of political pedagogy, is not the humanist conception of the educated individual, but the political being. In the forefront of political pedagogy are the conceptions, "type" and "formative education," which are necessarily related. "Formative education" is the conception of direct education based upon our own doctrine. "Direct" here means: from man to man, eye to eye. Through direct education one character draws forth another character, the model of the Führer and the comrades calls forth the young energies. . . . The new "type," which imparts content and significance to our entire education, is . . . valid only for those who, because of their birth, belong to this current of power. It is the "type" which permits us to anticipate specific kinds of conduct and action. This determination of the "type" and of education generally by activity, by human beings acting within a community, is the foremost and most important feature of political pedagogy.²⁰

In Sparta, also, the aim was to produce a "type" which could be depended upon to manifest "specific kinds of conduct and action." The parallelism between Sparta and Nazi Germany is more than superficial.

Vigorous steps are being taken to carry these ideals into practice. The Labor Front and the Hitler Youth maintain various agencies for training the leader caste. There are "leader schools" in Potsdam, Brunswick, East Prussia, Bavaria, and elsewhere. "National political educational institutes" have been organized jointly by the Nazi Party and the Ministry of Education. These schools are conducted on a military basis and the students wear a special uniform.

More ambitious preparations are under way. Training for "leadership" is to begin in the student's twelfth year at the "Adolf Hitler Schools," one of which is being established in each of the party districts. When the candidates graduate at the age of eighteen, they are required to perform labor and military service, and to undertake further study under the supervision of the personnel department of the party. The likeliest candidates are then selected for four more years of training at an "Order Settlement," which is a sort of military and political academy. Finally, those who have shown themselves most worthy will be sent to a supreme school (*Hohe Schule*). This institution is to be under the direction of Alfred Rosenberg, the official Party "philosopher."

Only certain portions of the plan have as yet been realized; yet we can judge the intent and spirit of the project. The originator of the scheme, Dr. Robert Ley, has announced that the aspirants are to be developed into "soldiers and fanatical preachers" of the Nazi ideal. A German news organ reports:

The vast educational work of National Socialism will be organizationally completed in about ten years. But it will only be practically effective after seventeen years when the first pupils of the Adolf Hitler Schools will have completed the entire pre-

scribed course. This élite alone will then decide Germany's destiny, for, as Dr. Ley says, no one in the future will be able to hold a political leader's position in State or Party who has not completed this course.²¹

Despite the length of time required to execute the plan, enough steps have been taken to indicate the type of instruction. A correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* "found little" in the preparatory schools "but drill, sports, and the study of *Mein Kampf*, with frequent lectures in which the 'Leader' of the school comments at length on that work." This same writer visited one of the new higher schools ("Order Settlements"). Discovering the same emphasis there as in the preparatory work, he was "astonished at the emptiness of the teaching. The men were being drilled systematically, taught hymns to '*Blut und Boden*' (blood and soil), and instructed in 'racial science' and party dogmas. The library contained nothing but National Socialist works, geographies, volumes of statistics, and everything that treats by word or picture of the pure German race." As he drove away in his car, this correspondent heard the tramp, tramp, of marching youths, and the words of their evensong:

Und wenn die Handgranate kracht
Das Herz uns im Leibe lacht—

(And when the hand grenade explodes
We shake with hearty laughter.)²²

Italy has not formulated such far-reaching plans to train the Fascist élite; yet such training as the State does provide has a similar emphasis. As Liddell Hart has written:

No country carries quite so far as Italy the conception of the "nation in arms." The male child is put in uniform when he is scarcely out of the cradle and may stay in it until he is put in the grave—since the hard-worked Italian peasant is often not very long lived, even apart from the risks of war.

At six years of age, the child is impressed into the "Balilla del Lupa" (Wolf Cubs), where he is given a uniform, and "taught to march, to wear gas masks, and carry out anti-gas drill, and to inure himself to life under canvas." At eight the youngster joins a regular Balilla corps, and continues to drill until he is eighteen, when the military instruction becomes more intensive. At twenty-one he is conscripted. When he is finally released from the army eighteen months later, he joins the military reserves. He is then forced to drill periodically until he reaches the age of forty-five; even subsequently he is expected to assist in civilian mobilization in event of war. "The Italian Press," remarks Liddell Hart, "was unusually accurate when it applauded this introduction of life-service with the remark that history has no parallel for such nation-wide militarization."²³

The army provides Mussolini with his ideal of dictatorship. "For my part," he has asserted, "I prefer fifty thousand rifles to five million votes."²⁴ He conceives himself as a military commander, with unconditional orders to enforce upon his subordinates. In his famous election speech at the Palazzo Venezia, January 28, 1934, he announced:

I always have regarded myself as a soldier who has his command, his absolute command which under all circumstances he has to execute; it is a holy command, and I will remain true to it unconditionally. Governing is a question of the will. If one has the will, one will remain in power.²⁵

In other statements, he makes even more plain that he himself issues the orders, and that Fascism must have a hierarchical structure like that of the army.²⁶ In the same spirit, Hitler has declared:

There must be no majority making decisions, but merely a body of responsible persons, and the word "council" will revert to its ancient meaning. Every man shall have councillors at his side, but the *decision* shall be made by the one Man.²⁷

Too decadent to create live forms of its own, Fascism retains the empty shells of democracy. It has its "courts," "elections," "plebiscites," and "labor organizations." There are "courts," but no right of habeas corpus, no judges exempt from political pressure, no compelling jurisdiction over police and higher officials. There are "labor fronts" and "labor syndicates"; but no right to strike, no genuine collective bargaining, no representatives of labor's own choosing.²⁸ There are "plebiscites" and "elections"; but no opposition press, no opposition party, no opposition candidates, no nominations by democratic means, no right to campaign against the official list of candidates. Whoever refuses to go to the polls, or opposes the regime, is considered a traitor or criminal. Jews are denied the right to vote. Even secrecy of ballot has been repeatedly infringed, and miscount of ballots has been suspected. A large opposition vote would only convince the government of the need of more censorship, espionage, and terror; it would be a dangerous, and perhaps a futile, gesture.

This eminently democratic system was instituted after the ground was cleared of political opponents. Since Hitler's advent to power, twenty-one members of the Reichstag have been murdered, and the murderers have gone unpunished. A large number of other members have been confined without legal process, and some are in prison to this day. These men that the Nazis have murdered or imprisoned were duly elected by the people.²⁹ Similarly in Italy, Mussolini seized power, although the people rejected him and his party at the polls. When the leader of the popular forces, Signor Matteotti, objected to these methods, he was attacked and brutally slain by Fascist agents. In Spain, the Fascists revolted against the democratically elected government; and when the people struggled to keep their democracy, Mussolini and Hitler sent hundreds of airplanes and many thousands of soldiers to rain death upon the Loyalist population. In Austria, Hitler and

his vast army invaded the country so as to prevent a free plebiscite, and forcefully to annex the country. In Czechoslovakia, the Nazis undermined the authority of a democratic State and, by sheer threat of war, dismembered the nation, destroyed the democracy, and finally seized the remaining territory of this non-Germanic country. No democrat can support Fascism, with its substitution of machine guns for free voting booths.

Neither can the advocate of an intellectual aristocracy favor these methods. Indeed, Fascism is much less aristocratic than the democratic regimes that it has replaced. In a statistical study of governmental and party leaders in Fascist Italy, Harold D. Lasswell and Renzo Sereno have demonstrated that Italy is not governed by experts or scientists. The hereditary nobility and plutocratic elements have easily held their own, the lawyers have about as much influence as ever, the engineers whom the Fascists in theory have "glorified" are "few and far between in the most effective agencies," and many men have entered politics by means of "informal violence."³⁰

No comparable study, I think, has been made of the "leaders" of Nazi Germany; but it is symptomatic of the regime that a military man, General Göring, who has had no training as an economist and is quite undistinguished as a thinker, occupies the position of supreme economic director of the Reich. The authors of an authoritative survey, based upon first-hand information and official Nazi statistics, are not impressed by the caliber of the present German government:

The German totalitarian State is not more efficient than a democratic one. It represents, indeed, a dualism in public administration which is both inefficient and costly. . . . The "Leader-State" is assuredly a far more costly form of government than the most extravagant democracy, even if we exclude the corruption which is the inevitable outcome of the disappearance of

Parliamentary control and the free expression of public opinion.³¹

Similarly Professor Roberts, who has first-hand and detailed knowledge of the Nazi system, has noticed the immense amount of waste and duplication.³² The crimes of Fascism are often committed in the name of efficiency ("Mussolini makes the trains run on time"), but this efficiency is largely mythical.

It is obvious that Fascism rejects equally the ideal of scientific control and the ideal of democratic sharing. The totalitarian state is organized like a vast army, and the moral values of Fascism are Spartan in essence. "The discipline of the Party is that of a military order," writes a German authority. "The iron clutches with which the individual is bound to the State and to the Party almost resemble religious duties, and the hierarchic arrangement gives the Fascist State a peculiar character, which could be described as a kind of modern feudalism."³³

3. *Theories of Ruthlessness and Inequality*

Many thinkers have contributed to the formation of the Fascist doctrine of the élite. It is possible to detect traces of the theories of Machiavelli, who believed that the wily and resolute tyrant is the best ruler in a time of crisis; of Gioberti, who insisted that only the rule of the élite corresponds to the genius of Italy; of Mazzini, who tempered his "republican" ardor by a dislike of genuine democracy; of Michels, Mosca, and Pareto, modern critics of democracy, who believed that the élite change and circulate as the strong, cunning men forge ahead; of Carlyle, whose "hero worship" dispenses with intellectual criteria of greatness; of Le Bon and Sorel, whom Mussolini admired for their exaltation of force and their attack upon "mob rule"; of Nietzsche and Spengler, who believed that man is a beast of prey and that

the strong man should cast aside humanitarian scruples; of Treitschke and Chamberlain, who found in Prussian military annals the ideals for the ruling caste; and of Stefan George, poet of antirationalism, and his numerous followers, who dreamed of a small minority of godlike heroes to whom the people must be subjugated. If we add to the works of such modern thinkers the examples of the Roman Caesars and the ancient Germanic warriors celebrated in Fascist literature, we discover the ideological basis of the Fascist "élite."

The antidemocratic trends in the German tradition have been indicated in other chapters of the present book. In the light of this tradition, Lewis Mumford has rightly condemned "those superficial interpretations of Nazism which overlook how much of its animus and creed already existed—long before Hitler and Rosenberg—in Luther, Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke, Wagner, and Houston Chamberlain."³⁴ Although there is much that is profound and enlightened in the German tradition, there is also much that is scandalous and regressive. Hitler represents the latter (and more superficial) aspect of Germanism, just as Thomas Mann, for example, represents the former. In many of the great German thinkers, the regressive and enlightened intermingle. Hegel, for example, is not primarily the forerunner of Fascism, although many of his ideas can be utilized by the Fascist apologists.

Among the less recognized harbingers of German Fascism has been the poet, Stefan George (1868–1933). Aurel Kolnai, in his challenging book, *The War Against the West*, declares that "of all those who have contributed to the rise of National Socialism as a creed the two outstanding figures are Friedrich Nietzsche . . . and Stefan George." He finds in George's works such Nazi concepts as "Race, super-moral Force, the dependence of freedom upon peculiar Type and Nobility, the Spiritual Sovereignty of the Ruler, Leaders as Demigods, the existence of the People merely as a league of

satellites and worshippers—to name but a few.”³⁵ The followers of the poet, comprising the Stefan George Circle, regard him as the forerunner and prophet of a national rebirth to be inspired by a small band of Heroic Leaders. Hermann Drahn, one of George’s disciples, announces that genuine Power manifests itself, “not in the persons of the many, the all-too-many, but only in the creative personality of the Hero, the Leader, the Prophet.”³⁶ The New Nobility, envisaged by George and the members of his Circle, are not distinguished by rational capacities, for mere reason is despised, but by a demonic spirit which springs from “the blood” and “corporate brotherhood.” George’s homosexuality may have helped to engender his sense of the creative force and the love-spell to be found in a select minority.

Another writer who is seldom mentioned in connection with Fascism is the Frenchman, Gustave Le Bon. Perhaps no book in social psychology written during the last fifty years has been so widely read and so influential as Le Bon’s *The Crowd*. This volume did not escape the attention of Mussolini. “One of the books that interested me most,” he has said, “was the *Psychology of the Crowd* by Gustave Le Bon.”³⁷ In this work, the author expresses his belief in “the extreme mental inferiority of crowds, picked assemblies included.”³⁸ He believes that impulsiveness, imaginative suggestibility, exaggerated emotionalism, incapacity to reason, and absence of the critical spirit are the outstanding characteristics of crowd mentality. A man in a crowd becomes an automaton, pulled hither and thither by a contagion of feelings and ideas. In isolation, he may be a cultivated individual; but in a crowd, he is a barbarian, acting by instinct.

These characteristics are not limited to mobs. “The general characteristics of crowds,” we are told, “are to be met with in parliamentary assemblies.”³⁹ Even “an entire nation . . . may become a crowd under the action of certain influences.”⁴⁰ Le Bon is contemptuous of democratic groups

of almost every description, and is especially opposed to socialistic organizations.

Crowds are essentially destructive; all important achievements are the work of a small élite. "The elect create, the plebs destroy."⁴¹ Hence "the advent to power of the masses marks one of the last stages of Western civilization," and is bound to produce "a barbarian phase."⁴² Democratic forms may nevertheless be utilized by aristocratic forces: the mere formal constitution of a State is of slight importance, since the real question is who pulls the strings. The people are in fact incapable of ruling themselves; what we call popular rule is really the dominion of tyrants and demagogues. Crowds are essentially servile, and their leaders "wield a very despotic authority."⁴³ This is especially true among the working classes, whose ringleaders and agitators command an absolutely docile obedience.

A man who understands mob psychology can readily become a tyrant:

The type of hero dear to crowds will always have the semblance of a Caesar. His insignia attracts them, his authority overawes them, and his sword instils them with fear.⁴⁴

The dictator's harangues should be unburdened with proofs, and his deeds should appear marvelous; he should captivate the popular imagination with startling images and theatrical representations.⁴⁵ Finally, he should not be too friendly with his subjects:

The gods and men who have kept their prestige for long have never tolerated discussion. For the crowd to admire, it must be kept at a distance.⁴⁶

That Il Duce agrees with Le Bon's estimate of popular government is indicated by his statement that democracy is a "parody or caricature . . . which, in reply to an inquiry of the great sociologist, Gustave Le Bon, I . . . defined as *the doctrine and regime in which a people is given the inter-*

mittent illusion of being sovereign."⁴⁷ Mussolini found in Le Bon's work an apology for dictatorship and a book of Machiavellian instructions.

Another of Il Duce's favorite authors was Georges Sorel, whom we have discussed in earlier chapters. Like Le Bon, he has a scorn of popular assemblies, and a conviction that irrational forces control society. But Le Bon makes a show of being a man of reason, whereas Sorel looks upon reason as ordinarily impotent. Science, he believes, is powerless to forecast the course of history.⁴⁸ In thus denying that history has a predictable scheme, Sorel prepares the way for the opportunistic and disruptive action of the "élite." As the Fascists have recognized, there is a definite relationship between the historical intuitionism of Sorel's philosophy, and the "putschist" technique in politics. The exiled German sociologist Karl Mannheim points out: "Fascism regards every interpretation of history as a mere fictive construction destined to disappear before the deed of the moment as it breaks through the temporal pattern of history."⁴⁹

According to Sorel, any social movement to take firm root must mobilize nonrational forces, and therefore must substitute the myth in place of scientific programs. A minority which achieves power will have to use violence. Despite his syndicalism, he was basically interested only in the minority. He was not primarily concerned to better wages and working conditions, but to develop rare heroes in a class war. He hoped that a new élite would emerge from this conflict and inaugurate a virile civilization.

Vilfredo Pareto is closely allied in thought to both Le Bon and Sorel: in all three there is an emphasis upon the élite and the nonrational character of life. Since we have dealt with Pareto's ideas in some detail, we shall confine ourselves to his theory of "the circulation of the élite," which Mussolini has called "the most extraordinary sociological conception of modern times."

All governments, Pareto thinks, are oligarchical:

We need not linger on the fiction of "popular representation" —poppycock grinds no flour. . . . King Demos, good soul, thinks he is following his own devices. In reality he is following the lead of his rulers.⁵⁰

The rulers are those who are adept either at chicanery or at violence. Corresponding to these methods, two types of élites are distinguished: the "lions," who employ force, and the "foxes," who employ cunning. (The economic élite are similarly divided into the crafty and adventurous "speculators," and the conservative and idealistic "rentiers.")

Sometimes one type, and sometimes the other, is dominant. A governing élite which is unable or unwilling to use force will fall prey to a determined and well-organized minority which does not hesitate to shed blood. The lions seize power, and the cycle begins. But violence, although very useful in gaining control, is less valuable than cunning in political intrigue. Hence in peacetime those skillful in "the arts of bamboozling" forge ahead: the foxes gradually replace the lions. "The individual who best knows the arts of sapping the strength of the foes of 'graft' and of winning back by fraud and deceit what seemed to have been surrendered under pressure of force, is now leader of leaders."⁵¹ But the fatal tendency of the foxes is passively to enjoy the fruits of intrigue, and to shirk or overlook the necessity of violent repression. When the rulers have thus grown too effeminate, the more talented and resolute individuals in the subject class, disliking the frauds rife within the State, lead a revolt against the foxes and violently seize power. With this reascendency of the lions, the entire cycle begins anew.

History is thus governed, not by a linear and progressive evolution, but by a "great law of rhythm," bringing periodic crises. "The pendulum continues swinging back and forth

from one extreme to the other, indefinitely." ⁵² Corresponding to the oscillation between the lions and the foxes is an oscillation in ideologies. The lions are men of faith; they are animated by myths and religious illusions. The foxes, on the other hand, are relatively sceptical in respect to the traditional moral and religious ideas. Hence we can speak of an alternation between "ages of faith" and "ages of scepticism."

The shift of forces can be delayed or neutralized if the ruling élite are sufficiently awake and resolute. They must not be beguiled by "humanitarian sentiments." The foxes can strengthen their own ruling class and weaken the opposition by admitting into their company the talented men in the subject class who are disposed to use force. The greatest strength lies, not in the exclusive predominance of either force or fraud, but in a combination of both. "A humanitarian aristocracy that is closed or stiffly exclusive represents the maximum of insecurity." ⁵³

When the threat to the ruling class comes from military forces outside the country, the danger again is that humanitarianism may sap the strength of the State. "Any people whose horror of blood will have advanced to the point that they no longer know how to defend themselves will sooner or later become the prey of any bellicose people." ⁵⁴ Hence the "moralists" who favor "the weak and humble . . . at the expense of the strong and energetic, who constitute the élite," are merely inviting a "new conquest by new barbarians." ⁵⁵

Pareto insists that his argument is perfectly objective. In one passage, he maintains that it is impossible to choose on any basis except sentiment between the ideal of the "superman" and the ideal of social equality.⁵⁶ Since he announces that nonnormative science is his exclusive concern, he should incline in neither direction; and yet it is not difficult to see that he is contemptuous of democracy and violently opposed to humanitarianism. In emphasizing the pragmatic value of

deceit and violence, he is in complete accord with Fascism. He is in fact a "soured" liberal; although he still likes certain features of the liberal ideal, he regards the goal as unrealizable. In bitter disillusion, he reacts against democratic liberalism, and half welcomes the "rigid and restrictive" institutions of an approaching "Byzantine" age. He now counts it a fault that he, a "scientist," once was infected with "one shred of faith that finds its expression in a certain sentimental leaning in favour of freedom."⁵⁷

His pessimistic outlook is reenforced by his conviction that human nature is practically unalterable; the basic types of behavior, he thinks, are invariant in all environmental and social settings. Since only the external trappings change, there can be no hope of any fundamental amelioration of the human lot. There is oscillation, but no genuine progress: "Change of regime brings about a change of the privileged, but does not abolish the privilege."⁵⁸ The hope of establishing a just and democratic society is sheer illusion:

Unfortunately, this *true* revolution, that should bring to mankind unmixed good, is only a deceiving mirage, that never becomes a reality; it resembles the Golden Age of the Millennium; always expected, it always loses itself in the morning mists, it always eludes the faithful at the very moment when they expect to grasp it.⁵⁹

Similar ideas were formulated by two other influential Italian thinkers, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels. Mosca, a famous professor at the University of Rome, speaks of "the falsity of the parliamentary legend," which distinguishes between "government by the few" and "government by the many." In reality, all governments are of the first class, since the few everywhere dominate by reason of their wealth and intelligence. "The will of the majority," as the controlling force in so-called democracies, is nothing but a fiction, consciously fostered by the minority who profit by it. The voter is a pawn of big interests: he has only a limited choice at the

ballot box, and a small influential group controls the newspapers and electoral propaganda. Indeed, no thoroughly democratic system is desirable, since the cultivated and "the middle class" are superior to the masses. Aristocracies, though sometimes superior, do not last; a new minority arises to drive out the old. The eternal struggles between "aristocracy" and "democracy" are really conflicts between rival minorities.

A number of Mosca's concepts are roughly parallel to those of Nietzsche, Le Bon, Sorel, and Pareto. Like these thinkers, he speaks of the pragmatic value of "universal illusions" and "great superstitions," which are necessary to consolidate political organizations and unify peoples or even whole civilizations.⁶⁰ Like his antidemocratic contemporaries, he recognizes the effectiveness of force as "the quickest means of establishing a conviction" and of insuring the predominance of a ruling class.⁶¹ His concept of "the ruling class" or "political class" is similar to the idea of the "élite" as developed by Sorel, Pareto, and others. Like Le Bon and Pareto, he is hostile to democratic collectivism. "Social democracy," he asserts, "is more than anything else the intellectual malady of our age."⁶² For the most part, he expressed ideas which were "in the air," but in advancing these doctrines as early as 1895, he was one of the first to give them wide currency.

An expanded edition of his masterpiece, the *Elements of Political Science*, appeared in 1923. Although in this new edition he still opposes universal suffrage and social democracy, he is much more sympathetic towards representative institutions. In a subsequent address, he refers to dictatorship as only a temporary expedient:

It is certain that there may be moments in the life of nations in which a temporary absolutism may be necessary to save a country from anarchy. But if a people of European culture acquiesced definitely in this form of government that would be an

indication of profound intellectual decadence, which in the long run must necessarily produce the decadence of every other form of human activity.⁶³

This statement, uttered after Il Duce was solidly entrenched, suggests that Mosca had misgivings as to the future under Fascism.

Another famous academic critic of democracy, Robert Michels, who has been influential in Germany as well as in Italy, speaks of an "iron law of oligarchy," which permits a transfer, but never an abolition, of undemocratic privileges. "The most formidable argument against the sovereignty of the masses," he maintains, "is derived from the mechanical and technical impossibility of its realization."⁶⁴ The necessity for expert leadership requires specialization, and specialization, in turn, implies authority. "Every human power," moreover, "seeks to enlarge its prerogatives." Hence the rulers will withdraw from the masses, and build defensive ramparts to safeguard their power.⁶⁵

The attack upon democracy is certainly not limited to continental Europe. If anyone thinks that the Fascist theory of the élite is alien to England, let him ponder the work of Thomas Carlyle. "The History of the World," Carlyle contended, "was the Biography of Great Men." Hence the paraphernalia of democracy is inherently absurd:

Find in any country the Ablest Man that exists there; raise *him* to the supreme place, and loyally reverence him: you have a perfect government for that country; no ballot-box, parliamentary eloquence, voting, constitution-building, or other machinery whatsoever can improve it a whit. It is the perfect state; an ideal country. The Ablest Man; he means also the truest-hearted, justest, the Noblest Man; what he *tells us to do* must be precisely the wisest, fittest, that we could anywhere or anyhow learn;—the thing which it will in all ways behove us, with right loyal thankfulness, and nothing doubting, to do! Our *doing* and life were then, so far as government could regulate it, well regulated; that were the ideal of constitutions.⁶⁶

Hence "the few Wise" must "take command of the Innumerable Foolish," lest "Wisdom," "Valor," and "heroic Nobleness" be submerged by mediocrity. The "Ableman" is the man of strong faith and resolute will. Intellectuality, on the other hand, is an indication of decadence: "Man is sent hither not to question but to work: 'the end of man,' it was long ago written, 'is an Action, not a Thought.'" ⁶⁷ There has been no lack of Englishmen to carry on this tradition of anti-intellectualism and "hero worship."

Democracy is subject to attack not only in Europe, but in every democratic country. Some attack openly, some covertly. In America, many of the enemies of democracy speak in its name. We should apply to such people the words of Emerson: "What you are speaks so loud that I cannot hear what you say." There are others whose words, if analyzed, indicate their intentions. In the writings of men like Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Thomas Nixon Carver, Lawrence Dennis, and Walter B. Pitkin, it is not difficult to discern "the looming shadow of Fascism" over the democracies.⁶⁸ In all countries the refrain is the same: "Only the few are wise, noble, heroic. Only the few can rule. What is needed is dynamic action."

4. *Criticism of the Fascist Élite*

We have now made abundantly clear the unsuitability of Fascism as a means of realizing democracy, intellectual "aristocracy," or, by implication, a combination of the two. Any further criticism can be restricted to pointing out that the Fascist theory of the *élite* involves a number of difficulties and inconsistencies.

In the first place, the Fascists demand an *élite*, yet reject all objective criteria for distinguishing the superior individuals. They insist that there is no *science* of values, no universal and objective standards whereby excellence can be

measured. Indeed, this is apt to be the difficulty with all self-styled *élite*. It is difficult at best to demonstrate that the self-elected *are* the true *élite*, and it is impossible so to demonstrate if objective criteria of measurement are rejected. To many of us, Mussolini and Hitler appear to be mere "sawdust Caesars," remarkable only for a narrow and undesirable range of abilities. The Fascists cannot *rationaly* oppose this opinion, since they admit no objective basis for judgment; ultimate value judgments are for them mere matters of sentiment or bias. (See Chapters III and IV.)

To be consistent, they should maintain that there is no authoritative opinion concerning the value of any given personality. There is only the opinion of this person or that; or the opinion of persons of some specified sort. Any choice of the "superior" from this standpoint is purely arbitrary. On the other hand, if the Fascists really do mean that their "élite" are truly and objectively superior, they should be prepared to state and in some measure justify their own criteria. But they have never satisfactorily explained how it is possible to select such a genuine *élite*, who is qualified to select them, and what are the qualifications both of the selectors and of the selected.

In practice, they depend upon mere externalistic indications of "superiority," chiefly racial and economic. But these criteria, besides being inherently unconvincing, sometimes conflict: for on one basis, a man may be adjudged superior, and on the other basis, inferior. The Nazis, for example, maintain that the wealthy generally deserve their wealth, because their economic status attests their superiority.⁶⁹ Yet they also maintain that the Jews are "sub-men," who deserve to be abused. According to the racial standard, *Jews*, whether wealthy or not, are innately inferior; but according to the economic standard, *wealthy* Jews are innately superior.

If the Nazis maintain that wealth is a sufficient indication of superiority, they should not persecute rich Jews; and they

should admit that a man may be a Jew and yet be the salt of the earth. On the other hand, if "Aryans" merely as such are innately superior, and poverty is no indication to the contrary, they should be treated like superior beings. Instead, the Nazis oppose the establishment of a genuine classless society even among the "Aryans," many of whom are dreadfully poor and exploited.

Admittedly, if being "Aryan" and being wealthy are not regarded as *each* a sufficient criterion of superiority, but rather as mere indicators within a certain range of probability, there is no formal contradiction in the Nazi point of view. Yet one suspects that the Nazis and other Fascists who share this viewpoint have not really thought out the relationship between their racial theory and their class theory. One theory tends to refute, and in practice to conflict with, the other.

In any event, their theory of the biological determination of the élite conflicts with their own very effective practice of social regimentation. Verbally they recognize the most extreme sort of biological determinism. Mussolini has spoken of the "immutable" inequality between people of various ranks, and Walther Darré, a typical Nazi, speaks of "the hereditary inequality of human beings." Similarly Hitler repeatedly refers to "the basic aristocratic principle in nature," whereby certain races and individuals are congenitally superior.

Yet the Fascists also boast of the wonders they can perform with propaganda and other environmental controls. Indeed, no one has more completely demonstrated the power of institutions in the molding of character than the Fascists. Whatever we may think of their methods otherwise, we must grant the effectiveness of their propaganda and regimentation. If ninety-nine per cent of a nation's electorate can be got to vote for Hitler, there would seem to be almost no limit to the malleability of human personality. The tremendous

transformation in national life which the Fascists have been able to achieve is the best refutation of their contention that human characteristics are almost invariably inborn. We can thank the Fascists for demonstrating that a servile society, such as they have created, and by implication its opposite, are determined mainly by noncongenital factors.⁷⁰

In working out their doctrines of a biological élite they have completely broken with Christianity, which most of them still profess. The English historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, comments as follows upon their "newfangled" division of mankind upon the basis of physical race as opposed to "the Christian classification by faith and works":

This new classification was manifestly both less significant and less humane than the historic classification which it claimed to supersede: less significant because the colour of the skin or the slant of the nostrils is a less important fact about any human being than his beliefs and behaviour; less humane because the leopard cannot change his spots nor the Ethiopian his skin, so that divisions based on marks of physical race are insurmountable, whereas the unbeliever and the evil-doer are never beyond reach of spiritual conversion so long as they live, so that divisions based on religious and ethical differences do not deny or rule out the ultimate unity of Mankind in the fatherhood of one God-head.⁷¹

Similarly opposed to the Christian doctrine of spiritual equality is the Fascist doctrine that the "élite" in the family circle is the man as head of the family. Here again a biological difference is made decisive, and rights are not equitably shared in an ideally Christian fashion.

Such racial and male chauvinism is no less opposed to the theory of Socialism. In Karl Marx, the greatest of Socialists, the doctrine of the ultimate solidarity of mankind is fundamental. Indeed, genuine Socialists everywhere are opposed to racial and sex discrimination, and to an "immutable" and privileged élite. The Fascists, when they call themselves

Christians and Socialists, are either ignorant or hypocritical. They have never bothered to be really consistent.

The greatest of the inconsistencies of Fascism, however, is that between its promises and its performances. The "leaders" have promised glorious things: peace, prosperity, the end of class struggle, the revival of national honor, the renaissance of culture. So far as promises go, Fascism is marvelous; yet in operation Fascist "timocracy" is essentially illiberal and destructive.

The overemphasis upon military virtues is a poor way to reinvigorate our civilization. Arnold J. Toynbee, author of the most extensive survey of civilizations ever attempted, indicates how dangerous is the "timocratic" way of life. His study of ancient Sparta and kindred societies indicates that "caste" and "specialization" are the basic factors in the arrest of cultural growth. When social organization becomes too rigidly hierarchical, and certain cultural aptitudes become greatly overdeveloped at the expense of others, the processes of growth are interrupted, and decay sets in. For the sake of a routinized efficiency and a rigid discipline, like that of an army or an ant hill, societies at times surrender aliveness, versatility, and sensitiveness. Of all the types of specialization, the overdevelopment of the soldierly cast of mind is the most dangerous. Toynbee reaches the conclusion that militarism is the most common cause of the breakdown of civilizations.⁷² Even Spengler, who yearns for a return of Caesarism, indicates that cultures die amid a fanfare of militarism. Similar conclusions are reached by Sir William Flinders Petrie in his *Revolutions of Civilization*, and by Gibbon in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

Hence reputable historians do not agree with Göring when he says that "the Army and Navy have always symbolized the strength of a people."⁷³ A civilization that has concentrated its major effort upon the technique of destruction is inher-

ently rotten, and cannot survive. It is doubtful if military authoritarianism, as a permanent type of social organization, is desirable even for the purposes of war. "Ever since the beginning of the eighteenth century," Bertrand Russell points out, "victory in every important war has gone to the side that had the most nearly democratic institutions."⁷⁴ Modern warfare, which involves an expert handling of difficult technical apparatus, requires an adaptability and an intelligent initiative that Fascist dictatorship does not cultivate. The recent victories in Ethiopia and Spain do not prove the contrary, since the implements of war have been too unevenly divided, and the anti-Fascists too desperately short of supplies, to test the fighting qualities of Fascist manpower.

Even if Fascism should "win" in a future world war, the victory would go to the strong and not to the wise. The soldierly cast of mind is a real cultural menace when it dominates beyond its rightful sphere. As Benedetto Croce has remarked:

Military discipline has its function only as one aspect of the social order. If instead of being contained within the society, it is itself the containing body or is coextensive with society, it can no longer be called military discipline, but is a general process of fostering universal stupidity. An artist with the face of a corporal, a scientist with that of a sergeant, a politician who waits for his orders and blindly carries them out, is no longer an artist, a scientist or a politician, but an imbecile.⁷⁵

The blighting effect of such authoritarian domination is obvious under Fascist rule. The attendance at universities has fallen off greatly, few notable works of art are being created, both artists and scientists have fled the Fascist countries in great numbers, excellent books and art works are burned and confiscated, and men revert to primitive tribalism in many forms of prejudice and superstition.

Even Plato's ideal State, we must admit, exhibits some of the defects of Fascist authoritarianism. The fundamental

error in his political theory is the presumption that aristocratic and democratic ideals are irreconcilable. This mistake led him to advocate a sharp division of the body politic into the philosopher-kings, the soldier-police, and the subject class. As a result, his Utopia, with its censorship and class stratification, exhibits a rigidity almost as unhealthy as Fascism. To safeguard his valid aristocratic ideal, we must therefore combine it with a more democratic set of values. "Aristocratic" values must be brought to the people through education and cultural opportunities, and democracy must learn intelligently to plan and make use of scientific experts. Indeed, circumstances will probably force democratic governments to do so; they are now in the very gravest danger, and they cannot safeguard their future without shrewd and deep-laid plans. The planners, of course, must be subject to democratic checks and responsibilities.

Plato was right, however, in rejecting the "timocratic" ideal. In comparison, the ideals of democratic sharing and scientific control are vital and beneficent. When we coolly analyze the nature of Fascism, we are inclined to honor more than formerly the aims of our predecessors. We see that intelligence and kindness have lost none of their life-giving virtue, whereas Fascism has "drunken of things Lethean, and fed on the fullness of death."

VII

RACE, STATE, AND INDIVIDUAL

*Upright governments have liberty as their aim, that men may live for themselves; not citizens for the sake of the consuls, nor a people for a king, but conversely, consuls for the sake of the citizens, and a king for his people.—DANTE ALIGHIERI*¹

1. *The Collapse of Traditional Liberalism*

SINCE the State exercises the main coercive power in modern society, a philosophy that eulogizes force and glorifies a militaristic élite can be expected to laud the virtues of an authoritarian State. Thereby the blackjack is legalized, the rule of the élite is institutionalized, and the ideal of liberalism is cast upon the junk heap.

The Fascists are not alone in abandoning the traditional theory of liberalism. The "Popular Front" movement, the "New Deal," Fascism, Socialism, Communism, involve a departure from the older liberalism. There are still remnants of the ancient faith in England and the United States, but most people feel that these "liberal" forces are struggling for a losing cause.

The traditional liberalistic position is that the State is for the sake of protecting the individual against interference, especially in the pursuit of wealth. Its value consists in safeguarding an individualistic system of social and property relations. This theory of the State arose when business was struggling to free itself from the trammels of feudalism and monarchical absolutism. It represents, as Laski has said, "the philosophy of a business civilization."

The nature of traditional liberalism is indicated by its spokesmen. "The great and chief end" of government, declared John Locke, is "the preservation" of "property."² He includes under "property," it is true, not only men's "estates," but also their "lives" and "liberties." There is much to indi-

cate, however, that he was especially concerned with the "liberty" of business enterprise. A capitalistic system, Adam Smith likewise announced, is almost self-regulating: a business man, to profit, must produce what the people most want. Hence the "obvious and simple system of natural liberty"—the minimum of governmental interference—is the true remedy for social ills. The monopoly of political authority, declared Edmund Burke, is an evil, but "the monopoly of capital is the contrary. It is a great benefit, and a benefit particularly to the poor."³ The masses, he believed, are "born to consume frugally," and it would be folly to interfere with the "laws of commerce" in order to relieve poverty. "It is inevitable," said Voltaire, "that the majority should be poor; it is only not necessary that it should be wretched."⁴

These statements embody the essence of historical liberalism: a measure of political democracy is regarded as necessary, but economic democracy is rejected and even political democracy is limited so as to safeguard property rights. Many features of the American form of government can only be explained in the light of this regard for property. The aim of the Constitution, declared James Madison, is "to protect the opulent minority against the majority." Barriers were put in the way of popular rule, and some of these barriers still remain. The House of Representatives can check the Senate, the Senate can check the House, the Congress can check the President, the President can check Congress, and the Supreme Court can check everybody. The original indirect method of electing the Senate and the President, the election of only one third of the Senate in any single election year, the difficulty of amending the Constitution, and the severe restrictions upon the right to vote (depending originally in most states, and even today in some states, upon property qualifications) are all devices for limiting democracy in the interest of privileged classes.

Yet the liberal ideal is not confined to the maintenance of

property rights. The belief in democracy and liberty that inspired Thomas Jefferson, for example, was not merely the desire to protect property. The passion for justice and freedom that animated Lincoln was no mere respect for vested interests. If we count such thinkers among the liberals we shall have to extend the meaning of liberalism.

A wider conception of liberalism is embodied in the American Declaration of Independence. This document asserts the equal right of all human beings to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The term "property" in Locke's treatise is replaced by the term "happiness," and the liberal ideal is correspondingly broadened. The Declaration also affirms that governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed," and that the people have the right to alter or abolish any form of government, and to institute new government, whenever the existing institutions become destructive of life, liberty, and happiness. There is no suggestion of restricting the rights of citizenship to a privileged class. This charter of liberty, when generously interpreted, is a perfectly valid statement of the liberal ideal. The present generation, however, must construe it in terms of the problems of modern life. To do so requires an enlarged and modernized conception of liberalism.

An examination of American laws and traditions will also suggest the need for broader concepts. Our most basic document, the Constitution, as it has evolved under amendment and legal interpretation, may be roughly divided into two main parts: the part concerned with the maintenance of "property rights," and the part concerned with the maintenance of "human rights." To some of our forefathers there seemed to be little or no conflict between these two parts, but gradually the conflict has intensified until the "commerce clause" and the "due process of law clause" have been interpreted so as effectively to nullify, in certain cases, the "general welfare clause." The checks upon democracy, the legal-

istic interpretation of property rights, and certain of the limitations upon federal power in the interests of States rights are operating to protect an unjust distribution of wealth.

But there is another part of the Constitution: the declaration of human rights, as embodied in the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the woman suffrage amendment. These rights include freedom of worship, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, fair trial by jury, universal suffrage, and protection against racial discrimination. To these have been added, as a result of various laws and traditions, the right to universal free education, and the right of labor to bargain collectively. Similar rights have been recognized, in various degrees, in every country where the liberal tradition has matured. In practice, these rights have never been fully realized, and some of them have been perverted by court decisions, but they are of basic importance even as ideals.

Now the essence of the reactionary program is to insist upon property rights at the expense of human rights. This is the tendency, if not the announced policy, of the American Liberty League and the more reactionary elements in the Republican and Democratic parties. It means the sacrifice of the Americanism of men like Jefferson, Lincoln, and Walt Whitman. In the name of "Americanism" we are often asked to oppose basic American ideals. Similarly, Fascism suppresses these human rights in order to protect the profit system and its allied institutions. We can see that this is true in Spain, where the Fascists have been subsidized by the multimillionaire, Juan March, and have fought on the side of landlords and industrialists against a democratic government. It is true in other countries where the Fascists are in control.

Clearly traditional liberalism has not sufficed to prevent tremendous abuses and to safeguard men from tyranny. During the last hundred years, many reforms have been achieved; yet injustice is more flagrant than ever. Terrible poverty

exists in the midst of potential plenty; and even political democracy, under these circumstances, is limited. Pareto and Mosca rightly point out that plutocratic and scheming minorities exercise an undue influence in "democratic" societies; but the lobbyists and grafters who circumvent democracy are either the agents of business, or the politicians who have yielded to business bribes and pressure. The seeking of special privileges by wealthy interests or by interests that seek to become wealthy is the source of most governmental corruption. The way to make political democracy "work" is to establish an economic democracy which would eliminate these forms of pressure.

Political freedom, moreover, cannot be genuine without economic freedom which, in turn, can only be realized within the context of equality. As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in his famous dissenting opinion in the case of *Coppage versus Kansas* (1914), liberty of contract begins where equality of bargaining power begins. *No man, in other words, can really be free when he is "ill-housed, ill-fed, and ill-clad," without money for education, without money for medicine, unemployed or living at a miserable wage.* Genuine liberty means something more than the absence of legal restraint. It means, to use Cooley's phrase, "opportunity for right development," involving social organization and economic planning. So long as economic power is concentrated in the few, genuine freedom is denied to the many. What I say is so trite that I would hesitate to say it, if it were not so true.

The whole liberalistic ideal obviously needs to be enlarged. In respect to such a broader liberalism, we have something to learn from the Soviet Constitution. This document not only provides for many of the civil rights with which we are familiar, but includes a novel list of rights. As Sidney Webb has written:

In 1936 the Soviet Constitution insures to every citizen not only protection against aggression but also the right to have re-

munerative work; the right to specified hours of rest and paid weeks of holiday; the right to education of every kind and grade free of all charges; and, most far-reaching of all, the right to full economic provision, according to need, in all the vicissitudes of life. . . . All these new and unprecedented rights of man are to be guaranteed by the . . . constitution, not merely to a ruling class, a dominant race, a favored sex, or even a specially insured minority, but universally, according to need, without exclusion of sex or color or social past, and without insurance premium, to all persons over eighteen in city or village, including the backward peoples of nearly two hundred different tribes throughout the vast continent. This is in startling contrast to the constitutions and practice of every other State in the world.⁵

Webb, moreover, believes that these "rights" are in process of realization. They are unlike the American "right" to the "pursuit of happiness," or unlike the rights in the Fourteenth Amendment (granting equality to the Negroes), which have remained, for a large part of the population, dead letters.

We shall not enter into the hot dispute as to the validity of Webb's opinions or the extent of civil rights in the Soviet Union, but we do wish to call attention to the fundamental widening of the traditional view of the rights of man, a widening which is fully consonant with our own Declaration of Independence. Whatever we may think otherwise of the Soviet system, we surely have to recognize that the Russians have embodied, in their constitution, a most significant set of principles.

In this particular respect, they are providing a model for all liberals. The way to realize the best part of the liberalistic ideal, we believe, is to recognize that existing property rights are often opposed to human rights, and that we must have a thorough reconstruction of our social order. To achieve this transformation with a minimum of bloodshed, we must vigorously maintain and extend our civil rights: freedom of speech, press, radio, assembly, and teaching; the right peacefully to strike and to picket; the right to organize

a party to change our system fundamentally. Also, we need to recognize that Fascism rather than Socialism is the great enemy of the broad liberal ideal; and that since the Fascist method is often violence, we must meet it realistically with a firm control. The program of liberalism, in a time of crisis, may have to be severely modified, in order to prevent the victory of absolute tyranny. At times we have to restrict the type of "freedom" which aims to destroy freedom. If the liberal government of Spain, before the outbreak of the Fascist revolt, had been less tolerant towards its enemies, more than a million lives might have been saved, and Western civilization would not be in such awful jeopardy. In these critical times, liberalism and democracy must be far more resolute in defense of the people's rights.

Finally, the entire psychological and ethical basis of liberalism needs to be repaired. Historical liberalism has been based upon an extremely individualistic theory of society. As elaborated by such thinkers as Jeremy Bentham, liberalism has maintained that every man is animated by purely selfish motives. Only the marvelous contrivance of free competition, we have been told, allows the sum of individual strivings to add up miraculously to the maximum of social welfare. This theory survives among the so-called liberal economists. For example, Ludwig von Mises, a well-known Austrian economist who writes in the tradition of historical liberalism, asserts that "egoism is the basic law of society," and that "there is no contrast between moral duty and selfish interests." He accordingly condemns the ideal of working out a cooperative society, and wishes to limit the State to the sole "task of safeguarding life and property."⁶ Yet this entire conception of society as a harmonious collection of unmitigated egoists has been undermined by the development of the social sciences and the rapid decline of relatively "free" competition. Gradually, and quite rightly, we have returned to Aristotle's doctrine that man is a social animal.

We must recognize, also, that there is nothing even in the traditional theory of liberalism which can justify the present grossly unequal distribution of wealth. The liberal tradition insists that the right to property is based upon labor. "Property," Locke states, is "that with which a man hath mixed his labour."

For it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on everything; and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common without any husbandry upon it, and he will find that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value.⁷

This excellent doctrine, which was accepted by Adam Smith and Ricardo, was a support to the business men who were trying to throw off the yoke of feudalism. The feudal "right" to property was ultimately based upon the greater power of the lord of the manor, but in the new bourgeois order which was arising, the title was to be based not upon mere force, but upon the industry and thrift (*i.e.* the "labor") of the farmers and small business men. Although the "labor theory of value" might be thus used to defend bourgeois property rights against dying feudalism, it completely fails to justify the distribution of wealth in the subsequent period of large-scale industry and finance capitalism.

Abraham Lincoln remarked that the implication of the "labor theory" was different from anything intended by the conservative economists:

No good thing has been or can be enjoyed by us without having first cost labour. And inasmuch as most things are produced by labour, it follows that all such things of right belong to those whose labour has produced them. But it has so happened, in all ages of the world, that some have laboured, and others have without labour enjoyed a large proportion of the fruits. This is wrong and should not continue. To secure to each labourer the whole product of his labour, or as nearly as possible, is a worthy object of any good government.⁸

This doctrine clearly implies a socialized system of distribution and ownership. Present-day liberalism, if it is not to be simply a name for reaction, must recognize the validity of Lincoln's contention: its new objective must be a democratic collectivism. But "liberalism" is instead being used as a tag for thought and activity which is far from progressive.

The older liberalism, with its extreme emphasis upon individualism, is being abandoned not only by ordinary wage earners but also by employers. As social life becomes more complicated and interdependent, there must be more regulation even to insure profits. The middle classes give up their individualism as they become convinced that economic combination and government aid will assist them in "getting on." During a time of depression, business men despair of maintaining their profits, or even avoiding bankruptcy, without assistance from the State. A powerful State is also indispensable to big business in a period of imperialistic rivalry, since the weak and unarmed State cannot defend the "right" to markets, raw materials, and colonies. As the labor movement grows more powerful and radical in its demands, business leaders seek also to employ the coercive power of the State to curb the growth of radicalism. When the crisis reaches an acute stage, a fierce struggle for power ensues, and liberalistic capitalism is abandoned either in favor of Socialism or, if the opposing forces prevail, in favor of Fascism. Business men may not prefer Fascism to capitalistic democracy, but they choose it in preference to a socialized workers' society.

2. *The Theoretical Foundation of the Fascist State*

Fascist economy, as Mussolini has said, "respects the principle of private property," but abandons the theory of liberalism which was the original foundation of capitalism:

Liberalism denied the State in the name of the individual; Fascism reasserts the rights of the State as expressing the real essence of the individual. And if liberty is to be the attribute of living men and not of abstract dummies invented by individualistic liberalism, then Fascism stands for liberty, and for the only liberty worth having, the liberty of the State and of the individual within the State. The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus understood, Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State—a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all values—interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of a people.⁹

“Liberty” is not interpreted by the Fascists as it was under liberalism; it is either thought of as consistent with political regimentation, as in the above passage, or it is unreservedly denounced, as when Mussolini in his essay on “Force or Consent,” calls it a “decayed corpse.”

Similar statements are made by the German Fascists. In the Nazi theory, however, the “Race” is usually substituted in place of the State as the central concept. The State, nevertheless, is exalted as the instrument for achieving racial unity, and is totalitarian and authoritarian in operation. “Liberalism” becomes, like “Marxism,” a term of abuse.

To grasp the Fascist theory of the State, we must understand its theoretical foundations. Mussolini has said: “We stand for sheer, categorical, definitive antithesis to . . . the fundamental principles laid down in 1789.”¹⁰ Alfred Rosenberg has likewise declared: “The grave sickness, with which the ideas of 1789 have infected Europe, has been overcome in Germany, not in a negative manner, but in the positive creation of a new State.”¹¹ These quotations suggest that there may be a real similarity between the Fascists and the thinkers who first repudiated the French Revolution.

The early part of the nineteenth century was a period of reaction against the French revolutionary influence. It was an age of war and ferment somewhat like our own. The

French Revolution and the ensuing war left Europe in a state of panic and Prussia in a mood of national humiliation. Just as the defeat of Germany in the World War brought a heritage of shame which did much to aggravate nationalistic ardor, so the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon aroused in the subjugated people a keen desire to reassert their national integrity.

The reaction against liberal ideals first became articulate in 1790 with the appearance of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in which the revolutionists are described as cruel and unnatural hoodlums bent upon the destruction of the precious old traditions, and the conservative State is celebrated as "a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection."¹² In Germany after 1800, when Napoleon seemed to be the heir of the revolution, the reaction was especially marked, and Burke's book enjoyed a great vogue. Men like Novalis, Schlegel, Kleist, Brentano, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Adam Müller attacked the entire theory of natural rights and political democracy which had inspired the revolution. During this period, most of the fundamental tenets of the political conservatism of today were developed. It was an age when antiliberal thinkers were redefining the relation between the State and the individual.

Adam Müller was the leading political and economic theorist among the German romanticists. Although born in Berlin, he entered the service of the Austrian state, and became a confidante of its minister, Metternich, the chief reactionary statesman of Europe. When Müller first advanced his political ideas, Napoleon was at the height of his power. Müller sought to free the German States from the Napoleonic yoke by invoking ideas and sentiments opposed to the entire liberal ideology of the French Revolution.

His influence has continued down to the present time. He has been regarded as a master by Othmar Spann, the philos-

opher and economic theorist of Austro-German Fascism. His works have enjoyed a considerable reputation in Germany, and a number of new editions of his writings have appeared. As the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* points out, "he is the spiritual ancestor of the ideology, though not of the methods, of National Socialism."

His main contention is that the State is similar in value, function, and structure to an organism. The individual citizens are subordinated to it just as individual cells are subordinated to the human body as an organic unity. "If we regard the State as a great individual, which absorbs the smaller individuals," he declares, "we see that society as a whole can only be represented as a sublime and complete human being."¹³ This obviously means an abandonment of the theory of liberalism, with its doctrine of the supreme value and reality of the individual.

The value of the social organism, Müller accordingly maintains, cannot be calculated as a mere summation of individual values: "Mankind—in so far as it is merely the sum of individuals who strive to be happy—represents an infamous purpose."¹⁴ The citizens must consequently learn to reckon by a new arithmetic: "one plus one, if combined together in a living whole, make three, or more than three."¹⁵ But there must be "a force which is greater than the sum of all individual forces" to achieve this productive union of all individuals. This force is the State, which represents "the totality of human affairs, their interconnection to form a living whole":

Since the dawn of civilization, not only in Europe but everywhere and at all times, man has been unable to hear, see, think, feel, or love without the State; in short, man can be thought of only as within the State.¹⁶

The task of statesmen, he contends, should be to "achieve a vital reciprocity, a living equilibrium, of the forces of land,

labor, spiritual capital, and physical capital.”¹⁷ In working out this scheme, he reveals his admiration for the Middle Ages, and wants to establish an order of estates somewhat like feudalism, which had by no means completely disappeared in Germany. He reserves the highest place in the State to a landed and hereditary nobility, and ranges the various additional groups in a hierarchical structure: soldiers, teachers, clergymen, manufacturers, laborers, and peasants are each to take their place in an order of rank. The Fascist State is organized in a different manner, but there is a similar emphasis upon dictatorial control from above, and a differentiation according to economic classes.

Like the Fascists, Müller also favors a belligerent nationalism. War, he maintains, is indispensable to the very existence of the political order: since each state is “compelled to feel and organize itself as a whole over against another whole which threatens its existence.”¹⁸ World calamity and stagnation would therefore be the inevitable result of abiding peace and a permanent league of nations.¹⁹ Even in the interim between hostilities, the ideal is “to retain the proud spirit of war and to weave it into the fabrics of so-called peace.”²⁰ In a note referring to this passage, Dr. Baxa, the recent editor of Müller’s works, remarks that “this kind of a State for ever will be the dream of the German longing.”²¹ The militaristic nationalism of Müller thus reappears in the aspirations of modern chauvinists. It is not too much to say that the Fascists accept all of the principal features of his ideal State: its organic, totalitarian, authoritarian, hierarchical, nationalistic, and warlike character.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), the idealistic philosopher and patriot, was more responsive to liberal influences than Müller. Being the son of a poor weaver and subjected to Jacobin influences, he was inclined toward democracy and a measure of social justice, but he finally developed a point of view similar to the Nazi. It is easy to exaggerate the simi-

larity: throughout his writings, there are traces of republicanism and cosmopolitanism. Yet the main impression created by his *Addresses to the German Nation* is the need of subordinating individual ends to an intense and almost fanatical nationalism.

His works have exerted an important influence in Germany since the World War. Even before the National Socialist "Revolution," a "Fichte Renaissance" was in full swing, and his ideals were being widely publicized. A *Fichte Bund* was organized under the auspices of national leaders. This organization has become a very important part of the Nazi propaganda machine. In 1935, it disseminated tons of books and five million pamphlets in forty-four languages, and its activity has continued unabated. The fact that the Nazis have retained the name of the *Fichte Bund* and have made such extensive use of the organization is some indication of their high regard for its namesake.

Writing after the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon, Fichte represents the extreme of exacerbated nationalism. In language that reminds us of Nazi chauvinism, he declares that "all the evils which have now brought us to ruin are of foreign origin," and that "to have character and to be German undoubtedly mean the same."²² The Germans are depicted as an "original" people compared with which all other peoples are "unoriginal." The unequaled profundity of the German mind, he thinks, is due to the use of a "pure" language. French or Italian represents the opposite type of language, which is based upon a "dead" tongue, such as Latin. But as Bertrand Russell has pointed out, the German language is no more pure than that of the Eskimos or the Hottentots, and hence Fichte has failed to assign reasons for the *unique* superiority of the Germans.²³

The doctrine of the State as advanced by Fichte assumes the same basic form as in Nazi theory. The Nation is the primary concept, and the State is said to exist essentially for

the sake of the Nation as conceived in racial terms. It "is not something which is primary and which exists for its own sake, but is merely the means to the higher purpose of the eternal, regular, and continuous development of what is purely human in this nation."²⁴ But elsewhere Fichte speaks of the State as similar to an organism, and the citizen as akin to a dependent part of this organic whole.²⁵

The individual, we are told, has no genuine existence or value as a separate entity. He should therefore set "no limit whatever" to his "sacrifices" for the sake of the race and the nation, and should admit no purpose "which is his own merely and not at the same time the purpose of the whole community." This unity of aim, Fichte declares, "does not by any means exclude the distinction of classes in society," but every class must be "dedicated to the whole."²⁶

His sentiments remind us of Hitler's declaration to the German workers: "You are servants of the nation, but you alone are nothing. As part of the organic whole you are everything."²⁷ He also anticipates the Nazi doctrine of a ruling élite: the world, he declares, exists for the sake of "the noble-minded," and all other men must conform to the wishes of this superior group.²⁸ Like the Fascists, he advocates national economic self-sufficiency (autarchy), and the subordination of science to racial considerations. He has clearly anticipated the main features of Fascism.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), the greatest philosopher of the early nineteenth century, has also unwittingly contributed to Fascism. Although he is in certain respects the intellectual heir of the Romantics, and although his *Phenomenology* and the first volume of his *Logic* were published prior to the Congress of Vienna, his influence belongs more particularly to the post-Romantic period following the Congress. The statesmen of the victorious allies of 1815 thought they had ended the revolutionary movement by finally disposing of Napoleon. They were mistaken; for

in the long period of peace which followed the Congress, the ideals of 1789 gradually reasserted themselves, and were eventually embodied in a great many legislative acts. Liberalism and political democracy, however, suffered a great immediate blow during the Napoleonic Wars and at the peace settlement. Hegel is the outstanding representative of this antiliberal reaction. It is often said that his political philosophy is a glorification of the undemocratic Prussian State. This judgment may not be wholly just, but he is inclined to defend the existing order as the historical embodiment of reason.

The ideal, he believed, is expressed in the actual: "what is rational is real; and what is real is rational."²⁹ Each nation makes its unique contribution to "the rational necessary course of the World-Spirit," but certain nations have more to contribute to world civilization than others, and the World-Spirit is most adequately expressed in the Prussian State. Hegel thus rejects the cosmopolitanism of Kant, and emphasizes the nationalistic aspects of tradition, upon which he would base politics. Hitler and Mussolini likewise stress the national tradition as the foundation of the political order. Mussolini seems to be echoing Hegel when he declares, "Tradition certainly is one of the greatest spiritual forces of a people, inasmuch as it is a successive and constant creation of their soul."³⁰

This creation of a national soul, Hegel believes, is to be achieved through the State, which is the highest embodiment of reason within the historical process. "The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth."³¹ There is no higher earthly authority to which an appeal can be made:

As against the State there is no power to decide what is intrinsically right and to realize this decision. Hence, we must remain by the absolute command. States in their relation to one another are independent and look upon the stipulations which they make one with another as provisional.³²

No international league, court, or body of law can limit the sovereignty of the State. Each nation, it is true, must be judged in its relation to the entire historical process: "the history of the world is the world's court of judgment."³³ But morality as between nations remains a mere ineffectual "ought"; it cannot be embodied in effective law, and hence nations are in a "state of nature," *i.e.*, a condition of legal anarchy, in their relation to one another. The mere power of survival is the ultimate arbiter of history, and hence for Hegel the sole effective test of national righteousness. This doctrine, as Morris Cohen has said, "misses the tragedy of history and is equivalent to Napoleon's dictum that God is on the side of the heaviest artillery."³⁴

Hegel accepts war as a necessary moral tonic; in battle men learn to be brave. The brave man looks to the sovereignty of the State as his "true absolute final end," and "in so doing gives up personal reality." "An utter obedience or complete abnegation of one's own opinion and reasonings, even an absence of one's own spirit, is coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of the spirit and of resolution."³⁵ These are the "virtues" that have always been demanded of the soldier.

Hegel regards this self-abnegation as the only true freedom. The individual fulfills himself by merging his individual interests in the collective whole. "It is the moral Whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the Whole."³⁶ The individual is thus made happy; but his good is negligible in comparison with that of the State, which is an "absolute, stable end-for-itself."³⁷

These statements resemble Mussolini's declaration that the State is "an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State." Like Hegel, Mussolini insists that the

State has a life of its own: "The Fascist State is itself conscious, and has itself a will and a personality."³⁸ Hitler, in contrast, tends to substantialize the race, and regards the State as only a means to racial welfare.³⁹

In reviewing the political doctrines of Müller, Fichte, and Hegel, we have discovered many ideas dear to the Fascists. *It is a singular and significant fact that the basic theory of the Fascist State was formulated in Germany during the early years of the nineteenth century.* Thus Fascism in many respects is not an original doctrine, but represents a reversion to earlier forms of political thought.

These ideas of the German romantics and idealists have been transmitted to later thinkers, both German and Italian. One of the chief links between the early nineteenth century and German Fascism is to be found in the writings of Paul de Lagarde (1827-1891). This author has derived a good deal from Fichte, and in turn has been assiduously read and quoted by Rosenberg and other Nazis. Son of a Berlin school-teacher, he studied theology, taught in the secondary schools, and eventually became Professor of Oriental Languages at the University of Göttingen. In addition to writing works of scholarship, he took a lively part in the social and political controversies of his day. His polemical essays stress the importance of basing German life upon the nation's religious and ethical traditions, excluding Semitic and foreign elements.

Like the Nazis, he does not approve the Hegelian deification of the State, and substitutes the nation, conceived in racial terms, as the supreme end and value. "The State," he declares, "is not a living organism but a machine. . . . A machine must not be treated in the same way as something living."⁴⁰ Not being alive, the State is a mere means to an end, and therefore Hegel is mistaken in identifying it with the sum of human interests: "the State does not carry within itself the whole essence of the human spirit."⁴¹ The effect of

Hegel's worship of the State is to sanctify the *status quo*, whereas political institutions, being imperfect, are rightly subject to change. The State is like "an Adonis, who dies each July in order to be resurrected in the next year, not as an identical but only as a similar being, which in turn will soon perish."⁴²

Despite these attacks, Lagarde has much the same attitude towards the nation as Hegel has towards the State. "What can be said of individuals can also be said of nations," he declares. "For nations too are personalities, and have a guiding idea, according to which to live is their sole duty."⁴³ In another passage, he complains that "not a single thought has been given to the fact that the nation, like the human being, has a soul, and that ultimately for individuals as well as for nations this soul is the thing of value."⁴⁴ The nation is thus the supreme end, to which individuals should be subordinated. If used as a means to *this* end, the State has a great importance. So long as the government is employed to give "a national and ideal character" to events, nothing should be permitted to disturb its authority.⁴⁵

Restating Fichte's position, Lagarde interprets the nation in racial terms. He insists upon eliminating from national life all "alien" elements, and in particular wishes to eradicate Semitic influences. "The Jewish people," he declares, "have not produced a single important man, with the possible exception of Spinoza."⁴⁶ Men like Maimonides were merely "thieves," stealing their ideas from foreign sources. Jewish institutions were similarly derived: monogamy, for example, was appropriated from the Germans in the year 1000 A.D. The national spirit of the Germans, in contrast, is unique and original. In modern times, however, there has been a tendency towards a de-Germanization of the nation; the essence of Lagarde's program is to return to pure Germanism.

He believes that both morals and religion should be purged

of alien elements. Universalistic ethics, he insists, cannot satisfy true nationalists:

. . . What does the faith in a moral order of the world, and the demand to love all human beings, have to do with the German nation? How can a faith which supposedly belongs to all human beings, and a demand which must be carried out as far as the sun shines, be fit to serve as a national ideal for all Germans? ⁴⁷

"The devil," he declares, "invented the idea of tolerance." ⁴⁸ Religion, too, must be purged: such Biblical characters as Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and David mean nothing to Germans, and the entire Old Testament might as well be discarded. ⁴⁹

The ideals of democracy, liberalism, mass education, and woman's rights are likewise foreign importations, and must be eliminated. The German racial heritage, by which the State should be guided, is fundamentally aristocratic, and expresses itself in a hierarchical system: "inequality is the basis of all sustenance and all growth." ⁵⁰ He particularly admires the training and discipline provided by the army, and regards struggle as a basic necessity:

Intellectual life—and political life is intellectual life—awakens through the necessity of struggle. . . . Through war [in the wide meaning of the word], a people gains the exercise and full development of its native abilities . . . ⁵¹

Lagarde's contention that international ethics, religion, and politics must be replaced by a belligerent nationalism foreshadows the ideas of the Nazis. Like Rosenberg and Hitler, he subordinates individual welfare to racial solidarity. With prophetic insight, he announces that "the future belongs to my party, the Radical-Conservatives, which thus far is represented by me alone." ⁵²

Another writer who has handed on the ideas of Fichte is the historian, Heinrich von Treitschke. This spokesman of

the age of Bismarck praised Fichte for contending that "a German could find light and right only in Germany."⁵³ He insisted that his countrymen must cling to this point of view:

We who are still living shall preserve Fichte's spirit best, if all the noble heads among us will strive to develop in our citizens "the character of the warrior" who knows how to sacrifice himself for the sake of the State. If Fichte's name is mentioned the present generation rightly thinks at once of the speaker who declaimed to a subjugated people these heroic words: "To possess character and to be German are undoubtedly synonymous."⁵⁴

A number of German writers of the nineteenth century thus formulated the essential elements of the Fascist theory of State and Race. Similar doctrines have been expressed by influential Italians, and in addition, Hegel and other German idealists have exercised a profound influence in Italy.

Niccolo Machiavelli, whose influence upon Fascism has been discussed in Chapter V, approaches more closely than any other great Italian thinker to the Fascist theory of the strong State. Another famous man whom the Fascists celebrate as their precursor is Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), the intrepid leader of the movement to liberate and unify Italy. Unquestionably he foreshadows certain aspects of the Fascist political theory. He contended that the fulfillment of duties is more important than the exaction of rights, and criticized liberal democracy for overemphasizing individual well-being. "The epoch of individuality is exhausted," he contended; "the epoch of association has begun."⁵⁵ An influential Fascist intellectual, Alfredo Rocco, cites the following characteristic passage from Mazzini:

Training for social duty is essentially and logically unitarian. Life for it is but a duty, a mission. The norm and definition of such mission can only be found in a collective term superior to all the individuals of the country—in the people, in the nation. If there is a collective mission, a communion of duty . . . it can only be represented in the national unity.⁵⁶

Rocco points out that "in Mazzini's conception of the citizen as an instrument for the attainment of the nation's ends and therefore submissive to a higher mission, to the duty of supreme sacrifice, we see the anticipation of one of the fundamental points of the Fascist doctrine."⁵⁷

Unlike the Fascists, however, Mazzini tempered his nationalism by the ideal of international cooperation. He religiously insisted upon the value of different nationalities, and looked forward to the unification of mankind. The Fascists, in their usual eclectic manner, have emphasized the doctrines which suit their purposes, neglecting Mazzini's internationalism and quasi-republicanism.

Other Italian contributors to Fascist political theory are sometimes mentioned. Among these, for example, is Vincenzo Cuoco, a contemporary of Müller and Fichte. He denounced the ideals of the French Revolution and praised the value of the national tradition. A far more immediate and decisive influence, however, has been exerted by a number of living Italians, such as Enrico Corradini, Giovanni Gentile, and Alfredo Rocco.

Corradini may be taken as somewhat typical of these theorists. In the years preceding the World War, he was an influential patriot and defender of the throne, whom Mussolini vehemently criticized. Yet as a Fascist in the postwar years, Il Duce completely reversed his position, and welcomed Corradini as an intellectual pillar of the new regime. In a book written in the early period of Fascist rule, Corradini insists that an individual is merely part of a social organism, and cannot exist otherwise:

Take away the fecund earth, and the seeds remain for a while unchanged and then perish. Similarly, take away the national society and the State, and the individual remains an embryonic being. . . . Certainly there is a difference between the biological fact which characterizes individuals and that much more imposing fact, the nation and the State, which operates between individuals; but the difference is apparent only. . . .⁵⁸

As soon as this concept of the social organism is firmly grasped, the liberal emphasis upon the freedom of the individual can no longer be justified:

Liberty, as conceived by old political theories, old parties, the old journalism, the out-moded parliamentary system, and the old ruling classes which held sway in Italy and are still in power in certain European States, is a word without content. The particular merit of the new Italian political culture consists precisely in this: that it has perceived the vanity of that word. . . . And why? The reason is simply this: Liberty, this basic concept of the old European political ideology, when it transformed itself from an active force having a definite historical function, that of liberating nations from absolutism, into a fixed and sacred doctrine, lost all sense of reality. It became the political principle which defined the relationship between State and individual, a principle which presupposed the existence of natural liberty between the State and the individual. . . . And that is precisely false. For we know now that a natural, native, initial liberty does not exist between State and individual, but rather that they are united in a biological unity. Political liberty must take this fact into account, it must make it its norm. This is the *punctum saliens* of the new Italian political culture, this is the revolution of principles. In order to regulate the relationship between State and individual, they must no longer be looked upon as separate entities; they must be perceived in their biological unity.⁵⁹

In the light of the theories we have cited, the main tenets of Fascist political philosophy may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The State functions as a collective mind or organism, or (in the Nazi version) the race so functions and employs the State as its instrument.
- (2) This mind or organism has a supreme intrinsic value.
- (3) It is morally absolute and self-sufficing. It has practically no obligations to its individual members, nor to any other State or race, nor to any more inclusive social organization, such as an international league.

(4) The individual achieves his freedom and welfare through his absorption in the State or race.

Let us now examine these tenets in greater detail.

3. *The New Leviathan*

Repeatedly in Fascist literature, the State is said to be an organism or group mind. Mussolini speaks of the State as having a will and as being itself conscious. Alfredo Rocco has declared that the State is "an organism distinct from the citizens who at any given time compose it, and has its own life and its ends higher than those of individuals, to which those of individuals must be subordinated."⁶⁰ Similarly Walther Darré, Nazi Minister of Agriculture, has referred to the State as a "superorganic organism," which exacts "devotion, sacrifice of the individual, and abandonment of egoism" for the sake of a "higher aim."⁶¹

But as we have remarked before, the Nazis more often deny the State as the final end of action, and substitute a new organism or group mind; namely, the race as determined by "the law of blood brotherhood." The State is still emphasized, but it is thought of as having a racial basis. "The Nazi State," declares one Party theorist, "is not only organic but biological, since it rests on ties of blood."⁶² This emphasis upon race permits the Nazis to count as part of the racial organism the many Germans who live outside of the territorial boundaries of the State. Obviously such an ideology is helpful in gaining control of the Germanic areas in central Europe, and in rallying support from Germans all over the world. Whichever concept be uppermost, race or State, much the same criticism applies. In either case, there is a tendency to emphasize the reality of the collectivity at the expense of the individual.

Now it seems unlikely that the facts ever warrant belief

in a social organism or group mind. Although individuals usually think and act as they do because of their manifold relations to other human beings, yet a single mind or personality appears to have a much more intense degree of integration than a race, a State, or any other social group. As L. T. Hobhouse has said, "There is something common in me to all my acts and experiences which is never common to you and me." ⁶³ The personality has a core of individuality and various subjective feelings which it can never precisely share; although you may sympathize with me, my toothache remains *my* toothache.

The mere fact that the individuals within a State are partly related in terms of spatial adjacency suggests that we are not dealing with relations within a supermind. The relations between the parts of a *mind* are not spatial. Again, physical coercion used as police power, which in practice is inseparable from the State, implies an absolute division and clash of interests between the persons who are members of the State. It is a little strange for one part of a mind to club another part. This objection is especially applicable to the Fascist State, in which the police power has become so conspicuous. It may be objected that there *are* conflicts of interests within a mind, and a mind does at times seem to discipline and coerce itself. But one part of the mind does not suppress another part by means of *physical* violence, which involves something other than the mere psychological relationships which hold *within* a mind. If the State or race, moreover, is analogous, not to a well-integrated and harmonious mind, but to a mind rent by inner conflict, it would not seem to be the well-nigh perfect thing which the Fascists consider it to be.

If we regard the State, not as a group mind, but as an organism, the difficulties continue to be formidable. Let us enumerate some of the distinguishing features of an organism. First, the parts are dead and functionless when removed

from their places within the organism. An eye cannot possibly live, even in a mutilated form, when plucked out of the body. Mussolini declares that it is similarly "impossible to conceive any individual existing outside the State unless he be a savage whose home is in the solitude of the sandy desert."⁶⁴ But Mussolini's admission that a savage might live outside the boundaries of any State implies that the individual is prior to the State, even though the State is prior to the *civilized* individual. In addition, we can easily conceive an individual detaching himself from one State and joining another, perhaps to his own enrichment. Such autonomy upon the part of the organs in a biological unity would be fatal.

Second, the parts of a higher organism are locally differentiated. Thus in the human body there are brain, nerves, heart, liver, etc. Despite the division of labor in society, there is no such extreme degree of differentiation within the State. Thought and digestion and nervous sensitivity occur in all the members. It is significant, moreover, that there is much less differentiation in an economic and political democracy than in a caste society. Obviously the "organic theory" is very useful to a ruling class, which can plead that it is the "brains" of the body politic. It is no accident that the proponents of this point of view are generally opposed to democracy.

Third, an organism passes through a life cycle, ending in old age and death. Each type of organism has a certain normal life span. The State appears to be very different; there is ordinarily no clearly marked point of birth or of death. Did the American State, for example, come into being when the colonies first began to resist English rule? Or when the Declaration of Independence was signed? Or when the independence of the United States was first recognized by Great Britain? Or when the Articles of Confederation were ratified? Or when the Constitution was adopted? When did the

political unity of China, or of Italy, become sufficiently great to call it a State? Is the British Commonwealth of Nations a State? If so, when did it come into existence? If the Commonwealth is not sufficiently integrated to be called a State, just what degree of integration is required? Just when can a State be said to have died? Does a State wholly perish, and a new one begin, when a revolution occurs? When a mere *coup d'état* occurs? If the British Commonwealth is a State, just how much home rule or independence would have to be granted to Australia, Canada, South Africa, etc., before this State would be dissolved? Such questions certainly suggest that a State is too amorphous an entity to possess a definite life span or cycle such as characterizes an organism. The conclusion seems to be inescapable that the State is not an organism.

Although a human society is probably more like a mind or organism than like a machine, the analogy is pressed too far in the attempt to justify cruel dictatorships. As Hobhouse points out, if we describe a State as "organic," we must not regard it as "a great Leviathan, a whole related to individuals as a body to its cells. . . . We must avoid importing into our defining term the associations which belong to it in another capacity." We must recognize that the "social organism," in its completeness, is an ideal rather than an actuality. No society very closely resembles an animal or a human personality. "But actual societies have a touch of the organic character, some more and some less." ⁶⁵

4. *The Abstract Monster as an End in Itself*

The decisive difference between a biological organism and a society is that the intrinsic value of the former inheres in the whole, whereas the intrinsic value of the latter is realized in its members. Values ordinarily depend upon social relations between personalities, but they are realized in each

man's life, and not in a group mind or superorganism in which individuals are merged and lose their identity. The State exists for man, and not man for the State.

This contention, which is basic to liberalism, is denied by the Fascists. Alfredo Rocco, for example, in an address enthusiastically endorsed by Mussolini, rejects Kant's famous principle that human beings should always be treated as ends in themselves, never as mere means or instruments. This is the basic principle of liberalism, he declares, but it is not the principle of Fascism:

For liberalism, the individual is the end and society the means; nor is it conceivable that the individual, considered in the dignity of an ultimate finality, be lowered to mere instrumentality. For Fascism, society is the end, individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals as instruments for its social ends. . . . Individual rights are only recognized in so far as they are implied in the rights of the State.⁶⁶

It might be difficult to find in Nazi literature any statement so clear and explicit in exalting the value of the collective above that of the individual. The appeal of Fascism often depends upon principles which are vaguely implied rather than clearly expressed. Certainly there is a tendency in Nazi theory to exalt the race as the highest value. Alfred Rosenberg, for example, declares:

Soul means race seen from the inside, and *vice versa* the race is the external aspect of a soul. To awaken to life the soul of the race means to know its highest values and to subordinate to its rule all other values within an organic hierarchy: in politics, in art, and in religion.⁶⁷

If this means what seems to be implied, the race has a supreme intrinsic value.

The plausibility of the doctrine that the State or the race is intrinsically good depends upon the assumption that it has a life or mind of its own distinct from that of any of its

individual members. (By intrinsic goodness, we mean of course that which is good for its own sake, and not merely as a means. A ladder is good as a means, but not as an end; hence it is not *intrinsically* good.) Almost everybody who has tried to formulate the meaning of intrinsic goodness has found it in some state of an organic, and most people would say of a conscious, being—in pleasure, virtue, interest, self-realization, satisfaction of desire, or fulfillment of some living impulse. Nonliving things may have great value as means to ends, but they are not ends in themselves.

If this is true and if our analysis has been correct, a group may have value as a means but not as an end; for we have seen that the only vitality that a group has is in the lives of its members. It is perfectly true that these members derive value from their group affiliation. Still, it is each member's good, and not the good of some fictitious group mind. The group is justifiable only to the extent that it benefits the individuals.⁶⁸

Even if this point of view is quite wrong, and the State or race does possess intrinsic value, it does not follow that the Fascists are in a position rightly to interpret the values of the group mind or organism. How can we know that any particular individual is the proper spokesman of this super entity? Does the racial soul whisper its promptings in the ear of Hitler? Is Mussolini in "cahoots" with the Absolute? What sign from on high can these self-announced spokesmen present? If a Fascist statesman proclaims that his deeds and opinions are not merely his, but those of a group mind, he is asserting that he is the tool of a being which eludes any scientific scrutiny, and which apparently can only be known mystically if it can be known at all. Lacking the mystical illumination, I see no reason to suppose that a Social Democrat might not interpret the interests of this elusive being just as well as Hitler or Mussolini.

5. *The Monster as a Moral Absolute*

In Fascist theory, this group mind or organism is exempt from moral strictures. Hitler remarks:

The following principle must especially be insisted upon and carried through in practice with what I may call a devoted fanaticism: namely, that an enemy of the National Socialist State, no matter whether at home or abroad, must not know or discover any person or source in Germany that will agree with him or support him.⁶⁹

This means, in practice, a rigorous suppression of criticism. "The sovereign State," Mussolini declares, "is above everyone and can afford to be against everyone, since it represents the moral continuity of the nation in history."⁷⁰

The plain fact, however, is that there have been bad States. Hegel himself declares that history affords the spectacle of "wrecks confusedly hurled," and that "the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals" have all been sacrificed at the "slaughter-bench" of history.⁷¹ "There have been barbaric times and circumstances," he asserts, in which "the State was only a worldly rule of force, lawlessness, and passion."⁷² How then, we ask, can he extol the State as "the march of God in the world," and as the "absolute, stable, end-for-itself"?

He attempts to escape contradiction by saying that the bad State is unreal:

Actuality is always the unity of universality and particularity. . . . In so far as this unity is absent, the thing is unrealized, even though existence may be predicated of it. A bad State is one which merely exists. A sick body also exists, but it has no true reality. A hand, which is cut off, still looks like a hand and exists, though it is not real.⁷³

But if only a perfectly integrated State is "real," Hegel's account of the real State hardly applies to our present world.

We would need to determine, in any event, whether the State in question is "real" or "merely existent." This would require individual reflection and moral criticism.

A similar difficulty confronts the Fascists. Will they contend, for example, that the Soviet government in Russia represents the highest good for its citizens? Will Mussolini admit that Haile Selassie's administration in Ethiopia actually embodied the highest interests of the people? Will Franco and his Fascist allies grant the excellence of the Spanish government which was elected in February, 1936? Of course not. The Fascists have heaped abuse upon all these governments. Hence they must admit that it is impossible always to identify the highest good with the existing State organization. But who is to say when the State is bad and when it is not? Who can judge except responsible and informed individuals, or the entire body of the citizens at the ballot box? The State should be an instrument of human welfare, and if it is a mere instrument of iniquity, the citizens have no obligation to uphold it; they must use their own best judgment in deciding whether this is the fact. The State itself surely has no oracle whereby it announces its own divinity.

The need of reflection and criticism is indicated by the fact that States on occasion flatly oppose each other; even Fascist States have been known to clash with each other as well as with non-Fascist States. When the representatives of one State say "A" is right, and the representatives of another State say "A" is *not* right, the two contradictory judgments cannot both be true. The most elementary principle of logic asserts that no proposition can be both true and false. The Fascists must either cast logic to the winds, or recognize that States are fallible. If they discard logic, there is no basis upon which to argue with them, and no reason to take their "arguments" seriously. On the other hand, if they admit that the State is fallible, they must surely grant that the

State is subject to criticism. By implication, they condemn their own practice of suppressing criticism.

A great many interests, it is well to remember, are international in scope. Art, science, commerce, religion, and various other activities transcend national boundaries. Unless nationalistic States recognize the need of conciliating their opposing interests, and of limiting their sovereignty by a body of international law, the interests which cross national boundaries will fail to achieve an organized expression. The result will be international and moral anarchy. In both its international and domestic policies, the State cannot escape moral restrictions, and must not be exempted from the ethical censure of responsible individuals.

6. *State-Policy and Individual Welfare*

The racial or totalitarian State might conceivably be exempted from moral criticism if individual welfare wholly depended upon, or coincided with, the State. The Fascists contend that this is the case. Roberto Farinacci, one of the chief Fascist "intellectuals," has declared:

The State, in the Fascist view, is not an entity foreign to the individual or standing in constant opposition to him; rather it is the very fount of authority and liberty, the supreme, universal and necessary aim of his life. . . . The liberty of the individual coincides perfectly with obedience to the State, that is to say, with the realization of that ultimate good for which the individual himself lives and works and through which he becomes a participant in history and in the divine life.⁷⁴

Mussolini, in like manner, affirms that "the individual exists only in so far as he is within the State and subjected to the requirements of the State," and that "the individual in the Fascist State is not annulled but rather multiplied."⁷⁵ The Nazis also insist that the individual can achieve freedom and personal dignity only by identifying himself with the race,

the nation, and the State. "Personality," declares Rosenberg, "does not stand in an alien relationship to the masses, but is the highest expression of the national will."⁷⁶

Under ideal conditions, the Fascist contention is true. If all men freely participate in the good of the whole as embodied in laws and institutions, there can be no opposition between individual welfare and social organization. But if the State is imperfect, or the nationalistic tradition awry, the freedom and welfare of the individual do not consist in his absolute subordination to the State and to the national tradition. Let us suppose that the government's ordinances are contrary to the happiness and welfare of the citizens, and that the State is a cruel dictatorship. Freedom would surely not consist in utter submission to such a vicious tyranny.

Our suppositions, it would seem, are not so contrary to the actual situation in the Fascist countries. Let us take Italy as an example. Does the Italian State achieve the perfect coordination between individual welfare and governmental decree? Writing in *Current History*, a student of Italian conditions points out:

Fascism's record of public service, particularly in the smaller towns and in the suburbs of the cities—public service as represented not only by utilities, but by such things as hospitals, sanatoria and schools—is poorer than that of any other European country in the same political category, and is certainly poorer than that of pre-Fascist Italy.⁷⁷

Certainly one index of social welfare is the amount of destitution; and Fascist Italy has a bad record in this respect. A study of the economic reports of the League of Nations reveals that Italy is almost at the bottom of the scale in economic welfare.

This condition might be excusable if the government were bending its main efforts to abolishing poverty, but the Fascist regime is mainly bent upon military prowess. A letter

in the *Manchester Guardian*, November 12, 1937, which describes the frightful economic plight of Italy, points out that the Fascist State is doing practically nothing to relieve the suffering of the poor. When confronted by the spread of pellagra, the terrible nutritional disease that drives its victims mad, the government has no constructive program to advance. The correspondent to the *Manchester Guardian*, who appears to be well informed, remarks: "The only remedy which Mussolini's regime is applying to this horrible evil is a typically Fascist one—the newspapers have been ordered never to print the word 'pellagra.'" ⁷⁸ It is a mockery to say that the common man in Italy, or in Germany either, achieves perfect self-realization through the State.

Even if the Fascist State were a means to the citizen's self-realization, it would not be the only means. There are many important organizations to which the individual may affiliate. The church, university, trade union, professional association, learned society, athletic association, and artistic group, in a free nation spring up spontaneously to embody the diverse interests of human beings. We might just as plausibly say of any one of these, as the Fascists do of the State, that it possesses a group mind or organic nature. If there is something sacred about a collectivity, why single out the race or State for exclusive adoration? Why sacrifice or rigidly subject these other associations to the totalitarian or "racial" State?

Is it because all other interests are perfectly integrated within the national State? But this is impossible if the interests are international in scope. Hitler has banned even such a conservative and innocuous organization as the Rotary Club on the ground that it is "international." Many other organizations, even when purely local or national in scope, have been monotonously regimented, curtailed, or altogether suppressed. The "racial" State, moreover, attempts only to integrate the Aryans, and attacks the Jews and religious

groups which object to "Germanic religion." Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the Fascist State adequately embodies the richness and diversity of human interests.

Political totalitarianism, in fact, indicates an inadequate integration. The State waxes strong and dictatorial during a period of international conflict or social crisis, and becomes most like the Hegelian ideal of a superorganism or group mind during war time. When a society becomes thoroughly integrated, the coercive State recedes, and spontaneous forms of cooperation take its place. In a well-integrated society it is unnecessary to force men into an artificial unanimity. The Fascist emphasis upon the State is therefore a sign of social disintegration. It is an accompaniment of class conflict and international enmity.

The Socialist parties also advocate a strong State; but there is this great difference, they seek to use the State *to remove the causes of the conflict*. They believe that poverty should be removed, and imperialistic aggression should be checked; and that the State must be used as a means to achieve these ends. But Marx did not worship the State; he merely regarded it as a necessary evil. The ultimate goal of "Marxism" is the "withering away of the State" when a classless and international democracy has been achieved. This objective is utterly different from the goal of Fascism, which employs the State for repressive and militaristic ends.

The ideal of the unity of all human beings was not invented by modern radicals or pacifists. The great German scholar and legal theorist, Otto von Gierke, points out that the conception of a single, all-inclusive community was quite generally accepted during the Middle Ages:

. . . In all centuries of the Middle Age, Christendom, which in destiny is identical with Mankind, is set before us as a single, universal Community, founded and governed by God Himself. Mankind is one "mystical body"; it is one single and internally connected "people" or "folk"; it is an all-embracing corporation,

which constitutes that Universal Realm, spiritual and temporal, which may be called the Universal Church, or, with equal propriety, the Commonwealth of the Human Race. Therefore that it may attain its one purpose, it needs One Law and One Government.⁷⁹

Medievalism did, in considerable measure, achieve such a universalistic culture. Upon the continent of Europe which comprised most of the medieval "world," there was a universal church, the Catholic; a universal philosophy, the Scholastic; a universal law, the Roman; a universal language, the Latin; a universal art, the Gothic; a universal ethics, the Christian; and a universal code of manners, the chivalrous. Dante's dream of a universal commonwealth, which was medieval to its core, is now returning in altered form as the ideal of democracy. We have learned how destructive are rampant nationalism and individualism; and we now wish to employ our vastly augmented resources for the construction of a world-wide culture.

According to Hegelian philosophy, it should be noted, higher degrees of reality and value are achieved with more inclusive degrees of integration. If we accept this point of view, we must regard Hegel's extreme attachment to the nation-state as less satisfactory than the medieval and now reviving faith in a world-state or a world confederation of States.

The absolute nation-state is an anachronism. Already the tremendous development of communication, mobility, and exchange has doomed the old order. Travel by means of train, automobile, steamship, and airplane; communication by means of telegraph, telephone, radio, television, cinema, and press; economic activity in the form of trade, finance, credit exchanges, and the international organization of both labor and capital; and cultural activity as embodied in art, religion, science, and sport—all traverse national boundaries and indicate the need of a wider integration than purely na-

tionalistic unity permits. Under these circumstances we cannot regard the racial or nationalistic State as the final and exclusive form of human organization. We cannot think that human interests are adequately articulated within political forms that are far more constricted than the activities which they pretend to regulate and subsume. We cannot imagine that human beings achieve their maximum freedom and welfare through the sharp division of mankind into warring States. The hope of the future lies, neither in a nationalistic totalitarianism nor an outmoded individualism, but in a world confederation of social democracies.

VIII

THE IDEALISTIC MASK AND THE REAL FACE

Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods here dwelling, grant that I may grow beautiful within, and that whatsoever I possess without may be in harmony with my inner man.—PLATO¹

1. *The Fascist Theory of History*

IN THE preceding chapter, we examined a doctrine based upon idealistic premises. The Fascist theory of the race or the State as a super mind or superorganism has been formulated by such idealists as Hegel and Gentile. But the term "idealism," as employed by the Fascists, means much more than the conception of a political or racial "organism." A metaphysical creed, a theory of history, a religious faith, a criticism of art, and an agrarian movement are all united within a comprehensive *Weltanschauung* which stresses "spiritual" rather than "material" factors.

We can at least roughly distinguish between the theories of the Nazis and the Blackshirts. The latter proclaim a relatively unadulterated idealism. The physical side of life is declared to be a mere appearance dependent upon the mental. This point of view is formulated by Gentile, the most influential of the Fascist metaphysicians:

Matter has its foundation in thought by which the personality is actualized. Things are what we in our own thought counterpose to ourselves who think them. Outside of our thought they are absolutely nothing.²

In Germany, on the other hand, the extreme emphasis upon racial factors has necessitated a "double-aspect theory" rather than a pure idealism. The physical marks of race, Rosenberg declares, are the external manifestations of soul, and the soul is said to be identical with racial character

viewed introspectively. Similarly Dr. Heyse, a professor of philosophy, speaking at Göttingen University on June 10, 1938, before the Academy of the National-Socialist League of University Teachers, explained that the Nazi *Weltanschauung* is opposed to the division of existence into soul and body, internal and external, history and nature. The present regime in Germany, he declared, constitutes the sole means of "regaining the Nordic-Grecian totality," in which physical and spiritual unite as aspects of an indivisible harmony.³

Upon a less abstract plane, the German and Italian Fascists are alike in opposing "materialism." The material conditions of life and production—in the sense of physical environment, economic conditions, and technological factors—are said to be less fundamental and less valuable than art, religion, patriotism, and other "things of the spirit." We shall use the term "idealism" to designate this belief in the primacy of "spiritual" factors.

This idealistic position involves a rejection of the "materialistic interpretation of history." Mussolini himself has denounced the doctrine "according to which the history of human civilization can be explained simply through the conflict of interests among the various social groups and by the change and development in the means and instruments of production." "Fascism," he says, "believes in holiness and in heroism; that is to say, in actions influenced by no economic motive, direct or indirect." It denies that class war can be a predominant force in social transformation, and "repudiates the conception of 'economic' happiness" whereby "the sorrows and sufferings of the humblest" would be alleviated. These "materialist conceptions" Mussolini attributes to Karl Marx.⁴ He has grotesquely distorted the theories of Marx, who maintained that economic factors are the most fundamental and decisive, but by no means the only important,

historical forces. His utterances, however, do reflect the official Fascist interpretation of history.

Hitler similarly announces that economic factors are of minor significance:

By economic means nothing can be achieved. Economics are of secondary importance. World history teaches us that no people became great through economics, but perished because of it. They died when their race was destroyed. Germany, too, did not become great through economics.⁵

Rosenberg likewise maintains that "a genuine renaissance is never a question of politics alone; still less is it a question of economic recovery as some nitwits presumptuously believe; it means a personal soul experience, the perception of a highest value."⁶ Thus the Fascists, whether in Italy or in Germany, regard "spiritual" factors as the basic forces in history, and in theory subordinate material considerations to "ideal" purposes.

Fascist "idealism" is also expressed in the vague and turgid mysticism which appears occasionally in the authorized literature. James Drennan, the British Fascist, unmistakably captures the tone of much Fascist thought in the following passage, which indicates the spiritual nature of historical forces:

Civilization is the superorganism of the natural world, and as Nature has its spiritual mystery which we call a soul, so the corporate soul of material civilization now emerges in the ardent, seeking will-to-mastery of a modern manhood. Civilization is not superman, but rather super-material, and out of the stone desert of civilization, the corporate manhood which is superman breaks forth to claim and to assert full lordship over matter.⁷

Drennan's emphasis upon "will-to-mastery," rather than reason, serves to differentiate this type of idealism from that of Hegel, who is the greatest philosophical proponent of the idealistic theory of history. "The only thought which philos-

ophy brings with it to the contemplation of history," declares Hegel, "is the simple conception of *Reason*; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process."⁸ God is essentially rational, and the divine rationality is immanent in nature and history; hence to trace the principles of logic is to trace the plan of the world. Rosenberg disagrees with Hegel on this score. He quotes the philosopher's declaration that "logic is the science of God," and comments: "This word ['logic'] is a fist-thrust in the face of any true Nordic religion and any true Germanic . . . science."⁹

The voluntaristic idealism of Fichte is perhaps the earliest counterpart of the Fascist position. Will and not reason is the substance of Fichte's universe. All "nonspiritual life," he maintains, "is only an empty shadow," and the essence of spiritual life is action and moral struggle. Even "reason" becomes an expression of will and activity:

The whole end of reason is pure activity, absolutely by itself alone. . . . The will is the living principle of reason—is itself reason, when purely and simply apprehended; that reason is active by itself alone, means that pure will, merely as such, lives and rules.¹⁰

Fichte's "physical world" is a mere obstacle which the Universal Will creates for the sake of moral struggle; and all history is a record of such struggle. Man's vocation is to remain true to the cosmic Will of which he is a part; it is to feel the pulse of the moral order, which is the very substance of nature and human life. "Doing, doing is what we are here for," said this German philosopher, and "doing" in the interests of "the spirit" is what the Fascists likewise demand. I shall not undertake to trace the development of German idealism from the time of Fichte until the present; but there can be no doubt that many thinkers have handed on the torch.

The famous Italian patriot, Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-

1872), advanced ideas akin to those of Hegel and Fichte. The social and economic environment is for him only "the manifestation of the moral and intellectual condition of humanity at a given period, and above all of its faith."¹¹ His theory of history is thoroughly idealistic:

Ideas rule the world and its events. A Revolution is the passage of an idea from *theory* to *practice*. Whatever men have said, material interests never have caused, and never will cause, a Revolution. Extreme poverty, financial ruin, oppressive or unequal taxation, may provoke risings that are more or less threatening or violent, but nothing more. Revolutions have their origin in the mind, in the very root of *life*; not in the body, in the material organism. A Religion or a philosophy lies at the base of every Revolution. This is a truth that can be proved from the whole historical tradition of Humanity.¹²

Like Fichte, Mazzini stresses the will. Mussolini was quick to appreciate this phase of the Mazzinian creed. We find the following entry in Mussolini's diary written during the World War:

I have made the acquaintance of several soldiers of the Mining Engineers. One of them . . . gave me a volume of the "Writings" of Giuseppe Mazzini. . . . I have devoured his "Letter to Carlo Alberto." I read it when I was a student. There is something prophetic in this work of Mazzini. I have copied some of it in my notebook. . . .

"Great things are not accomplished by protocols, certainly not in this century. The secret of Power is in the Will." . . .

What a wonderful thing for the fighting man to take with him, these writings of Mazzini!¹³

Although the Fascists differ from Mazzini in many respects, they have unquestionably been impressed by his ethical voluntarism and his idealistic interpretation of history.

A more recent writer, who illustrates the idealistic outlook adopted by Fascism, is Alfredo Oriani, who wrote for a limited public in the first two decades of the present century.

He was a lonely aristocrat, intent upon formulating an heroic moral creed. Mussolini in 1926 sponsored a complete edition of his works and wrote a preface to his book, *The Ideal Revolt*, which had originally appeared in 1907. In this preface, Il Duce lavishly praised the author as a "precursor of Fascism," "an exalter of Italian energies," and an adversary of "the politics of materialism and positivism." Oriani's emphasis upon the moral import of history is illustrated in the following lofty and nebulous, but characteristic, passage:

The ideal affirmation, which must shape into chivalrous phalanxes without captain or standard the new aristocracy dispersed among all social groups, shall be an eternal principle, as true yesterday as today, the affirmation that history and life cannot be changed in essence but must continually be ennobled in their various forms: that life is a tragedy and history a poem; that in the one, the individual succumbs in his own presence, while in the other he sacrifices himself to the continuity of the race. . . . It is necessary to affirm that love is the motivating power of generation, and that lovers must be transmuted into parents, sacrificing themselves to the devotion for their offspring; we must affirm that all that comprises our spirit is history's legacy to the generations of the future, and that, therefore, our interest in the present is only an echo of the past and shall become in turn the voice of the future. As each form of human cooperation increases in importance, it increases also in responsibility, since superiority implies only the right to suffer on a higher plane, to think for those who do not think, to love for those who do not love, to work for those who are not able to work. The greatness of the individual is to be measured by the number of souls he can absorb and to which he can give significance; no individual has anything to say so long as he speaks about himself.¹⁴

In view of the predatory character of Fascism, someone may wonder why Il Duce praises an altruist such as Oriani. The answer, of course, is that Mussolini desires an idealistic mask for a movement which is nonidealistic in many of its features. Indeed, there is much in Oriani's work which is opposed to Fascism: especially his opposition to war, imperial-

ism, dictatorship, and overweening nationalism. Mussolini was willing to overlook many passages for the sake of the religious and moral idealism which pervades Oriani's interpretation of history and society.

Giovanni Gentile, to mention a living contributor to Fascism, synthesizes the idealistic tradition of Italy and the metaphysical doctrines of German philosophy in a creed that has been accepted as semiofficial. In particular, he has praised Mazzini as "the Ezekiel of the new Italy," who fought with "apostolic ardor" against "the utilitarian, materialistic and hence egoistic conception of life." But philosophically he is even closer to Fichte; both men adopt a form of idealism in which will and activity are stressed.

Gentile's account of the origin of Fascism is briefly as follows: The political struggle known as the Risorgimento, which established a free and united Italy, found its main inspiration in a deeply religious and idealistic conception of life, articulated in the main by Alfieri, Foscolo, Leopardi, Manzoni, and, of course, Mazzini. After 1870, when the Industrial Revolution was in full swing, the counterforce of materialism made itself felt and eventually precipitated a very grave crisis. Italy was torn between two antithetical forces: the idealism inherited from the Risorgimento and the materialism springing from the Industrial Revolution. The conflict eventually culminated in the struggle for Italian participation in the World War. The interventionists took the position that, regardless of material injuries or military unpreparedness, the nation must be plunged into the War, either on Germany's side or against her, in order that Italy, "which came into being more by accident than by the will of its citizens, might be completely united." Theirs was "a moral reason, intangible, impalpable, incapable of measurement according to any material scale." The noninterventionists, on the other hand, were motivated by purely material considerations, and therefore maintained that the

nation could profit most by remaining neutral. After the war, with the return to power of Premier Giolitti, materialism once again became the predominant force, and a new crisis was precipitated. Fascism was necessary to resolve this post-war crisis, and to "liberate Italy from the dualism by which she was lacerated and paralysed." By its fresh burst of idealism, it gave Italy a single soul, and, therefore, the conditions of life and action. According to Gentile, Fascism, in its very inception, was a spiritualistic movement.¹⁵

As a thinker of great prestige and as former Minister of Education, Gentile has done much to shape the idealistic doctrines of Fascism. The real world, he contends, is purely a spiritual process, and as such, is identical with history. There is nothing beyond the act of thought, and nothing in this act is static:

Reality is spirit; and spirit never is but is always coming to be, not something given but a free activity. That is what distinguishes it from nature, and, such being its essence, spirit, which is identical with reality, is history, or the process of self-realization.¹⁶

To understand this passage, we must realize that "nature," as distinguished from spirit, is regarded as a mere figment of the mind; and since nature is unreal, spirit alone is real. The mind therefore has no real physical or economic environment to limit or condition it. The conception of the materialistic interpretation of history is simply a vulgar error.

Gentile means by "spirit," moreover, not the separate and individual human mind, which he regards as an unreal abstraction, but the "one universal Person" to which we all belong: "the *one man* in whom all individuals are united and with whom they are all identified." He accordingly exalts the collective mind at the expense of individual freedom:

In the way of conclusion, then, it may be said that I, as a citizen, have indeed a will of my own; but that upon further inves-

tigation my will is found to coincide exactly with the will of the State, and I want anything only in so far as the State wants me to want it.¹⁷

Hence he "emphasizes to the citizen his duty rather than his right."

The "one universal Person" is unaccountably identified with the State; and the State is declared to be "a soul, a person, a potent will, conscious of its ends, and vastly superior to individuals."¹⁸ Gentile has never made clear why the universal mind should not be identified with all mankind instead of with that segment of the human race which is included within the Italian State. A philosophy that begins by insisting upon the indivisibility of all human beings ends inconsistently by rejecting internationalism and endorsing nationalistic divisions. In this respect, Gentile is following the lead of Hegel, to whom he is mainly indebted for his theory of the State.

Unquestionably the more technical phases of Gentile's "Actual Idealism" have had little influence upon practical men like Mussolini. But his broad ideas are easily grasped: his contention that history is the self-realization of the human spirit, his belief that human beings are unreal apart from the group mind, his doctrine that the State, as an "ethical" being, is the highest expression of this social mentality, and his insistence that the Fascist State draws its vitality and worth from its spiritual nature. All of these ideas have been embraced by the Fascists. In particular, the activistic nature of this philosophy has been welcomed by Fascist opportunists. Just as Gentile finds reality and value only in the immediate activity of thought from which all fixities are excluded, so Mussolini and his Blackshirts delight in the immediacy of experience and refuse to apply abiding standards to morals and politics. Each historical event contains its own immanent standard, and there is no transcendent norm to which an appeal can be made. In such a philosophy, Il Duce finds a ra-

tionalization for his amazing record of inconsistency, which Gaudens Megaro has laid bare in his biography, *Mussolini in the Making*.

To summarize, the Fascist theory is based upon an activist idealism, which relegates material and economic factors to a subsidiary status. Although it would be possible to mention other thinkers who have influenced the Fascist interpretation of history, such as Vico, Gioberti, and Spengler, we have sufficiently indicated the general nature of these influences.

Obviously there is no way of proving or disproving this idealistic interpretation of history without an extensive argument. The causal factors involved in history are extraordinarily complex, and the problem is rendered more difficult by the metaphysical issue of idealism versus materialism. Since an adequate discussion would fill a good-sized book, we can do no more than summarily discuss the problem.

A materialistic interpretation of history is demonstrably false if pressed too far. Art, science, religion, national patriotism, personal intrigues, quirks of character, and countless accidents play a part in determining events. Men often act contrary to their economic interests or without economic motives. No intelligent person would deny the existence of noneconomic values or the complexity of historical forces.

Although man does not live for bread alone, bread is necessary that he may live for other things. All activities are conditioned upon subsistence; and without economic goods men are fettered in all their pursuits. If the economic problem were solved, it would indeed be possible to devote most human energies to love and science and art and play. Mankind would then pass from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. But the economic problem is not solved; it is very acute. The most reliable statistics indicate that wealth and economic power are being concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. There is continually more investment in plant

and machinery and relatively less investment in wages; men are displaced by machines. The small employer often cannot afford to buy this machinery, and he is then eliminated by the big employer who can avail himself of the economies of large-scale production. During depressions, the rich, having greater resources, are more likely to remain solvent and to obtain the property that other people lose.

Hence the bulk of the wealth gravitates into the hands of relatively few people, and an immense army of unemployed is created. Under these circumstances, there is a constant tendency towards overproduction relative to demand, and underproduction relative to need. The empty bellies possess only empty purses; in a system that runs for profit, they cannot make the wheels of industry turn. There is a simultaneous development of the instruments of production, and a severe restriction upon the uses of this productive system for the meeting of fundamental human needs. Terrible want persists in the midst of wholesale waste. This is a profound evil that the most conservative economists must recognize, however they may attempt to explain it.

To the less conservative economists, it appears that capitalistic interests, finding the domestic market impoverished, are driven to a feverish search for new markets and fields of exploitation; and the result is intense imperialism and the constant threat of war. Men are finally goaded to desperation by poverty and mass slaughter, and a period of revolution dawns. The interests that profit from the existing order subsidize and support bloody dictatorships to curb the forces of revolutionary change. Thus the world is rapidly dividing into armed and opposing camps, and there is great danger of a general conflict.

Whatever be our interpretation—conservative or radical—of the present economic and social crisis, there is no denying its seriousness. Given this profound crisis, the economic problem is fundamental. No good purpose is served by telling

men that economics are now of secondary importance. Such statements only obscure the issue. So long as a great many people are dreadfully poor, the defenders of the prevailing economic order must stress nonmaterial factors.

It ill befits the fat and well fed, however, to tell the hungry masses that man does not live by bread alone. A speech of the rotund General Göring has been reported as follows:

"I have given up eating so much butter," said the General amid sympathetic cheers which became uproarious when he added, "and the result is that I have lost over a stone and a half. Our Leader is building up a strong nation. If we eat too much we shall get too fat. I am eating less myself and I always remember our Leader eats no butter and no meat. What he can do, we can." ¹⁹

Men are willing to undergo tremendous sacrifices for the sake of ultimate justice; but if they realize the true situation, they are unwilling to rid themselves of the luxurious habit of eating meat and butter for the sake of a tyrannical and militaristic dictatorship.

The "idealism" of the Fascists constantly tends to change into ethical materialism. When Gentile defends the blackjack and declares that "every force is a moral force," when Mussolini speaks of the glories of the machine-gun and the bombing airplane, when the Nazis revert to a tribalism which makes spiritual values depend upon the "blood," when Fascists regiment art, science, and religion in the interests of nationalistic expansion, there is reason to question the quality of their idealism.

Repeatedly in Fascist literature we stumble upon a crude naturalism which assumes that right represents only the force of the stronger. Thus Dr. Helmut Nicolai, Nazi legal authority, proclaims:

The strong has a right against the weak; he has a claim that the weak make way for him. . . . But honorable struggle decides as to strength, and Fate decides who the victor is, who the victor

must be, if the life of the better and stronger is not to be stunted. Therein lies the divine justice which in the end claims the victory for the valiant and the forceful.²⁰

A similar identification of might and right is to be found in Hitler's philosophy of conflict as embodied in *Mein Kampf*. Throughout nature, we are told, there is a ceaseless struggle for survival. The few strong and fit survive; nature itself is based upon aristocratic and warlike principles. Man also is a fighting animal: in war mankind has become great. The race is the natural fighting unit; its combative power depends upon its purity and solidarity, and its rejection of democratic principles. If the German people had realized in time the importance of achieving a herdlike unity, Germany would now be master of the earth.

Fascist "idealism" depicts "nature" as red with tooth and claw, and identifies *what is* with *what ought to be*. Instead of realizing the ideal, it seeks to idealize the real. If material things are said to be the offspring of the spirit and pervaded with divinity, there is a ready excuse for doting on blood and iron. The "idealist" who regards the spirit as the source of everything is inclined to defend those gross material evils which fetter and maim the very life of the spirit.

2. *The Fascist Theory of Religion*

The duplicity that is so characteristic of Fascism is nowhere more obvious than in the field of religion. The religious strain in Fascism is termed "Christianity," but we may doubt the propriety of the name. It is true that we may discover many sweet declarations such as that of Herr Kerrl, Reich Minister for Religion: "The essence of National Socialism is faith, its deeds are love, and National Socialist positive Christianity is love for the neighbor."²¹ But the way in which such statements are officially interpreted is made clear by Herr Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda: "To be Chris-

tian means: Love thy neighbor as thyself. My neighbor is my racial comrade. If I love him, I must hate his enemies. Who thinks German must despise the Jews." ²² There would appear to be many such restrictions in the application of brotherly love. The bombardment of civilians in Barcelona, Madrid, and Addis Ababa, the ruthless punishment inflicted in concentration camps and on Lipari Island, and the extreme persecution of racial and religious minorities do not precisely harmonize with Christian philosophy.

The Fascists, it is true, admit in their more candid moments to an outlook that is not wholly Christian or idealistic. Mussolini, for example, has baldly accepted the creed that "man is a wolf to man":

Humanity is still and always an abstraction of time and space; men are still not brothers, do not want to be and evidently can not be. Peace is hence absurd, or rather it is a pause in war. There is something that binds man to his destiny of struggling, either against his fellows or himself. The motives for the struggle may change indefinitely, they may be economic, religious, political, sentimental, but the legend of Cain and Abel seems to be the inescapable reality, while "brotherhood" is a fable which men listen to between the bivouac and the truce. . . . The Christian and socialist "men be brothers" is a mask for the eternal and immutable "*homo homini lupus*" . . . And man will continue to be a wolf among wolves for a bit of land, for a trickle of water, for a crumb of bread, for a woman's kiss, for a necessity or a caprice.²³

The underlying creed of Fascism here stands forth in all its nakedness. Mussolini boasts, not *wholly* without foundation, that the "Fascist habit" is to tell "the brutal truth," ²⁴ that is to say, the truth as the Fascists see it.

Just as obviously unchristian as the statement of Mussolini is the Nazi doctrine of racial determinism, which even the Italian Fascists have now adopted. Far from this being idealistic, it is really a highly materialistic doctrine, since it makes mind and spirit mere by-products of man's biological

constitution. When racial fanaticism is conjoined with jingoism, it must take a good deal of propaganda to convince people that any such fusion represents genuine Christianity. As Hitler's persistent conflicts with the religious forces indicate, a good many Christians are still far from convinced. Both Catholics and Protestants have repeatedly criticized the Hitler regime, and there have been many retaliations. Thousands of Catholic and Protestant clergymen have been subjected to extreme insult or imprisoned.²⁵ Some of them, it appears, have been grossly abused even to the point of death, as in the case of Dr. Weissler, a leader of the Confessional Church, who perished in a concentration camp in March, 1937.

By various coercive measures the Nazi government has obtained control of most of the churches. On June 24, 1933, Hitler appointed Herr Jaeger as "State Commissioner" for the Prussian churches. Jaeger's conception of religion is indicated by his remark, "The phenomenon of Jesus is at bottom a characteristic Nordic ebullition."²⁶ On July 23, 1933, compulsory elections were held to ratify Hitler's selection of Bishop Ludwig Müller as coordinator of the German Evangelical Church. In preparation for the election, the church members were warned that it would be dangerous not to vote for Müller and his Nazi coworkers. One leaflet stated:

He who does not vote for the "German Christian" list, is our enemy. He who is our enemy is the enemy of the State. The enemy of the State will be put on the "Black List" and find himself in a concentration camp.²⁷

Thus instructed, two-thirds of the voters cast their ballots for the Nazi candidates. The outlook of Bishop Müller is indicated by a sermon of March 14, 1937, in which he declared:

We have absurd ideas about Christ. Christ was by no means filled with love and pity, but with wild wrath against the Jews. He never thought of founding a church. A church is a foreign

body amongst the Aryan German people. . . . My aim is to promote a general popular (*völkisch*) religiosity. . . . I shall build a new German Church with the help of those 80 per cent of the German people who reject present-day Christianity.²⁸

I shall not attempt to trace the many subsequent measures which were undertaken to bring religion securely under the dominion of the Party dictatorship. Some religious leaders have fled the country, as in the case of the world-famous theologian, Karl Barth, who decided to accept a chair at Basle University, Switzerland, rather than to begin his lectures at Bonn University each day by raising his arm and saying, "Heil Hitler!"²⁹ Those who have remained in Germany, and who were not fined, imprisoned or otherwise penalized were forced to bow to the dictatorship. In April, 1938, the Government announced that Protestant ministers must take the following oath of obedience to Hitler, on pain of dismissal without pension:

I swear that I will be loyal to the Führer of the German Reich and nation, Adolf Hitler, observe the laws and fulfill my pastoral duties, so help me God.³⁰

This oath has been resisted by many pastors and has been taken by others with mental reservations; but it has been used by the authorities as a basis for dismissal and discrimination. In spite of such repression, Herr Kerrl, the Nazi Minister for Church Affairs, has solemnly declared: "The State has but a single objective and that is to ensure complete liberty of conscience."³¹

As a result of this newfangled "liberty," a so-called "positive Christianity" is being substituted in place of the traditional "negative Christianity." It goes without saying that the high priests of this positive religion are no other than the Party leaders. Dr. Paul Goebbels affirms: "In the interpretation of political expediency we hold ourselves to be the instrument of God."³² Hitler, in particular, is elevated to

the rank of a supreme religious oracle. Reichsminister Kerrl has announced: "A new authority has arisen as to what Christ and Christianity really are—Adolf Hitler." ³³ The "German Christian" Dr. Engelke has gone so far as to say: "God has manifested Himself not in Jesus Christ but in Adolf Hitler." ³⁴ The director of the Labor Front, Dr. Ley, has confessed: "I believe in no one on this earth except Adolf Hitler. I believe in a Lord God who created me and who guides us; and I believe that this Lord God has sent us Adolf Hitler." ³⁵ National Socialism is evidently a new state religion, and Hitler is its prophet and high priest. He himself is deeply impressed with his religious role. Speaking in Vienna on the eve of the plebiscite, after the *Anschluss*, he announced that he was indeed the select instrument of Almighty Providence:

I believe that this was God's will—to send a boy into the Reich, to let him become its Leader, in order to bring his home country into the Reich. (Loud cheers, and cries of "We thank our Leader.") Otherwise one must doubt Providence. There is a higher Destiny of which we all are tools. When Herr Schuschnigg broke his word I knew instantaneously that this was the call of Providence. In three days the Lord defeated them, but I was granted the great grace to lead my country back—on the very day of treason. (Cheers, and shouts of "We thank our Leader.") . . . May every German tomorrow (the day of the plebiscite) bow before the Almighty who performed a miracle.³⁶

Obviously Hitler regards himself as a vessel of absolute truth: he has been set aside by the Deity to save the German race. This conviction no doubt is the source of much of his fanaticism and ruthless energy. He is "seized and possessed" by a "higher Power"—though it is uncertain whether this Power be God or Wotan.

The fusion of religion and patriotism is basic to the Nazi religious movement. "Germania" is the supreme object of worship; even God is identified with Germany. The Reich Youth Leader, Baldur von Schirach, sums up this phase of the Nazi creed:

One cannot be a good German and at the same time deny God, but an avowal of faith in the eternal Germany is at the same time an avowal of faith in the eternal God. For us the service of Germany is the service of God. If we act as true Germans, we act according to the laws of God. Whoever serves Adolf Hitler, the Führer, serves Germany, and whoever serves Germany serves God.³⁷

"Positive Christianity" is thus identified with "Germanic Christianity," and religion, like science and art, is denied an international character. In Rosenberg, this religious nationalism drops its Christian disguise, as the following passage indicates:

The idea of honor—of national honor—to us is the beginning and the end of our thinking and action. It does not tolerate beside it any center of force of whatever kind, neither Christian love, nor Freemasonic humanitarianism, nor Roman philosophy. . . . A German religious movement which aspires to become a church of the people must declare that the ideal of love for one's neighbour has to be subordinated to the idea of national honor; no action may be approved by the German church which does not in the first place serve to guarantee the national weal.³⁸

In such statements of Rosenberg, religion reverts to intolerant tribalism. "Nordic blood," he tells us, replaces the "ancient sacraments." He is aware that historical Christianity is opposed to this exclusive racial emphasis; the Old Testament, he insists, is unacceptable to the Nazis, and the Jewish and Oriental "rubbish" of the New Testament must also be eliminated. He frequently cites, it is true, the medieval Christian mystic, Eckhart, but he does not understand this German master. Eckhart's mysticism is converted into "the religion of the blood," a mere tribal creed.

A number of new sects have sprung up to embody the Nazi emphasis upon race and nation. One of these is the "German National Church" founded by the philosopher, Ernst Bergmann of Leipzig. Bergmann contends that a Nazi can be a Christian only "figuratively speaking." "The Ger-

man," he declares, "has his own religion . . . expressing the peculiarity and integrity of our race." An "other-worldly God" is rejected as essentially Semitic. Man is not a duality; there is only the concrete unity of body-soul, which excludes the possibility of a conflict between spirit and flesh. The German religion clings to an "heroic ethics" based on "three ancient German virtues: bravery, chivalry and fidelity, all of which spring from honor."³⁹ On June 14, 1938, Bergmann's "National Church" issued a manifesto which declared "that Adolf Hitler's book, *Mein Kampf*, expresses the purest ethics, and that the German people must continually find its inspiration in this book. The German National Church removes from its altars the Cross, the Bible and various religious images, and places in their stead the book of the Führer and the sword."⁴⁰ Thus religious ideas are secularized, God is nationalized, and Christianity is dismissed as, "in our sense, no longer a religion."⁴¹

Quite as unchristian is the neo-Aryan cult sponsored by the late General Ludendorff and his wife. To Frau Ludendorff, Christ was a "Jew and thus the source of every ill." Christianity must therefore be replaced by the worship of "German blood" and the "holy German earth." This sect, founded by an advocate of "total warfare," worships "blood and soil" with strange, neopagan rites. Although the Ludendorff sect itself is declining, the combined influence of movements of this type—the "German Christians," the "German Faith Movement," etc.—is very considerable.

Hitler has for the most part tolerated but not endorsed such religious tendencies. His own position is somewhat ambiguous. He has stated that the Nazi government needs the support of all Christians, and that the religious liberties of Protestants and Catholics will not be touched. Those priests and clergymen who "meddle" in politics and denounce National Socialism as antichristian are said to be mere perverters of Christianity. Religious organizations are to be left alone

so long as they do not meddle, but they must be brought under absolute control if they offer resistance to Nazi practices. Although nominally a Christian, Hitler has waged a continuous war against genuine Christians who could not otherwise be silenced.

There are many indications that Hitler's real convictions are not Christian. In a speech made at the 1938 Nazi party rally at Nürnberg, as reported in the *Manchester Guardian* of November 11, 1938, Herr Rosenberg declared:

In the answer to questions which I am going to give I am in full agreement with the Führer's ideas. . . . I do not hesitate to say, and I believe that I can speak in the Führer's name as well, that the Catholic Church and the Protestant Confessional Church as it is today will have to disappear from the life of our nation. . . . The splinters of Catholic youth movements which are bustling about will be absorbed in the course of time. The Hitler Youth is like a sponge which sucks everything without resistance. And, further, the curriculum of all categories in our schools has already been so far re-formed in an anti-Christian and anti-Jewish spirit that the generation which is growing up will be protected from the black swindle.

These remarks probably reflect the real opinions of Hitler more accurately than his "Christian" utterances. At least, the offensive against Christianity is continuing on a great scale. On February 10, 1939, the *Manchester Guardian* reported:

Following on the blows dealt at the Church youth organizations, both Protestant and Catholic, and to the Catholic Confessional schools, one of the last vestiges of active Catholic work outside church walls is to be brought to an end shortly by a Government order for the winding up of the Catholic Young Men's Association.

The article points out that signs are not lacking, even in Hitler's Reichstag speech of January 30, 1939, that the religious persecution will become even more intense.

The Italian Fascists are less heterodox than the Nazis. The

predominantly Catholic sentiment of the population and the political value of conciliating the Vatican have kept them on the beaten trails; yet the antichristian character of Italian Fascism is evident to all except the most obtuse. Mussolini, as Gaudens Megaro has shown in his biography, was for many years a "defamer of God and religion," and there is no evidence that he is now more than nominally a Catholic. As late as May, 1929, the conflict with Vatican policy was so intense that Pope Pius XI issued a bitter attack in which he referred to Mussolini as the devil.⁴²

Il Duce and the Pope, however, patched up a truce, supposedly to their mutual advantage. When the Ethiopian War broke out, most of the world condemned Mussolini; but the Pope was silent, and even permitted bishops publicly to support Italian arms.⁴³ He even openly blessed the revolt of Franco, who has unmistakably declared his Fascist inclination and has allied himself with Nazis, Blackshirts, and Moors. This aid to the Fascist cause is hardly consistent with the late Pope's repeated attacks upon Nazi racial and religious doctrines and upon Italian expressions of racialism and nationalism. He evidently fell victim to the assiduously fostered myth that the revolt of Franco was necessary to save the Catholic Church from destruction.⁴⁴ He either did not know, or he failed to bear in mind, that the Nazis were in large measure responsible for the outbreak and prosecution of the war.

Documentary proof of this fact is available. On the third day of the rebellion, the Loyalist militia in Barcelona carried out a thorough search of Nazi headquarters and subsidiary organizations. The captured documents reveal an amazing plot. By the year 1935, as many as fifty Spanish periodicals, including some of the largest newspapers in Spain, were secretly acting as disseminating agents of the Nazi propaganda machine. The methods of bribery, coercion, and intrigue which brought these news organs under control were ap-

plied likewise to the cinema, the radio, and other propaganda agencies. The Nazi agents actively aided the forces behind the revolt, and even delivered German military supplies to the future rebels. The revolt was not only effectively supported, but was actively fomented, by the Nazis.⁴⁵ Pope Pius XI and the Catholic hierarchy, it now becomes clear, simultaneously denounced Hitlerism and aided Hitler's intrigues by supporting Franco. They thereby also assisted Mussolini, who has been very deeply involved in the Spanish War.

Il Duce, on the other hand, has supported the Church only when he has found it convenient. When Catholicism conflicts with Fascist political aims, it is Catholicism that must be sacrificed. In May, 1938, when the Pope protested against the hoisting of the Swastika ("another cross that is not the cross of God") on the occasion of Hitler's visit to Italy, he was scolded by Mussolini's newspaper, the *Popolo d'Italia*:

If it is necessary to speak clearly, we would like to say to the Father of all of us Catholics . . . that today it is very dangerous to speak of and wave the cross of Christ as if it were a weapon and then to find oneself in the menacing and smirking company of Masonic and Bolshevist usurers without any longer having in one's hands even the whip which scourged them from the Temple of God.⁴⁶

Partiality towards the Nazis is again revealed in the secret government instructions to the Italian press in the spring of 1937:

April 28: Go carefully about the conflict between the Vatican and Germany and stay neutral. In any case, incline to the side of Germany but without even reproducing news about the trials of priests accused of immorality with which the press is full.⁴⁷

When the Church is subject to virulent attack in Germany, Italian Fascism sides with the Nazis and against the Vatican.

The late Pope himself clearly indicated the unchristian

character of Fascism. A Vatican document lists the heresies of National Socialism as follows:

1. The human races are, in their natural and unalterable condition, so widely differing from each other, that the lowest is as far removed from the highest as it is from the most highly developed animal.

2. The strength of race and the purity of blood must be protected and fostered by every means. Whatever serves this end is good and permissible.

3. The chief source and origin of all human, spiritual and moral qualities is the blood in which are contained the characteristics of the race.

4. The chief objective of education should be to develop racial characteristics and to fill the soul with a burning love for its own race, as the highest good.

5. Religion also is subordinate to race, and must be adapted to it.

6. The origin and highest standard of every system of justice is the racial instinct.

7. Only the Cosmos exists, the living universe. All things, including mankind, are but varying and progressively simplifying aspects of the living Whole.

8. The individual lives only through and for the State. Whatever rights he may exercise are merely conceded to him by the State.⁴⁸

It is to be noted that the eighth item in the above quotation applies even more clearly to Fascist Italy than to Nazi Germany. As stated, this theory of political totalitarianism was first practiced in Italy, and has nominally been rejected by the National Socialists, to be adopted by them under the disguise of the "*Totales Volk*" ("Total People"), and transformed into an even more drastic totalitarian creed. The seventh item also applies to certain Italian Fascist pronouncements, as, for example, to the philosophy of Gentile. Even the other six items apply increasingly to Mussolini's regime: in July, 1938, for example, the Italian Fascists endorsed an extreme anti-Semitic and racial creed, similar in essentials to

the Nazi ideology. The Pope vigorously denounced this "disgraceful imitation" of Germany, and declared: "To be Catholic means to be universal—not racial, not nationalistic, not separatistic."⁴⁹ Mussolini and his disciples replied to the Pope's criticism with words and acts of defiance.

Italian and German Fascism are becoming more and more indistinguishable, and Franco is playing the same game under the direction of the Fascist dictators. There are, of course, differences: German Fascism is speculative and mystical; Italian Fascism is pragmatic and cynical; Spanish Fascism is bigoted and sanctimonious. But they are allied, and by different means they pursue the same ruthless ends.⁵⁰ No Pope can be true to his Catholic principles unless he takes an unequivocal stand against *all* Fascist movements—German, Italian, Spanish, and every other. A new Pope, Pius XII, has now assumed office; and it is surely his Christian duty to be more unequivocal in opposition to Fascism than was his predecessor. If this is his stand, he will receive the enthusiastic support of the vast majority of Catholics.

Some of the most distinguished of Catholics advocate such a comprehensive anti-Fascist policy. Especially noteworthy is the position of Jacques Maritain, perhaps the greatest living Catholic philosopher, as stated in his preface to Alfred Mendizabal's remarkable book, *The Martyrdom of Spain*. With true Catholic piety and great intellectual acumen, Maritain argues that Franco's attack upon the legal Spanish government, which he thinks has been far from guiltless, cannot possibly be regarded as a holy war. Even if all of Franco's charges against the Republic are true, Maritain contends, the insurrection would still be unjustified, since the revolt deliberately undertaken by the Rebels was fated "to bring about in a few months of fratricidal war more ruin, more abominations and loss of human life than years of civic strife under the worst of conditions."⁵¹ Like other great Catholics—such as Cardinal Mundelein in the United States, Cardinal

Verdier in France, Cardinal Faulhaber in Germany, and Canon Rocaful in Spain—Maritain, although not a radical, is unwilling for Catholicism to become an ally of reaction.

The progressive Church leaders who regard Fascism as antichristian are obviously right. Its "philosophy" derives from such thinkers as Machiavelli, the advocate of ruthlessness; Nietzsche, the proponent of the will to power; Chamberlain, the spokesman of armed imperialism; Sorel, the theorist of violence; Pareto, the exponent of force and deceit; and Gobineau, the prophet of race prejudice. Its heroes are romantic militarists like D'Annunzio; Prussian drill masters like Von Moltke; aggressive despots like the Roman Caesars; savage gods like the pantheon of Valhalla. Its exaggerated nationalism is a perpetual danger to world peace. It rejects the ideals of sharing and of universal brotherhood which are basic to Christian ethics. Many thousands have already suffered violent deaths because of its aggressiveness. If Christ were alive today, he would surely side with the hungry masses and not with the warmakers. The Christian churches, we daresay, will only survive if they choose likewise.

3. *The Fascist Theory of Art*

Fascist "idealism" is manifested also in the sphere of art. The basic ideas embodied in the Fascist approach to art seem to be two: first, art is an "ideal" concern, which stands in contrast to materialistic interests; and second, art should be subjected to a patriotic and moral purging.

Art, it is contended, is essentially a spiritual, as opposed to an economic or material, activity. This point of view is illustrated in the esthetic theories of the two principal Italian philosophers, Croce and Gentile. Although Croce is opposed to Fascism, his idealistic interpretation of art has unquestionably influenced Fascist esthetics. Art, he maintains, is "intuition": the mere inward synthesis of images, emotions

and desires. The artist's "feelings" are formulated in *images*. Expression in physical terms is not artistic expression; it is a practical activity, and not, strictly speaking, art at all. Even from the contemplator's standpoint, the physical objects—*e.g.*, the statue, the building, the written poem, the music as sound—are not to be confused with art. They are simply "memoranda," physical stimulants for imaginative activity upon the part of the beholder. By separating art from the sphere of action, by denying its connection with craft and the immediate sensible world, by emphasizing its unique and incommunicable elements at the expense of its communicable and broadly human elements, Croce makes art, in effect, esoteric and subjective. His recognition that it is a primitive and universal function scarcely compensates for this subjective emphasis.

Gentile was originally a student and disciple of Croce. Later he broke away from his master and became the most distinguished of Fascist philosophers. His theory of art, nevertheless, retains Croce's emphasis upon subjectivity and feeling. The following passage represents his opinions during the period when Fascism was in process of crystallization:

Art is the self-realization of the spirit as subject. Man becomes enfolded in his subjectivity, and hears but the voice of love or other inward summons. Living without communication with the world, he refrains from affirming and denying what exists and what does not exist. He simply spreads out over his own abstract interior world, and dreams; and as he dreams, he escapes from the outer bustle into the seclusion of his enchanted realm, which is true in itself until he issues from it and discovers it to be a figment of his phantasy. This man is the artist, who, we might say, neither cognises nor acts, but sings.⁵²

In his later works, Gentile still clings to a "spiritual" interpretation of art. The artist expresses his feeling infused into images and thoughts. Art is "pure subjectivity." This theory

is developed within the context of philosophical idealism, which denies ultimate reality to the physical order.

Antonio Maraini, the secretary general of the Fascist Syndicate of Artists, agrees with Gentile that art is a spiritual activity. He has pointed out that an interest in art is a necessary consequence of the new idealism:

Fascism being the outcome of a revolution profoundly ethical in character, and filled with ideals which stress the value of the spirit above material gains, could not disinterest itself from artistic problems, whether from the point of view of the quality of the work produced or from that of the good of the artist.⁵³

Hitler also believes that "the value of the spirit" is to be stressed "above material gains." In a lecture on art and culture, at the Nürnberg Party Congress, September 7, 1937, he pointed out that national wealth consists above all in artistic treasures:

The artist's achievements are to be celebrated . . . as the highest accomplishments of a nation. The material wealth produced by the individual nations is absolutely insignificant as compared with the values of true cultural achievements. If a magic power removed today everything from our country which the "rabbit horizon" of the ordinary citizen of the world characterises as worthless art or art by means of which one cannot earn one's bread, our towns would then suddenly collapse. Cathedrals, minsters, the magnificent structures of our court- and civic-buildings, museums and theatres would disappear just as would the last street light or the walls of our houses, the glass of our windows and the pictures on our walls: in one word, our rich and beautiful world would be—a void!

Being a spiritual affair, art does not spring from "the ordinary citizens of the world," but from an artistic élite:

A true epoch-making artistic accomplishment will, therefore, only be the work of an isolated, gifted man, a prophet far in advance of his contemporaries, it can never be the result of an ordinary, average collective effort.

Once we grasp the fact that art is the work of the "creative individual," we will be able to "see how little artistic capacity has to do with the actual given circumstances of man and how expressive a gift it is for a few gifted nations and their especially blessed individuals." The basis of the artistic life of the nation, Hitler continues, is to be found in "a real community spirit," rather than in "the ceaseless urge towards economic interests, profit or dividends." Great works of art will arise to celebrate "the great community of the nation," which towers above economic interests. "The State shall not be a power without culture, nor a force without beauty. For even the defense of a nation is only then morally justified when it is the shield and sword of a higher mission." ⁵⁴

Although Hitler condemns the worldly outlook of the ordinary man, his idea of art is not far removed from the popular concept. When the word art is mentioned, the average person thinks of a picture, or at most, of the fine arts, such as sculpture, painting, and music. He is apt to look upon the artist as an unworldly chap, and to contrast him with the worker or the business man. He would probably agree with the Fascists that art represents the spiritual rather than the material interests of man.

This view of art is based partly upon a misunderstanding. Art is spiritual, if you please, but only because it unites body and spirit. In so doing, it reconciles the fundamental aspects of man's nature—the spontaneous and the orderly, the sensuous and the rational. Hence it is needed to restore the serenity and wholeness of man's nature. In so far as it achieves this function, it is not only the foundation, but the culmination, of all culture. It belongs with first and last things. The contemporary crisis of the arts is not to be resolved by placing the artist upon an idealistic pedestal. The basic need is a closer integration of art and life.

No doubt the Fascists would maintain that they are achiev-

ing this closer integration. Hitler, for example, indicates in the above quotations that art is basic to the national wealth; and he can point to a gigantic building program which is bringing a Roman splendor to the cities of Germany. But as Thomas Mann declares:

The impulse of this regime to glorify itself in luxurious and enormous public buildings that are just as morbidly ambitious as they are artistically wretched is an obsession of a decidedly abnormal kind. It has something maniacal about it and calls to mind that a building mania is clinically a well-known symptom.⁵⁵

Spengler also points out that the tendency to erect monstrous structures is characteristic of a dying civilization. Another typical form of Nazi art, which is perhaps more integral to the new life of Germany, is the group ritual. The Storm Troopers, for example, have a "dawn ceremony" entitled "Men, Fighters, Soldiers." The participants are a band of music, a male speaking choir, and three principal speakers, namely, the Believer, the Doubter, and the Caller. The Doubter recounts the defeats in German history, whereupon he is inevitably silenced, for the time being, with the date of some victory. Speeches and music alternate in a glorification of the German past. The Hitler Youth and other organizations have similar rituals: "cantatas," "festivals," "choral poems," and "consecration plays." Special ceremonies are being developed for christenings, marriages, funerals, and so on. It is too soon to estimate the value of this characteristically Nazi art form, but it is probable that such ritualism has no permanent value. In general, the arts have suffered very seriously under Fascism, especially in Germany.⁵⁶

The basic difficulty is not that Hitler has advanced a false theory of art: it is rather that there is a hopeless contradiction between valid esthetic objectives and the vulgar objectives of the Fascist regimes. Fascism, as we have abundantly

indicated in the present book, is a decadent form of society: there cannot be a fruitful bond of sympathy between genuinely healthy artists and the decadent overlords of the totalitarian States. Not being able to command the genuine artists, the dictators must rely upon ostentatious ceremonialism and building programs to compensate for their real artistic poverty. At the same time, they rationalize their failure *genuinely* to integrate art and life by announcing that art is exclusively spiritual and that it is far removed from the "rabbit horizon" of the ordinary man.

In opposition to Hitler and the Fascist estheticians, we venture to say that art should be part of the daily experience of man: the expression of joy in labor, the sign of a happy life. It should be integrated with economics, technology, and the forces of social reconstruction in preparing a new life: the only really good life possible to the Western world. The artistic phase must enter continually into engineering, industry, and city planning. Artists must join in planning the distribution of buildings in our cities, the appearance of the buildings inside and out, the furniture and the utensils used therein, and all the details of equipment, such as door-knobs and light-fixtures. A revival of creation, in the form of various amateur pursuits, will be possible when a sound economic order brings to the people leisure and opportunity. There must also be an educational system adequate to evoke the esthetic capacities of the people.

What I say, of course, is not new—it is said with abundant amplification and concrete specification in Lewis Mumford's *Technics and Civilization* and *The Culture of Cities*. Mumford envisages a new decentralization, cleanliness, order, and beauty, made possible by modern technics and machinery. He is quite aware that machine civilization has tended to cut out the romantic overtones of life; to produce people who are narrowly efficient. But he also shows in de-

tail that we have the technical means to a great new life: at last setting free the spirit of man. He discovers a new imaginative world in modern materials and technics, in glass, concrete, steel, electricity, rapid transit, community planning. He contends that this esthetic revolution depends upon a fundamental social reorganization, instituting a democratic and planned economy.

It is important to remember that there is a tradition, embodied in the works of men like Ruskin, Morris, Wright, Gropius, and Mumford, which insists upon the democratic, functional, and collective nature of art. If we accept this tradition, we must reject Fascist esthetics as representing a false, one-sided "idealism." We can still agree with Croce that art is essentially imaginative, but we must insist that imagination only completes itself through embodiment in a concrete, external object. We can also agree with Gentile that the artist "dreams" and through his dreams achieves "self-realization"; but we should recognize that the greatest artists connect their dreams with the world around them. The function of art is not to isolate the artist or his public from life; it is to organize experience more meaningfully, more intensely, more coherently, more vividly, than ordinary life permits. Art yields a heightened, articulated sensuous experience, in which universal human values shine forth with a peculiar luster. The Fascists, because they deny and destroy these universal values, are undermining the very basis of art.

Their esthetic "idealism" is false even when judged from the standpoint of its internal consistency. Hitler speaks of art as exclusively a "spiritual" activity; yet he proposes that its subject matter be determined by the physical marks of race. He and Mussolini praise it as a great end in itself; yet they degrade it to the status of a mere tool, an instrument of propaganda, a means to a political end. Great art can have

a political content, but only if it is sincere, unforced, and responsive to the creative forces in society. The artist cannot profitably serve the forces of social decay.

In the following passage, Hitler indicates that art must be rigidly subordinated to Nazi racial and nationalistic policies:

Simultaneously with this political purification of our public life, the Government of the Reich will undertake a thorough moral purging of the body corporate of the nation. The entire educational system, the theatre, the cinema, literature, the press and the wireless—all those will be used as means to this end and valued accordingly. They must all serve for the maintenance of the eternal values present in the essence of our nationality. Art will always remain the expression and the reflection of the longings and the realities of an era. The neutral international attitude of aloofness is rapidly disappearing. Heroism is coming forward ardently and will in the future shape and lead political destiny. It is the task of art to be the expression of this determining spirit of the age. Blood and race will once more become the source of artistic intuition.⁵⁷

So "a drastic purge" of art was undertaken, and eventually Hitler was able to boast:

I am master of German art, and henceforth I, personally, shall supervise all art development in Germany, to assure us that German art of the future will appeal to the better instincts of the people.⁵⁸

The man who thus became the dictator of German art is himself a very inferior artist. Propaganda Minister Goebbels, no artist at all, has been his doughty lieutenant in uprooting "the experimental mania of elements alien to our people and race,"⁵⁹ and has announced that "the principle of authoritative leadership will define the range within which the artist is to move."⁶⁰ To prevent any unauthorized ideas from arising in the esthetic sphere, Goebbels decreed on November 27, 1936, that critics in all fields of art must

cease to praise or blame, and must content themselves with mere description.

As a result of such restrictions, art becomes subordinated to "the religion of the blood," and the Nazis announce the need of a "racial esthetics," just as they have also announced the need of a "racial science" and a "racial morality." Rosenberg declares:

Almost all of the philosophers who have written about "esthetic form" and about values in art, have overlooked the fact of a racial ideal of beauty. . . . It is self-evident, however, that if one should speak at all about the character and effect of art, the purely physical representation of a Greek, for example, must have a different effect upon us than, let us say, the picture of a Chinese emperor. Each line in China has a different function from the corresponding line in Greece, a line which can neither be explained nor "esthetically" appreciated without knowledge of the formative, racially-conditioned will. Furthermore, any work of art has a soul content. Aside from its formal treatment, even this content can be understood only on the basis of different racial souls.⁶¹

In practice, this means, for example, that Heinrich Heine's "Jewish" poems are consigned to the flames and that performances of Mendelssohn's "Jewish" music are prohibited. It means, in general, an intense and intolerant nationalism in art. Many artists are exiled, many books are burned, many paintings are removed from galleries, many works of music are banned.

The purgation extends not only to the productions of Jewish and Socialistic artists, but even to works which are unconventional from a purely esthetic standpoint. Such an "Aryan" composer as Paul Hindemith is banished because his music is of an experimental nature. Similar attacks upon experimental painting, sculpture, architecture, and literature have occurred. The campaign against unconventional art has been intensified since Hitler, in a speech on July 18, 1937, proclaimed the end of modern art. Real art, he de-

clared, was eternal, and hence could not be modern; so-called modern art had been invented by the Jews for the purpose of exploiting stupid people. The fight against the "Moderns" was to be unrelenting, and so it has been.⁶²

No one will disagree with Hitler's contention that the twentieth century has witnessed an artistic revolt of mixed value. This insurgency is a sure indication of disorientation and transvaluation: the shock of disaster and the threat of dire catastrophe have profoundly stirred the imagination of mankind. As a result, the work of many artists is overtense and undisciplined: "emotion" can no longer be "recollected in tranquillity." Such creation, however, is a necessary phase of transition, and is far better than an escapist art orientated only towards the past. In defending experimental art, I am not thinking primarily of the more extreme products of our age: "music" that is sound and fury, "painting" that is an explosion of "subconscious" feelings, "literature" without sense or syntax. The "Futurism" of Marinetti and his colleagues, perhaps the most hysterical movement of all, was an integral part of the early development of Italian Fascism. Some of these works of art we could spare; though politicians are not trustworthy censors even of these more extreme creations.

The safest plan is to leave the artists free to do as they choose. They tend to provide an intuitive rectification for the evils of society. Their function is to explore new values; they withdraw from blind alleys and seek fresh avenues of expression. If sometimes they lose their way, they more often find new outlets for the hemmed-in forces of life. Censorship makes them cease this exploration, and imposes upon them the forms of paralysis which seize decadent institutions. The remedy for artistic irresponsibility and disorganization is not Fascist repression.

Today it appears that art, outside of the Fascist countries, has entered a more constructive phase. Artists are dedicating

themselves to necessary tasks. The best of them are learning to substitute, in place of a noisy exhibitionism, the quiet gestures of inevitability. They are beginning to realize that sound esthetic ideals cannot be adequately realized within a decadent social order; the best interests of art, they perceive, are identical with the best interests of man. Most men of artistic genius, therefore, sympathize with the attitude of Picasso, who announced his opposition to Spanish Fascism in these words:

My whole life as an artist has been nothing more than a continuous struggle against Reaction and the death of art. How could anybody think for a moment that I could be in agreement with Reaction and death, against the people, against freedom? ⁶³

This brand of idealism is very different from the Fascist.

4. *The Fascist Praise of Rural Life*

The "idealistic" emphasis of Fascism is also apparent in a preference for the countryside as opposed to the city. Fascist literature is full of panegyrics to the spiritual character of rural life. The metropolis, in contrast, is represented as the den of materialism. James Drennan, the British Fascist, contrasts the healthy spiritual traditions of the country with the diseased condition of the city:

The emphasis of both Fascists and Nazis is on the country, the peasant family, on manhood and true womanliness—on all the old values which have become subjects for the epileptic giggling and the idiot witticisms of the decadent intellectuals of the Megapolis.⁶⁴

Typical of the Fascist "emphasis" is the statement of Mussolini:

The Government looks on the peasants, in war and in peace, as the fundamental forces on which the country relies for its suc-

cess. . . . As between the city and the village, I am for the village. . . . The time for a prevalently urban policy has passed. . . . I have willed that agriculture take first place in the Italian economy.⁶⁵

Similar are the words of Hitler, spoken soon after he assumed office: "If this regime can carry through the objectives which I have laid before you, then the peasantry will become the supporting foundation for a new Kingdom of Blood and Soil."⁶⁶

With this aim in mind, Hitler appointed Walther Darré, an ardent ruralist, as Minister of Agriculture. Darré had already become the official theorist of this phase of the Nazi movement. In his books and speeches, he has depicted the peasant as the custodian of ethics, the conserver of the good old traditions, the keeper of morality and religion. He contrasts the sordid materialism of a money-economy with the soaring idealism of a land-economy. Like Spengler, he thinks of the soil as the source of poetry and religion, and of the city as the breeding ground of scepticism and greed.

He also contrasts the "peasant" as a type with the "nomad," the former being "creative," and the latter "destructive." The peasant is self-reliant and plans for the future, the nomad is fatalistic, with "no care for the morrow." In contrast to the peasants, the nomads are parasitic and destructive: "How well the Arabs," for example, "know how to destroy can best be seen in the Sudanese proverb, that even the grass must wither where the Arabs plant their feet."⁶⁷ Altogether different are the Nordics, who are essentially agricultural settlers: "Wherever in the history of mankind the Nordic race appears, it is always creative, it never destroys culture."⁶⁸

The early Nordics were not animated by a nomadic spirit, but by a desire to conquer and settle in a new ample abode. Their "acknowledged love of the sword" was the result of their attachment to the soil. Similarly, the militaristic tend-

encies of the Nordics in more recent times spring from their desire to gain new, or to defend old, soil. Even their space consciousness, as reflected in various forms of art, is the result of living in the open. The Nordic race alone, we are told, is the real creator of artistic three-dimensional representation, and "the drying up of Nordic blood in art can best be seen when mastery over space and its relation to the object is diminished."⁶⁹ Again, the philosophical bent of this race is traceable to its rural predilections:

A true peasantry . . . has a philosophical attitude, and by nature a true peasant is a philosopher. The most essential characteristic of a philosophy which rests upon an agricultural life consists in its preoccupation with the nature of things, *i.e.* with the laws and organic relationships of this world. An agricultural philosophy always is a philosophy of cognition which touches more than the surface of things. Herein lies the key to the fact that the Nordic race alone is responsible for the progress of mankind in the true philosophy of cognition.⁷⁰

In contrast to the rural Nordics stand the urban and nomadic Jews. The utter divergence between these two races is indicated by their different attitudes toward the pig. Whereas the Jews loathe everything connected with pigs, the Nordics hold the pig in special esteem. They see in this domestic animal the living symbol of their settled agricultural existence. Darré has written at length upon the importance of the pig in the life of the German people. His main theme, of course, is the supreme virtue of "blood and soil," of which the pig is but a lowly symbol.

Ruralism is also characteristic of Fascism outside of Germany. (For example, the Norwegian novelist, Knut Hamsun, who reacts against urban life in favor of agrarian primitivism, has become an ardent Fascist; and the "Southern Agrarians" in the United States occasionally display Fascist tendencies.) This preference for rural life is no accident: it is related to the contrast in economic outlook between city

and country. The workers congregate in the large cities and there learn the methods of mass struggle and the ideals of revolutionary Socialism. The agricultural population, on the other hand, is usually conservative or even reactionary. The peasants of the Vendee combated the French Revolution, the kulaks of Russia resisted the Soviet regime, and the landlords and peasants of Spain provided Franco with his main native support. Hitler has unmistakably declared that he favors the agricultural areas because of their opposition to radicalism:

But for the counterpoise of the German agricultural class, the communistic madness would already have overrun Germany, and thus finally ruined German business. What the whole of business . . . owes to the sound commonsense of the German agriculturists cannot be repaid by any sacrifice of a business nature. We must, therefore, devote our greatest solicitude in the future to pursuing the back-to-the-land policy in Germany.⁷¹

Similarly, the leading agricultural economist of Italian Fascism, Arrigo Serpieri, "values the stable relationships between the worker and the land that he cultivates":

Thus we can have in the country, not nomadic casual laborers, forever uncertain of the next day, forever agitated in the search of a higher wage rendered illusory by uncertain employment, but genuine peasants attached to the soil, loving the soil, who do not ask the impossible, who know how to content themselves, certain in any case of the necessities of life.⁷²

Here is at least one reason why the Fascists like rural attitudes: the peasants are more manageable than the industrial workers; they are less apt to be inflamed with revolutionary ardor.

The many Fascist tributes to the peasants do not mean they are to be allowed a free hand in determining agricultural policy. Darré makes very clear that they must occupy a subordinate status, and that decisions should rest with a landed élite. An Italian authority likewise maintains:

The landowners have not only the right, but also the Fascist duty, of remaining in their superior positions as leaders. It is their duty to protect their hierarchical positions against all challengers. . . . And they must be *intransigent* in matters of discipline, respect, obedience, esteem.⁷³

The Spanish Fascists, we should not forget, came to the rescue of the great landlords when the Popular Front Government began the redivision of the land in the interests of the poverty-stricken peasants.

At the same time that the Fascists condemn the city for its "mammonism" they defend the economic system which has bred this evil. Even their rural policies, moreover, are not especially successful. Professor Stephen H. Roberts, who seems not to exaggerate, speaks of "the agricultural fiasco" under Hitler's rule; and the flight of peasants from the German countryside to industrial areas has persisted on a great scale. Professor Carl T. Schmidt, who has made a searching study of Mussolini's rural policy, concludes that Italian Fascism has not alleviated the dreadful poverty of the Italian peasants.⁷⁴ The novels of Ignazio Silone, *Fontammarra* and *Bread and Wine*, unforgettably portray the extreme suffering of the peasants under Il Duce's rule.

A reasonable rural policy, in contrast to Fascist agrarianism, would mean the planned application of hydroelectric power, biochemistry, genetics, and technology to the production of agricultural abundance under a system of democratic sharing. This should be supplemented by "a wider diffusion of the instruments and processes of a high human culture, and . . . the infusion into the city of the life-sustaining environment and life-directed interests of the countryside."⁷⁵ The direction of advance has already been outlined by Sir Ebenezer Howard, Patrick Geddes, and Lewis Mumford. There is much sound advice for the reconstruction of rural and urban life in Mumford's book, *The Culture of Cities*. The entire program as he outlines it is non-Fascist in charac-

ter, and his more recent book, *Men Must Act*, is a vigorous demand for uncompromising resistance to Fascism.

I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing fine about Fascist idealism. No doubt many disillusioned and unhappy individuals have found in this movement a source of hope and enthusiasm. There has been a genuine resurgence of national spirit, especially in Germany. Men have been willing to sacrifice many things for what seemed to them the glory of the nation. I do not think that the gains are such as to compensate for the dangers and the losses; but it would be niggardly to deny that the Fascists have excited a great deal of idealistic ardor. If this were not so, Fascism would not be so great a menace. A creed that is utterly false is merely silly, and it cannot take possession of millions of minds.

The real problem is to enlist such human idealism, purged of its elements of hate and superstition, in a sound and constructive program. We must consider two questions. After all the evils and all the heartbreak described in the present book, is there any legitimate ground for hope? If we decide that our situation is by no means hopeless, there is a second question that we must ponder. What is the reasonable program for the salvaging of human values? The remainder of the book will be devoted mainly to answering these two questions.

IX

THE PROSPECTS OF WESTERN CULTURE

Man is in the making; but henceforth he must make himself. To that point Nature has led him, out of the primeval slime. She has given him limbs, she has given him brain, she has given him the rudiment of a soul. Now it is for him to make or mar that splendid torso. Let him look no more to her for aid; for it is her will to create one who has the power to create himself. If he fail, she fails; back goes the metal to the pot; and the great process begins anew. If he succeeds, he succeeds alone. His fate is in his own hands.—G. LOWES DICKINSON¹

1. *Spengler's Relation to Fascism*

NO ONE who has considered the evidence in the preceding chapters can doubt that we are living in a mad age. The shock of crisis has torn primordial impulses loose from their rational moorings: there has been a startling increase in superstition, jingoism, Jew-baiting, violence, and warfare. A great many people are terribly poor, yet the nations are engaged in a wild orgy of military expenditure. Our delicately interdependent civilization may not be able to endure the very unequal rate of advancement between morals and mechanics; the entire pattern of our culture may at last be shattered. These statements are not unduly alarmist. They are just what wise men have been saying, and what even the most humble have been thinking. Oswald Spengler's prophecy of doom, *The Decline of the West*, has echoed the whole world's fears.

Is Spengler too pessimistic? This is a question of deep interest. It is the question whether our culture has irreversibly entered the stage of decline. If so, such cultural decay as exemplified by Fascism would be inevitable.

Spengler, however, is not only a prophet of decline, but also a philosopher of Fascism. As early as the writing of *The Decline of the West*, of which the first draft was completed

before the World War, he foresaw and *welcomed* the main aspects of Fascist dictatorship. When the Nazi regime was at last established, he declared: "No one can have looked forward to the national revolution of this year with greater longing than myself." ² Everything of a political nature that he had written since the German Republic was established, he declares, was to contribute to the overthrow of Social Democracy. He greets the victory of Hitler as an indication that Germany may resume the masterful role it played in Bismarck's day,³ and likewise looks with favor upon Mussolini, the "master man," whom he compares with one of his favorite heroes, Frederick the Great.⁴ He criticizes Fascism, it is true, but primarily because it is too "democratic"!

Spengler has exercised a considerable influence upon the development of Fascism. He was for years on friendly terms with Gregor Strasser, one of the most influential theorists in the early phases of the Nazi movement. He is frequently quoted by Fascist writers, as for example by Oswald Mosley; and he is echoed even when he is not directly quoted. Hitler himself made a study of *The Decline of the West*. Although he did not find the book entirely to his liking, he and Spengler arranged a two hours' tête-à-tête in March, 1933.

Certain passages in *The Hour of Decision* probably reflect its author's disappointment with this interview, as for example the statement:

The seizure of power took place in a confused whirl of strength and weakness. I see with misgiving that it continues to be noisily celebrated from day to day. It were better to save our enthusiasm for a day of real and definitive results—that is to say, of successes in *foreign policies*, which alone matter.⁵

The fact is that Spengler, if he had lived, would have welcomed a more ruthless form of dictatorship. In his own statement of ideals, he presages the next stage of decay: the period of desperation when the Fascists must abandon the

myth of a cultural renaissance, and replace their crumbling mass-base by a naked military dictatorship. Thus Spengler's works promise to become the main theoretical formulation, not of present-day Fascism, but of the more extreme tyranny of the future.

"The Fascist formations of this decade," he declares, "will pass into new, unforeseeable forms, and even present-day nationalism will disappear. There remains as a formative power only the warlike, 'Prussian' spirit—everywhere and not in Germany alone. . . . Caesar's legions are returning to consciousness." ⁶ The task of the new Caesars is nothing short of world conquest: "He whose sword compels victory . . . will be the lord of the world. The dice are there ready for this stupendous game. *Who dares to throw them?*" ⁷ But the hazard can be won only by a dictatorship that purges itself of every taint of Democracy. The future Caesars must show less tenderness for "the people" than Hitler and Mussolini:

For Fascism is also a transition. It had its origin in the city mobs and began as a mass party with noise and disturbance and mass oratory. Labour-Socialist tendencies are not unknown to it. But so long as a dictatorship has "social service" ambitions, asserts that it is there for the "worker's" sake, courts favour in the streets, and is "popular", so long it remains an interim form. The Caesarism of the future fights solely for power, for empire, and against every description of party.⁸

Although the present-day Fascists do not measure up to Spengler's ideals, they frequently share the historian's enthusiasm for Caesar. In an address on "The Philosophy of Fascism," Sir Oswald Mosley speaks of Caesarism as "the mightiest emanation of the human spirit in high endeavor towards enduring achievement," and refers to Fascism as "the last great world-wave of the immortal, and eternally recurring, Caesarian movement." ⁹ Mussolini's admiration for Caesar is tremendous. "I love Caesar," he has exclaimed, ". . . the greatest man that ever lived." ¹⁰

The Fascist theorists, on the other hand, reject the Spenglerian theory of the inevitable decline of Western culture. According to James Drennan, the spokesman of Mosley's party: "Fascism is the conscious revolt of a generation determined to escape its overhanging doom in the building of a new destiny. Fascist thought, even to the extent that it accepts the Spenglerian analysis as a relatively incontrovertible interpretation of past history, repudiates the pessimism of the great German's conclusions."¹¹ Hitler has likewise declared: "We live in the firm conviction that in our time will be fulfilled not the decline but the renaissance of the West. That Germany may make an imperishable contribution to this work is our proud hope and our unshakable belief."¹² Mussolini and his followers have similarly spoken of the great "awakening" of Fascist Italy.

The Fascist myth of a cultural renaissance, however, has been qualified by more pessimistic utterances similar to Spengler's. "We do not believe in programs, in plans, in saints or apostles," announces Mussolini, "above all we believe not in happiness, in salvation, in the promised land."¹³ He has repeatedly stated that happiness is unrealizable. The Nazi leaders have likewise told the German workers that they must learn to endure poverty. The common people, we grant, have been promised a rebirth of the nation if guns are substituted in place of butter, but even Spengler, the "pessimist," thinks that "Caesarism" will bring a partial "rejuvenation," and speaks of "tremendous tasks" yet to be fulfilled.

Despite its superficial optimism, Fascism springs out of the soil of pessimism. It is a phenomenon of social decay, and it can thrive only when men despair of a genuine social reconstruction. It triumphs, not so much through its own strength, as through the weakness of its opponents. People accept it when they feel that the anti-Fascist forces have nothing to offer and that the situation is almost hopeless.

In postwar Germany, there was dire suffering and a profound sense of humiliation and insecurity. Before the victory of the Nazis, people were saying, "Nothing could be worse than the present." In Italy the situation was less desperate, but there was the feeling that the country had "won the war but lost the peace," and that public affairs were drifting dangerously. There was also a great deal of poverty, which has of course continued. The mood of confusion and discouragement in both Germany and Italy was skillfully utilized by the Fascist leaders. The people felt the need of a Messiah, and Hitler and Mussolini were glad to assume the role.

The new regimes, although optimistic on the surface, did not fail to manifest pathological symptoms. From the very beginning, the Fascists exhibited a disgust with civilization and urban life, and a tendency to revert to barbaric practices. In many ways, Fascism represents an atavistic movement and a revolt against civilization, such as only suffering and bitter disillusionment could engender. Even the cruelty of the Fascist bombers, squadrists and Jew-baiters, betrays their unhappiness. As the psychologist Jung has remarked, those who willfully injure others are usually suffering themselves.

In Italy, moreover, the early mood of optimism has gradually disappeared, and the dictatorship has become increasingly grim. A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* writes: "An entirely new fact, pessimism, despite appearances, is overtaking the upper hierarchy of the regime."¹⁴ The initial afflatus of the movement in Germany, on the other hand, has not been exhausted, but there are many signs of uneasiness and approaching difficulty. As the plight of the Fascist countries grows worse, the leadership draws closer to the mood of Spengler.

In one respect, however, the historian differs markedly from the Fascists: he is opposed to their racial and nationalis-

tic biases. He declares that "racial feelings," although "deep and natural," cannot serve as a foundation for great politics, and that "dolicocephalic heads do not count; what counts is what is in them."¹⁵ He looks forward to a world-wide unification:

We Germans of the present century, with our being interwoven with the Faustian civilization, have rich and unutilized possibilities in us and tremendous tasks before us. To the international order which *irrevocably* prepares itself, we have to contribute the idea of the world-organization of the World State, the English the system of world-trusts and world-exploitation, and the French have nothing to offer.¹⁶

Whatever may be Spengler's incidental prejudices, he does not see eye to eye with the Nazis. Yet as we shall see, his historical relativism leads him, on other occasions, to conclude that "world-citizenship" is a miserable slogan.

The Nazis, of course, have their own reservations. Their attitude is reflected in *Spenglers Weltpolitisches System und der Nationalsozialismus* (1934), a book by a Nazi party spokesman, Johann von Leers. The principal charges made by the author are as follows: Spengler's theory of history is too deterministic. He ignores "the science of race," and is unwilling to embrace economic and political nationalism. He still believes in *laissez faire* capitalism. (Spengler, as a matter of fact, regards monopoly capitalism as a necessity.) He confuses Communism, which he rightly denounces, with any form of social planning. His "Caesarism" evades responsibility to the people and their welfare, and does less than justice to the ideal of comradeship between leaders and followers. He has made slighting remarks about Fascism: that it is transitory, that it is too democratic, that it is too spectacular, etc.¹⁷ Despite this criticism, we must recognize that much of Spengler's divergence simply indicates a more ruthless and undemocratic theory. He simply goes the Fascists one better.

An attack somewhat like that of Leers is to be found in

the incidental criticisms of Spengler in Alfred Rosenberg's book, *Blood and Honor*. The author contends that Spengler lacks the true Faustian spirit, the heroic affirmation of the will. The historian is wrong in maintaining "that in some mysterious and providential manner the course of history is predetermined and unchangeable."¹⁸ His deterministic scheme of history, we are told, belongs purely to the nineteenth century, and has been "overcome" in the present century by the National Socialists, whose acceptance of "the vital commandments of the German man" presage the renewal of culture. Even in conceiving of history as "nonreversible," Spengler has failed to recognize the forces of his time which really are nonreversible, namely, blood and soil. As a result of neglecting these constants of human history, he has failed to see that the decline of a culture can be arrested. To secure the renaissance of their national culture, the German people must look to the factors slighted by Spengler—the return to country life and the upsurge of racialism—and not to the Spenglerian prescription for a partial revival, namely, the rule of the Caesars over the depersonalized masses.

At the same time that Rosenberg rejects "the return of the Caesars," he commends Spengler for his praise of Moltke, as a specimen of the Prussian militaristic spirit.¹⁹ Spengler had written:

Prussianism is a very superior thing which sets itself against every sort of majority- and mob-rule; above all, against the dominance of the mass *character*. Moltke, the great educator of the German officer, the finest example of true Prussianism, was thus constituted. Count Schlieffen summed up his personality in the motto: "Talk little, do much, be, rather than seem."²⁰

Rosenberg, in selecting this passage for special commendation, indicates that he is not so far from the ideal of Caesarism as his words seem to imply. He prefers to symbolize the

ideal of militarism and dictatorship by the Germanic figure of a Prussian drillmaster, rather than by the alien figure of a Roman conqueror.

Spengler and the Fascists are akin in certain other respects. They agree, for example, in extolling the virtues of war. "War is the creator of all great things," declares Spengler. "All that is meaningful in the stream of life has emerged through victory and defeat."²¹ War, he admits, is growing far more frightful; but he believes that it is impossible to avoid, and that the nobility of life can be maintained upon no other terms. "Even if a tired and soulless mankind," he contends, "should renounce politics and war, like the Classical man of the later centuries or the Indians and the Chinese of today, it would only become a victim instead of a maker of wars, a victim and prey of the wars made by others."²² It is far better to accept war as necessary and beneficent:

Again and again between these catastrophes of blood and terror the cry rises up for reconciliation of the peoples and for peace on earth. . . . Esteem as we may the wish towards all this, we must have the courage to face facts as they are—that is the hallmark of men of race-quality and it is by the being of these men that *alone* history is. Life, if it would be great, is hard; it lets choose *only* between victory and ruin, not between war and peace, and to the victory belong the sacrifices of victory.²³

Such grim sentiments appear in scores of Fascist books.

Spengler is also thoroughly like the Fascists in celebrating the "instincts of the blood" as opposed to the sober exercise of thought. "The mind needs the blood," he declares, "but the blood does not need the mind."²⁴ The "beat of cosmic cycles" pulsates in the blood, and establishes "the *one* grand felt harmony."²⁵ This instinctive rapport with nature guides the man of action. Compared with him, the man of thought is utterly ineffectual:

For, in the last resort, only the active man, the man of destiny, lives in the *actual* world, the world of political, military and

economic decisions, in which concepts and systems do not figure or count. Here a shrewd blow is more than a shrewd conclusion, and there is sense in the contempt with which statesmen and soldiers of all times have regarded the "ink-slinger" and the "bookworm" who thinks that world-history exists for the sake of the intellect or science or even art. Let us say it frankly and without ambiguity: the understanding divorced from sensation is only one, and not the decisive, side of life. A history of Western thought may not contain the name of Napoleon, but in the history of actuality Archimedes, for all his scientific discoveries, was possibly less effective than that soldier who killed him at the storming of Syracuse.²⁶

Such statements constitute the intellectual stock in trade of Fascism. For example, James Drennan, who has caught the tone of Fascist literature, declares:

The intellect of the cities is exhausting itself, and intellectual politics utterly discredit themselves. "Men of action"—physical men "of the blood" in contrast to the exhausted intellectuals—alone have the capacity to master events and to arrive at the control of the uncontrollable megapolitan state. It is the phase of the Pompeys and the Caesars, the Mussolinis and Hitlers.²⁷

Even the terminology of Spengler is similar to that of the Fascists. As early as 1919, in his *Preussentum und Sozialismus*, he used the term "Socialism" in a manner very similar to its employment by the Nazis. He likened Socialism to Prussian nationalism and the theory of a cruel, domineering élite. "We need hardness," he announced, "we need a class of Socialist natural lords. . . . Might, might, and ever more might."²⁸ The term Socialism is here quite opposed to the classless society of Marxian theory; the task of the new age, he announces, is "to liberate German socialism from Marx." "Socialism, as I understand it," he proceeds to explain, "presupposes individual proprietorship with its old-German enjoyment of power and booty."²⁹

His conception of "Prussian Socialism" is quite as authoritarian and undemocratic as that of the Nazis:

The German, or to be more exact, the Prussian instinct was that the power belongs to the whole. The individual serves it. The whole is sovereign. . . . Everybody is put in his place. There are commands and there is obedience. This, since the eighteenth century, is authoritarian socialism, which is illiberal and anti-democratic, as compared with English liberalism and French democracy. But it is also clear that the Prussian instinct is anti-revolutionary.³⁰

These words accurately describe the National Socialist system.

Even Spengler's economic proposals bear a marked resemblance to the measures adopted by the Nazis. Strikes, he asserts, must be prohibited, since they are "a private economic measure anti-State in character."³¹ Although property should be retained by the employer, wages should be determined by an economic council representing the State. Property itself should be so regulated that it becomes in effect "a kind of hereditary fief" with certain rights and duties attaching to it as in feudal times. The purpose of the regulation should not be to establish social equality, but to maintain a division based upon the Prussian system of "command and obedience."³² In making such proposals as early as 1919, Spengler forecast the actual practices of Hitler.

Many of the basic tenets of Fascism are to be found in the historian's pages: opposition to the intellect, to the city; hatred of liberalism, democracy, and *genuine* Socialism; idealization of war and *Machtpolitik*; an extreme voluntaristic ethics, and an "idealistic" theory of history; belief that the machine and modern technology are opposed to art and other elements of a liberal culture. Even when Spengler diverges from Fascism, he often presages the next stage of decay.

What argument does he present in support of his Fascist ideals? Very little, it would seem. Of a *science* of values, his pages afford not a trace. Of a *reasoned* theory of economics,

there is not much indication. To this extent, his ideals lack a defense. But he does present one argument, which is by no means unimpressive. Upon the basis of his vast historical erudition, he contends that his program offers the only *practical* alternative in our age of cultural decline. "The essential," he declares, "is to understand the time *for* which one is born."³³ History is irreversible, and the great men of each age are those who most fully embody the spirit of their times. "The genuine statesman is incarnate history, its directedness expressed as individual will and its organic logic as character."³⁴

Now our age is said to be akin to imperial Rome; and Spengler unqualifiedly advises, "When in Rome, do as the Romans do." It would be foolish to think that we can any longer succeed with a mental pursuit such as art:

We are civilized, not Gothic or Rococo, people; we have to reckon with the hard cold facts of a *late* life, to which the parallel is to be found not in Pericles's Athens but in Caesar's Rome. Of great painting or great music there can no longer be, for Western people, any question. Their architectural possibilities have been exhausted these hundred years. Only *extensive* possibilities are left to them.³⁵

Consequently "men of the new generation" should "devote themselves to technics instead of lyrics, the sea instead of the paint-brush, and politics instead of epistemology. Better they could not do."³⁶

This argument, at best, has only a limited validity. The principle involved in the argument is that men should take on the color of their time and place: they should be "incarnate history." But if this principle is accepted without limitation, propositions such as these logically follow: "When among thieves, be a thief also." "If drunkenness prevails, be a drunkard." "While among cutthroats, do not hesitate to murder." "In a time of decadence, be notably decadent." In other words, Spengler overlooks the fact that it might

be better to produce poor art than a technically very fine murder even in a period when very skillful murders abound. Now we would not accuse Spengler of harboring murderous impulses; but he does recommend the policy of imperialistic conquest, entailing what many persons would regard as mass murder, and he has little use for ethical criteria in distinguishing between what a man should or should not do.

The argument illustrates the tendency to substitute "factualism" in place of ethics, the "is" in place of the "ought," the will-to-power in place of the will-to-the-good. Spengler repeatedly boasts that purposes, ideals, and values are of little or no importance. It is a mistake, he insists, to suppose that life has any objective:

Life has no "aim." Mankind has no "aim." . . . Life is the beginning and the end, and life has no system, no program, no reason; it exists for itself and by itself, and the deep order in which it realizes itself may only be seen and felt—and then perhaps it may be described, but it cannot be dissected according to good or bad, right or wrong, useful and desirable.³⁷

From the standpoint of such ethical nihilism, it is "success" judged in terms of power that counts. "In history," declares Spengler, "it does not matter whether one is right or wrong. Success is decided by the fact whether one is practically superior to the opponent or whether one is not."³⁸ The sole problem is to be on top of the heap: to be master of whatever tendencies happen to be predominant in one's time and place. In the face of the so-called "purposelessness" of life, humanistic morality is discarded, and a relativistic creed of "action" is substituted:

We are not "human beings *per se*." That belongs to the ideology of the past. World citizenship is a wretched phrase. We are human beings of a century, of a nation, of a circle, of a type. These are the necessary conditions by which we can be men of action, even through words to be men of action. The more fully we exhaust these given limits, the farther our effect reaches.

Plato was Athenian, Caesar Roman, Goethe German: that they were that wholly and primarily was the presupposition of their world historic effect.³⁹

We suspect that Plato and Goethe, and even Caesar, would have decisively rejected Spengler's relativism in favor of a more universalistic outlook. The Spenglerian creed is not that of the great men of the past, but of men who ruthlessly bomb civilians because it is the way to have a "world historic effect," and to be "practically superior to the opponent."

The reduction of values to the purely factual plane is not only characteristic of Spengler, but represents a pervasive tendency of Fascism. In the preceding chapter, we remarked a strange duality in the Fascist theory: on the one hand, it boasts of its "idealism" and its "moral superiority"; on the other hand, it vaunts its "unsentimental" respect for sheer brute power. In this mood, it regards the acceptance of ethical criteria as an indication of weakness. Conduct is regarded as justifiable if it accords with the currents of the age or the characteristics of the nation. We must not underestimate the practical force of this position. So widespread is the inclination to climb on the bandwagon, no matter what sort it is, that Spengler's argument has already made, and will continue to make, a popular appeal. In the period following the Munich settlement, when Fascism is obviously on the march, and democracy is in retreat, there is great danger that millions of people will swing to Fascism because "it is the thing to do." We are therefore justified in examining Spengler's contentions with all due care, especially in view of the fact that his books are very widely read in America and Great Britain.

2. *The Argument of "The Decline of the West"*

Let us now analyze the argument whereby Spengler reaches his conclusions. The nerve of his reasoning consists

in the interpretation of each culture as an organism. This idea, for most historians, is only a metaphor, but for Spengler it seems to be literally true. He uncompromisingly asserts:

Cultures are organisms, and world-history is their collective biography. Morphologically, the immense history of the Chinese or of the Classical Culture is the exact equivalent of the petty history of the individual man, or of the animal, or the tree, or the flower. . . . If we want to learn to recognize inward forms that constantly and everywhere repeat themselves, the comparative morphology of plants and animals has long ago given us the methods.⁴⁰

Hence a culture is a "bounded and mortal thing." "It blooms on the soil of an exactly-definable landscape, to which plant-wise it remains bound." It dies when it "has actualized the full sum of its possibilities in the shape of peoples, languages, dogmas, arts, states, sciences."⁴¹

Spengler examines certain of these cultures in detail: the Egyptian, the Chinese, the Indian (Hindu), the Classical (Greek and Roman), the Magian (early Christian, Arab, and Persian), and the Western (roughly Western Europe since about 900 A.D., including America since its colonization). Other cultures he notes but does not sketch: the Babylonian, the Mexican, and the nascent Russian. Each culture has a "soul," represented by its "prime symbol," an "image" of "depth" or "extension." "For the Classical world view," for example, the prime symbol is "the near, strictly limited, self-contained Body; for the Western infinitely wide and infinitely profound three dimensional Space; for the Arabian the world as a Cavern"; for the Chinese the landscape as something to "wander" through.⁴² This symbol indicates a peculiar mood or personality for each culture, corresponding to a fundamental sense of differentiation and direction which is unconsciously shared by all members of the society.

The mood of the culture expresses itself in every aspect of life: in art, morality, mathematics, politics, city structure, and in a thousand acts and institutions. Being interdependent, the attributes of a culture form a unique complex. The result is an absolute relativism: each culture is wholly self-contained. There is no universally valid religion or science or art or ethics, nor any real interaction between cultures.⁴³

Each culture uniquely develops its destiny out of its own nature, yet each develops according to a general pattern of youth, growth, maturity, and decay. "We know it to be true of every organism," Spengler points out, "that the rhythm, form and duration of its life, and all the expression details of that life as well, are determined by the *properties of its species*." ⁴⁴ Just as every tree, unless it is prematurely killed, must transcribe a similar history of maturation and decay, so every culture, as an organism of a different type, must pass through a parallel cycle to an inevitable conclusion: "the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petrifying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic." ⁴⁵ The early phase of fermentation, the period of myth and legend, is followed by the definite crystallization of religion, philosophy, and science. Art at first is unself-conscious; politics and economics are agrarian. Gradually the culture passes into maturity: the great conclusive systems of science and philosophy take shape, art and religion become more labored, social life becomes more urban and materialistic. The stage of "civilization" sets in: money instead of religion dominates society, imperialistic dictatorships seize the citadels of power. Life degenerates into a fixed stock of forms; the appeal of mere size, or bizarreness, or mechanical efficiency supersedes the urge to intensify the inward life. "Primitive human conditions slowly thrust up through the highly

civilized mode of living,"⁴⁶ and the end is at hand. At last a new culture, destined to pass through a similar cycle, springs into being.

We who now live in the midst of Western civilization are in the declining period of our own culture. The signs of this decline are patent: spread of Socialism, decay of religion, degeneration of philosophy to the level of the classroom, sensationalism and eclecticism in the arts, domination of society by money and technics, concentration of "creation" in a few big cities, falling birth rates among the fitter stocks, increasing poverty and dependence on the dole, and artificial means of maintaining the economic order. This decline is inexorable. "Only dreamers believe that there is a way out. Optimism is *cowardice*."⁴⁷

In so far as there is a limited salvation possible, it is to be achieved by abandoning art, science, and philosophy and turning instead to engineering, colonization, political dictatorship, imperialist expansion; and on the side of pure thought, to the writing of history. Spengler, as we have seen, entertains the hope of a partial revival; but Caesarism, imperialist war, and a "second religiousness" (*i.e.*, a recrudescence of superstition?) are all he holds out to us in the way of hope.

The development sketched above is strictly necessary in its broad outline. A kind of Calvinistic predestination governs mankind. The forms of expression are predetermined in every phase of activity. A culture may be strangled to death (*e.g.*, the Aztec culture), but if it lives on, it can only pass through the stages of maturation and decline.

Now there is much in Spengler with which we must agree. He does make us vividly aware of the interdependence of cultural factors: of the way in which a great work of art, for example, is connected with almost the whole of a culture. He also affords us a tremendous broadening of horizons. In so doing, he destroys the "empty figment of *one*

linear history," centering in the West, and rightly substitutes "the drama of a *number* of mighty cultures."⁴⁸ He demolishes the naïve conventional interpretation of history as conforming to the "Ancient-Medieval-Modern Scheme," which minimizes the autonomous contributions of non-Western cultures, and depicts historical trends as leading up to, or culminating in, Modern Progress. His whole argument, in fact, tends against Western provincialism and a superficial overvaluation of modernity. Spengler calls this reorientation "the Copernican Revolution in History"; and assuredly we must admit that his bold escape from the ordinary limitations of perspective amounts to a veritable revolution in outlook. We must also grant that our Western culture is in a critical state; the Spenglerian parallels between present disorders and the decadent conditions of other cultures have an obvious, though only partial, validity.

3. *History Fitted to a Procrustean Bed*

When we turn to Spengler's errors, however, we discover that his mistakes vitiate much of his argument. We are consequently forced to question his estimate of the prospects of Western culture, and to reject his ultra-Fascist prescriptions, which are worse than the disease they are designed to alleviate.

We must first convict him of historical inaccuracy. His theory of cultural relativism is too extreme to be demonstrable, his culture-organisms too independent to be real. He maintains, for example, that Classical culture lived "intensely in the pure sensuous present," and shunned the thought of the infinite, the spiritual, the dynamic, the future, and the remote past. Western culture is properly symbolized, on the other hand, by the legendary character of Faust, the introspective magician, who thirsted for the infinite.

In maintaining this sharp contrast, however, Spengler ignores the idea of infinity as it finds expression in various Greek philosophers, such as Anaximander and Melissos; he fails to note Plato's rejection of the corporeal,⁴⁹ overlooks the disembodied spirits and incorporeal God of Aristotle, and arbitrarily severs the mystical philosophy of Plotinus from its Greek sources; he discounts the evangelical strain in the Orphic religion, and "ignores the Greek epitaph, the Greek tombstone, the ephebic oath, the cult of the vestals, and the reconstruction of temple sites—all of which were classical modes of perpetuation."⁵⁰ His theories also run afoul such eminent authorities on Greek science and philosophy as Robin, Milhaud, Burnet, and A. E. Taylor, who have shown that Plato and the mathematicians of the Academy anticipated many of the features of Western mathematics.⁵¹ In Plato's doctrine of "the dyad of the great and small," we find implicit several notions that Spengler looks upon as utterly un-Greek in character, namely, the concepts of the surd, zero, negative quantity, the infinitesimal, the continuum, and the variable. Since Spengler regarded mathematics as the abstract formulation of the cultural *Weltanschauung*, the formula of the very "soul" of the culture, his mistaken conception of Greek mathematics constitutes a major error.

If we turn to his analysis of Western culture, we discover that he scarcely notices the large amount of materialistic philosophy, the tremendous effect of Aristotle on the Middle Ages, the fact that we have kept Classical mathematics, and built upon the basis of Classical physics. Though he reveres Goethe, the supreme poet of the Faust legend, whom he regards as the most representative man of Western culture, he disregards the mature poet's allegiance to the un-Faustian ideal of Spinoza, the impersonal devotion to the abiding and universal. In this respect, Goethe is nearer to Plato than he

is to the voluntaristic philosophers of the modern Occident.⁵²

Similar conclusions apply in the field of technics and invention. Spengler regards our technology as peculiar to the "Faustian" genius of the West. But Lewis Mumford, in his history of technics, has pointed out:

The waterwheel, in the form of the Noria, had been used by the Egyptians to raise water, and perhaps by the Sumerians for other purposes; certainly in the early part of the Christian era watermills had become fairly common in Rome. The windmill perhaps came from Persia in the eighth century. Paper, the magnetic needle, gunpowder, came from China, the first two by way of the Arabs: algebra came from India through the Arabs, and chemistry and physiology came via the Arabs, too, while geometry and mechanics had their origins in pre-Christian Greece. The steam engine owed its conception to the great inventor and scientist, Hero of Alexandria: it was the translations of his works in the sixteenth century that turned attention to the possibilities of this instrument of power. In short, most of the important inventions and discoveries that served as the nucleus for further mechanical development, did not arise, as Spengler would have it, out of some mystical inner drive of the Faustian soul: they were wind-blown seeds from other cultures.⁵³

Spengler recognizes the fact, pointed out by Mumford, that various elements of our technology originated in other cultures, but he insists that the West has applied these inventions to utterly different purposes. This contention is sound in reference to gunpowder, which was used in ancient China for fireworks, but has been employed in the West mainly for war and industry. Certain other inventions, however, cannot be interpreted in this way: for example, paper and the waterwheel. The fact is patent that we have borrowed much from other cultures, especially the Classical. This conclusion is fully substantiated by the important work by Alfons Dopsch, *The Economic and Social Foundations of*

European Civilization, which traces the very real continuity between Graeco-Roman and Medieval culture, especially in respect to technics and economic institutions.⁵⁴

Oriental societies also have borrowed a great deal from the West. A striking illustration is the Westernization of Japan, which in a few generations has been transformed into a highly industrialized and militaristic country. So thorough has been this Westernization that Japan is today exhibiting the same sort of Fascist traits as Germany and Italy. Another notable example is Russia, once largely an Oriental country. Its Westernization, vigorously initiated by Peter the Great, has been rushed forward under Soviet rule. The Soviet Union is not only adopting Western methods with amazing rapidity, but is profoundly influencing the entire world with innovations of its own.

These examples show that the unity of a culture is not so absolute as Spengler believes. Cultures are differentiated by emphases and trends, not by utter discontinuity or uniqueness. The degree of coherence and differentiation of a culture falls short of the individual unity of a personality. Cultures do not have "souls," or the same kind of life as organisms.

Spengler is also historically inaccurate in his theory of definite cyclic stages. We must question, for example, his generalization that great art never characterizes the "winter period" of a culture. He dates the beginning of the winter period in Indian culture as early as 600 years *before* Christ, yet the greatest living authority on Indian art, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, has written: "We can safely say that the first century and a half of the Christian era represents the most critical period in the history of art in India, the second to the fourth century that of the highest achievement."⁵⁵ Similarly, the Sung period (960-1280 A.D.), which is regarded by eminent authorities as the greatest period of Chinese painting, falls, in terms of Spengler's chronology, in the late

winter. The period perhaps supreme in Japanese art, the Ashikaga (1335-1573 A.D.), is even later in the period of supposed decadence and sterility. Some of the greatest art works of Egypt, such as the creations of the New Kingdom, appear late. The noble poetry of Virgil and Lucretius, and some superb utilitarian architecture (viaducts, bridges, ramparts, etc.) belong, in Spengler's account, to the Classical decadence.⁵⁶

Further inaccuracies are to be discovered in Spengler's pages, but our space does not permit a more detailed criticism. When the total body of evidence is considered there is little ground for maintaining that all cultures develop according to one monotonous plan; their life spans differ, their phases are often not parallel, and their rates of development vary widely.⁵⁷

4. *The Warping Effect of Prejudices*

Even when Spengler's facts are not in question, his supplementary evaluations are often dubious. Especially is this true of his depreciation of modern accomplishments. Our age is remarkable for its achievements as well as for its failures. We cannot follow Spengler in denying or lightly dismissing many fresh manifestations of cultural energy, as for example: the current revolution in physics, initiated by such men as Einstein, Heisenberg, and Planck; the mathematical achievements of Riemann, Lobatchewsky, and Minkowski; the renovation of logic by Whitehead and Russell; the greatness of some of our recent poetry, such as Housman's exquisite lyrics, Hardy's mighty *Dynasts*, or Alexander Blok's somber prophecy, *The Twelve*;⁵⁸ the excellence of some of our contemporary music, such as that of Debussy, Sibelius, and Bartok; the present revival in sculpture, as in the works of Maillol, Bourdelle, Lehmbruck, Faggi, and Epstein; the beginnings of a new world architecture, as in the

buildings of Gropius, LeCorbusier, and Frank Lloyd Wright; the greatness of some of our modern painting, as in the best works of Cézanne, Rousseau, Braque, Orozco, and Rivera; the spiritual import of the world-wide political and economic ferment, which is by no means merely destructive; the tremendous creative force in modern technology, which may be employed for good as well as ill. Who shall say that these manifestations of creative energy represent nothing but decadence? There is just one objective test that is possible: not the opinion of one man, but the consensus of experts. Yet the experts certainly do not agree; there are many connoisseurs of the arts and critics of Western thought who find our age extremely hazardous, but full of struggle and promise: a period of great uncertainty rather than of obvious approaching doom.

The pages of Spengler betray a romantic bias that warps his estimate of our scientific age. Like the Fascists, he regards intellectuality as an omen of decadence: feeling and intuition are the truly creative factors. This bias extends to the products of science: machines and technological processes. He is unable to conceive technics broadly as an element in human society, to be integrated with art and ethics, in laying the foundation for a generous existence. Technology and art are for him necessarily antithetical; the true allies of the machine are imperialism and war. Rejecting the ideal of a cooperative society, he hails the return of "Caesarism" as offering a limited salvation by the sword.

Hence it would seem to many of his readers that he cannot appreciate the moral basis of any decent world order, and that he throws his influence to the side of spiritual impotence and brutality. He admits the abstract possibility of a new culture rising to take the place of the present one, but he condemns, as the symptoms of decay, those very factors that constitute the ground of other men's hopes.

To a person of moral sensitiveness, there is scant appeal in the following statement of his creed:

Man is a beast of prey. I shall say it again and again. All the would-be moralists and social-ethics people who claim or hope to be "beyond all that" are only beasts of prey with their teeth broken, who hate others on account of the attacks which they themselves are wise enough to avoid. Only look at them. They are too weak to read a book on war, but they herd together in the street to see an accident, letting the blood and the screams play on their nerves. And if even that is too much for them, they enjoy it on the film and in the illustrated papers. If I call man a beast of prey, which do I insult: man or beast? For remember, the larger beasts of prey are *noble* creatures, perfect of their kind, and without the hypocrisy of human morals due to weakness.⁵⁹

Spengler obviously has no patience with "the toothless feeling of sympathy and reconciliation"; and accordingly is glad that Germans have regained the power of hatred:

We finally have learned that which I shall openly tell you: *the ability to hate*. Whoever is not able to hate is not a man, and history is made by men. Its decisions are hard and cruel, and he who believes that he can evade them through reconciliation and understanding is not made for politics. . . . That we Germans finally are able to hate, is one of the few results of the present time that augurs well for the future.⁶⁰

Anyone schooled in the humanism of Plato and Aristotle, the moral traditions of Christianity, or the new discipline of international Socialism, will distrust evaluations based upon such an attitude.

The plausibility of Spengler's argument depends in considerable measure upon his evaluations. He presumes to be descriptive, but he is frequently normative; hence the relevance of an attack upon his values. The trouble with his argument is not that he evaluates (for perhaps this is necessary), but that his values rest upon uncriticized and even nasty presuppositions. The ultimate bases of judgment are

not scrutinized; they remain hidden but pervert the entire argument. In the realm of values, Spengler is an unmitigated dogmatist. A careful reader with a different set of values will find much of Spengler unconvincing.

5. *More Than One Kind of Analogy*

Next, we must question Spengler's argument from analogy, based upon the supposed parallelism between the development of our culture and the cultures of the past. Logicians tell us that this form of reasoning is treacherous. We should not trust it unless the analogies are close, and the examples sufficiently numerous to afford a basis for induction.

Does Spengler, we may ask, present us with a sufficient number of examples to warrant prediction? He has cited seven cultures other than our own, if we omit the Russian which he conceives as still latent. One of these, the Mexican, he regards as never having reached the stage of "civilization," being throttled in full career. Another culture, the Babylonian, he discusses too briefly to build up a significant comparison. Of the remaining four cultures, one, the Egyptian, hardly bears out Spengler's argument. It endured four thousand years: over three times as long as our Western culture has so far lasted. Analogy would in this case suggest that our society may attain a new lease of life.⁶¹ Two of the remaining cultures, the Chinese and the Indian, have survived after a fashion down to the present and now show vigorous signs of revival. A culture that is able to manifest the great social ferment of contemporary China is not moribund; a culture that can produce a Tagore, a Bhowe, a Gandhi, and a Nehru is not dead. There remain only the Classical and the "Magian" cultures. But the Magian is in part a creation of Spengler's imagination: it is a curious amalgam of Persian, Arabian, Jewish, neo-Platonic, Byzan-

tine, and early Christian elements.⁶² The Classical culture, to be sure, did meet its downfall in a manner suggestive of our own possible fate. But the analogy in this case is a good one if, and only if, no outstanding differences can be discovered.

Here Spengler's argument breaks down. In a number of fundamental respects, Western culture differs from the declining Classical culture and, in fact, from any other culture of the past: (1) the rate of development differs, (2) modern technology is far more advanced, (3) there is far less excuse for economic and social exploitation, and (4) we are more enlightened as to dangers and opportunities. We shall examine each of these divergencies.

First, Spengler fails to take sufficient account of the fact that the speed of the historical process differs greatly. The modern rate of change has been tremendously accelerated. In contrasting present-day Europe with declining Rome, Johan Huizinga, the distinguished Dutch historian, remarks that "years seem to have replaced centuries as the yardstick of measurement."⁶³ Likewise, W. F. Ogburn, the distinguished American sociologist, in his famous book, *Social Change*, notes this increasingly rapid pace as one of the basic features of our cultural development. Spengler also is aware of the kinetic nature of modern Western culture, but he fails to realize that this factor undermines any close analogy between present conditions and the static cultures of the past. Hence he confidently expects "the return of the Caesars," and even advises men to desert other ideals. On the other hand, Huizinga concludes that in various respects, including the rate of alteration, "the development of Roman civilization bears little resemblance to the processes of our time."

Second, there is the fact that Western technology is far more advanced than the technology of any other society. This technical superiority is a highly dynamic factor, whose

creative force is well-nigh unlimited *if we learn to control it*. Provided we use machinery to free, not kill or enslave, we may speedily end the present disparity between waste and want. Machines, instead of sowing death in war or throwing men out of work, will provide opportunity and material well-being for all. In any event, we can assert, with a confidence as well founded as Spengler's, that the disintegration of our culture can be arrested by the application to social problems of that same technique of scientific thinking which has already triumphed in natural science and technology.

Third, all past cultures were based upon the exploitation of a subject class, but this need not be true of Western culture in the future. The Classical culture, for example, was based upon the sharp division of social classes into rich and poor, freemen and slaves. Professor Rostovtzeff, in his authoritative history of Graeco-Roman civilization, points out that "slavery and financial ruin" were the portion of "the lower classes," and that a "very important cause" of cultural decline was "the aristocratic and exclusive nature of ancient civilizations."⁶⁴ This condition was never corrected, despite revolts, palliatives, and the advent of Christianity. Now there is no reason why modern civilization, with its expanded system of production that makes poverty quite unnecessary, should similarly perpetuate want and oppression. At present, in fact, there is a mighty international movement to end exploitation and to base our culture upon apparently sound economic and moral foundations. No one can gauge the renovating power of this revolt of the masses. The foundations of all past cultures and of modern capitalism have been unjust; this may not be true of the new society which is emerging.

Fourth, no other culture has possessed our knowledge of history, and no other has projected its plans so vigorously into the future. This keen sense of the past and future, which as Spengler contends is characteristic only of the

West, differentiates us from all the cultures of the past. Neither Rome nor any other civilization has been so enlightened as to the dangers that beset it, nor so amply supplied with the blueprints of a new order. The extent of mass education, in itself, is a fact which renders our culture unique. If our fate depends, as H. G. Wells has said, upon a race between education and catastrophe, it is perhaps too soon to pick the winner.

If we are to reason from analogy, moreover, there is more than one analogy that we can employ. The comparison between our own age and Rome is in many ways less significant than the comparison between our period and the declining Middle ages. If anyone doubts that the late Middle Ages exemplified many of the signs of arrest and decay, he cannot do better than read the brilliant work by Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*.⁶⁵ The reader will discover that the late Medieval period was marked by an atmosphere of impending doom and the strangest grotesqueries of thought and conduct. Dying feudalism exhibited many of the signs of decadence that we find today associated with dying capitalism. *Yet the issue was not the death of the culture, but the renaissance.*

The accuracy of this analogy may be substantiated by the works of many historians. A more sensational and less reliable depiction of the extreme crisis of the late Medieval culture is presented by Egon Friedell (an historian who committed suicide when Hitler annexed Austria), in the first volume of his *Cultural History of the Modern Age*. Pitirim A. Sorokin, in his recent monumental work, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, shows not only that crisis-phenomena flared to a great height in the transition from Medievalism to the Renaissance, but also during other such profound transitions between one phase of culture and another. Arnold J. Toynbee, in his vast *Study of History*, indicates that a number of societies have passed through such periods of great trouble, to

emerge at last upon a plane of heightened development. Finally, Karl Marx and "Marxian" historians have insisted upon the analogy between the current transition from "capitalism to socialism," and the past transitions from "slavery to feudalism," and from "feudalism to capitalism." Until such analogies are examined, the pessimism of Spengler would appear to rest upon very inadequate foundations. Despite all his erudition, he is like any pseudo scientist who overlooks or slights a large part of the evidence.⁶⁶

6. *A Disastrous Excursion into Mythology*

Spengler's contention that cultures are organisms is also extremely vulnerable. Most of his theoretical mistakes result from applying literally a metaphor borrowed from the science of biology. No doubt there is some similarity between a culture and an organism, but Spengler presses the analogy much too far. After perusing *The Decline of the West*, the reader is almost tempted to inquire as to the sex of Egyptian civilization, or to ask if Western culture was suckled by its mother, or if it has suffered from influenza! A State or race, we have maintained in Chapter VII, cannot be regarded as a genuine organism, and the arguments which we advanced apply with equal force to an entire culture. If we have not erred, therefore, we must reject Spengler's theory that cultures are organisms.

Someone might object that the word "organism" is often employed broadly to include civilizations or cultures. It is true that the term is sometimes used vaguely, but we may question the advisability of stretching the meaning to this extent. It will not do to call both a society and a biological organism by the same name, and then apply to a culture the characteristics of a person or animal; yet this is precisely what Spengler does. We should either confine the term "organism" to living bodies, or recognize that its other uses are meta-

phorical. We cannot speak, in any literal sense, of a culture-soul, or of the "old age" of a culture.

As Huizinga has said, Spengler's scheme of world history now stands like "an empty, deserted mausoleum"; and his theory of social organisms is mainly to blame:

The one-sidedness, the distortions, the artificial analogies which he utilized in building his structure, made it, from the beginning, an untenable home for history. . . . The fundamental error of his work, however, does not lie in the gaps of his knowledge, nor in the limitations of his vision, but in the fact that, without hesitation, he travelled the road which leads from morphology to mythology. His personified abstractions, which, like the metaphorical beings of all times, lived through youth, maturity and old age, have shared the fate of all idols.⁶⁷

If Huizinga is right we cannot suppose that a culture, merely as such, is forced to transcribe the cycle of an organism, passing through the definite stages of childhood, youth, maturity, and old age. It may instead, for example, be incorporated in a larger social organization without suffering a decline. It is impossible for one organism to merge into another, but we cannot say that of a society. Our Western culture, for example, may be merged into a new international order which will represent a synthesis of Orient and Occident. (Indeed, the intermingling of East and West is one of the most momentous facts of our age, and is certain to have a profound effect upon the development of culture.)

On the other hand, even if Spengler is right in maintaining that cultures are organisms, his conclusions are still not cogent. What he has done, in that event, is to identify a new species of organism, but he has examined only seven members of the species (excluding Western culture), and some of these only cursorily. As a scientist, he must needs be cautious in defining the characteristics of the type. (It once seemed safe to assert that "all swans are white," but black swans were finally discovered in Australia.) How do we know that our

own culture may not turn out to be exceptional? How can we be sure that Western culture may not survive its present crisis (like a man who recovers from a dread disease), and perhaps achieve a far greater longevity than the cultures of the past?

If it is true that a culture is an organism, it is very different from a biological organism, and as such might possess many surprising characteristics. A man could scarcely be farther removed from an amoeba, than a culture-organism, if such exists, is removed from an individual man. An entire culture, in its immense range and complexity, is an "organism" of almost incomparable scale. Hence, any argument from analogy will prove very dangerous. These superorganisms may be more diverse in character than other kinds of organisms, and hence less predictable. Or they may be subject to certain diseases, which have cut short the lives of past cultures, but which may not prove fatal in the future. We cannot eliminate such possibilities by merely arguing upon the basis of an analogy between cultures and animals.

Even if all these considerations be brushed aside, there is nothing in Spengler's hypothesis to prevent the immediate birth of another culture which will rapidly usurp the place of our decaying "Faustian" civilization. Animals and plants give birth to other organisms like themselves; so far as the organic analogy is concerned, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a new culture quickly springing up to replace the old. The world is in the throes of great agony, and there is much to indicate that the pangs signify the approaching birth of an international collectivist society.

7. *Three Philosophies of History*

The foregoing criticism of Spengler must now be confirmed by reference to two other historians. Since the publication of *The Decline of the West*, Pitirim A. Sorokin,

professor of sociology at Harvard University, and Arnold J. Toynbee, professor of history at the University of London, have published works of comparable erudition and scope. We shall test the validity of our criticism by comparing Spengler's conclusions with those advanced by the two later historians.

Sorokin, in his massive work, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, has surveyed sociocultural trends in the Graeco-Roman and Western society from 600 B.C. to the present. He also has made brief excursions into Egyptian, Babylonian, Hindu, Chinese, and Arabian cultures. Although he pays much less attention than Spengler to non-European civilizations, he has more exhaustively studied "cultural fluctuations" within this smaller compass. His analysis embraces the fluctuations of art, science, philosophy, religion, ethics, law, politics, economic affairs, wars and internal disturbances (riots, revolutions, etc.). In this task, he has been assisted by a fairly large staff of scholars, who have at times independently checked his conclusions. The method followed has not been an impressionistic noting of historical trends, but the most systematic quantitative and qualitative research.

Sorokin and Spengler of course agree to a certain extent. They both recognize that our culture is in a very critical state, and that in many phases it is rapidly declining. They discover many of the same signs of decline, such as the tendency to substitute mere quantity in place of quality, as in the dizzy pursuit of speed or in the building of mammoth skyscrapers. Although Sorokin is more cautious in his interpretation, he and Spengler also agree in finding a high degree of interdependence between the various aspects of a culture.

The disagreements, however, are fundamental. In the first place, Sorokin rejects the Spenglerian thesis that each culture possesses a unique "soul" isolated from the "souls" of other cultures. Certain fundamental types of thought and behavior, he believes, are found not only in our own, but in

every other culture. His work is largely a study of what he calls "Ideational," "Sensate," and "Mixed" forms of mentality and conduct. The Ideational type is characterized by mysticism or religious "rationalism," idealism, eternalism, realism (as opposed to nominalism), an ethics of absolute principles, few scientific discoveries and inventions, static character of social life, symbolic and abstract tendencies in art, etc. The Sensate type is characterized by empiricism, materialism, temporalism, determinism, nominalism, an ethics of happiness and utility, many discoveries and inventions, dynamic character of social life, naturalism and sensualism in the arts, etc. The Mixed type represents a balance between these opposites, a combination of "other-worldliness" and "this worldliness." (The scheme is somewhat like William James' well-known classification of thought into the "tender-minded" and the "tough-minded.")

Sorokin shows that these types occur not only in Western culture but in other cultures and even at primitive levels. The difference between civilizations is largely a matter of emphasis; Hindu culture, for example, has been predominantly Ideational and thus stands in contrast to the more Sensate development achieved in the West. This analysis differs from Spengler's contention that "there is at bottom entire discrepancy" between the cultures. It is true that Spengler recognizes a great similarity of *form* between his eight cultures, but the *content* of cultural life is presumed to be unique in each case. Sorokin nowhere advances such a sharp distinction between content and form, and leaves the impression that the cultures are a good deal alike in both form and content.

In the second place, Sorokin rejects Spengler's theory that every culture is destined to pass through childhood, youth, maturity, and old age in an unalterable sequence of phases. Accordingly, he does not think that our culture is doomed to perish because it has already reached old age. He main-

tains, on the contrary, that the present crisis represents a transition from the Sensate to the Ideational phase, just as the late Middle Ages represented a critical transition from the Ideational to the Sensate phase:

Such a period is always disquieting, grim, cruel, bloody, and painful. In its turbulence it is always marked by a revival of the regressive tendencies of the unintegrated and disintegrated mentality. Many great values are usually thrown to the winds and trodden upon at such a time. Hence its qualification now as the great crisis. Crisis, however, is not equivalent to either decay or death, as the Spenglerites and cyclicists are prone to infer. It merely means a sharp and painful turn in the life process of the society. It does not signify the end of the traveled road or of the traveling itself. Western culture did not end after the end of its Ideational phase. Likewise, now when its Sensate phase seems to be ending, its road stretches far beyond the "turn" into the infinity of the future.⁶⁸

In contrast to Spengler's rigid theory of cyclical recurrence, Sorokin's theory is based upon a combination of recurrence and novelty, as in the thematic variation of a musical composition. "Sociocultural processes," he believes, "are as manifold in pattern as life itself, as rich and creative as the activity of the highest human genius."⁶⁹ He rejects not only Spengler's periodicity for the culture as a whole, but also any strict periodicity for art, science, religion, philosophy, politics, and all other divisions of culture. The "creative-erratic" nature of history is conceived as universal.

In the third place, the analogy which Sorokin finds most instructive is not that between the present crisis and the old age and death of *other* cultures, but rather the analogy between the present critical transition and the earlier critical transitions *within* Western culture. He demonstrates that crisis phenomena—in morals, religion, philosophy, science, art, politics, economic activity, etc.—were particularly abundant towards the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance. A great many social disturbances—wars,

riots, revolutions, and other uprisings—occurred in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Very similar conclusions hold for the transition from Ideational to Sensate culture, and from Sensate to Ideational, in the Graeco-Roman and early Christian periods. Arguing upon the basis of these analogies, Sorokin arrives at different conclusions from those of Spengler. His theory, as we have seen, “does not predict either the death or decay of the Western culture and society,” but does point “to the decline of the present Sensate phase and the probability of a grim transition” to a “new magnificent” Ideational phase. “Such a standpoint raises no fear of the temporary decline, nor even regrets it.”⁷⁰

Incidentally, it may be that Sorokin falls into the error, just opposite to that of Spengler, of exaggerating the linear character of Western history. He apparently finds no profounder transition between the Graeco-Roman culture and the early Medieval, than between the Medieval and the Renaissance. Thus Classical culture is not judged a separate culture, as in Spengler’s interpretation, but as only the first part of a single linear development. We shall not undertake to discuss whether Spengler or Sorokin is more nearly right in his interpretations; but it does seem to us that Spengler exaggerates the discontinuity between “Classical” and “Western” culture, and that Sorokin exaggerates the degree of continuity.

The latter historian also differs from the former as to what values should predominate in the next phase of society. Spengler’s choice of technics, militarism, dictatorship, and imperialist expansion represents preferences which to Sorokin are merely the signs of decay in an overripe Sensate phase. To persist in this direction is simply to spread the rotteness, and to impair the growth of the new fruit.

Sorokin’s values, however, are themselves not entirely satisfactory. His willingness to retreat from science and economic planning into a haphazard supernaturalism represents

a tendency no less regressive than Spengler's. In this respect, Sorokin really joins forces with the Fascists, since the revolt against reason and the reaction towards "idealism" are basic characteristics of Fascism. Yet our sharp disagreement with this phase of Sorokin's thought, which we do not have space adequately to criticize, should not blind us to the effective attack he has made upon Spengler's argument.

Let us now examine the theories of Toynbee, who possesses, we believe, a sounder scheme of values and a finer mental poise than either Spengler or Sorokin. In his immense work, *A Study of History*,⁷¹ at the present writing still uncompleted, he covers much the same ground as Spengler, but even more comprehensively. He is in the process of surveying the successive civilizations of mankind with an exhaustiveness without parallel: studying the geneses, growths, breakdowns, interactions, rhythms, and prospects of human societies.

The main objects of his study are "civilizations," which are larger units than cities or nations, and less static and primitive than savage societies. In his terminology, a "civilization" has about the same meaning as a "culture" in the language of Spengler, who in contrast to Toynbee reserves the term "civilization" to denote the stage of cultural decadence. As a result of a different classification and perhaps a somewhat wider survey than that of his German contemporary, he identifies twenty-one full-fledged civilizations, and several that only partly emerge from their primitive backgrounds, such as the inchoate societies of the Polynesians and the early Scandinavians and Irish. He supplies an unusually adequate basis for historical generalization.

He agrees with Spengler that our Western civilization is "rushing down a steep place into the sea."⁷² Yet he retains hope that this headlong descent can be stopped, and shows no trace of Spengler's feeling of predestination. One reason for his different attitude is that his premises are quite different. He

rejects the Spenglerian thesis that cultures are, in a literal sense, organisms, and the accompanying dogma that they live and die like animals. His "civilizations" do not develop unique souls *in vacuo* like the "cultures" of Spengler. Rather, they evolve in conflict and cooperation with one another, and share fundamental characteristics. "The variety that is manifested in Human Nature and in human life and institutions," he declares, "is a superficial phenomenon which masks, without impairing, an underlying unity." ⁷³

This sense of the unity of mankind, he believes, is the main element in a state of mind produced by the emerging world-order. "In the new age," he points out, "the dominant note in the corporate consciousness of communities is a sense of being parts of some larger universe, whereas, in the age which is now over, the dominant note in their consciousness was an aspiration to be universes in themselves." ⁷⁴ Though capitalistic industrialism and nationalism are still very powerful forces in our Western society, the new social and economic processes have doomed the old order by fashioning a close web of interdependence. Men must therefore strive for a synthesis of forces, and thinkers must seek "to envisage and comprehend the whole of Life." ⁷⁵ Toynbee thus stands at the opposite pole from Spengler: he apparently has none of the latter's prejudice against a planned cooperative and international commonwealth; although, like many liberals, he dislikes some of the particular methods employed to achieve Socialism in Soviet Russia.

His circumspect survey of history differs profoundly from what he rightly terms the "overemphasis and hyper-dogmatism" that mar Spengler's account. ⁷⁶ Though he detects certain general patterns of development, he recognizes that civilizations differ greatly in their crises and life spans. He promises to show in a future volume that a "Time of Troubles" has repeatedly jeopardized civilizations but with widely divergent consequences: some societies have been

crushed and have sunk fruitlessly to their death; others have summoned the energy to meet the challenge, and in the very act of struggle have achieved a renaissance; still others, in going down to destruction, have given birth to vigorous civilizations. Hence a crisis like that of Western society need not prove fatal; or if it does, the ordeal of death may be accompanied by the trauma of birth.

The creative process, which thus yields a renaissance or a new civilization, exhibits a rhythmical pattern to which Toynbee gives the name "Challenge-and-Response." The integration of custom is disturbed by a severe blow or pressure: the result is that the equilibrium is shattered by a differentiation and clash of forces; finally, after much struggle, the conflict is abated by fresh equilibration that gives to life a new essence. "In the language of Mythology, when one of God's creatures is tempted by the Devil, God Himself is thereby given the opportunity to recreate the World." 77 Toynbee shows that this is the meaning of the legend of Adam and Eve, of Job, of Jesus of Nazareth, of Faust and Gretchen, of Hippolytus and Phaedra, and of Hoder and Balder. Many societies have sensed the importance of this rhythmic alternation between the static and the dynamic, and have given to the process special names to denote its dual phases: as, for example, Ying and Yang, Love and Hate, God and Devil. Though Toynbee does not remark the fact, this rhythm was described at length by Hegel and Marx: his "integration, differentiation, reintegration" correspond to their "thesis, antithesis, synthesis."

Yet the English historian has made a unique contribution in elucidating the meaning of Challenge-and-Response with abundant examples from the annals of civilization. He shows that the challenges have been of such diverse types as slavery, caste, religious discrimination, war and border conflict, migration overseas, the struggle against hard country, and the shifting of climatic zones. The main advances occur when

danger or hardship shatter men's composure without sapping their strength. Great extremes of difficulty may be just as unfavorable as the opposite extremes of ease; but if the strength can be summoned to meet a crisis, the opportunity afforded is of great significance.

There is one type of stimulus that is especially relevant to the critical problem of Western civilization. When a society begins to decay, a challenge is presented to the lower orders who have no "stake" in the *status quo*:

. . . The ailing civilization pays the penalty for its failure of vitality by becoming disintegrated into a dominant minority which attempts to find a substitute for its vanishing leadership in a regime of force, and a proletariat (internal and external) which responds to this challenge by becoming conscious that it has a soul of its own and by making up its mind to save its soul alive. The dominant minority's will to repress evokes in the proletariat a will to secede; and the conflict between these two wills continues while the declining civilization verges to its fall. . . . In this conflict between a proletariat and a dominant minority . . . we can discern one of those dramatic spiritual encounters which renew the work of creation by carrying the life of the Universe out of the stagnation of autumn through the pains of winter into the ferment of spring.⁷⁸

Through the struggles of the proletariat, a new society is conceived and born. As Toynbee promises to show in Volume Five, this mode of creation has been repeatedly tested out in the laboratory of history. Thus to cite but a single example, our Western civilization was created by the Christians and the Barbarians, the "internal" and the "external" proletariat of the Graeco-Roman society in its last phase.

One hardly needs to point out that such a challenge confronts the "proletariat" of today. Capitalistic civilization is in headlong decline, and the revolt of the masses has commenced in dead earnest. *This fact fully accounts for the conditions that inspire Spengler's eloquent prophecies of disintegration and death. What Toynbee reveals and Spengler*

fails to perceive is that these very conditions provide a superlative challenge to the creative energies of our age. Already the forces are dividing: the dominant minority rely upon force and demagoguery, the majority are slowly awakening to new values and ideals. What the final result will be no one can precisely foretell, for "the outcome of an encounter cannot be predicted and has no appearance of being predetermined, but arises, in the likeness of a new creation, out of the encounter itself."⁷⁹ We only know that the very forces that create the danger also create the opportunity.

If we turn from Toynbee's analysis of our present crisis, to his hints as to what should be done, we again find him at variance with Spengler. Whereas the German hails the "return of the Caesars" as offering the best possible release for our energies, Toynbee proves that militarism, even when accompanied by geographical expansion, is the commonest cause of the breakdown of civilizations and of the degradation of life.⁸⁰ One of his most instructive chapters recounts the paralysis that crept over the Spartan state, whose military successes and Fascist-like dictatorship doomed it to mediocrity and decay. A similar fate destroyed the Assyrian state, the Ottoman empire, the late Egyptian civilization, and a number of other societies.

In another work, the *Survey of International Affairs: 1933*, Toynbee attacks German Fascism as a reversion to force and "tribalism." He points out that the "pagan worship of a parochial community which was the religion of Herr Hitler and his followers," has had tragic parallels:

This had been the substance of the religion of Primitive Man; and certain human societies had several times carried this primitive religion with them—*though this always with fatal consequences*—after entering upon the enterprise of civilization.⁸¹

In his companion volume, *Survey of International Affairs: 1935*, he indicates that Italian aggression against Ethiopia

was also an expression of culturally destructive forces. There can be no question that he, unlike Spengler, condemns Fascism as a type of cultural regression.

The two historians also diverge in their attitude toward technology. Spengler regards technics as the best refuge for the enfeebled intellects of the present age; whereas Toynbee believes that moral needs, instead of technological requirements, are now paramount. We have the essential technics that we require; our trouble is that "the new-won powers and the new-made apparatus" are being prostituted to the antisocial functions of "War and Tribalism and Slavery and Property."⁸² What our civilization needs, therefore, is a profound spiritual reorientation: less stress upon quantity and more upon quality; less regard for bare mechanical efficiency, and more concern for esthetic and moral sensitiveness. Toynbee warns us that technological development, if unaccompanied by progress toward self-determination and refinement, is but the symptom of social disintegration.

If we should venture to criticize Toynbee, we might question his formulation of the goal of society. The ideal of growth is not, as he has said, to shift the action from "the field of the external environment—whether physical or human—to the *for intérieur* of the growing personality or the growing civilization."⁸³ A wiser ideal, we believe, has been enunciated by the German esthetician, Karl Bücher, who hopes "that it will be possible to unite technics and art in a higher rhythmical unity, which will restore to the spirit the fortunate serenity and to the body the harmonious cultivation that manifest themselves at their best among primitive peoples."⁸⁴ The union of the inner and the outer, of matter and spirit; the ideal of satisfying the whole man through the integration of technics, science, and politics, with art, ethics, and an unsuperstitious religion: this is the rational goal and the logical culmination of Western civilization.

In pursuing this goal, we should remember that past so-

cities have also faced supreme crises and despaired of the lives of their cultures. Typical of the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance is the despairing cry of the French poet, Deschamps:

Time of mourning and of temptation, Age of tears, of envy and of torment, Time of languor and of damnation, Age of decline nigh to the end, Time full of horror which does all things falsely, Lying age, full of pride and of envy, Time without honour and without true judgment, Age of sadness which shortens life.⁸⁵

But the human spirit rallied from such pessimism to endure the birth pangs of a new age. We must ourselves engage without fear in a like creative ordeal.

THE PRESENT CLASH OF IDEALS

*No auguring mind can doubt that deeds which root
 In steadiest purpose only, will effect
 Deliverance from a world-calamity
 As dark as any in the vaults of Time.*

—THOMAS HARDY¹

1. *Either We or They*

THE future existence of civilization depends upon an immense mobilization of new thought and energy. Many of the old ideals, surviving from a preindustrial age, do not fit an environment fabricated by colossal trusts, combines, bureaucracies, agencies of propaganda, international movements of labor, and imperialistic aggregations of capital. Political control is still largely modeled upon a prescientific pattern; an economy of scarcity persists in an age of potential abundance; morals have not kept pace with the furious tempo of mechanical advancement; religion is powerless to stem the savagery of war or the ruthlessness of economic struggle. Technological change has been extraordinarily rapid but social institutions have remained relatively static; the consequence is a fundamental disharmony at the very heart of modern civilization. Men would like to rely upon the old moralizing agencies—the family, the church, the neighborhood, and the community; but these institutions are perhaps more insecure and ineffective than ever before in history. Hence the might of new ideals and institutions must be enlisted to curb the battalions of disaster. What I say is trite, but so long as millions persist in folly, the facts must be reemphasized.

In view of the evidence in the present volume, we cannot look to Fascism for the salvaging of Western culture. The Fascist dictatorships, we can safely conclude, do not provide the mentality which is so desperately needed; they instead

constitute the supreme threat to civilization—the expression of irrational and unbridled power upon a grand scale. Millions are wondering if tomorrow they shall not be called upon to fight and perhaps to die in a war brutally instigated by irresponsible dictators. By the time this page is read, another vast war may be reaping its ghastly harvest. Even if war is temporarily averted, the threat of world calamity is so great and so sinister that it can be checked only by the resolute and concerted action of all men of good will. Mankind has never faced a greater crisis.

The intellectual essence of this crisis can now be briefly summarized. The world is confronted by a clash between two irreconcilable ideals: humanism and antihumanism. The humanistic ideal, which underlies the greatest achievements of Western culture, is based upon the Greek ideal of intellectual aristocracy and the Christian ideal of democratic sharing. Science put to the service of human welfare; life “motivated by love and guided by knowledge”—here is an ideal as old as civilization and as new as the perpetually shifting horizon of experience. The antihumanistic ideal, which revives as nations plunge downward towards barbarism, is but the ancient code of tribalism rendered now more deadly by the hellish efficiency of lethal instruments and the pitiless dictatorship of the Power State. The character of this antihumanistic movement can be analyzed as follows:

First, the Fascists deny the universality of truth. They severely limit or reject the ideal of scientific objectivity and substitute the “will and strength” embodied in “myth,” in “intuition,” in “instinct,” in racial and nationalistic passions. The international republic of learning, created by thinkers of every race and nation, is renounced and even reviled by authoritative Fascist spokesmen. Intellectual integrity is sacrificed to the cunning arts of the propagandist.

Second, the Fascists deny the universality of values. They discard the ideal of *moral* objectivity, and condemn the lib-

eral attempt, by means of science and persuasion, to compose the bitter conflicts in human ideals. They deny the existence of valid, universal norms; they refuse to be just and impartial; they exalt and almost worship their own prejudices—the biases of race, nation, sex, class, and creed; they vilify and persecute those groups and interests which believe in fairness, equality, the acceptance of foreign values, the ultimate unity of mankind.

Third, the Fascists worship the parochial community. They have created a new collectivism, narrow, intolerant, and repressive. Whether the object of worship be called the State or the Race, the totalitarian "community" is primarily the expression of collective selfishness, opposed to the supernational interests of Western culture, and equally opposed to the freedom of individual personalities. Fascism affords no rich and inclusive unity, but a monotonous uniformity. Only a servile mind could regard this servile society as the highest of values.

Fourth, the Fascists defend inequality and class distinctions. They condemn the universality of rights, duties, and privileges which must underlie any system of democratic sharing. Representing the embattled forces of authoritarianism, they range themselves on the side of the Few against the Many. Their illiberal tactics, moreover, are unredeemed by the aristocratic virtues of the scientist and the expert; their ideal is like that of ancient Sparta, the cultivation of a military élite and the rule of martial law.

Fifth, the Fascists revive the cult of militarism. Not long after the most terrible war in history, they resolve upon imperialistic expansion as the goal of the nationalistic will-to-power, and again and again proclaim that war is the dynamism behind social advancement. At no other period in modern times has the religion of war been so brazenly professed. The damage from such militarism, quite apart from the terrific suffering in Ethiopia, Spain, and China, is incalculably

great. Even if a huge international war is narrowly averted, this "peace" is a fraud and a cheat. It is accompanied by crisis after crisis; by the tension and waste of a huge armaments race; by war enmity, war censorship, war repression. The antihumanistic outlook of Fascism inevitably finds expression in strife.

Sixth, the Fascists employ the mask of idealism to conceal the bitter truth. Much of the appeal of Fascism depends upon its supposed opposition to materialism, but its idealism is like the esprit of a military corps: it reenforces aggressive intent and overweening chauvinism, and diverts attention from misery and predatory interests. Its metaphysics, religion, esthetics, and ruralism cannot wholly disguise the principle upon which it operates: "man a wolf to man." Under the system of totalitarianism, no activity, however "idealistic," is exempt from censorship, regimentation, and tribal discipline.

If we should try to condense into a single formula the essence of Fascism, we should maintain that it is *the denial of universality*. The universality of truth, of value, of law, of human rights—in other words, the solidarity of mankind—is rejected in favor of the partisanship of race, nation, and class. By a dialectical necessity, the humanistic or anti-Fascist forces must defend the opposite standpoint: they must put their trust in humanity, justice, good will, and international understanding. As opposed to the Fascist "revolt against reason," they must defend the ideal of criticism, of objectivity, of persuasion, of unfettered research, of universal science. As opposed to the defense of class stratification, they must strive to create a truly democratic society in which the full resources of humanity will be put to the service of the maximum welfare. The humanistic ideal must be the *integral* personality nourished by the *universal* culture: nations no longer at loggerheads, peoples no longer divided into exploiters and exploited, personalities no longer maimed by want or tyranny:

“the harmony of enduring individualities connected in the unity of a background.”

I fear that this contrast between humanism and anti-humanism, between the democratic and the Fascist ideal, may seem to be dramatically heightened. Yet as one reads Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, or Rosenberg's *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, or Mussolini's article in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, the contrast appears quite as uncompromising as I have described it. My conclusions, in fact, are greatly reinforced by the book of Aurel Kolnai, *The War Against the West*.² This compendious work, which summarizes the theory of scores of authoritative Nazi books, is a veritable chamber of horrors, compared with which my own documentation is mild. In describing the Nazi *Weltanschauung*, Kolnai is indicating the major characteristics of Fascism; for Italian Fascism is no longer in the vanguard of the Fascist movement, and German Fascism is determining the main tenor of the movement. The slavish way in which the Italian spokesmen are imitating the racial ideas in Germany, and the supine manner in which Mussolini has allowed Hitler to seize Austria and thereby to destroy a field of Italian influence and expansion, are but two indications that Germany is now exercising the principal initiative. Yet even before Hitler became the generalissimo of the Fascist camp, the contrast between Democracy and Fascism was evident. Mussolini was but stating a sober fact when he declared in his famous Palazzo Venezia speech on October 8, 1921: “The struggle between two worlds [Democracy and Fascism] can permit no compromise. . . . Either We or They!”

2. *The Need of United Action*

Even in “isolated” America, we must not lull ourselves into a false sense of security. It is obvious that the antidemocratic offensive is world-wide, and that it threatens free insti-

tutions wheresoever they exist. The regime of Metaxas in Greece, of Franco in Spain, of Salazar in Portugal, of Vargas in Brazil; the Fascist movements in Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Roumania, Hungary, and all the Balkan States; the militarism and repression in Japan; the very ominous trend towards Fascism and civil war in France; the pro-Fascist inclination of officials in the British government; the recurrent dictatorships in South America, the revolt of Cedillo in Mexico, the repression in Quebec, the curtailment of civil liberty in Jersey City, the terrorism in Harlan and other American industrial centers—indicate that German and Italian Fascism are simply the most striking manifestations of a world-wide tendency. We must not delude ourselves into supposing that we live in a social vacuum: if peace or democracy is destroyed in the rest of the world, we cannot escape without catastrophe.

There is no good reason to think that the United States is immune from Fascism. The tradition of violence is indigenuous to our country: we have had innumerable cases of lynching, vigilante terrorism, strike-breaking, industrial espionage, and forcible suppression of civil liberties. Our multimillionaires are powerfully entrenched and seem determined to retain control at almost any cost.³ Economic problems, at the same time, are far from being solved, and there is every likelihood of acute crises in the future. The struggle between those who have and those who have not will almost certainly intensify; many dangers will beset us before a genuine economic democracy is achieved. Under these circumstances, the threat to democratic institutions is not a matter of months or even a few years: so deep is the present world crisis that it may require a century fully to recover and to safeguard popular institutions.

The greatest danger is that factional differences will divide those who believe in democracy; for the tactics of Fascism, we must remember, are always the same: divide and conquer. The dissension and irresolution of the anti-Fascist forces in

Germany and Italy alone permitted Hitler and Mussolini to attain power. Austria, in turn, became an easy prey of the Nazis, because Dollfuss had earlier killed and imprisoned the Socialist leaders and curbed the workers—who were passionately devoted to democracy—and because the British Prime Minister had, in effect, pursued a policy of nonresistance to Fascist aggression. The Spanish Government, representing a coalition of anti-Fascist forces, maintained indeed an heroic stand against Rightist insurrection; yet the aggression was possible in the first place only because of indecision and lingering dissension among the anti-Fascist groups. The other democratic countries, moreover, deserted and betrayed Spanish democracy; whereas Hitler and Mussolini, acting in unison, utilized the farce of “nonintervention” to crush a liberal democracy under a remorseless superiority of lethal machinery and imported battalions. Thus encouraged, Hitler demanded the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. In this critical situation, Britain and France, instead of taking a firm stand, virtually became the accomplices of the dictators in smashing the chief bastion of democracy in Central Europe.

Unity among the anti-Fascists has not yet been achieved in Great Britain and the United States. The British Labor Party has been weakened by factionalism, and has been unable to unite with the Liberals on the right or the radical forces on the left; a Tory government has consequently remained in power, to the encouragement and obvious delight of the Fascist dictators.⁴ In the United States, the labor groups, instead of uniting to defend and advance democracy, have ferociously attacked one another; and similar divisions have greatly weakened the progressive forces in the political field. The President, it is true, has eloquently championed the policy of “quarantining” aggressor nations and of respecting international agreements; yet his Administration established and maintained the Spanish embargo, the effect of which was, first, to “quarantine” a friendly Republic, defending

itself against internal and foreign aggression, and second, to violate a solemn treaty dating from 1902 guaranteeing "full and entire liberty of commerce and navigation" between Spain and the United States. Japan, obviously an aggressor and a treaty-breaker, has been allowed to buy in the United States the greater proportion of her military equipment, with which she has fought a war almost unparalleled in the amount of suffering it has wrought. Such contradictions in policy and divisions in the ranks have very seriously impaired the strength and prestige of democracy.

The opponents of concerted action often employ the argument that we should enter into no group or alliance in which there can be detected Communist influence. This contention, however, is not always disinterestedly advanced; the fear of Communism, which underlies the argument, has been artificially stimulated by the Fascists and their sympathizers. Mussolini has assiduously fostered the myth that Italy was menaced by the "reds" at the time of the March on Rome; yet before the event, the Duce himself wrote that Bolshevism was dead in Italy (Editorial, *Popolo d'Italia*, June 2, 1921). The Nazi Minister of Propaganda, Herr Goebbels, likewise employs the Communist bogey as his favorite device; he uses it to excuse the persecution of mild liberals and even decent conservatives. In preparing forcibly to partition Czechoslovakia, the Nazis denounced the little Republic as under the control of Moscow; yet reliable news agencies, such as the *Manchester Guardian* and the *New York Times*, have been unanimous in reporting that these charges lacked foundation. Many apologists for Franco have declared that he and his Fascist allies fought to save Spain from Communism, and millions of good people have been thus deceived; yet according to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (a conservative British authority), there were only about fifty thousand Communists in the entire country when the revolt began,⁵ and at no time have the Communists in the govern-

ment been more than a relatively small minority. The Japanese authorities have likewise tried to persuade their own people and the rest of the world that China must be rescued by military assault from the "red peril"; although these tactics have certainly strengthened whatever Communist influence has existed in China, and have doomed more than a million non-Communists, Metaxas in Greece, and Vargas in Brazil, have boasted that their dictatorships have "saved" their countries from Communism, yet in both nations there has not been the remotest threat of Communist control. Even in America, there is not an important political campaign in which certain liberals are not denounced as Communists or Communist sympathizers; and repeatedly civil rights have been suppressed and labor unions have been attacked as a "protection against Communism." An argument which is so often abused should be examined with some care.

Surely a good cause should not be deserted merely because Communists support it. Indeed, it would seem to be no great tragedy that Communists, all over the world, are now combining with the milder democratic groups against Fascism and reaction and in defense of republican institutions. There would seem to be more occasion for worry if the Communists, who represent internationally a force of immense power, were to exercise their influence against democracy and in support of Fascism.

The Communists and the Fascists, it is well to remember, have not only bitterly opposed each other, but have pursued very different policies in respect to Spain, China, Czechoslovakia, the Jews, the League of Nations, the Popular Front, capitalism, imperialism, public health and education, the sharing of wealth and privileges, and countless other matters. With all its faults, the Soviet working-class dictatorship, judged upon the basis of its professed ideals and established record, is extremely different from a Fascist dictatorship.

We shall be able to view the situation with greater calm-

ness if we remember that conditions in the United States and England are quite unlike the conditions which ushered in the Soviet regime. Russia had long suffered from bloody despotism, general illiteracy, and desperate poverty. In the transitional period, moreover, these ancient evils were aggravated by world war, economic collapse, blockade, famine, civil strife, and foreign intervention. With not only this heritage from the past but with new and ever-present dangers to combat, the Russian people have not been able to achieve a full-fledged democracy. It is very unfortunate that they have not, but it would be a miracle if they had.

Now the Communists have truly declared that no such conditions prevail in modern England and America as in pre-Socialist Russia, and that no such desperate methods need be employed in these countries as under the Soviet dictatorship.⁶ The Communists do believe, however, that during a period of acute social crisis, when the very basis of society is being transformed, a powerfully entrenched minority will resist the will of the majority to create a new social order, and that the resistance, as in Spain, may reach the extreme of Fascist insurrection. They contend, with more realism than some of their critics, that civil war and Fascist victory can be averted at this stage by no other means than the severe curtailment of the liberties of those whose principle is the denial of the liberties of the majority.

Mindful of the Communist position and of the facts which give it weight, sincere liberals must guard against the favorite propagandistic device of Fascism—the bogey of Communism. They should not be frightened out of their wits by the presence of a small Communist party within the nation. They should not fail vigorously to support peace, democracy, civil rights, and a decent standard of life merely because Communists likewise support them. If they desert good causes because of such fears, they need not be surprised if the common people eventually turn to Communism as more resolute

and sincere, or to Fascism as more alluring. A democracy that is weak and vacillating is merely preparing its own funeral.

3. *Fascist Strategy and the Counter-Tactics of Democracy*

The main features of Fascist strategy should now be clear. Briefly, they are as follows: The real issues are systematically obscured; Jews and other scapegoats are blamed for the ills of the nation; "strong men" arise who trade upon every grievance, and promise all things to all people. The fear of Communism, as we have seen, is exploited to the utmost; men and movements not really Communist are labeled as such; and Fascism is advanced as the only effective barrier against Communist revolution. As soon as the Fascists achieve military strength, the fear of war is also recklessly exploited, and those who oppose Fascist expansion are threatened with military assault. Hating and fearing war, the democratic powers are brought to capitulate; they abandon united resistance and adopt a policy of "appeasement." This permits the Fascists to attack their victims one by one, and thus to wage a war of attrition against democracy. New territory is generally acquired by fomenting strife within the country to be attacked, and employing military threat or actual force to "restore order." (Such tactics have been used against China, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, and have been tried against France in the Cagoulard plot.) In contrast to the disunity of their enemies, the Fascists present a united front: they support each other in international aggression (*e.g.*, the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle), stir up nationalistic and racial passion as a means of solidifying "patriotic" opinion, and put down internal resistance by censorship and totalitarian repression. Now these tactics have proved abominably successful, and they can only be defeated by resourceful counter-tactics.

To set forth adequately the proper strategy of the democratic forces would require another volume, but I cannot conclude this book without stating a few principles which already command a large measure of agreement.

First, it is extremely important to distinguish between short-range and long-range objectives, and to unite upon the basis of the former even when it is impossible to agree about the latter. Unquestionably there is a great deal of disagreement among anti-Fascists as to remote ends. Many people who favor political Democracy are not yet convinced that it is necessary to establish genuine economic Democracy. The majority of people in the United States and Great Britain are not ready for Socialism, *yet they do favor the maintenance of our fundamental civil rights and our present democratic institutions*. The formation of the democratic front should depend upon the latter convictions and not the former. The time is short, and the need of unity is pressing. To emphasize the more remote objectives, about which people are divided, at the expense of the more immediate objectives which command general agreement, is surely to court disunity and defeat. Let us unite when we do agree and differ only when we must.

Certain things we must defend *now*: peace, democracy, and the national standard of life. The task of practical leadership is to embody these great causes in proposals so simple and concrete that well-intentioned men everywhere will rally to their defense. If men learn to work together for such immediate ends, they will be the more nearly prepared to work together in the international and cooperative society of the future. But of course, in uniting upon the basis of immediate objectives, we should by no means cease to ponder ultimate goals, and the sooner we reach agreement and clear understanding about these, the fewer disastrous mistakes we shall make now and in the long run.

Second, the movement to advance democracy and check

Fascism must have a solid foundation in the ranks of labor. For a number of reasons, labor exercises decisive power in any anti-Fascist front. Both numerical strength and high degree of organization render it extremely potent. Since it manufactures and transports the sinews of war and does most of the fighting, it is involved in any effective movement to prevent war and to check Fascist aggression. Its interests are sharply opposed to the repression and authoritarianism of the Fascist system, and most fully in accord with both economic and political democracy. No other class in the community stands to gain so much from a new equalitarian social order; the struggle of the workers is therefore the fundamental dynamic that can lift society to the level of a classless humanism. On the other hand, there is no other class that stands to lose so much from the inequalitarian practices of Fascism; consequently no other class can be depended upon to oppose so resolutely the forces that perpetuate and intensify social oppression. No country is seriously in danger from internal Fascist developments so long as labor is united, clear as to its own interests, and democratic in its forms of control and organization. Anti-Fascists should therefore do all in their power to build unity, strength, democracy, and clarity of purpose within labor's ranks, and to enlist allies in the professional and middle-class groups for the workers' efforts in behalf of peace, democracy, and an adequate standard of life.

Third, it is necessary for democracy to offer a better way of life to the people in the Fascist countries than their own dictators can possibly afford. Fascism will not be defeated until a great many of its own people and its sympathizers in the democratic countries stop supporting it. To effect this change of opinion, the democratic forces must draw up such plans and achieve such victories as will provide a deep appeal to common people everywhere.

We must recognize that the Fascist countries have certain

grievances, whether real or imaginary, which have won them an effective measure of support. Chief among these is the charge that their low standard of living is the result of the selfish policies of rival imperialist Powers in refusing to the Fascist nations a place in the sun. Although this contention is by no means entirely sound,⁷ the strife of rival imperialisms is unquestionably a major cause of Fascism and war. Hence, the proper answer to this complaint is not the surrender of colonial peoples to the cruelty of Fascist dictatorship and racial prejudice, but the abandonment of a selfish imperialistic policy upon the part of the "democratic" states.

The real facts should be frankly admitted: Great Britain is (within limits) a democracy, but the British Empire is not; France is similarly a democracy, but the French Empire is not; the United States is likewise a democracy, but it has opposed democratic movements in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and other dependencies and spheres of influence. As rapidly as possible the people in the democracies should be won over to a different policy: to the surrender of exclusive national sovereignty in the colonial territories, and the establishment of international control of essential raw materials, so that no nation which agrees to cooperate shall be deprived of its equitable share, and no people shall be ruthlessly exploited for the benefit of foreign masters. Either colonial possessions should be internationalized under such conditions as would be just to the natives, or they should be converted into self-governing States to which the advantages of civilization would then be extended upon the basis of equality. Unquestionably any such plan cannot be quickly realized, but no other plan is fully compatible with peace and democracy.

At the same time that the democracies advance towards a juster international order, they must demonstrate the advantages of a democratic way of life in their internal policies. Democracy cannot win by a purely defensive campaign; its strength lies in devotion to public welfare—in a steady move-

ment towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance, and oppression. Every victory in such a campaign will add to the attractiveness of the democratic creed, and diminish the rival appeal of Fascism.

Fourth, the democrats of the world must fortify themselves with the knowledge of their united strength and the rightness of their cause, and must bring to an end the policy of retreat and compromise. If we consider the relative strength of the Fascist and non-Fascist States, the disproportion is truly great. France, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia control the major portion of the wealth and power of the world. It is correct also to include among the non-Fascist powers: the French colonies, the British Dominions and colonies, China, a number of the smaller States of Europe, especially Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries, and most of South and Central America. The Fascist States, despite their great gains, are still relatively very weak in population and ill supplied with the raw materials necessary to conduct a war. Germany and Italy must import either all or a considerable part of their rubber, jute, cotton, wool, oil, gasoline, iron, zinc, copper, nickel, gold, tin, bauxite (from which aluminum is extracted), tungsten and molybdenum (essential for various military purposes). Japan is likewise limited in resources, and is approaching exhaustion in its war against China; it cannot be expected effectively to aid Germany and Italy for a long time to come.

Of course, if Japan conquers and exploits a large part of China, and if Italy and Germany attain control of all Central and South-Eastern Europe or other rich territories, the balance of forces will be tremendously altered. There is still time for the principal democratic States to organize a great Peace Coalition, backed by overwhelming resources; but with every victory of the Fascist powers the opportunity grows less, and the danger of a long and terrible World War

grows correspondingly greater. Yet obviously the policy of the democracies, especially in the case of England, has been to acquiesce in this shift of forces. The Japanese armies have seized Manchuria, Mussolini has crushed Ethiopia, Italian and German Fascists have invaded Spain, Japanese troops have again overrun China, German soldiers have occupied Austria, the Nazis have fomented civil strife in Czechoslovakia and have forcibly liquidated the little Republic. On none of these occasions have the democratic powers made a determined stand against aggression; and it has become increasingly clear that the Fascist war of attrition against democracy will achieve victory after victory and the international anarchy will become ever more accentuated so long as the Tories of France and England continue their policy of compromise. But these collusive statesmen will not forever stay in office, and even now there are mighty forces to mobilize in defense of democracy.

The events following the Munich Pact indicate the disastrous effect of the program of "appeasement," and the need of a much firmer policy. The safeguards of international law were all but destroyed by the new wave of blackmail and treaty-breaking; minority problems were created far more serious than those which existed before the Pact was signed; Poland and Hungary, like wolves, seized their share of the prey; Czechoslovakia was lost to democracy, France and Britain suffered a terrific blow to their prestige and power, the democratic forces were weakened throughout the world; Germany, in contrast, gained enormously in psychological, military, and economic strength; the Nazis, thus encouraged, intensified their persecution of the Jews, revived their colonial demands, and began a great press campaign for the "liberation" of the Ukraine; Central and South-Eastern Europe were opened to more effective German penetration; Hungary and Rightist Spain joined the Fascist "Anti-Comintern" alliance; Japan, perceiving the

weakness of Britain's foreign policy, landed troops in South China, isolated the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, and cut off China's direct access to the sea; Italy, rattling its Fascist saber, began loudly to clamor for Tunisia, Jibuti, Corsica, Nice, and Savoy; Loyalist Spain, abandoned by the democratic powers, fell at last before the reenforced legions of the dictators; the armament race was accelerated to a degree thought impossible a few months previous, and the greater part of the world faced the twin dangers of war and economic collapse. To cap the climax, Hitler utterly demolished the Munich Pact just five months after he had signed it. Despite his insistence upon racial self-determination, despite his guarantee of the new boundaries of Czechoslovakia, despite his "renunciation" of further territorial aspirations in Europe, his government and its vast army seized the defenceless nation of Czechs and Slovaks. The Italians, inspired to do likewise, thereupon invaded and subjugated Albania. At this eleventh hour, Chamberlain and Daladier, discarding their policy of "appeasement," began to organize the anti-Fascist forces, which they had earlier done so much to destroy. These statesmen may again compromise and retreat, but this much is evident: the democracies cannot continue to surrender to the Fascist dictators without jeopardizing their very existence. They *must* have the courage to unite and stand their ground.

Unquestionably there are risks and obligations in the policy of unified resistance; but it would be folly to suppose that there are not great dangers and extremely great penalties in surrender and perpetual retreat. Are we not willing to hazard something for our basic convictions? Are we not prepared to run some risks for the sake of freedom, democracy, the eternal truths of the past, and the hopes of tomorrow? Shall we permit all the courage and resolution to be exercised by the forces of intolerance?

We must engage in no acts of aggression ourselves, and be just, calm, and humane in the exercise of our power: so to

conduct ourselves is a sign of mental strength. Yet we must not fall prey to fears and hesitations, and must realize that a great deal is demanded of us. As Kolnai points out, there is no simple or easy solution:

Resistance can only be planned sensibly and effectively by action in many fields at once. There is no such thing as a single remedy: there is no such thing as a nostrum, philosophical or political, which would work alone, swiftly and infallibly. No action except an integral one: spiritual and political; ideological, moral, scientific, social, economic, diplomatic, and if need be, military; inward and outward at the same time—will be of a size to meet the emergency. Intellectual criticism and self-reassertion will only attain to spiritual stature if backed by a determination to hold our ground in every sense. Armaments and protective treaties will be condemned to political vacuity unless there be a spiritual substance to direct and guarantee their application.⁸

Whatever action be taken, America and Great Britain will exercise the decisive role. The immense resources of the United States will be a principal factor in determining the outcome of any major contest. No aggressors can hope to win in the end if we refuse them the aid of American trade and credits and amply extend such aid to their victims. Equipped with tremendous economic strength and protected by incomparable natural barriers, we can determine the fate of the world under such conditions as to minimize the danger of our being plunged into war. Great Britain and its Dominions are equal to the United States in power and prestige; these countries united under vigorous democratic leadership, with the support of France and Russia, are absolutely invincible. All the odds are on our side, and we are playing for the greatest stakes in history. Let us act with the resolution that befits free men defending their freedom. "*The ultimate victory, the ultimate victory of tomorrow,*" President Roosevelt has truly declared, "*is with democracy . . . for no people can be kept eternally ignorant or eternally enslaved.*"⁹

NOTES

Title merely followed by date indicates that the work has been cited previously. Publisher, city, and date are usually given when the title of a book is first introduced.

CHAPTER I

1. Johan Huizinga, *In the Shadow of Tomorrow*, Norton, New York, 1936, p. 16.
2. Cf. Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1918, p. 498.
3. Benito Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, Vallecchi, Florence, 1936, p. 46.
4. G. A. Borgese, *Goliath: The March of Fascism*, Viking Press, New York, 1937, pp. 217-18.
5. Mussolini, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
6. Speech by Mussolini, May 26, 1937. *Bulletin of International News*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. XIV, p. 4. (Oct. 2, 1937.)
7. Speech by Mussolini, May 17, 1930. *Documents on International Affairs: 1930*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1931, p. 116.
8. Speech by Mussolini, Aug. 24, 1934. *Documents on International Affairs: 1934*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1935, p. 362.
9. Mussolini's Address to the General Assembly of the National Council of Corporations, March 23, 1936. *Source Book on European Governments*, Van Nostrand, New York, 1937, pp. III-84-86.
10. Cf. *Armaments Year Book*, League of Nations, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1937; and the similar *Year Book* for 1938. The outlay for 1937 is nearly three times as much as the world military expenditure in 1913, and there is a substantial increase in 1938. After the Munich Settlement in Sept., 1938, military preparations have greatly speeded up.
11. *New York Times*, March 22, 1936.

12. Speech by Mussolini at Udine, Sept., 1922. Barone Bernardo Quaranto di San Sevirino, *Mussolini As Revealed in His Political Speeches*, Dent, London, 1923, p. 146.

13. Quoted by George Seldes, *You Can't Do That*, Modern Age Books, New York, 1938, p. 192.

14. Sections 7 and 9, "The Labor Charter," passed by the Fascist Grand Council, April 21, 1937. *Source Book on European Governments*, 1937, pp. III-45-46.

15. Speech before the Reichstag on March 23, 1933. *Ibid.*, p. IV-130. In the course of a debate in Berlin in May, 1930, Hitler also declared: "It is absurd that workers should interfere with the management of economic affairs. . . . They have no claim to a share in property." For the text of this debate, cf. Otto Strasser, *Ministersessel oder Revolution?* Berlin, 1930.

16. Werner Sombart, *Deutscher Sozialismus*, 1934, has appeared in translation under the title, *A New Social Philosophy*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1937. Cf. pp. 49-51.

17. Cf. San Sevirino, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-85.

18. Speech of Hitler at Nürnberg, Sept. 9, 1936, *International Conciliation*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nov., 1936, p. 552.

19. Charles Maurras, *Dilemme de Marc Sangnier*, p. xiv. Quoted by Julien Benda, "The Enemies of Democracy in France," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XIII, p. 285 (Jan., 1935).

20. San Sevirino, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

21. Cf. Mussolini, *Gerarchia*, March, 1923, p. 803. Reproduced in Herbert W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1928, p. 342.

22. See the articles on the German economic situation by Tolischus, *New York Times*, May 16-19, 1938. My quotations are from these articles.

23. "Capitalism in Germany," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 29, 1938.

24. R. Walther Darré, *Neuadel aus Blut und Boden*, J. F. Lehmann, Munich, 1930, p. 156.

25. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," *International Conciliation*, Jan., 1935, p. 9 (translation of an article contributed to the *Enciclopedia Italiana* in 1932; the best short official summary of Fascist theory available in English).

26. "Official Announcement given out by the Trustee for Labor for the economic district Brandenburg," quoted by Rob-

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27. Quoted in Evangelical Church Letter Submitted to Chancellor Hitler in June, 1936, *International Conciliation*, Nov., 1936, p. 563.

28. General Hermann Göring, *Germany Reborn*, Mathews & Marrot, London, 1934, pp. 37-38.

29. *Popolo d'Italia*, Feb. 1, 1921; reproduced in Herbert W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, 1928, p. 275.

30. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Munich, 1936, p. 687.

31. Cf. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, p. 52.

32. Quoted by Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 150. Brady's book is a convincing demonstration of the capitalistic character of German Fascism. The books of Gaetano Salvemini similarly demonstrate the capitalistic character of Italian Fascism.

33. Speech by Mussolini at Milan, Oct. 4, 1922. Gioacchino Volpe, *History of the Fascist Movement*, Soc. An. Poligrafica Italiana (no date), p. 105.

34. Emil Ludwig, *Talks with Mussolini*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1933, p. 126.

35. Cf. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, *op. cit.*, p. 371. Italics mine.

36. Joseph Goebbels, *My Part in Germany's Fight*, Hurst & Blackett, London, 1935, p. 149. (Diary, Sept. 4, 1932.)

37. Mussolini, *Messaggi e Proclami*, Milan, 1929, pp. 38-39.

CHAPTER II

1. Quoted by Hans Kohn, *Force or Reason*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1937, p. 73. Meinecke is one of the greatest of modern German historians.

2. James Drennan, *B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism*, Murray, London, 1934, pp. 212-13.

3. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," 1935, pp. 6-7.

4. Cf. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Modern Library, New York (no date), p. 4; and *The Will to Power*, Macmillan, London, 1910, Vol. II, pp. 358-59.

5. On the influence of Nietzsche on Mussolini, see Margherita Sarfatti, *The Life of Benito Mussolini*, Frederick A.

Stokes, New York, 1925, pp. 141-43; and Gaudens Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1938, pp. 138 ff. Rosenberg pays tribute to Nietzsche in *Blut und Ehre*, Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Munich, 1936, p. 297; and *Gestaltung der Idee*, Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Munich, 1937, p. 18.

6. Cf. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (transl. from 3rd French ed., 1912), B. W. Huebsch, New York (no date), pp. 130-31.

7. Rosenberg, *Gestaltung der Idee*, 1937, p. 149.

8. Sarfatti, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

9. Quoted by Sir Herbert Samuels, "Wars of Ideas," *International Conciliation*, May, 1937, p. 475.

10. Herbert W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, 1928, p. 346; translated from Gentile, *Che cosa è il Fascismo*, Vallecchi, Florence, 1925.

11. From a speech by Mussolini at Trieste, Sept., 1920. San Sevirino, *Mussolini As Revealed in His Political Speeches*, 1923, pp. 114-15.

12. From the famous essay by William James, "The Will to Believe."

13. Emil Ludwig, *Talks with Mussolini*, 1933, pp. 195, 208-9.

14. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Holt, New York, 1911, p. 176.

15. Speech by Mussolini at Naples, Oct. 24, 1922. Quoted by Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy*, Holt, New York, 1935, p. 218.

16. Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Hoheneichen-Verlag, Munich, 1935, p. 114.

17. Rosenberg, *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, p. 142.

18. Rosenberg, *Mythus*, 1935, p. 120.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

21. Cf. Lion Feuchtwanger, "How Germany Persecutes Writers," *Nation*, July 24, 1937.

22. Cf. Edward Y. Hartshorne, *German Universities and National Socialism*, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1937, pp. 72-73, 93-95, 100-101. The number of dismissals has undoubtedly increased since the publication of this book; if we include the dismissals in Austria and Czechoslovakia since the annexations, there has been a very substantial increase.

23. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 1936, pp. 468, 473.

24. Rosenberg, *Gestaltung der Idee*, 1937, pp. 203, 214.

25. Rosenberg, *Mythus*, 1935, p. 28.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 76 ff.
28. Cf. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, June 30 and July 1, 1936, and *New York Times*, the same dates.
29. *Nature*, April 24, 1937, p. 702.
30. *Nature*, Jan. 18, 1936, p. 93.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
32. "Heidelberg, Spinoza and Academic Freedom," *Nature*, Feb. 22, 1936, p. 303.
33. *Deutsche Mathematik*, Jan., 1936. Quoted in Hans Kohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-34. For further indication of the state of science in Germany, cf. Charles A. Beard, "Education Under the Nazis," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XIV (1936), pp. 437-52; Dorothy Thompson, "Culture Under the Nazis," *ibid.*, pp. 407-23; Robert A. Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, 1937, Chaps. II and III; Edward Y. Hartshorne, *op. cit.*; and the collection of letters and comments, *Heidelberg and the Universities of America*, Viking Press, New York, 1936.
34. Cf. dispatch from Lucerne, Switzerland, in *New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1938. A volume of speeches and official statements by President Roosevelt and ex-Premier Stanley Baldwin has been banned by the German Government. "It is believed here," the dispatch states, "that this is the first time any Western European Government has barred official statements by the head of another State with which it maintains diplomatic relations."
35. Cf. "Berlin in 1937," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Sept. 3, 1937.
36. *Mein Kampf*, p. 198.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
38. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *When There Is No Peace*, Macmillan, New York, 1939, pp. 93-94. This book, by the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, is an excellent analysis of the causes and consequences of the Munich Pact.
39. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 28, 1937.
40. Cf. article by Gaetano Salvemini, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 30, 1937. Later evidence indicates that the Cagouards, French Fascist group, are implicated in the murders.
41. *New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1938.
42. Benedetto Croce, "The Future of Democracy," *New Republic*, April 7, 1937, p. 255.

43. Cf. Max Ascoli, "The Fascisti's March on Scholarship," *American Scholar*, Winter, 1938, pp. 50-59; and Gaetano Salvemini, *Under the Axe of Fascism*, Viking Press, New York, 1936, pp. 81-88.
44. Address reprinted in *Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto*, Vol. VIII (1928), pp. 451, 452-53. Quoted by H. Arthur Steiner, "The Fascist Conception of Law," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. XXXVI, p. 1271, Dec., 1936.
45. Emilio Bodrero, "Die Geschichte als dynamische Element," *Europäische Revue*, Vol. III, p. 646 (Nov., 1927).
46. Julien Benda, *The Great Betrayal* (transl. of *La Trahison des Clercs*), Routledge, London, 1928, p. 77.
47. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, p. 53.
48. Rosenberg, *Mythus*, 1935, p. 544.
49. Adam Müller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, Gustav Fischer, Vol. I, p. 128 (June 1922). (Original ed., Berlin, 1809.)
50. Quoted by Jerome Davis, *Contemporary Social Movements*, Appleton-Century, New York, 1930, pp. 489-90.
51. Cf. Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy*, 1935, p. 200.
52. Cf. summary of the "thirteen commandments" of the Nazi Party, *New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1938.
53. Cf. Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 443.
54. Rabindranath Tagore, "East to West," *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1927, pp. 730-31.
55. Quoted by John Morley, at head of the second chapter, "Of the Possible Utility of Error," of *On Compromise*, published in 1874. This chapter is much worth reading in the present connection. I have restated in briefer form several of Morley's arguments.
56. Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

CHAPTER III

1. George Santayana, *Reason in Science*, Scribner, New York, 1928, p. 319.
2. Cf. Mussolini, *My Autobiography*, Scribner, New York, 1928, p. 14.
3. Cf. Margherita Sarfatti, *The Life of Benito Mussolini*, 1925, p. 101.
4. Cf. Gaudens Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making*, 1938, p. 115.

5. On the influence of the *Voce* and its editor, Prezzolini, see Peter M. Riccio, *On the Threshold of Fascism*, Casa Italiana, Columbia University, New York, 1929, especially pp. 162-70.

6. Pareto points out that when an economist speaks of "utility" or "value" he does not mean what is objectively valuable from an ethical standpoint. "Exchange value" or "marginal utility" has nothing to do with value in the ethical sense. If the reader of Pareto will bear this in mind, he will find no contradiction between the quotations in the present chapter and the occasional passages where Pareto is discussing "value" or "utility" (or, to use his own term, "ophelimity") from the economic point of view. Ethical value, he thinks, cannot be objectively determined, but economic value within limits can be, simply because it is not ethical. For an interesting criticism of "equilibrium economics," to which Pareto adheres, see John Strachey, *The Nature of Capitalist Crisis*, Covici-Friede, New York, 1935, pp. 159-64. Pareto's highly subjectivistic theory of value involves an abandonment of any real consideration of an economics of *welfare*. The paradoxical consequences of this position are indicated by Strachey.

7. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (English translation of *Trattato di Sociologia generale*), Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1935, Vol. I, p. 497. (Further references to this work of Pareto in the notes will be to the volumes and page numbers of this English translation.) Compare: "Aristotle . . . determines what state one *ought* to prefer: 'If one would soundly ascertain what the best state is he must first determine what the best life is.' With that, we leave the field of the experimental relative to go wandering compassless in the field of the metaphysical absolute. In reality Aristotle does not determine his absolute—a thing that would be impossible. He merely finds the solution to the problem that best accords with his own sentiments. . . ." (Vol. IV, p. 1458.)

8. Vol. III, pp. 1241-42.

9. Vol. I, p. 311.

10. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 499-500.

11. Vilfredo Pareto, *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, 2nd ed., Marcel Giard, Paris, 1926, Vol. I, p. 308. The viewpoint of this book, which Mussolini has praised, is similar to that of the *Trattato*.

12. Vol. III, pp. 1281-82.

13. Vol. III, p. 1293.

14. Vol. III, p. 1345.
15. Vol. III, p. 1402.
16. Moeller Van den Bruck, *Germany's Third Empire* (translation by E. O. Lorimer of *Das Dritte Reich*, 1923), George Allen & Unwin, London, 1934, p. 178.
17. R. Walther Darré, *Neuadel aus Blut und Boden*, 1930, pp. 205-6. (Part of this passage, in the original, is quoted from another writer, Eduard von Stackelberg, but the ideas are accepted by Darré.)
18. Sarfatti, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
19. Cf. Spinoza, *Ethic*, 4th Part, Proposition VII: "An affect cannot be restrained nor removed except by an opposed and stronger affect" (White and Sterling transl., Oxford Univ. Press, 1930.)
20. Cf. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford Univ. Press, 1928, p. 458. Compare the statement by Jeremy Bentham written to his disciple, Dumont, May 11, 1802: "In the invention or choice of a fundamental principle for morals or politics, what writers of all parties and descriptions have aimed at hitherto has been the hitting upon some cant word or short form of words, such as should serve as a sort of hook on which to hang the opinions of which their prejudices and passions have been productive" (*Bentham's Theory of Fictions*, ed. by C. K. Ogden, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1932, p. xxvi). Pareto would not only subscribe to this statement, but add that all ethics, now and in the future, can arise in no other way.
21. Pascal, *Thoughts*, P. F. Collier, New York, 1910, p. 105.
22. Lawrence Dennis, *The Coming American Fascism*, Harper, New York, 1936, p. 105.
23. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, p. 9.
24. The *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* is a work of international scholarship published by Macmillan. The report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends is summarized in *Recent Social Trends*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1932.
25. George Santayana, *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*, Scribner, New York, 1931, p. 39.
26. James Strachey Barnes, *Fascism*, Holt, New York, 1931, pp. 65, 67.
27. Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, Vol. I, p. 36 n. Pareto's hostility to metaphysics, revealed in this passage and elsewhere,

may also be challenged; but to do so would lead us too far astray.

28. Edward L. Thorndike, "Science and Values," *Science*, Jan. 3, 1936, pp. 7-8.

29. Pareto, Vol. I, p. 13.

30. Quoted by T. V. Smith, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XLV, p. 117 (March, 1936).

31. Rosenberg, *Gestaltung der Idee*, 1937, p. 55 (Rosenberg's italics).

32. Pareto, Vol. III, p. 1269.

33. Mario Palmieri, *The Philosophy of Fascism*, Dante Alighieri Society, Chicago, 1936, p. 82. This book was published under the auspices of the Dante Alighieri Society, Rome, with an introduction by Dr. Guido Corni, Honorary Governor of Italian Somaliland, and with the approval of Mussolini. The translation of the present passage from *Il Duce* is therefore semiofficial.

34. Cf. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, American Book Co., New York, 1937, Vol. III, p. 529, for a statement of conclusions which are contrary to Pareto's arraignment of human thought. Sorokin's generalizations are based upon a much more systematic survey than the opposite views of Pareto, who depends upon an impressionistic jotting down of examples and takes no adequate note of negative instances.

35. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Harcourt, Brace, 1936, p. 43.

36. Gaudens Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making*, 1938, p. 333. The previous quotations from Mussolini appear in Megaro's book, pp. 66, 86, 146, 319, 329, 330.

37. Pareto, Vol. IV, p. 1476.

38. Cf. Vol. III, p. 1032.

39. Cf. Vol. IV, p. 1477.

40. Cf. the summary of this article by Gioacchino Volpe, *History of the Fascist Movement* (no date), p. 81, from which the phrases quoted have been taken. Volpe is Professor of History in the University of Rome, and a leading Fascist apologist.

41. Lawrence Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 142-44. Dennis goes on to argue that this point of view will tend to reduce the use of force; but one may well question his argument.

43. This conclusion is sometimes denied by hedonists, who maintain that pleasure can occur even when it is not wanted. For

an effective reply to this objection, cf. Dewitt H. Parker, *Human Values*, Harper, New York, 1931, pp. 26-28.

44. Harold J. Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice*, Viking Press, New York, 1935, p. 81.

45. Quoted by George Herbert Palmer, *The Field of Ethics*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1901, p. 212.

46. Pareto, Vol. I, p. 312.

47. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 888-89.

48. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Knopf, New York, 1928, Vol. II, p. 368. Quoted by James Drennan, *B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism*, 1934, p. 183.

49. Camillo Pellizi, *Fascismo Aristocrazia*, Alpes, Milan, 1925, pp. 46-48. Reproduced by Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, 1928, p. 241.

50. Santayana, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

51. Harold Loeb, *Production for Use*, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1936, p. 17. (This survey is described more fully in Harold Loeb and associates, *The Chart of Plenty*, Viking Press, New York, 1935.)

52. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

53. G. V. Hamilton, *An Introduction to Objective Psychopathology*, Mosby, St. Louis, 1925, p. 287.

54. William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 5 vols., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1918-20. A shorter exposition of the theory of the wishes is to be found in Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1923.

55. John Dewey, "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXI, p. 350.

56. Plato, *Meno* (Jowett's translation), # 86.

CHAPTER IV

1. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 4.

2. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 1936, pp. 200-201.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 371.

4. Cf. Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, Macmillan, London, 1922, Chap. III. I am indebted to Sidgwick in the foregoing discussion.

5. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1896, p. 581.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 472.
7. F. C. Sharp, *Ethics*, Century Co., New York, pp. 109, 140-41. Prof. Sharp's excellent discussion of right coincides with the point of view advanced in the present chapter.
8. Lord Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions*, *Times*, 5th ed., 1732, Vol. II, p. 33. Quoted by Sharp, *op. cit.*, p. 351.
9. *New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1938.
10. Rosenberg, *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, p. 380.
11. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. 687.
12. Otto Koellreutter, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Staatslehre*, Tübingen, 1932, p. 230. Quoted by Lawrence Preuss, "National Socialist Conceptions of International Law," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXIX, p. 598 (Aug., 1935). This article by Prof. Preuss contains additional evidence of nationalistic bias on the part of the Nazis.
13. *Popolo d'Italia*, Feb. 1, 1921. Reproduced in Herbert W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, 1928, p. 275.
14. Quoted by Wilbur Forrest, *New York Herald Tribune*, Jan. 26, 1926.
15. Quoted by Willard Price, "Japan's Divine Mission," *New Republic*, Nov. 17, 1937, p. 40.
16. Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Hanseatische Verlags-Anstalt, Hamburg, 1933, p. 7.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 35-36.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
19. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. 740.
20. *Documents on International Affairs: 1930*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1931, p. 116.
21. Speech by Mussolini at Milan, Nov. 1, 1936. *Documents on International Affairs: 1936*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1937, p. 344.
22. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 28, 1938.
23. Emil Ludwig, *Talks with Mussolini*, 1933, pp. 69-70.
24. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 14, 1938.
25. Cf. *ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1938, p. 103.
26. Quoted by Hermann F. Reissig, *Adolph Hitler and Francisco Franco* (pamphlet), New York, 1939, p. 7.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 3. Quoted from a dispatch of Dec. 10, 1938, to the *New York Times*.
28. *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, Nov., 1937.
29. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 1935, p. 697.
30. Carl Schmitt, *Staat, Bewegung, Volk*, Hanseatische Verlags-Anstalt, Hamburg, 1933, p. 45.
31. *New York Times*, Sept. 10, 1937.
32. *News in Brief*, Sept. 22, 1937, pp. 154-55. This publication is issued in Berlin for the benefit of foreign journalists. Hence the present translation is Nazi in origin.
33. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 12, 1937.
34. Reproduced by Frieda Wunderlich, "*Deutsch-Mann über Alles*," *American Scholar*, Winter 1938, p. 101.
35. The entire letter, from which I quote, is reproduced in the Appendix to Henri Lichtenberger, *The Third Reich*, Grey-stone Press, New York, 1937, pp. 319-25. A good article summarizing the legal methods of ruining and persecuting the Jews, is Curt L. Heymann, "German Laws Against the Jews," *Current History*, March, 1938.
36. *New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1939.
37. Arthur de Gobineau, *The Inequality of Human Races*, Heinemann, London, 1915, p. 210.
38. Published in Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Auswahl aus seinen Werken*, Ferdinand Hirt, Breslau, 1934, pp. 67-69. This book of selections, compiled by the Nazis, is gleaned from Chamberlain's various political writings.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
43. Chamberlain, *Politische Ideale*, F. Brückmann, Munich, 1916, p. 88.
44. Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-2.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
50. Rosenberg, *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, p. 156.
51. See note 18 to Chap. I.
52. For a criticism of the Aryan Myth and related doctrines,

consult J. B. S. Haldane, *Heredity and Politics*, New York, 1938; F. H. Hankins, *Racial Basis of Civilization*, N.Y., 1926; Jacques Barzun, *Race: A Study of Modern Superstition*, N.Y., 1937; Otto Klineberg, *Race Differences*, N.Y., 1935; A. C. Haddon and Julian Huxley, *We Europeans: A Survey of Racial Problems*, N.Y., 1936; Margaret Schlauch, *Who Are the Aryans?* N.Y., no date; Paul Radin, *The Racial Myth*, N.Y., 1932; Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*, N.Y., 1928; Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, new ed., N.Y., 1938; and Boas, *Aryans and Non-Aryans*, N.Y., 1934.

53. Speech before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, quoted in the *New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1937.

54. Franz Boas, *Aryans and Non-Aryans* (pamphlet), 1934.

55. T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1931.

56. Karl Pearson, "On Our Present Knowledge of the Relationship of Mind and Body," *Annals of Eugenics*, Vol. I, pp. 382-406 (1925-26).

57. Cf. Franz Boas, "Changes in the Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XIV, pp. 530-62 (1912).

58. For an excellent discussion of this question, cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1934, Vol. I, pp. 243 ff. W. F. Ogburn's famous book, *Social Change*, indicates that the development of culture occurs without much if any attendant biological alteration. A large number of standard works in anthropology assume the same point of view. Such works attack the prevalent idea that Negroes, for example, must be innately inferior because their culture is less highly developed.

59. *Mein Kampf*, pp. 437-38.

60. Frieda Wunderlich, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

61. *New York Times*, April 18, 1934.

62. *Mein Kampf*, pp. 459-60.

63. Quoted by Stephen H. Roberts, *The House That Hitler Built*, Methuen, London, 1937, p. 229.

64. Cf. Wunderlich, *op. cit.*; and Edward Y. Hartshorne, *German Universities and National Socialism*, 1937, p. 74.

65. Cf. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 13, 1939, p. 30.

66. These quotations from Rosenberg appear in his *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 1935, pp. 482-83, 485, 495-96, 503; and his *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, pp. 220, 223.

67. Emil Ludwig, *Talks with Mussolini*, 1933, pp. 112, 170.
68. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 14, 1938.
69. Cited by Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 230.
70. *Schwarze Corps*, No. 42; quoted in "Kulturkampf," *News Bulletin of the Religious Policy of the Third Reich*, London, Dec. 11, 1937.
71. Rosenberg, *Gestaltung der Idee*, 1937, p. 92.
72. Mussolini, Address to the General Assembly of the National Council of Corporations, quoted in *Source Book on European Governments*, 1937, p. III-75.
73. Oswald Mosley, *Fascism: 100 Questions Asked and Answered*, B.U.F. Publications, Ltd., London, 1936, question 8.
74. Cf. Lawrence Dennis, *The Coming American Fascism*, 1936.
75. Carl T. Schmidt, *The Plough and the Sword*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1938, p. 173. Dr. Paul H. Douglas of the University of Chicago, another authority on economic conditions in Italy, reviewing Dr. Schmidt's book in the *New Republic*, July 13, 1938 (p. 287), declares that "Schmidt's analysis gives every evidence of being accurate and truthful, and it agrees with virtually all the information that I have been able to gather."
76. Cf. Gaetano Salvemini, *Italian Fascism*, Gollancz, London, 1938.
77. Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 168. For a summary of Nazi literature indicative of class bias and opposition to workers' rights, see Aurel Kolnai, *The War Against the West*, Viking Press, New York, 1938, Chap. VII and, indeed, much of the book.
78. Margaret Mead, "Primitive Society," in Findlay Mackenzie (editor), *Planned Society: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1937, pp. 23-24. Dr. Mead is an assistant curator of ethnology at the American Museum of Natural History and a well known anthropologist.
79. Quoted by Nathaniel Cantor, "Prison Reform in Germany—1933," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XXV, p. 88 (May-June, 1934).
80. Communication to *New Republic*, Aug. 7, 1935, p. 365.
81. Cf. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 28, 1938.
82. Quoted by Lawrence Preuss, "The Position of Aliens in National Socialist Penal Law Reform," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 209-10 (1935).

83. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Aug. 23, 1935.
84. Heinrich Gerland, *Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung*, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 860 (1933). Quoted by Lawrence Preuss, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
85. *New York Times*, May 19, 1934.
86. On the subject of Nazi justice and terror, cf. Karl Billinger, *Fatherland*, New York, 1935; Heinz Liepmann, *Murder Made in Germany*, New York, 1934; C. Michaelis, H. Michaelis, and O. W. Sonin, *Die Braune Kultur*, Zurich, 1934; *Yellow Spot*, London, 1936 (on maltreatment of Jews); Stefan Lorant, *I Was Hitler's Prisoner*, London, 1935; World Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, *The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror*, New York, 1933; Stephen H. Roberts, *op. cit.*, Chap. IX; and the articles by Lawrence Preuss, listed in the adjoining notes.
87. Hellmut Nicolai, *Die Rassengesetzliche Rechtslehre*, Vol. XXXIX, p. 27 (1932). Quoted by Lawrence Preuss, "Germanic Law Versus Roman Law in National Socialist Legal Theory," *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, Nov., 1934, p. 272.
88. *Westdeutsche Beobachter*, May 10, 1938; reproduced in "Kulturkampf," May 23, 1938.
89. Howard League for Penal Reform, *The Accused: An International Survey*, Geneva, 1937.
90. Hermann Göring, *Germany Reborn*, 1934, pp. 124-25.
91. *Nature*, April 24, 1937, p. 703.
92. Cf. *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. XIII, p. 851 (April 3, 1937).
93. Quoted by Nathaniel Cantor, "The New Prison Program of Italy," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XXVI, p. 220 (July, 1935).
94. Giulio Battaglini, "The Fascist Reform of the Penal Law in Italy," *Jour. of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XXIV, p. 252 (May-June, 1933).
95. Cf. M. E. Tracy, *Our Country, Our People, and Theirs*, Macmillan, New York, 1938, pp. 110-18 (statistics cited are from Tracy); Salvemini, *op. cit.*, Chap. I; and Nathaniel Cantor, "The Fascist Political Prisoners," *Jour. of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 169-79 (July-Aug., 1936).
96. Unamuno's statement was transmitted to Paris and there published. The present translation is quoted by Nancy Bedford

Jones, *Students Under Arms: Education in Republican Spain* (pamphlet), New York, 1938, p. 11.

97. Cf. Ruiz Vilaplana, *Burgos Justice*, Knopf, New York, 1938.

98. Cf. the article by Lawrence Fernsworth, *New York Times*, June 12, 1938; *New Republic*, June 22, 1938, pp. 170-71; *Foreign Policy Reports*, Jan. 16, 1937, pp. 262-63; and the very important book by Georges Bernanos, *Les Grands Cimetières sous la Lune*, Paris, 1938. Bernanos, like Unamuno, is a great Catholic intellectual and man of letters.

99. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Sept. 24, 1937.

100. Quoted by F. L. Schuman, *The Nazi Dictatorship*, 1935, p. 165.

101. Cf. note 84 to Chap. V.

102. From a MS. which, at the present writing, is unpublished.

103. Julien Benda, *The Great Betrayal*, 1928, p. 137.

CHAPTER V

1. Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, Macmillan, New York, 1933, p. 105.

2. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, 1937, Vol. III, p. 342 (Sorokin's italics).

3. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

5. Quoted in *Catholic World*, June, 1937, p. 257.

6. A full account of the circumstances of this murder, and a briefer account of others of a similar nature, may be found in Gaetano Salvemini, *The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy*, Henry Holt, New York, 1927.

7. The number killed (without trial) has been variously estimated. The *Manchester Guardian* claimed to know 282. Kurt Ludecke estimated that there were over five hundred Nazis killed (*I Knew Hitler*, Scribner, New York, 1937). Frederick L. Schuman, basing his estimate upon "confidential but probably reliable sources," gives the number of "1,186 persons murdered on 'Bloody Sunday' and during the week which followed" (*The Nazi Dictatorship*, Knopf, New York, 1935, p. 443). A similar estimate is given by Wickham Steed, *New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 28, 1937, p. 1. Hitler, commenting on this "blood purge" in

the Reichstag, stated: "If anyone should ask why we did not have these men tried in the usual manner by the courts of justice, I can only say that in that hour I was responsible for the fate of the German nation, and thus *I myself* embodied the supreme legal authority." (Konrad Heiden, *A History of National Socialism*, Knopf, New York, 1935, pp. 426-27).

8. There has been a great deal of dispute as to the circumstances of the Kirov murder and of subsequent acts of violence in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government maintains that a large band of conspirators, linked primarily to Leon Trotsky and the governments of Germany and Japan, have engaged in many acts of espionage, sabotage, and murder, and have plotted a great many additional acts of violence in an attempt to overthrow and destroy the existing regime. These "wreckers" are charged with having deliberately organized at least fifteen major train wrecks, and 1,500 minor ones, involving a considerable loss of life; and with many other criminal acts. In the Kemerovo mines, ventilation tubes were shut off, killing ten miners and wounding fourteen others; etc. Much of the evidence is revealed in the verbatim *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre*, published in English by the People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1937; and in similar proceedings reporting the trial of Bukharin and his "rightist" co-plotters, published in 1938. During the trials recorded in these reports, Pyatakov, Radek, Bukharin, and their fellow "conspirators," confessed to many terrorist plans and acts which involved the cooperation of German, Japanese, and other foreign agents, and of many Russians not then on trial. Trotsky, Dewey, and others have charged that these confessions are spurious and have been secured by torture and threats. (See the report by John Dewey and his associates, *Not Guilty*, Harper, New York, 1938.) On the other hand, D. M. Pritt, famous British lawyer and Member of Parliament, who was present at the earlier trial, is convinced that the evidence is genuine; and the same may be said of Walter Duranty, *New York Times* correspondent (see his preface to the 1937 edition of his book, *I Write As I Please*). The article by the American engineer, John Littlepage, in the *Saturday Evening Post*, Jan. 1, 1938, maintains, upon the basis of personal observation, that most of the men executed in the purges were "guilty as charged." Another article worth reading is Wickham Steed, "The Crisis in Russia: The Long View," *Atlantic Monthly*,

Aug., 1937, pp. 163-73. See also the comments by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, rev. ed., Scribner, New York, 1938.

9. Cf. note 39 to Chap. II.

10. Emil Ludwig, *Talks with Mussolini*, 1933, p. 51. A similar statement is made in Sarfatti's biography.

11. *Gerarchia*, April, 1924. Selections are reprinted in Sarfatti, *The Life of Benito Mussolini*, 1925; present passage, p. 129. (Sarfatti gives the date as May, 1924; but the date is given as April, 1924, in Mussolini's collected writings and discourses—see note 16 below.)

12. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-32.

14. *The Prince* (transl. W. K. Marriott), Dutton, New York, 1908, Chap. XVII, pp. 134-35.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

16. "Preludio al Machiavelli," *Gerarchia*, April, 1924. Mussolini, *Scritti e Discorsi*, Ulrici Hoeple Editore, Milan, 1934, pp. 108-9.

17. Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics*, Macmillan, New York, 1916, p. 598. Cf. S. K. Padover, "Treitschke: Forerunner of Hitlerism," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. IV, pp. 161-70 (June, 1935).

18. Essay published in *Il Pensiero Romagnola*, Romagna, 1908; excerpts and summary in Sarfatti, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-43, and Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making*, 1938, pp. 138-40.

19. Alfred Rosenberg, *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, p. 297; and *Gestaltung der Idee*, 1937, p. 18.

20. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Macmillan, New York, 1916, p. 63. This cult of cruelty finds a disciple in Barrès; cf. his *Du Sang, de la Volupté et de la Mort*. For Spengler's rapturous description of the joy of plunging a knife into an enemy, cf. note 60 to Chap. IX.

21. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Macmillan, 1910, Vol. II, p. 311.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

24. Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, Macmillan, New York, 1924, p. 91.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 40, 41. There is no justification in anthropology for Nietzsche's myth of a primitive regime of force.

Kropotkin's emphasis upon mutual aid, rather than violence, is at least as close to the truth. See in this connection such books as Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, and B. Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*.

26. Sorel declares that these passages from Nietzsche apply particularly to the "Homeric heroes," and then adds: "It is quite evident that liberty would be seriously compromised if men came to regard the Homeric values as suitable only to barbaric peoples" (*Reflections on Violence*, 1912, p. 273).

27. Gaudens Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making*, 1938, p. 242. Although Sorel has been a major influence upon Italian Fascism, he seems to have had little effect in Germany. In 1926, Carl Schmitt, an important political theorist, wrote that Sorel was "scarcely known" in Germany. But Schmitt, who has had some influence upon German Fascism, agrees with Wyndham Lewis (*The Art of Being Ruled*, p. 128) that "George Sorel is the key to all contemporary political thought." (Carl Schmitt, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus*, Munich, 1926, p. 78).

28. Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, p. 295.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 246-47, 243.

30. Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, 1935, Vol. IV, pp. 1534-35.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 1532.

32. Herbert W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, 1928, pp. 261-62, 265. Selections from Marinetti are reproduced in the Appendix, Part I, of Schneider's book.

33. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," 1935, p. 7.

34. Speech before the Chamber of Deputies, May 26, 1934; quoted by Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy*, 1935, p. 175.

35. Associated Press dispatch, Aug. 11, 1937.

36. Speech of May 5, 1936. *The Times* (London), May 6, 1936.

37. Speech of October 24, 1936. *Current History*, Jan., 1937, p. 35.

38. Speech at Milan, Oct. 4, 1922. Cf. Volpe, *History of the Fascist Movement* (no date), pp. 103-4.

39. *Popolo d'Italia*, April 19, 1921. Quoted by Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

40. Speech to the Department of Finance, March 7, 1921. In Odon Por, *Fascism*, transl. E. Townshend, Knopf, New York, 1923, p. 148.

41. Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making*, 1938, p. 323.
42. Cited by Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs: 1933*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1934, p. 149.
43. Hermann Göring, *Germany Reborn*, 1934, p. 67.
44. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 1936, p. 173.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
48. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 714-15.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 653.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 766-67. Cf. p. 699, where Hitler declares that "the inexorable mortal enemy of the German people is and will always be France," and p. 757, where he states that "no sacrifice shall be unbearable if the result affords only the possibility of a destruction of our greatest enemy." The context clearly indicates that "the greatest enemy" is France.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 742.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 315-16.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 689.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 749.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
56. Quoted in R. B. Mowat, *Europe in Crisis*, Arrowsmith, Bristol, 1936, p. 22.
57. *Documents on International Affairs: 1936*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1937, p. 21.
58. Approved translation, M. Müller & Sohn, Berlin, 1936.
59. *New York Times*, Oct. 4, 1938.
60. Hitler, *My Battle* (English translation), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1933, p. 271. Cf. the following statement attributed to Hitler by a former confidant: "Never antagonize potential enemies. Attack them only when you can destroy them" (Kurt G. W. Ludecke, *I Knew Hitler*, 1937, p. 59). Cf. also the statement of General Constantin Hierl, high Nazi officer, who declares that "sham pacificism" is useful in "lulling the opponent to sleep" while the country prepares for war (*Grundlagen einer deutschen Wehrpolitik*, National Socialist Library, No. 12, 1929, p. 16).
61. Cf. the German-Japanese Agreement on Communism signed at Berlin, Nov. 25, 1936. This states: "The competent authorities of both high contracting parties will, within the framework of existing laws, take strict measures against those who, at home or abroad, directly or indirectly, are active in the service of the

Communist Internationale or lend a helping hand to its disruptive work" (my italics). The treaty also states that the contracting parties are "convinced that to tolerate the Communist Internationale's interference with the internal affairs of nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being but threatens world peace at large." "Third parties" are asked to join in the agreement, and Italy, Hungary and Spain have since done so. How very loosely the terms of this treaty are apt to be interpreted is indicated by the intervention of Italy and Germany in the Spanish war, which has been depicted as a war against Communism. Yet at the time this intervention began the Communists held only 16 out of 473 seats in the Spanish Cortes, there was not a single Socialist or Communist in the Cabinet, and Azana, the President, was a moderate Republican.

62. Quoted in *Current History*, Jan., 1937, p. 35.

63. Alfred Rosenberg, *Gestaltung der Idee*, 1937, p. 363. Rosenberg apparently has in mind the famous aphorism of Heraclitus, "War is the father of all and the king of all."

64. R. Walther Darré, *Neuadel aus Blut und Boden*, 1930, p. 222.

65. Werner Haverbeck, "Aufbruch der jungen Nation," *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, Heft 35, p. 81. Quoted by Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, 1937, p. 189.

66. For an exposition in English of Ludendorff's theory, cf. Liddell Hart, *Europe in Arms*, Random House, New York, 1937, Chap. XVI.

67. Ewald Banse, *Germany Prepares for War*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1934, p. xx. An interesting account of Professor Banse's position and influence in Germany is contained in the publisher's preface to this volume. The record indicates that the German Government desires to avoid suspicion abroad while retaining extreme militarists such as Banse in positions of responsibility. Cf. Aurel Kolnai, *The War Against the West*, 1938, pp. 411, 424 ff., 639 ff.

68. Oswald Spengler, *Politische Schriften*, C. H. Beck, Munich and Berlin, 1934, p. 129.

69. R. Walther Darré, *Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse*, J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, Munich, 1929, p. 435.

70. Rosenberg, *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, p. 72.

71. Henri Lichtenberger, *The Third Reich*, 1937, p. 282. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, in

a foreword to this book, declares: "It is safe to say that nowhere else will the English-speaking peoples find a more accurate, a more comprehensive or a more just examination and interpretation of the Germany of today."

72. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 25, 1937. The Italians, according to this article, admit that as many as 3,000 natives were thus massacred, and others put the number as high as 5,000. For evidence as to the extremely brutal methods employed by the Fascists in the conquest of Ethiopia, see Geoffrey T. Garratt, *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, 1938, Chap. VII.

73. For confirmation of this statement, cf. *New York Times*, April 28 and May 5, 1937; *New York Herald Tribune*, May 6 and May 13, 1937; and *London Times*, May 5, 1937. The evidence implicates German flyers beyond a peradventure of doubt.

74. Quotations in this paragraph are from George L. Steer, *New York Times* correspondent, writing in *London Mercury*, Aug., 1937.

75. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 7, 1937.

76. See *The Times* (London), May 5, 1937.

77. The news correspondent Jay Allen gives a vivid account of this massacre in the *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 30, 1936. Other similar mass executions have taken place at Granada, Seville, Saragossa, and elsewhere. As to such practices, see dispatch by Frank L. Kluckhohn, *New York Times*, October 11, 1936.

78. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 7, 1937.

79. Cf. Foreign Policy Association *Reports*, Vol. XII, Nos. 18, 20, and 21.

80. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Sept. 10, 1937.

81. Associated Press dispatch, Sept. 25, 1937.

82. A summary of this article is printed in the *New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1937.

83. Roosevelt's speech in Chicago, Oct. 5, 1937. These sentences are a "paraphrase of a recent author," but are advanced as the President's convictions. The author is James Hilton, and the passage paraphrased appears in *Lost Horizon*.

84. Rosenberg, *Gestaltung der Idee*, 1937, p. 43.

85. Gioacchino Volpe, *History of the Fascist Movement*, p. 105, quoting from Mussolini's speech at Milan, Oct. 4, 1922.

86. Liddell Hart, *Europe in Arms*, 1937; from the chap. on the Spanish War inserted in pamphlet form. Reprinted by courtesy of Random House, Inc.

87. Balbo, *Diario di 1922*, p. 19, quoted in Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy*, 1935, p. 140.
88. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 1935, p. 78.
89. Oswald Mosley, *The Greater Britain*, B.U.F. Publications, London, no date, pp. 28-29.
90. Salvemini, *Under the Axe of Fascism*, 1936, pp. 207, 210. Cf. L. Rosenstock-Franck, *L'Economie Corporative Fasciste en Doctrine et en Fait*, J. Gamber, Paris, 1934.
91. Published by Gollancz, London, 1938.
92. Associated Press dispatch from Tokyo, Oct. 7, 1937.
93. Associated Press dispatch, Oct. 6, 1937.
94. Curt. L. Heymann, "Germany's Colonies," *Current History*, Feb., 1937, p. 40.
95. Norman Angell, *Raw Materials, Population Pressure and War*, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1936, pp. 14-15. Mr. Angell presents an effective rebuttal to the argument of the "haves" and the "have-nots."
96. Cf. Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Macmillan, New York, 1928.
97. Ernst Wiechert, "The Poet and His Times," address delivered to students at the University of Munich, April 16, 1936. Its publication was forbidden by the authorities, and it was circulated through typewritten copies. It is printed in the Appendix to Henri Lichtenberger, *The Third Reich*. Wiechert has since been imprisoned for his criticism of the Nazi regime.

CHAPTER VI

1. Alexander Meiklejohn, *What Does America Mean?* W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1935, p. 25.
2. Harold J. Laski, "Democracy," article in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
3. Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, transl. by M. Campbell Smith, London, 1903, pp. 185, 195.
4. Speech by Mussolini at Berlin, Sept. 28, 1937. *News in Brief*, Oct. 5, 1937, p. 173.
5. *Mein Kampf*, p. 501.
6. Göring, *Germany Reborn*, 1934, pp. 37-38.
7. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," 1935, p. 16.

8. Cf. Hitler's address, "The Basis of Nationhood," at the Seventh National Socialist Congress, Nürnberg, Sept. 16, 1935, pub. by M. Müller & Sohn, Berlin, pp. 68-69.

9. Plato, *The Republic*, Book VIII, #548-549 (Jowett's transl.).

10. Mussolini, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 13.

11. Francesco Ercole, *Dal Nazionalismo al Fascismo*, Rome, 1928, p. 250. Cf. George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, Henry Holt, New York, 1937, p. 748: "To equate freedom with caprice, to condemn both as egoism, and to represent the pursuit of happiness as a mean desire for selfish advantages have been stock arguments with idealist hero-worshippers since the days of Thomas Carlyle."

12. *New York Times*, March 2, 1938.

13. Quoted by Julien Benda, "The Enemies of Democracy in France," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan., 1935, p. 289.

14. Benito Mussolini, *Reden* (ed. Dr. Max H. Meyer), K. F. Koehler, Leipzig, 1925, p. 232.

15. Hitler, addressing 50,000 "Hitler Youths" at Nürnberg, Sept., 1935. Quoted by Aurel Kolnai, *The War Against the West*, 1938, p. 321.

16. *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1937.

17. For an interesting discussion of the resemblance between Plato's Republic and the Nazi State, cf. R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, "Would Plato Have Approved of the National Socialist State?" *Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, April, 1938. Hoernlé is correct in noting similarities, but he fails adequately to note the differences and the closer parallelism between the Fascist and the Timocratic State.

18. Valerio Campogrande, *L'Ordinamento dello Stato Italiano Fascista*, Lattes, Turin, 1928, p. 6. Quoted in Herbert W. Schneider and Shepard B. Clough, *Making Fascists*, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1929, p. 101.

19. Göring, *Germany Reborn*, pp. 79-80. Cf. the following statement from the *Völkischer Beobachter*, Hitler's newspaper and the central organ of the National Socialist Party: "The head of the Party, the chief of the whole State administration, the supreme lord of justice, is the Führer, Adolf Hitler. What the Führer does is always right." This infallibility, the article declares, entails enormous legal consequences for every German "racial comrade," because it is the basis of German justice. (July 16, 1936; cf. *New York Times*, July 17, 1936, from which I quote.)

20. *Völkischer Beobachter*, Feb. 12, 1938. For further indica-

tion of the militaristic and "Spartan" character of German education, see the impressive series of quotations from official texts and decrees in *Education in Nazi Germany*, foreword by Norman Angell, Kulturkampf Association, London, 1938.

21. Quoted from the *Westdeutsche Beobachter*, in "Kulturkampf," Jan. 5, 1938.

22. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Nov. 19, 1937.

23. Liddell Hart, *Europe in Arms*, 1937, p. 48.

24. Sarfatti, *The Life of Benito Mussolini*, 1925, p. 327.

25. Quoted by Dr. Hellmut Fischer, *Das Eliteprincip des Faschismus*, H. & J. Lechte, Emsdetten, 1935, p. 26.

26. Cf. Mussolini, *My Autobiography*, 1928, p. 213. Although this "autobiography" was written by Richard Washburn Child, it received Mussolini's stamp of approval.

27. Hitler, *My Battle* (English transl.), 1933, p. 187.

28. On Italian labor organizations, cf. Gaetano Salvemini, *Under the Axe of Fascism*, 1936, and *Italian Fascism*, 1938; and on German Labor, Robert A. Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, 1937.

29. Cf. the letter from the Executive of the German Social Democratic Party (exiled), *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 29, 1937.

30. Cf. Harold D. Lasswell and Renzo Sereno, "Governmental and Party Leaders in Fascist Italy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 914-929 (Oct., 1937).

31. *Germany: The Last Four Years*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1937, pp. 74, 78. This book, based upon Nazi statistics and inside information, was prepared by a group of German economists, some of whom occupy high positions. For obvious reasons, the authors are anonymous.

32. Cf. Stephen H. Roberts, *The House That Hitler Built*, 1937, especially p. 101.

33. Hellmut Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

34. Lewis Mumford, *Men Must Act*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1939, p. 176.

35. Aurel Kolnai, *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 38.

36. Hermann Drahn, *Das Werk Stefan Georges*, 1925; quoted by Kolnai, *ibid.*, p. 185.

37. Mussolini, *My Autobiography*, p. 25. (See note 26 above.)

38. Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1896, p. 6.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
41. Le Bon. *The Psychology of Revolution*, Unwin, London, 1913, p. 325. (The argument of this book is similar to that of *The Crowd*.)
42. *The Crowd*, pp. 18-19. (Cf. Le Bon's *The Psychology of Socialism*, Macmillan, New York, 1899, a work which predicts utter ruin if democratic collectivism should be established.)
43. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
45. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77, 221.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
47. Mussolini, *Scritti e Discorsi dal 1932 al 1933*, Ulrici Hoeple, Milan, 1934, p. 226.
48. Cf. Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, p. 131; and *De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme*, Paris, 1928, pp. 1-2.
49. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1936, p. 122.
50. Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, 1935, Vol. IV, pp. 1569, 1573.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 1515.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 1692.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 1516.
54. Pareto, *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, 1926, Vol. I, p. 38.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
56. *The Mind and Society*, Vol. IV, p. 1472.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 1909 n., 1912.
58. *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, Vol. I, p. 96.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
60. Cf. Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (transl. of *Elementi di Scienza Politica*), McGraw-Hill, 1939, pp. 70-71. (As to Mosca's influence upon Fascism, cf. Peter M. Riccio, *On the Threshold of Fascism*, 1929, pp. 162-70.)
61. Cf. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, p. 190.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
63. Gaetano Mosca, "The Crisis in Parliamentarism and How It May Be Overcome," in *The Development of the Representative System in Our Time*, Interparliamentary Union, Geneva, 1928, pp. 75, 81.
64. Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, Hearst's In-

ternational Library, New York, 1916, p. 25. (Michels was formerly professor at Turin, more recently at the University of Perugia. He has written a number of critical but sympathetic studies of Fascism, in addition to his pre-Fascist work from which I quote.)

65. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 407-8.

66. From the beginning of the lecture, "The Hero As King," in Carlyle, *Heroes and Hero Worship*. As to Carlyle's Fascist inclinations, cf. Benjamin Evans Lippincott, *Victorian Critics of Democracy*, Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1938. The author points out (p. 48) that "editions of translated excerpts from Carlyle appeared in Italy from 1920 through 1922, and that 300,000 copies of selections were sold in Germany between 1926 and 1932. . . . Carlyle's lectures on heroes are prescribed reading in many schools in Germany."

67. Carlyle, "Characteristics," *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, Scribner, New York, 1900, p. 25.

68. Cf. the quotations from these and other American authors in Robert A. Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, 1937, and in the same author's "The Fascist Threat to Democracy," *Science and Society*, Spring, 1938. Many other such quotations can be culled from such right-wing periodicals as the *American Review* and the *American Mercury*.

69. Cf. Robert A. Brady, *op. cit.*, Chap. IV, for evidence that the Nazis identify born leadership with economic success.

70. For a critique of the assumption that "nature" takes precedence over "nurture" in determining human behavior and ability, see the article by Raymond Pearl, *American Mercury*, Nov., 1927; H. J. Muller, "The Dominance of Economics over Eugenics," *Scientific Monthly*, July, 1933; and J. B. S. Haldane, *Heredity and Politics*, Norton, New York, 1938. See also the speech by Julian Huxley before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, *New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1937. Prof. Huxley points out: "Several years ago a study was made of children of the underprivileged and their defects were attributed to the result of heredity. Later discovery was made of the effect of lack of vitamins in the diet, with the result that those very defects were found to be not at all hereditary, but that they could be wholly eliminated with milk and spinach."

71. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs: 1933*, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1934, p. 121.

72. See Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 1934, Vol. III, pp. 50-111, 150, 167-68.
73. Göring, *Germany Reborn*, 1934, pp. 23-24.
74. Bertrand Russell, "The Future of Democracy," *New Republic*, May 5, 1937, p. 381.
75. Benedetto Croce, "The Future of Democracy," *New Republic*, April 7, 1937, p. 255.

CHAPTER VII

1. The *De Monarchia of Dante Alighieri*, edited by Aurelia Henry, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1904, p. 45.
2. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning the True, Original, Extent and End of Civil Government*, Chap. IX, #124.
3. Edmund Burke, *Thoughts and Details on Scarcity*. Cf. Harold J. Laski's discussion of Burke in *The Rise of Liberalism*, Harper, New York, 1936, pp. 229-31. The interpretation of liberalism which is here very briefly summarized is developed in Laski's excellent book, to which I am indebted.
4. Quoted by Laski, *ibid.*, p. 253.
5. Sidney Webb, "Soviet Russia's New Deal," *Nation*, Nov. 21, 1936, p. 597.
6. Ludwig von Mises, *Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis*, Cape, London, 1936, pp. 398, 402.
7. Locke, *op. cit.*, Chap. V, #40.
8. Abraham Lincoln, *Complete Works*, ed. Nicolay and Hay, Century Co., New York, 1920, Vol. I, p. 92.
9. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, pp. 12-13.
10. Speech before the National Directory of the Fascist Party, April 7, 1926, in Mussolini, *Discorsi del 1926*, Alpes, Milan, 1927, p. 120.
11. Rosenberg, *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, pp. 180-81.
12. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Walter Scott, London, no date, p. 120.
13. Adam H. Müller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, ed. Jacob Baxa, Gustav Fischer, Jena, 1922, Vol. I, p. 182. (Original published in Berlin, 1809.)
14. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 147.
15. Müller, *Versuche einer neuen Theorie des Geldes*, ed.

Helene Reser, Gustav Fischer, Jena, 1922, pp. 10-11. (Original published in Leipzig and Altenburg, 1816.)

16. *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, Vol. I, pp. 66, 31.

17. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 26.

18. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 7.

19. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 80.

20. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 86.

21. Baxa's note to the above quotation (the notes are in Vol. II).

22. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation* (transl. R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnbull), Open Court, Chicago, 1922, pp. 84, 208.

23. Cf. Bertrand Russell, "The Revolt Against Reason," *Atlantic Monthly*, Feb., 1935, p. 226. The fact that Fichte makes German superiority depend upon language rather than upon biological characteristics, differentiates him from the Nazis.

24. Fichte, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-47.

25. Cf. the quotations from Fichte's *Principles of Natural Right* in F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, Columbia Univ., New York, 1910, pp. 20-23.

26. Cf. Fichte, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. J. H. Fichte, Berlin, 1845, Vol. VII, pp. 37-38; *Addresses to the German Nation*, p. 145; and *The Characteristics of the Present Age*, in *The Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, Trübner, London, 1889, Vol. II, p. 168.

27. Hitler's speech to the Labor Front at Nürnberg, Sept. 12, 1936, *New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1936.

28. Fichte, *Addresses*, p. 133. Cf. *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. VII, p. 46.

29. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (transl. S. W. Dyde), Bell, London, 1896, p. xxvii.

30. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, p. 55.

31. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (transl. J. Sibree), Colonial Press, New York, 1900, p. 39.

32. *Philosophy of Right*, p. 336.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

34. Article on Hegel in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

35. *Philosophy of Right*, p. 334. Cf. p. 331.

36. *Philosophy of History*, p. 38.

37. J. Macbride Sterrett (translator), *The Ethics of Hegel*, Ginn, Boston, 1893, p. 189.

38. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," p. 13. James Strachey Barnes, a pro-Fascist writer, has said: "The notion of the State as an end in itself forms no part whatever of orthodox Fascism" (*The Universal Aspects of Fascism*, Williams & Norgate, London, 1938, p. 95). If this is true, a number of Fascist declarations, including the present quotation from Mussolini, are very misleading. Compare Hegel's statement: "The State is the spirit, which abides in the world and there realizes itself consciously. . . . In thinking of freedom we must not take our departure from individuality or from the individual's self-consciousness, but from the essence of self-consciousness. Let man be aware of it or not, this essence realizes itself as an independent power, in which particular persons are only phases. The State is the march of God in the world; its ground or cause is the power of realizing itself as will." (*Philosophy of Right*, pp. 244-45.)
39. Cf. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 1936, pp. 421, 433-34.
40. Paul de Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften*, Dieterichsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Göttingen, 1892, p. 143.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 289.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 183-84.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 364.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
53. Heinrich von Treitschke, *Historische und politische Aufsätze*, S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1911, Vol. I, p. 124.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
55. Joseph Mazzini, *The Duties of Man and Other Essays*, Dutton, New York, p. 323.
56. *International Conciliation*, Oct., 1926, pp. 414-15.
57. *Ibid.*
58. Enrico Corradini, *La Riforma Politica in Europe*, Mondadori, Milan, 1929, p. 100.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-4.

60. Alfredo Rocco, "La Trasformazione dello Stato," *La Voce*, Rome, 1927; selection transl. by Herbert W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, 1927, pp. 328-29.

61. R. Walther Darré, *Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse*, 1929, p. 287.

62. Hans Gerber, *Staatsrechtliche Grundlinien des neuen Reiches*, Tübingen, 1933, p. 19. Cited in *Science and Society*, Winter, 1937, p. 222.

63. L. T. Hobhouse, *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, Macmillan, New York, 1918, p. 52. See also pp. 53-54.

64. Speech before the Senate, May 12, 1928. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, pp. 57-58.

65. Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-33.

66. Alfredo Rocco, "The Political Doctrine of Fascism," *International Conciliation*, Oct., 1926, pp. 402-3.

67. Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 1935, p. 2.

68. Cf. J. McT. Ellis McTaggart, *Philosophical Studies*, Longmans, Green, New York, 1934, p. 109: ". . . Whatever activity it is desirable for the State to have, it will only be desirable as a means, and . . . the State itself can have no value but as a means. And a religion which fastens itself on a means has not risen above fetish-worship. Compared with worship of the State, zoolatry is rational and dignified. A bull or a crocodile may not have great intrinsic value, but it has some, for it is a conscious being. The State has none. It would be as reasonable to worship a sewage pipe, which also possesses considerable value as a means." McTaggart's entire essay, from which I quote, is worth reading.

69. Hitler, "The Restoration of German Liberty," address at the Seventh National Socialist Congress, Nuremberg, Sept. 11, 1935 (transl. pub. by M. Müller & Sohn, Berlin, 1935), p. 15.

70. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, p. 63.

71. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, 1900, p. 21.

72. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 1896, p. 266.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

74. Roberto Farinacci, "Render unto Caesar" (transl. from *Regime Fascista*, Cremona Fascist daily), *Living Age*, Jan., 1939, p. 410.

75. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, p. 57; and "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," 1935, p. 15.

76. Rosenberg, *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, p. 246.
77. Hugh Quigley, "Fascism Fails Italy," *Current History*, June, 1934, pp. 258-59. This statement was made after twelve years of Fascist rule. The entire article is instructive.
78. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Nov. 12, 1937. The Italian author of this communication is anonymous, but he appears to have access to considerable information.
79. Otto Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1922, p. 10. (First ed., 1900.)

CHAPTER VIII

1. Plato, *Phaedrus* (transl. Lane Cooper), Oxford Univ. Press, 1938, p. 71.
2. Giovanni Gentile, *The Reform of Education*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1922, p. 107.
3. Cf. "Kulturkampf," June 24, 1938. To criticize these philosophical contentions would lead us into abstruse arguments, which would be out of place in an untechnical work such as the present.
4. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," 1935, pp. 8-9.
5. Hitler, *Reden*, ed. Ernst Boepple, Deutscher Volksverlag, Munich, 1934, p. 36.
6. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 1935, p. 15. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 23, and *Blut und Ehre*, p. 241.
7. James Drennan, *B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism*, 1934, p. 204.
8. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, 1900, p. 9.
9. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, p. 287.
10. Fichte, *The Vocation of Man*, transl. William Smith, London, 1838, Bk. III, Sec. 3. (Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1924, p. 516.)
11. Bolton King, *The Life of Mazzini*, Dutton, New York, 1912, p. 288.
12. Mazzini, *The Duties of Man and Other Essays*, 1907, p. 266.
13. Mussolini, *My Diary: 1915-17*, Small, Maynard, Boston, 1925, pp. 131-32.
14. Alfredo Oriani, *La Rivolta Ideale*, original ed., 1907, pp. 85-86.

15. Cf. Giovanni Gentile, *Origini e Dottrina del Fascismo*, Libreria del Littorio, Rome, 1929, from which the quoted phrases in the present paragraph are taken.

16. Gentile, "The Transcending of Time in History," in *Philosophy and History*, ed. Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936, opening sentence.

17. Gentile, *The Reform of Education*, 1922, pp. 29-93.

18. Cf. Gentile, *Che Cosa è il Fascismo*, Vallecchi, Florence, 1925, pp. 235-36.

19. London *Daily Telegraph*, Oct. 29, 1936.

20. Quoted in Lawrence Preuss, "National Socialist Conceptions of International Law," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXIX, p. 600 n. (Aug., 1935).

21. Quoted in "Memorial to Chancellor Hitler of Ten Confessional Leaders of the German Evangelical Church," *International Conciliation*, Nov., 1936.

22. Paul Goebbels, *Mjölnir* (Ehrer, Munich, 1931), quoted by Frederick L. Schuman, *The Nazi Dictatorship*, 1935, p. 315.

23. *Popolo d'Italia*, March 7, 1920. Reproduced in Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*, 1928, pp. 274-75. After attaining power and signing a treaty with the Pope, Mussolini has been, in general, less frank.

24. Speech of Nov. 15, 1933. *Source Book on European Governments*, 1937, p. III-68.

25. On the imprisonment of Catholics and Protestants, see *New York Times*, Dec. 2 and 12, 1937. In addition, even the highest Catholic dignitaries, such as Archbishop Sproll, Archbishop Gröber, Cardinal Innitzer, and Cardinal Faulhaber, have been subjected to insult and riotous anti-Catholic demonstrations.

26. Quoted by Waldemar Gurian, *Hitler and the Christians*, Sheed & Ward, New York, 1936, p. 97. This book, written by a Catholic, reviews the Nazi attacks upon both Protestants and Catholics.

27. Quoted in *The Church Struggle in Germany: A Survey of Four Critical Years*, by an "English Christian," with preface by the Bishop of Lichfield, Rt. Rev. E. S. Woods, D.D., Kulturkampf Association, London, 1937, p. 13.

28. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Nov. 19, 1937.

29. Cf. *Manchester Guardian*, April 23, 1937.

30. *New York Times*, April 20, 1938.

31. *News in Brief*, Dec. 31, 1937, p. 207.
32. "Memorial to Chancellor Hitler, etc.," *International Conciliation*, Nov., 1936.
33. Kerrl, Feb. 13, 1937. Quoted in *The Church Struggle in Germany*, 1937, p. 5.
34. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 15, 1938.
35. Speech by Dr. Ley, March 30, 1938. "Kulturkampf," April 15, 1938. For other statements of the same temper, see "Kulturkampf," Nov. 23, 1937, and "Memorial to Chancellor Hitler, etc.," 1936.
36. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 15, 1938.
37. *The Times* (London), July 29, 1936.
38. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 1935, pp. 514, 608.
39. Cf. Prof. Bergmann's "Catechism," Henri Lichtenberger, *The Third Reich*, 1937, Appendix.
40. "Kulturkampf," June 24, 1938.
41. Bergmann, *op. cit.*
42. Cf. George Seldes, *The Vatican: Yesterday—Today—Tomorrow*, Harper, New York, 1934, p. 384. Seldes gives a vivid account of the relation of the Pope to Italian and German Fascism. He indicates that there has been a very deep conflict, despite eventual collaboration, to a certain extent, with Mussolini and Hitler's ally, General Franco.
43. Cf. William Teeling, *Pope Pius XI and World Affairs*, Stokes, New York, 1937, p. 137. This book, written by a Catholic, formulates the attitude of those Catholics who dislike the Vatican compromises with Fascism.
44. Edgar DeWitt Jones, president of the Federal Council of Churches, and twelve other distinguished American clergymen, stated in a well documented report: "Religion is not being attacked in Spain. The people of Spain are not antireligious. The regretted and admitted burning of churches, etc., was occasioned because the particular churches attacked were being used as rebel forts and because the hierarchy—not, of course, the masses of the lower clergy, had permitted itself to be identified with reaction and oppression." (Pamphlet entitled *Spain*, New York, 1937, p. 23.)
45. The evidence seized at Barcelona is summarized in *The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain*, by an anonymous writer, published by Gollancz, London, 1937. Photographic reproductions of some of

the confiscated documents are included. Similar reports have appeared in the *Manchester Guardian*. Antonio Ruiz Vilaplana, the former dean of the College of Law Secretaries at Burgos, maintains that "it is the aid from Germany that has been the basic factor in the Spanish conflict," and that "it is a mistake to rate the importance of Italian intervention above the German." Certainly the importance of Nazi military supplies and technical aid has been very great. (Cf. Vilaplana's book, *Burgos Justice*, 1938, and *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 21, 1938, from which I quote.)

46. *New York Times*, May 10, 1938.

47. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 28, 1937.

48. The summary of a syllabus issued by the Vatican to the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities, published by Georges Goyau in the *Paris Figaro*; cf. "*Kulturkampf*," May 14, 1938.

49. Speech at Vatican City, July 29, 1938 (International News Service). Cf. *New York Times*, July 17 and 30, 1938. The Fascist racialist creed adopted in Italy is summarized in the *Times*, July 15, 1938.

50. In substantiation of the close alliance between Franco and the Fascist dictators, the following news dispatches may be cited: "The Spanish Fascist insurgents intend to establish a government similar to the Fascist regimes of Italy and Germany, Generalissimo Francisco Franco declared in reply to a questionnaire which I submitted to him during my visit to Spain to report the fall of Bilbao" (Webb Miller, *New York Herald Tribune*, July 15, 1937). "Chancellor Adolf Hitler today telegraphed his congratulations to Insurgent General Francisco Franco on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Spanish Civil War" (*New York Times*, July 17, 1938). "General Francisco Franco has telegraphed his congratulations to Adolf Hitler on the annexation of Austria" (*New York Times*, May 24, 1938). "Rebel Spain has honored Italy and Germany by awarding decorations to Field Marshal Hermann Göring, Germany's No. 2 Nazi, and Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister" (*Chicago Tribune*, July 18, 1938). Such news items could be indefinitely multiplied.

51. Alfred Mendizibal, *The Martyrdom of Spain*, Scribner, New York, 1938, pp. 14-15. Señor Mendizibal was formerly professor of the Philosophy of Law at the University of Oviedo, and

is secretary of the Spanish group of the Catholic Union of International Studies. This work, with its preface by Maritain, dissects from the Papal endorsement of Franco. An even more forthright book in condemning Franco is the sensational work, *Les Grands Cimitières sous la Lune*, by the great Catholic writer, Georges Bernanos (Paris, 1938). Here is a powerful indictment of the Rebels written by a Catholic of unquestionable prestige.

52. Giovanni Gentile, *The Reform of Education*, 1922, pp. 231-32.

53. Antonio Maraini, "Italian Art Under Fascism," *Studio*, Dec., 1936, p. 297.

54. All of the above quotations from Hitler's speech appear in *News in Brief*, Sept. 22, 1937, pp. 152-54.

55. Thomas Mann, *The Coming Victory of Democracy*, Knopf, New York, 1938, pp. 37-38. Mann's lecture is a noble statement of the democratic ideal in opposition to Fascism.

56. Cf. the book on Nazi art by M. E. Wernert, published by the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere, Paris, 1937. Upon the basis of a broad survey, Wernert concludes that art has suffered a very severe decline under Hitler. Cf. also V. F. Calverton, "The Cultural Barometer," *Current History*, April, 1937, pp. 91 ff.; and Dorothy Thompson, "Culture Under the Nazis," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1936.

57. Speech of Hitler before the Reichstag, March 23, 1933. James K. Pollock, "Documents on the Nazi Government of Germany," in *Source Book on European Governments*, 1937, p. IV-128.

58. Speech of Hitler at Munich, July 18, 1937. Universal News Service.

59. Cf. *New York Times*, April 16, 1933, Sec. 4.

60. *The Times* (London), June 5, 1934.

61. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 1935, p. 279.

62. Cf. Gonda Gore, "Art in Nazi Germany," *Fortnightly Review*, Aug., 1938, p. 214.

63. Statement as released by the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy.

64. James Drennan, *op. cit.*, p. 194. Cf. also pp. 198-99.

65. Mussolini, *L'Agricoltura e i rurali: Discorsi e Scritti*, Rome, 1931; quoted by Carl T. Schmidt, *The Plough and the Sword*, 1938, p. 42.

66. Hitler, quoted in *Der 3. Reichsbauerntag in Goslar*, Ber-

lin, 1935, p. 7 (reproduced in Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, 1937, p. 231).

67. R. Walther Darré, *Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse*, 1929, p. 50.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 300.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

71. Speech of March 23, 1933. *Source Book on European Governments*, 1937, p. IV-131.

72. Quoted by Carl T. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

73. G. Pesce, *Contadini d'Italia*, Bologna, 1926. Quoted by Schmidt, p. 138.

74. Professor Schmidt is a member of the Department of Economics of Columbia University. The study cited (*The Plough and the Sword*) is based on research under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council. Professor Roberts' discussion is in his book, *The House That Hitler Built*, 1937, pp. 189-98. As to the flight of peasants from the countryside to industrial areas, see *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1938. Darré estimates that since 1933 from 700,000 to 800,000 persons have forsaken the rural districts for the urban and industrial areas.

75. Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1938, p. 401.

CHAPTER IX

1. G. Lowes Dickinson, *A Modern Symposium*, Doubleday, Page, New York, copyright 1905, 1933, pp. 152-53.

2. *The Hour of Decision* (transl. Charles Francis Atkinson), Knopf, New York, 1934, p. ix.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

5. *Ibid.*, p. xii.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 186. "Caesarism," as here employed, involves a rather large dose of Spenglerian romanticism. It does not truly apply to men like Augustus and Marcus Aurelius.

9. Quoted by James Drennan, *B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism*, 1934, pp. 286-87.

10. Emil Ludwig, *Talks with Mussolini*, 1933, pp. 62, 216.
11. Drennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.
12. Speech by Hitler in Reichstag, May 21, 1935. Approved translation published by M. Müller & Sohn, Berlin, p. 48.
13. Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*, 1936, p. 55.
14. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, June 10, 1938.
15. Spengler, *Politische Schriften*, C. H. Beck, Munich and Berlin, 1934, pp. 202-4. This book is an important compilation of Spengler's speeches and writings on political subjects, including his *Preussentum und Sozialismus*.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
17. Cf. Johann von Leers, *Spenglers Weltpolitisches System und der Nationalsozialismus*, Junker & Dunnhaupt, Berlin, 1934.
18. Rosenberg, *Blut und Ehre*, 1936, p. 49. Cf. also pp. 403, 551, 673.
19. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 518.
20. *The Hour of Decision*, p. 193.
21. *The Decline of the West*, Knopf, New York, Vol. II, 1928, p. 363. (Vol. I appeared in translation in 1926, Vol. II in 1928; these volumes were first published in German in 1918 and 1922, respectively. Translations by Charles Francis Atkinson.)
22. *Politische Schriften*, p. 55.
23. *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 429. The term "race quality," as employed in this quotation, does not mean that Spengler shares the Nazi race prejudices. The English text is here slightly misleading. Perhaps the term "excellent breeding" would be more faithful to the German.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 353.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 17. Quoted with approval by Drennan, the British Fascist, *op. cit.*, p. 181. Cf. Spengler, *Politische Schriften*, p. 84: "We do not believe in the power of reason over life. . . . The logic of the spectacle of nature, the connection between cause and effect, seems to us superficial; only the logic of the organic, of fate, of instinct, which one feels and the almightiness of which one sees in the change of things, gives evidence of the depth of becoming."
27. Drennan, *op. cit.*, p. 180.
28. *Politische Schriften*, p. 105.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. vii-viii.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
32. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 45-46, 95-96.
33. *The Decline of the West*, Vol. II, p. 443.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 40. Incidentally, this passage implies a somewhat extreme depreciation of the art and architecture of Rome. Cf. Elie Faure, *The Spirit of the Forms*, Harper, New York, 1930, pp. 54-55.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
37. *Politische Schriften*, pp. 85-86.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
40. *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, p. 104.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
46. *Ibid.*, Appendix, Table III.
47. Spengler, *Man and Technics*, Knopf, New York, 1932, p. 104.
48. *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, p. 21.
49. Cf. Plato, *The Sophist*, #245-247.
50. Lewis Mumford, review of *The Decline of the West*, in *New Republic*, Vol. XLVI, p. 368, May 12, 1926.
51. Cf. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres après Aristotele*, Paris, 1908; Milhaud, *Les Philosophes-géomètres de la Grèce, Platon et ses prédécesseurs*, Paris, 1900; Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, Pt. I, London, 1928, pp. 312-24, and *Platonism*, Berkeley, 1929, Chaps. 2, 3, 5, 7; Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Work*, London and New York, 1929, Chap. 19. Burnet points out that Newton and Leibniz were actually influenced by this Greek mathematics in working out the differential calculus (*Greek Philosophy*, Pt. I, p. 322). Cf. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, pp. 62-67, for an interpretation in conflict with the above authorities.
52. Consider, for example, Goethe's remark: "The form of this world passes; and I would fain occupy myself with that only which constitutes abiding relation." (Quoted by John Addington Symonds, *Essays: Speculative and Suggestive*, Smith, Elder, London, 1907, p. 55.)

53. Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1934, p. 108.

54. Alfons Dopsch, *The Economic and Social Foundations of European Civilization*, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1937. Dopsch eruditely contends that there was no real break in continuity between Roman and early medieval civilization. He concludes: "Much which once seemed to be a new and deliberate creation is now seen, owing to our clearer knowledge of the period, never to have been lost at all, but to have persisted in those obscure, sparsely documented and twilight centuries of European cultural development. The later centuries did but complete and extend what had already been introduced and established in that earlier age" (p. 390).

55. Article on "Indian Art," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th Edition.

56. Virgil's dates are 70-19 B.C., and Lucretius' are 95-52 B.C. The period of decadence, according to Spengler, had set in more than two centuries before this time. As to Chinese and Japanese painting, cf. Laurence Binyon, *Painting in the Far East*, 3rd ed., London, 1923, p. 273; and Ernest F. Fenollosa, *Epochs of Chinese and Japanese Art*, London, 1912, Vol. II, Chaps. X and XI, especially p. 19. As late as the nineteenth century, Japan produced two painters of remarkable capacity, Hokusai and Hiroshige. Cf. Spengler, who believes that artistic decadence in Chinese culture (including Japanese), began as early as the Han period (A.D. 25). In deciding the truth of this matter, we must pit one man's opinion against another's; but at least Spengler's interpretation is not that of recognized authorities in the field. (For Spengler's chronology, see Table II, in Appendix to Vol. I of *The Decline of the West*.)

57. Cf. Mortimer J. Adler, "Spengler, the Spenglerites, and Spenglerism," *Psyche*, Vol. VIII, pp. 73-84 (July, 1927), and the excellent article by R. G. Collingwood, "Oswald Spengler and the Theory of Historical Cycles," *Antiquity*, Sept., 1927, pp. 311-25, for an indication of Spengler's unempirical and arbitrary methods. Also see the summary of Sorokin's and Toynbee's conclusions in the latter part of the present chapter.

58. Some critics would see in the pessimistic character of such literature an indication that our culture is drawing towards its close. But "Ecclesiastes" sounded the extreme note of futility at the beginning of a culture, and the "Dance of Death" theme

pervades the art and literature of the late Middle Ages, just before the awakening of the Renaissance.

59. *The Hour of Decision*, p. 21. Cf. *Man and Technics*, pp. 19 ff.

60. *Politische Schriften*, p. 147. Cf. *Man and Technics*, p. 43, in which Spengler speaks of "the intoxication of feeling when the knife pierces the hostile body, and the smell of blood and the sense of amazement strike together upon the exultant soul." Every "real man," Spengler asserts, feels these primitive impulses in contrast to "the toothless feeling of sympathy and reconciliation."

61. Cf. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 128: "It is not yet thirteen centuries since our Western Society emerged from the interregnum which followed the fall of the Roman Empire. The span of Egyptian history extends over at least four millennia." It is true, of course, that the period of maximum achievement in Egyptian culture was considerably shorter.

62. On the arbitrary way Spengler pieced together these elements, cf. Adler, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

63. J. Huizinga, *In the Shadow of Tomorrow*, 1936, p. 35.

64. M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928, Vol. II, p. 336.

65. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, E. Arnold & Co., London, 1924.

66. For a more extended attack upon such analogical arguments as those of Spengler, cf. Charles A. Beard, "The Collapse of Historical Theories Based on Analogies," in *The Discussion of Human Affairs*, Macmillan, 1936.

67. Johan Huizinga, *Wege der Kulturgeschichte*, Drei Masken Verlag, Munich, 1930, pp. 57-58.

68. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, American Book Co., New York, 1937, Vol. III, pp. 537-38. Used by permission of the publisher.

69. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 186.

70. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 538.

71. Toynbee's *A Study of History* is being published by the Oxford University Press. The first three volumes were issued in 1934, and others are to follow.

72. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 103. But as indication that Toynbee retains hope that the decline of Western society can be stopped, see p. 242 n.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
74. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 15.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
76. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 378 n.
77. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 284.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 336. The term "proletariat," as employed in this quotation, means not just an urban laboring population under modern industrialism, but any disinherited class or group whose interests are opposed to those of the dominant minority. In relation to our own culture, the "internal proletariat" would presumably be the poor and downtrodden within the Western countries, and the "external proletariat" would be the colonial and "backward" peoples, rising as in India and China against their foreign exploiters.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
80. See Vol. IV and the first part of Vol. III. Although at the present writing, Vol. IV has not been published, Toynbee indicates what is to be its theme.
81. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs: 1933*, p. 115. My italics.
82. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. III, pp. 241-42.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
84. *Arbeit und Rhythmus*, Leipzig, 1924. Quoted by Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, 1934, p. 344.
85. Quoted by Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, 1924, p. 24.

CHAPTER X

1. Thomas Hardy, *The Dynasts*, Macmillan, London, 1923, p. 444.
2. Published in London by Gollancz and in New York by Viking Press, 1938.
3. See especially the reports of the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee. The Committee found that "industrial espionage was . . . a common, almost universal, practice in American industry," and that brutal strike breaking and industrial munitioning were of shocking frequency. The Committee points out that "these are the methods, not of criminals and sadists, but of employers high in the esteem of the Nation, possessing wealth and power

over millions of men and women; and that these practices are not sporadic excesses of mismanagement, but rather the chosen instruments of a deliberate design to thwart the concrete expression of the right of collective action by individual workers who, without that right, have no rights." *Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor*, Report of the Committee on Education and Labor Pursuant to S. Res. 266, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1937, p. 7.

4. For a review of the British foreign policy, revealing its pro-Fascist trend, cf. Geoffrey T. Garratt, *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1938. Mr. Garratt was formerly correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* and has seen a great deal of international affairs. No one who reads his book can doubt that democracy has been repeatedly and cynically betrayed by the British Tory Government.

5. Cf. *Bulletin of International News*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Aug. 1, 1936, p. 6. Compare the following statement by the impartial Foreign Policy Association: "The Spanish Civil War was not provoked by Communists, either in Spain or Moscow. . . . The program of the Spanish Popular Front government, against which the army rebelled, called for liberal rather than radical reforms." *Foreign Policy Reports*, Jan. 1, 1937, p. 256.

6. Mr. Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, has repeatedly advocated the maintenance and strengthening of American democracy. He has declared: "The Communist Party opposes with all its power, and will help to crush by all proper democratic means, any clique, group, circle, faction, or party which conspires or acts to subvert, undermine, weaken, or overthrow, any or all institutions of American democracy whereby the majority of the American people have obtained power to determine, in any degree, their own destiny" (statement made in Madison Square Garden, New York, May 4, 1938). The Communists, of course, are convinced that a complete democracy will require a socialization of industry, but they do not advocate Socialism as an immediate objective, and they declare themselves opposed to undemocratic, forcible methods of effecting the change. Mr. Browder has written: "The Communist Party repudiates now as in the past, all theories or proposals looking toward the forcible imposition of Socialism upon the majority of the people. We repudiate the 'reckless re-

solve to seize power' by any minority." (Browder, *The Democratic Front*, International Publishers, New York, 1938, p. 239.)

7. For a criticism of this contention, see the latter part of Chap. V in the present volume, and especially Norman Angell, *Raw Materials, Population Pressure and War*, World Peace Foundation, New York, 1936.

8. Kolnai, *The War Against the West*, 1938, pp. 677-78.

9. Speech before the National Education Association, *New York Times*, July 1, 1938.

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